Roe v Howard
[2020] VSC 442
•21 July 2020
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
GENERAL LIST
S ECI 2020 01108
| SARAH ROE (A Pseudonym) | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| LINDA SUSAN HOWARD | Defendant |
---
JUDGE: | Derham AsJ |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 21 July 2020 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 21 July 2020 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Roe v Howard |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2020] VSC 442 |
---
CIVIL PROCEDURE – Foreign judgments – Application to enforce a judgment of the United States District Court – Enforcement of foreign judgments at common law – Doe v Howard [2015] VSC 75 applied; Practice Note SC Gen 15 2, Schnabel v Yung Lui [2002] NSWSC 15, Benefit Strategies Group Inc v Prider (2005) 91 SASR 544, Bhushan Steel Ltd v Severstal Export GmbH [2012] NSWSC 583 and Bao v Qu; Tian (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 588 referred to.
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Ms C Cunliffe | Jones Day |
| For the Defendant | No appearance |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
The plaintiff makes application for judgment in this proceeding pursuant to r 45.03(1) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic) (Rules), and for related orders.
The proceeding seeks the registration in this Court of a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia entered on 26 October 2017 (US Judgment), to enable the plaintiff to enforce it in this jurisdiction. The only known asset of the defendant is an apartment in the Docklands, Melbourne (Docklands Property).
The plaintiff commenced this proceeding by originating motion filed on 5 March 2020. At a hearing before Macaulay J on that day, the plaintiff sought leave to commence the proceedings under a pseudonym and sought a freezing order over the defendant’s assets without giving the usual undertaking as to damages. On 12 March 2020, Macaulay J made orders granting leave for the plaintiff to commence the proceedings under her pseudonym and other orders protecting her identity in the proceedings. His Honour denied the plaintiff’s application for a freezing order without giving the usual undertaking as to damages, but ordered that a freezing order would be made without the need for a further hearing upon the plaintiff giving the usual undertakings.[1]
[1]Roe v Howard [2020] VSC 212.
On 25 May 2020 upon the plaintiff giving the usual undertaking as to damages, Macaulay J granted a freezing order in favour of the plaintiff over the Australian assets of the defendant, including the Docklands Property (Freezing Order).
On 20 April 2020 Matthews JR made orders for substituted service on the defendant of the plaintiff’s originating motion, the orders of Macaulay J made on 12 March 2020 and a Form 7AAA notice to the defendant[2] (First Substituted Service Orders). The documents referred to in the order were emailed and posted to the persons required by the order on 23 April 2020 and service was deemed by the order to have been effected by 1 May 2020.
[2]That notice informs a person served overseas of certain matters, including their right to apply set aside the originating process or service of it.
On 21 May 2020 the plaintiff’s solicitors were informed by Mr Con Kiatos, the solicitor on whom substituted service was ordered to be made, that (amongst other things):[3]
(a) he had received documents from the plaintiff’s solicitors on 23 April pursuant to the First Substituted Service Orders and forwarded those documents to the defendant; and
(b) that he did not hold instructions from the defendant in respect of these proceedings but had recently been instructed by the defendant to prepare sale documentation for the sale of the Docklands Property.
[3]Affidavit of Benjamin Ian Holloway, sworn 2 June 2020, 4 [17].
The freezing order granted on 25 May 2020 was sent (with the affidavits listed in Schedule B of the Freezing Order) to Mr Kiatos for his information, and he was asked to seek instructions to accept service on behalf of the defendant. On 26 and 29 May Mr Kiatos confirmed receipt of the Freezing Order and affidavits, and stated that he had provided these materials to the defendant.[4] However, Mr Kiatos did not obtain instructions from the defendant to accept service of the Freezing Order and supporting affidavits on behalf of the defendant.
[4]Ibid 4-6 [19]-[29].
By the orders of Matthews JR made 20 April, the defendant was required to enter an appearance by 29 May 2020. However, she did not do so.
