[2018] HCATrans 137
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P24 of 2018
B e t w e e n -
PAUL JOSEPH RODI
Appellant
and
STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
KIEFEL CJ
BELL J
KEANE J
NETTLE J
GORDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 7 AUGUST 2018, AT 10.00 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR M.D. HOWARD, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the appellant with my learned friend, MS R.R. JOSEPH. (instructed by Norton Rose Fulbright Australia)
MS A.L. FORRESTER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent with MR L.M. FOX. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (WA))
KIEFEL CJ: Yes, Mr Howard.
MR HOWARD: May it please the Court, there are effectively three appeal grounds, although there are two formally. The first is that there was fresh evidence which raised the significant possibility that the jury, acting reasonably, would have acquitted the appellant if that fresh evidence with the evidence at trial had been before the jury. That is the first ground.
The second ground is really two, in the sense that it raises non‑disclosure, but it does so firstly under the Criminal Procedure Act and then, secondly, under the common law.
If I can turn to the first ground, that of the fresh evidence, the question of whether there was with the fresh evidence a significant possibility that the jury, acting reasonably, would have acquitted the appellant comes to an assessment of how the trial may have run with that fresh evidence. We say that there are three principal impacts or effects of that fresh evidence, if they had been available.
The first is that it may have led the jury, certainly increased the chances of the jury, accepting the appellant’s evidence at the trial that the cannabis came from his own two plants. Secondly, we say that it would have opened up significant lines of cross‑examination of Detective Coen at the trial. Your Honours will know that Detective Coen was called as an expert witness and in the way that the trial unfolded could probably fairly be described as the principal prosecution witness.
We say that there are three lines of cross‑examination which would have been opened up. The first is as to what his expertise was based on; secondly, why he had changed his view as to yield, and that would have opened up the third which was going to the range that he had himself actually observed.
There is always an element of speculation. But, in this case, the task of speculating is made somewhat easier – or, perhaps, one can do it more confidently – because there was cross‑examination in the Court of Appeal of the detective by the appellant, in person, as it turned out ‑ but one can see in that cross‑examination what may have occurred at the trial with the benefit of what we have called the…
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- Case
- [2018] HCATrans 137
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the warrant satisfied the constitutional requirement for particularity in the description of things to be seized, as enshrined in section 30(1) of the *Western Australian Constitution Act 1889* (WA). This involved an examination of the scope of the power to issue search warrants under the *Corruption, Public Integrity and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2018* (WA) and whether the warrant, as issued, was too broad and therefore invalid.
The Court reasoned that the constitutional guarantee of particularity in search warrants is a fundamental protection against arbitrary governmental intrusion. It held that a warrant must specify with sufficient clarity the items to be seized so that the executing officer is left with no reasonable discretion as to what may be taken. In this instance, the warrant was found to be insufficiently particular, authorising the seizure of a wide range of documents and electronic data without adequate limitation, thereby exceeding the constitutional requirement.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the search warrant, and declared that the evidence seized pursuant to it was inadmissible.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the High Court of Australia as an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia. The appellant, Paul Joseph Rodi, appealed against his conviction and sentence for possession of a commercial quantity of cannabis. The primary appeal was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, where the appellant was convicted and sentenced. The appellant then appealed to the Court of Appeal of Western Australia, which upheld the conviction but varied the sentence. Dissatisfied with the outcome, the appellant sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. The High Court granted special leave and heard the appeal on August 7, 2018. During the hearing, the appellant's counsel argued two grounds of appeal: the first ground related to fresh evidence that was not disclosed to the appellant prior to the trial, and the second ground related to a breach of the statutory and common law disclosure obligations. The respondent's counsel argued that the appeal should be dismissed, and if the Court found in favour of the appellant on any ground, the appropriate remedy would be a remittal for a retrial.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the fresh evidence presented raise a significant possibility that the jury, acting reasonably, would have acquitted the appellant if that evidence had been before them at trial?
