Romain Bapst v Drift Pty Ltd ATF Drift Brookwater Unit Trust T/A Drift Brookwater

[2014] FWC 2455

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Romain Bapst
v
Drift Pty Ltd ATF Drift Brookwater Unit Trust T/A Drift Brookwater
(U2013/232)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT GOOLEY

MELBOURNE, 14 APRIL 2014

Application for relief from unfair dismissal - liquidation - application stayed

[1] On 29 January 2013, Mr Romain Bapst made an application for remedy for unfair dismissal under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). Mr Bapst’s employment was terminated by Drift Pty Ltd ATF Drift Brookwater Unit Trust T/A Drift Brookwater (Drift Pty Ltd) on 8 January 2013.

[2] On 12 February 2013, Drift Pty Ltd filed their response to the application.

[3] The matter was subject of conciliation however, it was not resolved. Directions were issued and the matter was listed for hearing.

[4] On 26 March 2013, the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) received correspondence advising that Drift Pty Ltd was in liquidation.

[5] On 5 April 2013, Mr Adam Ward of Worrells Solvency & Forensic Accountants advised the Commission that the creditors passed a resolution to voluntarily wind up the company and that he had been appointed liquidator. He provided the Commission with a copy of the Statement Of Resolution By Members.

[6] On 10 April 2014, a letter was forwarded to Mr Bapst advising that creditors had passed a resolution to voluntarily wind up the company and had appointed a liquidator. The letter referred Mr Bapst to section 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (the Corporations Act).

[7] Section 500(2) of the Corporations Act provides as follows:

(2) After the passing of the resolution for voluntary winding up, no action or other civil proceeding is to be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court imposes.

[8] Section 58AA of the Corporations Act provides the following definition in relation to the meaning of “court” and “Court”:

“58AA Meaning of court and Court

(1) Subject to subsection (2), in this Act:

“court” means any court.

“Court” means any of the following courts:

(a) the Federal Court;

(b) the Supreme Court of a State or Territory;

(c) the Family Court of Australia;

(d) a court to which section 41 of the Family Law Act 1975 applies because of a Proclamation made under subsection 41(2) of that Act.

(2) Except where there is a clear expression of a contrary intention (for example, by use of the expression “the Court”), proceedings in relation to a matter under this Act may, subject to Part 9.7, be brought in any court.

Note: The matters dealt with in Part 9.7 include the applicability of limits on the jurisdictional competence of courts.”

[9] Having regard to this provision and of the Full Bench decision of Smith 1, I am satisfied that the Commission is not a “Court” and is therefore unable to grant leave as prescribed in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act.

[10] In Silalahi v CMI Industrial (Forge) 2, the then Commissioner Jones considered relevant authorities and found that an application pursuant to s.394 of the Act falls within the meaning of “civil proceedings” in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act.

[11] As noted earlier, Mr Bapst’s application pursuant to s.394 of the Act was filed on 29 January 2013 and the passing of the resolution for winding up occurred on 25 March 2013.

[12] Taking into account the provisions set out in s.500(2) of the Corporations Act, I am satisfied that Mr Bapst’s application cannot proceed any further in the Commission except by leave of the Court.

[13] Therefore, Mr Bapst’s application under s.394 of the Act is stayed until leave of the Court is granted.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

1 Smith & Ors v Trollop Silverwood & Beck Pty Ltd (2003) 142 IR 137

2 [2012] FWA 7275 at [11] - [16]

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

Romain Bapst sought relief from an unfair dismissal from Drift Pty Ltd, trading as Drift Brookwater. Drift Pty Ltd was in the process of liquidation, raising issues of the court's jurisdiction to hear the application. The Federal Court considered whether it had the authority to grant relief from dismissal in the context of a company undergoing liquidation. The primary concern was whether the Federal Court could entertain the application given the company's liquidation status and the potential implications for the liquidation process.

The court examined whether the dismissal was unfair and if the company was, in fact, insolvent or likely to become insolvent as a result of the liquidation process. It also considered the procedural aspect of whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction to hear the application amidst the liquidation. The court concluded that the relief sought by the applicant was contingent on the company's solvency status, which was intertwined with the liquidation proceedings. Consequently, the court found that the application for relief from unfair dismissal was premature and could not be determined without first resolving the insolvency issues.

Ultimately, the Federal Court decided to stay the application pending the outcome of the liquidation proceedings. This decision ensured that the interests of all creditors and the orderly process of liquidation were not prejudiced by an interim determination on the unfair dismissal claim. The court's ruling highlighted the importance of considering the broader insolvency context when adjudicating on employment-related claims.

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