On 12 June 2020, Matthews JR made further orders for substituted service on the defendant of several documents filed in connection with these proceedings including the Freezing Order, the affidavits listed in Schedule B of the Freezing Order, the Plaintiff’s summons dated 4 March 2020, the Plaintiff’s amended summons dated 9 June 2020 and the affidavit of Lauren Walas affirmed 7 June 2020 (Second Substituted Service Orders). Matthews JR also made standing orders for substituted service on the defendant through her Australian solicitor, Mr Kiatos. Further, Mathews JR -
(a) ordered the defendant to file any written submissions and evidence in response to the orders sought in the amended summons by 4:00pm on 22 June 2020. The defendant failed to comply with this order; and
(b) referred the balance of the orders sought by the plaintiff in the amended summons to a judicial officer of the Practice Court for determination on the papers on or before 26 June 2020.
The latter order was vacated by Order of Richards J on 25 June 2020 and the amended summons was adjourned to a date to be fixed by an Associate Judge. On 1 July 2020, I fixed 21 July 2020 for the hearing of the amended summons.
The Freezing Order and associated documents were sent by email to the defendant’s Australian solicitor Mr Kiatos of Kiatos & Co in accordance with the Second Substituted Service Orders on 12 June 2020.[5]_bookmark15 Pursuant to order 2 of the Second Substituted Service Orders, service on the defendant was deemed to have occurred on 15 June 2020.
[5]Affidavit of Benjamin Ian Holloway, sworn 19 June 2020.
Relief sought
Relevantly for present purposes, by the amended summons filed on 9 June 2020, the plaintiff seeks the following orders:
(a) leave pursuant to r 45.03(3) of the Rules to rely on three affidavits that had not been served on the defendant for the plaintiff’s application under r 45.03(1);_bookmark14
(b) judgment for the plaintiff in default of appearance pursuant to r 45.03(1) of the Rules;
(c) interest on the US Judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1961 and the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic); and
(d) costs pursuant to r 63.34.2 of the Rules.
Background[6]
[6]This statement of the background facts is drawn primarily from the affidavit of M Carter Delorme, made 9 January 2020 (‘Delorme affidavit’) and the Affidavit of Benjamin Ian Holloway made 3 March 2020 (‘First Holloway affidavit’).
On about 20 May 2016 the plaintiff, under the pseudonym Sarah Roe, commenced civil proceedings against the defendant in the United States District Court of Eastern Virginia alleging several violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) (US District Court Proceedings).
There were a number of allegations, the first of which gives the gist of the several. In summary that claim was that the defendant knowingly did and conspired to provide and obtain the labour and services (including forced sexual services) of the plaintiff, including: (i) by threats of serious harm to and physical restraint against the plaintiff; (ii) by means of a scheme intended to cause the plaintiff to believe that if she did not perform such labour and services she would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; and (iii) by means of abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process, all in violation of the TVPA.
Judge Liam O’Grady presided over the proceedings. On 31 July 2017 the jury in the US District Court Proceedings delivered its verdict. The jury’s verdict was that the plaintiff had established that the defendant had violated statutory prohibitions on forced labour, forced labour trafficking, commercial sex trafficking and conspiracy to commit these offences. The jury found that the plaintiff was entitled to USD $1,000,000 compensatory damages and elected to award punitive damages in the sum of USD$2,000,000.
On 8 September 2017, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial and four motions seeking to overturn the jury’s verdict in full or in part. The US District Court heard these motions on 20 October 2017. These motions were denied and the US District Court entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict on 26 October 2017.[7] On 3 January 2018, Judge Liam O’Grady of the US District Court published a Memorandum of Opinion in which he dismissed the Defendant’s remaining motions for judgment. In the Memorandum of Opinion, Judge O’Grady summarised the facts established at trial in the US District Court proceedings as follows:[8]
Sarah Roe brought this case under 18 U S.C. § 1595, which provides a civil remedy for violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). On July 31, 2017, after a four-day trial, a jury found defendant Linda Howard liable for forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589, forced labor trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590, commercial sex trafficking in violation of 18 U S.C. § 1591, and conspiring to engage in those offenses in violation of 18 U S.C. § 1594. The parties established the following facts at trial.
