Robinson v Glennon

Case •

[2025] NSWSC 770

•

17 July 2025

No judgment structure available for this case.

Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Robinson v Glennon [2025] NSWSC 770
Hearing dates: 20 – 22 May 2025
Date of orders: 17 July 2025
Decision date: 17 July 2025
Jurisdiction:Equity
Before: Brereton J
Decision:

The parties are to propose orders to give effect to these reasons by 4pm on 24 July 2025

Catchwords:

SUCCESSION – family provision – intestacy – application for family provision order under s 57(1)(e) or (f) of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) – whether plaintiff is an eligible person – whether plaintiff was dependent on the deceased – whether deceased had a moral obligation or duty to provide for plaintiff – whether plaintiff was a member of the same household as deceased for a period – whether factors warranted plaintiff making an application pursuant to s 59(1)(b) – whether plaintiff a natural object of testamentary recognition in circumstances where she had an ‘on and off again’ relationship with the deceased – where defendant was administrator of the deceased’s estate and his sister – family provision application successful

Legislation Cited:

Succession Act 2006 (NSW)

Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) (repealed)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Ball v Newey (1988) 13 NSWLR 489

Chapple v Wilcox (2014) 87 NSWLR 646; [2014] NSWCA 392

Lodin v Lodin [2017] NSWCA 327

McKenzie v Baddeley [1991] NSWCA 197

Petrohilos v Hunter (1991) 25 NSWLR 343

Purnell v Tindale [2020] NSWSC 746

Re Fulop Deceased v Public Trustee (1987) 8 NSWLR 679

Re Russell [1970] QWN 22

Spata v Tumino (2018) 95 NSWLR 706; [2018] NSWCA 17

Tobin v Ezekiel (2012) 83 NSWLR 757; [2012] NSWCA 285

Vaughan v Hoskovich [2010] NSWSC 706

Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191; [2005] HCA 11

Wang v D’Ambrosio [1999] NSWSC 227

Yee v Yee [2017] NSWCA 305

Texts Cited:

Practice Note SC Eq 7

Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Kylie Robinson (plaintiff)
Vicki Glennon (defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
P Livingstone (plaintiff)
A Martin (defendant)

Solicitors:
CSS Legal (defendant)
No other appearances
File Number(s): 2024/151634
Publication restriction: N.A.

Judgment

Introduction

  1. These proceedings concern a claim by the plaintiff, Ms Kylie Robinson, for provision for her maintenance, education or advancement in life pursuant to s 59 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) out of the estate of Mr Geoffrey Baxter. Mr Baxter died intestate on 1 August 2023, aged 56 years old. The defendant is Ms Vicki Glennon, who was Mr Baxter’s sister. Ms Glennon was granted letters of administration in respect of Mr Baxter’s estate on 16 May 2025. Subject to the outcome of these proceedings, Ms Glennon will receive the whole of Mr Baxter’s estate under the intestacy provisions in the Succession Act, as his sister (see s 129). Mr Baxter had no other siblings, no children and no living parents.

  2. It is common ground that Mr Baxter and Ms Robinson had a relationship, but the precise nature, longevity and extent of this relationship was disputed. The relationship certainly was “toxic” at times, with episodes of domestic violence as well as substance abuse, especially but not limited to alcohol. They were living apart when Mr Baxter died and Ms Robinson did not learn of his death for six weeks. Ms Robinson’s evidence was that she left Mr Baxter’s house in about May 2023 “after another drunken and abusive outburst” from Mr Baxter. However, her evidence was that she still considered Mr Baxter to be her “de facto spouse and long-term partner”. Ms Glennon contends that the relationship, such as it was, had come to a permanent end.

  3. Mr Baxter’s estate includes a property located at Tyndale, where he lived. Ms Glennon estimates its value to be $330,000. His estate otherwise comprises a car ($30,000) and money in a bank account ($873). His estate has total estimated liabilities of $45,506.16, which means the estimated value of his net assets is $315,366.84.

  4. Ms Robinson does not contend that she has any entitlement under the intestacy provisions in Chapter 4 of the Succession Act.

