Rogers v Law Coast Mortgages Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rogers v Law Coast Mortgages Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 181

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for adjournment – applicant unrepresented – applicant reasonably believed hearing date was for directions only – whether discretion to refuse adjournment miscarried.

Squire v Rogers (1979) 27 ALR 330 referred to
Bloch v Bloch (1981) 37 ALR 55 referred to
Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625 referred to
Scott v Handley (1999) 58 ALD 373 referred to
Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438 referred to
Neil v Nott (1994) 121 ALR 148 referred to

Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, Litigants in Person Management Plans:  Issues for Courts and Tribunals (2001)

GREGORY ERIC ROGERS v LAW COAST MORTGAGES PTY LTD, KIM CHRISTIE, ALAN CHARLES PARRY, IAN CHARLES GRIFFITHS, CHRISTINE MATSINGER, MALCOLM DONALD McCOLM
Q194 of 2001

FINN J
CANBERRA (HEARD IN BRISBANE)
5 MARCH 2002


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q194 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

GREGORY ERIC ROGERS
APPELLANT

AND:

LAW COAST MORTGAGES PTY LTD
FIRST RESPONDENT

KIM CHRISTIE
SECOND RESPONDENT

ALAN CHARLES PARRY
THIRD RESPONDENT

IAN CHARLES GRIFFITHS
FOURTH RESPONDENT

CHRISTINE MATSINGER
FIFTH RESPONDENT

MALCOLM DONALD McCOLM
SIXTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 MARCH 2002

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA (HEARD IN BRISBANE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed with costs.

2.The order of the Federal Magistrates Court be set aside.

3.The matter be remitted to the Magistrate to be heard and determined again.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q194 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

GREGORY ERIC ROGERS
APPELLANT

AND:

LAW COAST MORTGAGES PTY LTD
FIRST RESPONDENT

KIM CHRISTIE
SECOND RESPONDENT

ALAN CHARLES PARRY
THIRD RESPONDENT

IAN CHARLES GRIFFITHS
FOURTH RESPONDENT

CHRISTINE MATSINGER
FIFTH RESPONDENT

MALCOLM DONALD McCOLM
SIXTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE:

5 MARCH 2002

PLACE:

CANBERRA (HEARD IN BRISBANE)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal to this court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction against the order of a Federal Magistrate dismissing the application of Gregory Eric Rogers to set aside a bankruptcy notice served by the respondent, Law Coast Mortgages Pty Ltd, (“Law Coast”).  Mr Rogers was unrepresented in the proceedings before the Magistrate as also on the hearing of this appeal. 

  2. Stated shortly the appeal challenges the refusal of the Magistrate to adjourn the hearing of the application to set aside the notice which was then determined adversely to Mr Rogers.  The basis of Mr Rogers’ objection to the Magistrate so acting is that prior to the hearing he received a letter from the Registrar of the Federal Magistrates Court indicating that the hearing scheduled for the day in question was to be a directions hearing only.  Mr Rogers’ complaint is that in being forced to go on he was both denied natural…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 181
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Rogers v Law Coast Mortgages Pty Ltd concerned the refusal of the Magistrate to adjourn a hearing of an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice. Mr Rogers argued that the refusal denied him natural justice and opportunities to present further evidence and seek clarification of the issues. The case involved a history of property development loans made by Law Coast to Perdon Pty Ltd, a company of which Mr Rogers was a director, secured by mortgages over the property. Perdon defaulted on an interest payment in April 1998, leading to various legal proceedings between the parties. Mr Rogers had commenced an action seeking relief from the mortgage and personal guarantees, which was yet to be determined. The bankruptcy notice arose from an application made in Mr Rogers’ own action, seeking to hold a solicitor in contempt. The application was dismissed, leading to an order for indemnity costs against Mr Rogers. He subsequently filed an application to set aside the bankruptcy notice, which was heard on 19 April 2001 but adjourned by the Magistrate to allow further evidence to be filed.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Magistrate's refusal to adjourn the hearing constituted a denial of natural justice and whether the adjournment would have been in the interests of justice. The respondents argued that Mr Rogers had ample opportunity to present further evidence, that no prejudice was shown, and that the adjournment was not necessary. They cited cases such as Squire v Rogers and Bloch v Bloch to support their position. The court acknowledged that while appellate courts are generally slow to interfere with a court's discretion to refuse an adjournment, they will intervene if the refusal results in a denial of justice. The court highlighted that a litigant in person, such as Mr Rogers, may require additional consideration, particularly when opposed by parties with legal representation.

The court concluded that the appeal should be allowed, and the matter remitted to the Magistrate for rehearing. The refusal to adjourn the hearing on the day it was listed, when Mr Rogers was not in a position to proceed, was deemed a significant step that could involve a denial of procedural fairness. The court emphasised that a party must be given a reasonable opportunity to present their case, which includes the opportunity to prepare it fully. The appeal was allowed with costs, the order of the Federal Magistrates Court was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Magistrate for a new hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed with costs.