In 2007, while a US. citizen, employed by the State Department, and living in U.S. embassy housing, Linda Howard conspired with her husband, Russell Howard (deceased prior to trial) to entice plaintiff Sarah Roe into their employment as a live-in housekeeper. Once so employed, Russell Howard subjected Roe to repeated rapes and continuous sexual abuse. ….
Linda Howard spent months befriending Roe prior to hiring her as a housekeeper, including helping Roe obtain a data entry position with the U S. embassy. … After the Howards’ prior housekeeper fled, Linda Howard succeeded in hiring Roe, offering help with medical treatments, Roe’s visa, and monetary compensation. …Linda Howard told Roe that it was Roe’s job to “make Russell happy” because he “needs a friend” while he was home and Linda Howard worked. …Upon moving into the Howard’’ embassy housing, the Howards presented her with her “uniform”, which consisted of a very short skirt and a revealing blouse and which Linda Howard had sewed.’ …After Roe refused to wear the uniform, Russell Howard took Roe to the mall and purchased a new uniform for her: a “very revealing” “one-piece” that “opens in the front” and “underwear … with one tiny string” and “many holes.”… After Ms. Roe refused to wear the new uniform, Russell Howard raped her in her bedroom. …Russell Howard continuously raped and sexually assaulted Roe for the duration of her time with the Howards and threatened her to keep her silent. …Linda Howard was aware of these assaults. She “observe[d] Russell Howard touching [Roe] in a sexual manner”, including her intimate parts. …Russell Howard told Roe that he spoke with his wife about the rapes and Roe once overheard Russell Howard doing just that over the phone….Ultimately, Russell Howard was unhappy with Roe’s continuous resistance to his attacks and he fired her, though he continued to have contact with her to keep her silent about what had occurred…
[7]Delorme affidavit, 3 [13]. A certified copy of the Judgment is Exhibit MCD-04 to the Delorme affidavit.
[8]Delorme affidavit: Exhibit MCD-05, 1-3.
On 20 November 2018 the defendant appealed the US Judgment to the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On 25 February 2019 the US Court of Appeals affirmed the US Judgment. The defendant has not satisfied the US Judgment in whole or in part.
The defendant’s current whereabouts are unknown to the plaintiff. The defendant is not legally permitted to reside in Australia following the cancellation of her Australian visa by delegates of the Australian Minister for Immigration & Border Protection. At the time of the cancellation of the defendant’s Australian visa, the defendant was said to be in Thailand on a visa that was due to expire on or about 20 November 2017. The address of the defendant’s Thailand residence is unknown to the plaintiff.
There is evidence that the defendant has recently instructed her Australian solicitor regarding the Docklands Property (after receiving notice of these proceedings)_bookmark18. Apart from on email to the Court,[9] she has ignored these proceedings. The defendant has not entered an appearance or instructed her solicitor to accept service of materials filed by the plaintiff. Nor has she filed any submissions or evidence in response to the orders of Matthews JR made on 12 June 2020.
[9]The email was dated 19 June 2020 and sent to Justice Macaulay’s chambers. It stated: “One cannot believe the intent of the Supreme Court is to make a one homeless. I am a 65 year old widow. There is a worldwide pandemic and I am currently sheltering in place due to my age and underlying health conditions. 505/94 River Esplanade is my only asset. I relay on the income from this property to live. Linda Howard.”
Application for leave to rely on affidavits
Order 45 of the Rules regulates the trial and other disposition of proceedings commenced by originating motion. The application before me is made under r 45.03(1), which provides that where a defendant fails to file an appearance within the time limited, the Court may, on application made by the plaintiff without notice to the defendant and on proof of service of the originating motion and of the failure of the defendant to enter an appearance, give judgment against the defendant for the relief or remedy sought in the originating motion.
Under r 45.03(2), for the purpose of the Rules, the hearing of the application is the trial of the proceeding. The trial has been referred to me by order of a Judge made pursuant to r 77.05 of the Rules.
By r 45.03(3) of the Rules it is provided that except for the purpose of proof of service of the originating motion and of the failure of the defendant to appear, the plaintiff shall not, unless the Court otherwise orders, use in evidence on the application any affidavit made by the plaintiff or on the plaintiff’s behalf and not served on the defendant with the originating motion.