  5. By way of summary, I have concluded that a family provision order should be made in favour of Ms Robinson. She is the only person to whom Mr Baxter owed a moral duty to make provision. While their relationship was marked by violence and periods of estrangement, Ms Robinson is the living person to whom Mr Baxter was closest over the last decade of his life. For many periods over that decade, she depended on him (mainly for accommodation), and he depended on her (mainly for domestic assistance). They had been engaged to be married. Her financial position now is poor and her needs are great. After allowing for expenses and (capped) legal costs incurred by Ms Glennon, she should have the whole of the estate. In money terms, Ms Robinson is likely to receive less than $200,000.

Is Ms Robinson an eligible person?

  1. Ms Robinson may apply for a family provision order if she is an “eligible person” within the meaning of s 57 of the Succession Act. She claims to be an eligible person by reason of s 57(1)(e) or (f), which are in the following terms:

(e)     a person—

(i)     who was, at any particular time, wholly or partly dependent on the deceased person, and

(ii)     who is a grandchild of the deceased person or was, at that particular time or at any other time, a member of the household of which the deceased person was a member,

  1. (f)   a person with whom the deceased person was living in a close personal relationship at the time of the deceased’s person’s death.

Section 57(1)(e)

  1. Section 57(1)(e) has two limbs. Ms Robinson relevantly must establish that:

  1. she was wholly or partly dependent on Mr Baxter at a particular time or times; and

  2. she was a member of the same household as Mr Baxter at a particular time or times.

The times in (1) do not have to overlap with the times in (2).

  1. Ms Robinson contended that she was partly dependent upon Mr Baxter. Ms Glennon contended that Ms Robinson was never “wholly or partly dependant” on Mr Baxter. She submitted that if anything, it appears that Mr Baxter was dependent upon Ms Robinson.

Legal principles

  1. There are several decisions from the Court of Appeal that address what is meant by “dependent” and “partly dependent”. Some of the decisions concern applications under the now repealed Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW), but the provision in that Act (see s 6) was relevantly the same as it is now in the Succession Act.

  2. In Petrohilos v Hunter (1991) 25 NSWLR 343 at 346D-F, Hope AJA (with whom Clarke and Sheller JJA agreed) wrote:

The word “dependent” is an ordinary English word, and whether a person is or has been wholly or partly dependent upon another is a question of fact. No doubt one of the commonest forms of dependence is a financial one, in the sense that the dependence flows from the fact that accommodation, food, clothing and other necessities or amenities of life are provided by the person who owns or is otherwise entitled to the accommodation and pays for the other things. But I do not think that the word, as used in the statute or otherwise, has this very limited meaning. In ordinary parlance, young children are properly and commonly said to be dependent on their mother as well as their father, regardless of where the money comes from. A contrary view, that young children are not dependent on their mother if she has no independent means, seems to me to be a misuse of language

  1. In Ball v Newey (1988) 13 NSWLR 489 at 491A-B Samuels JA (with whom Hope JA agreed) wrote:

“Dependent”, in the ordinary sense of the word, means the condition of depending on something or on someone for what is needed. In determining whether that relationship exists, it is relevant to bear in mind what was said by Sankey LJ in Lee v Munro (1928) 98 LJKB 49 at 53; 21 BWCC 401 at 408, that in “deciding whether or not there is dependency the factors to be considered are past events and future probabilities”. While it is true that here we are concerned with financial dependence and not emotional dependence, the whole relationship between the appellant and the deceased must be examined in the light of that statement in order to exclude situations which might present the simulacrum but not the substance of dependency.

  1. As to what is meant by the concept of “partly dependent”, in McKenzie v Baddeley [1991] NSWCA 197, Priestley JA (with whom Hope AJA agreed) observed at 6 that the word “partly” in its context is a word of some elasticity: it did not necessarily mean “substantially”, rather it suggested the meaning of “more than minimally” or perhaps “significantly”.

  2. In Tobin v Ezekiel (2012) 83 NSWLR 757; [2012] NSWCA 285, Meagher JA (with whom Basten and Campbell JJA agreed) held at [109]-[110] that dependency in this context means actual reliance on someone else for the total or partial satisfaction of some need and that dependency may exist irrespective of whether the dependent person is financially or physically able to support him or herself.