2. The order of the Federal Magistrates Court be set aside.

3. The matter be remitted to the Magistrate to be heard and determined again.

Background

Background to the litigation

Stated shortly the appeal challenges the refusal of the Magistrate to adjourn the hearing of the application to set aside the notice which was then determined adversely to Mr Rogers. The basis of Mr Rogers’ objection to the Magistrate so acting is that prior to the hearing he received a letter from the Registrar of the Federal Magistrates Court indicating that the hearing scheduled for the day in question was to be a directions hearing only. Mr Rogers’ complaint is that in being forced to go on he was both denied natural justice and denied the opportunities to put on further evidence and to seek clarification of the issues that were to be agitated. To set his complaints in context it is necessary to refer to the previous history of the matter in some detail.Background Setting In 1997 a company of which Mr Rogers was a director, Perdon Pty Ltd (“Perdon”), borrowed money from Law Coast for property development purposes. Law Coast was the vehicle through which a firm of solicitors conducted a solicitor’s mortgage lending business. Mr Rogers and his wife (also a director) provided personal guarantees of the loan. The loans were secured by mortgages over the property to be developed. In April 1998 Perdon defaulted on an interest payment. On 4 January 1999 both Perdon and Mr Rogers commenced actions in the Federal Court seeking relief from the mortgage and personal guarantees respectively. The following day Law Coast commenced Supreme Court of Queensland proceedings seeking possession of the mortgaged lands. The Federal Court proceedings were subsequently cross-vested to the Supreme Court. On 21 March 2000 Wilson J of that Court gave summary judgment dismissing Perdon’s action against Law Coast on the basis it did not disclose a triable issue. An appeal to the Court of Appeal from that decision was struck out on 14 June 2001 for want of prosecution. Mr Rogers’ own claim is yet undetermined. It was an application made in Mr Rogers’ own action that gave rise to the order on which the relevant bankruptcy notice was founded. He sought unsuccessfully to have dealt with for contempt a solicitor in the employ of the firm instructed by Law Coast in the various litigations mentioned above. In dismissing that application a judge of the Supreme Court made an order for indemnity costs against Mr Rogers. Those costs were later assessed and the assessment was not challenged. The bankruptcy notice was subsequently issued and the application to have it set aside was filed on 18 December 2000. On 22 January 2001 the matter was listed for hearing on 19 April 2001. When the matter came on then, it was adjourned by the Magistrate who apparently directed the applicant to file further evidence in support of the cross-demand against Law Coast (that cross-demand relating to his own action in the Supreme Court). It would seem that Mr Rogers had already filed brief written submissions in support of his application but that he had not by then exhibited in the Magistrates Court the statement of claim in his own action. This he filed subsequently together with an affidavit of a solicitor, Gary O’Neill (who had explained the relevant documentation to him at the time of the loan), which had previously been filed in Perdon’s action in the Supreme Court.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FINN J
The respondents reiterated the views put before the Magistrate; they contended that Mr Rogers had ample opportunity since the April hearing to put on further evidence and had done so; no prejudice was shown to have been occasioned by the refusal of the adjournment; Mr Rogers had not adduced evidence showing his own action was different from, or had any better prospects than the Perdon action; the further evidence he proposed would be of no assistance; and he had been amply indulged already. There had been no denial of natural justice. Reference was made to Squire v Rogers (1979) 27 ALR 330 at 337-338 and Bloch v Bloch (1981) 37 ALR 55 at 58-59.Conclusion It is unfortunate, but nonetheless necessary, that this appeal must be allowed and the matter remitted to the Magistrate for rehearing. The question whether or not to grant an adjournment was a matter within the discretion of the Magistrate to be resolved according to the overall requirements of justice in the particular circumstances: Squire v Rogers, above, at 337. In consequence it is accepted that appellate courts will be slow to interfere with the discretion of a court to refuse an adjournment, but that they will do so if the refusal will result in a denial of justice to the applicant and the adjournment will not result in any injustice to any other party: Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625. It has, though, been acknowledged in this Court that for a court to refuse an adjournment of the hearing of a proceedings sought by an applicant on the day of the hearing on the basis that he or she is not in a position to proceed, and thereby to dismiss those proceedings, is a significant step not lightly to be taken: Scott v Handley (1999) 58 ALD 373 at 379. Such a refusal can involve a denial of procedural fairness. As was said in R v Thames Magistrates’ Court; ex parte Polemis [1974] 2 All ER 1219 at 1223:“… nothing is clearer today than that a breach of the rules of natural justice is said to occur if a party to proceedings … is not given a reasonable chance to present his case. It is so elementary and so basic it hardly needs to be said. But of the versions of breach of the rules of natural justice with which in this court we are dealing constantly, perhaps the most common today is the allegation that the defence were prejudiced because they were not given a fair and reasonable opportunity to present their case to the court, and of course the opportunity to present a case to the court is not confined to being given an opportunity to stand up and say what you want to say; it necessarily extends to a reasonable opportunity to prepare your case before you are called on to present it. A mere allocation of court time is of no value if the party in question is deprived of the opportunity of getting his tackle in order and being able to present his case in the fullest sense.” The factors of which account properly can be taken in ensuring justice is done extend beyond the interests of the parties to such matters as congestion of court lists and case management: see Scott v Handley, above. One factor that may, in the circumstances, be of no little importance is that the party asserting he or she is not in a position to proceed is a litigant in person who suffers the disadvantage of being opposed by parties having legal representation: Scott v Handley.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FINN J

Full text does not contain this section.