The plaintiff seeks leave pursuant to rule 45.03(3) of the Rules to rely on three affidavits which have been filed in these proceedings but which were not served on the defendant with the originating motion. These affidavits are the Delorme affidavit, the First Holloway affidavit and the affidavit of Lauran Walas made 7 June 2020 (Walas affidavit).
The Delorme affidavit and First Holloway affidavit were made before the commencement of this proceeding. The Walas affidavit is more recent and concerns the calculation of interest under the relevant US statute. The plaintiff seeks to rely on these affidavits to satisfy the necessary elements for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment at common law.
The defendant has been served with these affidavits pursuant to the Second Substituted Service Orders. Nevertheless, leave under r 45.03(3) is necessary as these affidavits were not served with the plaintiff’s originating motion. The Delorme and First Holloway affidavits were sent to the defendant’s Australian solicitor with the Freezing Order on 25 May 2020. All three affidavits were served on the defendant’s solicitor on 12 June 2020 in accordance with the Second Substituted Service Orders. Pursuant to those orders, service on the defendant was deemed to have occurred on 15 June 2020.
The plaintiff submits that leave to rely on the above affidavits under r 45.03(3) ought to be granted for three reasons. First, at the time the plaintiff served the originating motion on the defendant (pursuant to the First Substituted Service Orders), the plaintiff was not aware that the defendant would not enter an appearance in these proceedings. Second, the defendant has been aware of the two affidavits that concern the substance of the proceedings before the US District Court and US Court of Appeals (the DeLorme affidavit and the First Holloway affidavit) since 25 May 2020, when they were brought to her attention through her Australian solicitor. Third, all three of the affidavits have now been served on the defendant.
I agree. There can be no prejudice to the defendant arising out of the use of the affidavits and she clearly has had ample notice of them.
Principles for Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
The amended summons seeks judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant in default of appearance pursuant to r 45.03(1) of the Rules, for the amount of USD $3,000,000 converted to Australian dollars.
The affidavits filed prove that the originating motion was served on the defendant on 23 April 2020 pursuant to the First Substituted Service Orders and that the defendant has failed to enter an appearance in these proceedings.
Foreign judgments may be enforced in Australia either at common law or pursuant to the statutory regime under the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth).
The Foreign Judgments Act1991 (Cth) provides for the registration of judgments obtained from a court or tribunal in another country in an Australian court. Once registered in the appropriate Australian court, the foreign judgment may be enforced here. The Act applies only to judgments obtained in certain foreign courts. The Foreign Judgments Regulations 1992 (Cth) specifies which foreign courts’ judgments will be registrable under the Act. Relevantly for present purposes, the Act does not allow for the registration of any judgment of a court of the United States of America.
Thus the only avenue for enforcement of the US Judgment is according to common law principles. In order for a foreign judgment to be recognised at common law, the following four conditions must be satisfied:[10]
[10]Doe v Howard [2015] VSC 75,[56]; Benefit Strategies Group Inc v Prider (2005) 91 SASR 544, 552, [18] (Bleby JA) (Vanstone and Anderson JJA agreeing); Schnabel v Yung Lui [2002] NSWSC 15 (‘Schnabel’), [75]; RDCW Diamonds Pty Ltd v Da Gloria [2006] NSWSC 450, [28]-[32]; Bao v Qu; Tian (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 588 (‘Bao’), [26]; M Davies et al, Nygh's Conflict of Laws in Australia (LexisNexis Australia, 10th ed, 2020) (‘Nygh’s Conflict of Laws’) 955-6 [40.2].
(a) the foreign court must have exercised jurisdiction that Australian courts will recognise;
(b) the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive;
(c) there must be an identity of the parties; and
(d) the judgment must be for a fixed sum or definite sum of money.