2. Was there a breach of the statutory disclosure obligations under the Criminal Procedure Act?
3. Was there a breach of the common law disclosure obligations?
4. If a breach of disclosure obligations was found, would it amount to a substantial miscarriage of justice?
5. Is there power for the Court to enter a judgment for the offence of simple possession instead of ordering a retrial?
Held
1. The court concluded that the fresh evidence presented did not raise a significant possibility that the jury, acting reasonably, would have acquitted the appellant if that evidence had been before them at trial. Therefore, the appeal on this ground was dismissed.
2. The court found that there was a breach of the statutory disclosure obligations under the Criminal Procedure Act.
3. The court found that there was also a breach of the common law disclosure obligations.
4. The court determined that the breach of disclosure obligations amounted to a substantial miscarriage of justice.
5. The court held that it had the power to enter a judgment for the offence of simple possession instead of ordering a retrial, in line with the submission made by Justice Mitchell. However, the appellant's instructions were to seek a retrial.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court in Rodi v State of Western Australia considered several grounds of appeal, focusing on issues of fresh evidence, statutory and common law disclosure obligations, and potential remedies in the event of a successful appeal. The court's reasoning and ratio decidendi on each major issue are as follows:
1. Fresh Evidence: The court assessed whether the fresh evidence presented a significant possibility that the jury would have acquitted the appellant if that evidence had been before them at trial. The fresh evidence pertained to the expert opinion on the typical yield of cannabis plants. The court found that the fresh evidence might have increased the jury's chances of accepting the appellant's evidence that the cannabis came from his own plants, opened significant lines of cross-examination regarding the expert's qualifications and changes in opinion, and could have altered the prosecutor's closing argument. Despite the majority's finding that the prior evidence would have had a limited impact on the jury's evaluation, the court acknowledged that there was a reasonable possibility that the fresh evidence could have affected the outcome. This established a precedent that fresh evidence should be considered in light of its potential impact on the jury's decision.
2. Statutory Disclosure Obligations: The court examined whether there was a breach of the statutory disclosure obligations under the Criminal Procedure Act. The appellant argued that the prior evidence of the expert's opinion on cannabis yield should have been disclosed under section 95(6) of the Act. The court found that the statutory disclosure obligations applied to material that could assist the accused's defence, even if it was not part of the prosecutor's case at the time. This established a precedent that statutory disclosure obligations under the Criminal Procedure Act are broad and apply to material that could potentially assist the accused's defence, regardless of the prosecutor's knowledge or intent to use it.
3. Common Law Disclosure Obligations: The court also considered whether there was a breach of the common law disclosure obligations. The appellant argued that the prior evidence should have been disclosed under the common law, as it was material in the possession of the police and readily available to the prosecution. The court found that the common law disclosure obligations were not abrogated by the statutory provisions and continued to apply. This established a precedent that the common law disclosure obligations are not superseded by statutory provisions, and both must be considered in assessing disclosure obligations.
4. Substantial Miscarriage of Justice: The court examined whether a breach of disclosure obligations would amount to a substantial miscarriage of justice. The court found that the breach of disclosure obligations, both statutory and common law, amounted to a substantial miscarriage of justice because it deprived the appellant of the opportunity to challenge the key prosecution witness effectively. This established a precedent that a breach of disclosure obligations can amount to a substantial miscarriage of justice if it deprives the accused of a fair trial.
5. Power to Enter Judgment for Simple Possession: The court considered whether it had the power to enter a judgment for the offence of simple possession instead of ordering a retrial. The court found that it did have the power to make such an order under section 37 of the Judiciary Act and that it was an appropriate remedy in this case. This established a precedent that the court has the discretion to enter a judgment for a lesser offence if it deems it appropriate in the circumstances.
In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that fresh evidence should be considered in light of its potential impact on the jury's decision, statutory disclosure obligations are broad and apply to material that could potentially assist the accused's defence, common law disclosure obligations are not superseded by statutory provisions, a breach of disclosure obligations can amount to a substantial miscarriage of justice, and the court has the discretion to enter a judgment for a lesser offence if appropriate.