GAUDRON J. This is an application by the third defendant, a corporation known as North Queensland Bacon Company Pty. Limited, for an order, inter alia, that the Writ of Summons, or alternatively, service of the Writ of Summons against it, be set aside. In the proceedings as they are presently constituted, the other parties are natural persons. I have previously held that the plaintiff is a resident of New South Wales. The first and second defendants are respectively residents of Queensland and Western Australia.

2. By his Statement of Claim the plaintiff asserts that this Court has jurisdiction by reason that:
"the action is ... a 'matter between residents of
different States' with the Third Defendant properly joined in the action by the authority of: (i) the ambit of the 'matter'; (ii) Section 32 of the Judiciary Act 1903; and (iii) Rules 4(2)(c), 7 and 10 of Order 16 of the

High Court Rules."

3. Section 75(iv) of the Constitution confers original jurisdiction on this Court in, inter alia, matters "between residents of different States". The word "residents" as used in s.75(iv) has been held to refer only to natural persons: Australasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd. v. Howe (1922) 31 CLR 290; Cox v. Journeaux (1934) 52 CLR 282; Crouch v. Commissioner for Railways (Q.) (1985) 159 CLR 22. See also Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand Ltd. v. Ferguson (1969) 119 CLR 191, at p 196.

4. In Cox v. Journeaux, Dixon PJ., at first instance, held that the presence of a corporation on the record had the effect of denying to a proceeding otherwise between residents of different States the character of a matter "between residents of different States" as those words are used in s.75(iv) of the Constitution. To the same effect is the decision of Menzies PJ. referred to in the judgment of Windeyer PJ. at first instance in Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand (at p 196). The plaintiff contends that this aspect of s.75(iv) was not raised on appeal in Cox v. Journeaux and that the decision of Dixon PJ. in that case and the decision of Menzies PJ. in Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand are not supported by any decision of the Full Court. The plaintiff further submits that this aspect of those decisions must now yield to the more recent authority of Philip Morris Inc. v. Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty. Ltd. (1981) 148 CLR 457, at p 507, Fencott v. Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570, at p 603, and Crouch involving an exposition of the meaning of "matters" in s.75 of the Constitution and the jurisdiction thereby conferred on this Court. See also McCauley v. Hamilton Island Enterprises Pty. Ltd. (1986) 61 ALJR 235; 69 ALR 270. I am asked by the plaintiff to rule accordingly and to dismiss…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Rochford v Dayes

Details

AGLC: Rochford v Dayes [1989] HCA 17
Case: [1989] HCA 17
Decision Date: 6 March 1989

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Rochford v Dayes* concerned a dispute between the appellant, Rochford, and the respondent, Dayes, regarding the validity of a notice to quit served on Rochford. The matter came before Gaudron J of the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the notice to quit served by Dayes on Rochford was valid and effective in terminating Rochford's tenancy. This involved an examination of the requirements for a valid notice to quit under the relevant tenancy legislation.

Gaudron J considered the provisions of the *Landlord and Tenant (Control of Rents) Act 1942* (NSW) and the principles governing the service of notices to quit. Her Honour determined that the notice served by Dayes was defective because it did not specify the grounds upon which the tenancy was being terminated, as required by the Act. Consequently, the notice was invalid and did not operate to terminate the tenancy.

The Court therefore found in favour of Rochford, holding that the notice to quit was ineffective.

Orders