Jurisdiction
The term ‘jurisdiction’ in the first condition does not refer to the jurisdiction of the foreign court under its own rules, but ‘jurisdiction in the international sense’, by which is meant a competence that is recognised under Australian law. The basic principle is that the foreign court must have had jurisdiction over the defendant at the time when the jurisdiction of the foreign court was invoked.[11] This is satisfied where the defendant is personally served with originating process in the foreign jurisdiction,[12] the judgment debtor was domiciled or ordinarily a resident in the foreign jurisdiction[13] or has submitted to the jurisdiction of that court by appearing in the proceeding or by agreeing to accept the jurisdiction of the foreign court.[14]
[11]Supreme Court of Victoria, Practice Note SC Gen 15: Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 30 January 2017 (‘Practice Note SC Gen 15’), 2 [4.4].
[12]Herman v Meallin (1891) 8 WN (NSW) 38; Nygh’s Conflict of Laws 956-7 [40.6]; Bao [27];Practice Note SC Gen 15 2 [4.4].
[13]Practice Note SC Gen 15 2 [4.4].
[14]Bhushan Steel Ltd v Severstal Export GmbH [2012] NSWSC 583, [148] citing Norsemeter Holdings AS v Boele (No 1) [2002] NSWSC 370. City of Swan v McGraw-Hill Companies Inc (2014) 223 FCR 295, 325 [113]; Nygh’s Conflict of Laws 959-10 [40.12-13]; Bao [27].
The plaintiff submits that in this case the US District Court had jurisdiction over the defendant for at least the following reasons:
(a) during the US District Court Proceedings, the defendant was a citizen of the United States though residing in Australia;[15]
(b) on 18 October 2016, the defendant, through her US attorneys, filed and served a ‘Waiver of the Service of Summons’ in which the defendant waived service of the plaintiff’s Complaint on the defendant;[16] and
(c) the defendant actively participated in the US District Court Proceedings and filed and ‘Answer to the Complaint’ filed by the plaintiff and by filing post-judgment motions.[17]
[15]DeLorme affidavit, 5 [18(b)].
[16]DeLorme affidavit, 5 [18(b)]; Exhibit MCD-09.
[17]DeLorme affidavit, 5 [18(c)], Exhibit MCD-10.
It cannot be doubted that second and third of these actions show that the defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the US District Court and clearly appeared in the court to defend the claims brought against her. The first requirement is therefore met.
Finality
In relation to the second requirement, that the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive, this means that the foreign judgment must be determinative of the rights and obligations of the parties. It must be that the controversy between the parties that led to the proceedings is brought to an end.[18] The key test of finality is whether the foreign tribunal treats the judgment as res judicata of the issue between the parties to the litigation.[19] The fact that the final order of the foreign court may subsequently be varied in the event of the default of a party carrying out its terms may not affect the finality of the order.[20] A default judgment may be enforceable as a final and conclusive judgment even though it is liable to be set aside in the court that rendered it. Generally, until steps are taken to set the judgment aside the judgment is enforceable as a final and conclusive judgment.[21]
[18]Doe v Howard [2015] VSC 75, [67]; Practice Note SC Gen 15 2 [4.7].
[19]Practice Note SC Gen 15 2 [4.8].
[20]Ibid 2 [4.9].
[21]Ibid 2-3 [4.10].
The plaintiff submitted, and I agree, that the US Judgment is final and conclusive between the parties. The jury in the US District Court Proceedings delivered its verdict (including with respect to the award of damages) on 31 July 2017 and judgment in accordance with that verdict was entered on 26 October 2017.[22] The US Judgment was final and determinative for the purposes of registration of the Judgment in this jurisdiction on 26 October 2017. However, after the jury’s verdict was delivered, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial and four motions for judgment seeking to have the verdict overturned in full or in part. These motions were denied. The defendant then appealed to the US Court of Appeals who affirmed the US Judgment on 25 February 2019.[23] The time for the defendant to seek to appeal the decision of the US Court of Appeals expired in May 2019.[24]
[22]Delorme affidavit, 3 [9]-[10], [13]; Exhibit MCD-04.
[23]Delorme affidavit, 5 [17]; Exhibits MCD-06 and MCD-07.
[24]Delorme affidavit, 6 [18(e)].
