Romain Bapst v Drift Pty Ltd ATF Drift Brookwater Unit Trust T/A Drift Brookwater
[2014] FWC 2455
•14 APRIL 2014
[2014] FWC 2455 |
FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal
Romain Bapst
v
Drift Pty Ltd ATF Drift Brookwater Unit Trust T/A Drift Brookwater
(U2013/232)
DEPUTY PRESIDENT GOOLEY | MELBOURNE, 14 APRIL 2014 |
Application for relief from unfair dismissal - liquidation - application stayed
[1] On 29 January 2013, Mr Romain Bapst made an application for remedy for unfair dismissal under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). Mr Bapst’s employment was terminated by Drift Pty Ltd ATF Drift Brookwater Unit Trust T/A Drift Brookwater (Drift Pty Ltd) on 8 January 2013.
[2] On 12 February 2013, Drift Pty Ltd filed their response to the application.
[3] The matter was subject of conciliation however, it was not resolved. Directions were issued and the matter was listed for hearing.
[4] On 26 March 2013, the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) received correspondence advising that Drift Pty Ltd was in liquidation.
[5] On 5 April 2013, Mr Adam Ward of Worrells Solvency & Forensic Accountants advised the Commission that the creditors passed a resolution to voluntarily wind up the company and that he had been appointed liquidator. He provided the Commission with a copy of the Statement Of Resolution By Members.
[6] On 10 April 2014, a letter was forwarded to Mr Bapst advising that creditors had passed a resolution to voluntarily wind up the company and had appointed a liquidator. The letter referred Mr Bapst to section 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (the Corporations Act).
[7] Section 500(2) of the Corporations Act provides as follows:
(2) After the passing of the resolution for voluntary winding up, no action or other civil proceeding is to be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court imposes.
[8] Section 58AA of the Corporations Act provides the following definition in relation to the meaning of “court” and “Court”:
“58AA Meaning of court and Court
(1) Subject to subsection (2), in this Act:
“court” means any court.
“Court” means any of the following courts:
(a) the Federal Court;
(b) the Supreme Court of a State or Territory;
(c) the Family Court of Australia;
(d) a court to which section 41 of the Family Law Act 1975 applies because of a Proclamation made under subsection 41(2) of that Act.
(2) Except where there is a clear expression of a contrary intention (for example, by use of the expression “the Court”), proceedings in relation to a matter under this Act may, subject to Part 9.7, be brought in any court.
Note: The matters dealt with in Part 9.7 include the applicability of limits on the jurisdictional competence of courts.”
[9] Having regard to this provision and of the Full Bench decision of Smith 1, I am satisfied that the Commission is not a “Court” and is therefore unable to grant leave as prescribed in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act.
[10] In Silalahi v CMI Industrial (Forge) 2, the then Commissioner Jones considered relevant authorities and found that an application pursuant to s.394 of the Act falls within the meaning of “civil proceedings” in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act.
[11] As noted earlier, Mr Bapst’s application pursuant to s.394 of the Act was filed on 29 January 2013 and the passing of the resolution for winding up occurred on 25 March 2013.
[12] Taking into account the provisions set out in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act, I am satisfied that Mr Bapst’s application cannot proceed any further in the Commission except by leave of the Court.
[13] Therefore, Mr Bapst’s application under s.394 of the Act is stayed until leave of the Court is granted.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
<Price code A, PR549610>
1 Smith & Ors v Trollop Silverwood & Beck Pty Ltd (2003) 142 IR 137
2 [2012] FWA 7275 at [11] - [16]
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