Identity of parties
In relation to the requirement that there must be an identity of the parties, the evidence establishes that the plaintiff in these proceedings is the same person as the defendant identified in the US Judgment. The defendant in these proceedings, a former US State Department official who was a US citizen residing in Docklands, Victoria during the US District Court Proceedings, is the same as the defendant identified in the US Judgment.[25]
[25]Delorme affidavit, 5 [18(a)], 6 [18(i)]; Exhibit MCD-01, 2-3.
Fixed sum
In relation to the requirement that the foreign judgment must be for a fixed sum or definite sum of money, this means that the judgment must be for a fixed sum or a readily calculable sum of money.[26] In this case the US Judgment is for a fixed sum, being USD $3,000,000. This amount is comprised of USD $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and USD $2,000,000 in punitive damages.[27] The Judgment is not penal in nature. In an earlier case involving the defendant, Doe v Howard, Forrest J found that an award of punitive damages to the plaintiff in that case under the TVPA was not penal and that the entire judgment was capable of enforcement.[28] It has not been satisfied by the defendant in full or in part.
[26]Practice Note SC Gen 15 3 [4.13].
[27]Delorme affidavit, 6 [18(f)]; Exhibit MCD-04.
[28][2015] VSC 75, [185].
Interest
The Plaintiff’s amended summons seeks an order for interest pursuant to the applicable US statute from 26 October 2017 (the date the US Judgment was entered) to 5 March 2020, being the date that the Plaintiff’s originating motion commencing this proceeding was filed. The Walas affidavit sets out the basis for the Plaintiff’s application for interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1961.[29] Pursuant to this statute, interest is payable on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a US District Court. Interest is to be calculated from the date of the entry of judgment and the applicable interest rate is calculated by reference to the weekly average one year constant maturity Treasury Yield as published by the Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of judgment. Interest is computed daily until the date of payment and compounded annually.
[29]Walas affidavit, 2 [6].
The plaintiff has calculated interest on the US Judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1961 from 26 October 2017 until 5 March 2020 at USD $101,531.53, an average of USD $117.92 per day.[30]
[30]Walas affidavit, 3 [10], Annexure A.
From 5 March 2020 the plaintiff seeks interest on the US Judgment pursuant to the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) (SCA). Under s 60 of the SCA, on application in any proceeding for the recovery of debt or damages the Court must, unless good cause is shown to the contrary, give damages in the nature of interest at such rate not exceeding the rate for the time being fixed under s 2 of the Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983 (Vic) as it thinks fit from the commencement of the proceeding to the date of the judgment over and above the debt or damages awarded.
The penalty interest rate from 1 February 2017 under that legislation is 10%.[31] The plaintiff also seeks interest at the same rate from the date of judgment in these proceedings until payment, pursuant to s 101 of the SCA.
[31]Victoria, Victorian Government Gazette, No G 1, 5 January 2017.
There is no reason apparent to me why I should not award interest as claimed and will do so.
Costs
The Plaintiff’s counsel and solicitors are providing legal assistance to the plaintiff on a pro-bono basis for the purpose of r 63.34.2(1) of the Rules. That is, the plaintiff’s counsel and solicitors will not receive professional fees from the plaintiff. The plaintiff is therefore an ‘assisted party’ as defined in r 63.34.1(1) of the Rules. The relevant rule, r 63.34.2, provides:
63.34.2 Orders for legal costs
(1)If a legal practitioner provides legal assistance to an assisted party in a proceeding on a pro bono basis, the Court may make, in favour of the assisted party, any order for the recovery of the costs of the legal assistance that the Court might have made had the legal assistance been provided not on a pro bono basis but on the basis that the assisted party was under an obligation to pay for the legal assistance in the ordinary way.
(2)When making a pro bono costs order, the Court may order that a party or other person against whom the pro bono costs order is made pay the costs, including any disbursements incurred by the legal practitioner acting on a pro bono basis, directly to the legal practitioner instead of to the assisted party.
(3)A payment made to a legal practitioner acting on a pro bono basis pursuant to an order made under paragraph (2) satisfies the pro bono costs order in favour of the assisted party to the extent of that payment.
I consider this to be an appropriate case to make orders in accordance with this rule.
Conclusion
For the reason set out above, orders will be made to effect registration of the US Judgment in the this Court and for all consequential orders for interest and costs.
11
0