  3. The decision in Spata v Tumino (2018) 95 NSWLR 706; [2018] NSWCA 17 is a useful one because it concerns a case where there was a claim for dependency based on the provision of accommodation. The case concerned the matrimonial home of Gina and Ross. Ross was the registered proprietor. John was Ross’s son and Gina’s stepson. When John’s relationship with his wife broke down, Gina said to John (in Ross’s presence) “don’t worry, you can come and stay here”. John stayed with Gina and Ross for a couple of years. Payne JA concluded at [87] that in the absence of evidence of the role Gina played, if any, in the decision to allow John to reside in the home for the couple of years, he would not conclude that John was partly dependent upon Gina for accommodation. The analysis of the facts and conclusions drawn by Sackville AJA (Macfarlan and Payne JJA agreeing) at [150]-[152] is informative. By way of summary, his Honour observed that if Gina had played a significant part in the decision to encourage or at least to permit John to live with them well beyond the period immediately following the breakdown of John’s marriage, that would have been sufficient to establish that John was partly dependent on Gina for the provision of accommodation. However, the evidence suggested that the decision that John could stay was made by Ross and that Gina merely acquiesced in the situation.

The facts

  1. Ms Robinson and Mr Baxter commenced a relationship as a couple in about April 2014. During most of 2014, Ms Robinson lived in Murwillumbah but went to stay with Mr Baxter for a couple of nights every week or two. While she was there, she cooked and cleaned the house (which she said was “filthy”). Another man and woman also stayed at the house. Towards the end of 2014, Ms Robinson moved into the Tyndale property.

  2. In 2015, Ms Robinson continued to live primarily at Tyndale, but she says that Mr Baxter was “a very difficult person to live with” as he was abusive when he was drinking alcohol or smoking marijuana. Ms Robinson “regularly” took her things and stayed with a woman she knew in Grafton, sleeping on her couch. Sometimes she slept in her car. Mr Baxter would call her to apologise and she would return to the Tyndale property. In about April 2015, she was injured by a needle while cleaning the house and was admitted to hospital with hepatitis and cholecystitis. Later in the year, she spent a number of weeks or months in a drug rehabilitation facility. It is not clear on the evidence how long she remained in the program.

  3. Ms Robinson’s evidence was that in 2015, Mr Baxter asked her to marry him and she accepted. Ms Robinson’s evidence about getting engaged was challenged. Her credit as a witness was challenged although not to a significant degree. I do not accept the challenges to her evidence. My impression was that she was conscious of the need to be truthful in her evidence and gave truthful evidence. She denied that she was prepared to lie whenever it suited her purposes. She gave evidence that was contrary to her interests in the case and showed considerable candour.

  4. In early 2016, Ms Robinson spent about a month in Grafton prison for breach of a suspended sentence. She was released on parole to the Tyndale residence. During the year there were further incidents of domestic violence, with Ms Robinson leaving the house to stay with friends or sleeping rough after leaving or being thrown out, only for Mr Baxter to apologise and ask her to return. That was the cycle.

  5. In late 2016, Mr Baxter gave Ms Robinson an amethyst engagement ring. However, a few weeks later he got angry because she did not want to stay at Tyndale and he was violent and then burnt her clothes and furniture. During one of their fights at about that time he threw away the ring, probably when he threw her jewellery box over the verandah.

  6. During 2017, the relationship was “on and off”. Ms Robinson appears to have mainly lived away from Tyndale, and mostly in Coffs Harbour. But she would stay at Tyndale for a night or two every week or so. Her evidence was that Mr Baxter would call her and ask for her to return, and say that “I want you to come home, it is your home”. She did return after calls of this kind but only for short periods. She was concerned Mr Baxter was not eating properly and would bring him groceries. She spent about three months in prison late in 2017. Mr Baxter visited her while she was incarcerated.

  7. Ms Robinson was living with Mr Baxter at Tyndale in the first few months of 2018 but spent most of the balance of 2018 living in Brisbane with friends. She continued to be “on and off” with Mr Baxter, but they spoke regularly by telephone.

  8. From about September 2019 to February 2022, Ms Robinson was at least partly living with Mr Baxter. That was mainly at the Tyndale premises but they also spent time living with Mr Baxter’s father in Yamba during the COVID lockdown. Mr Baxter’s father died in August 2020. It is evident that during this time there continued to be fights between them and the cycle of Ms Robinson leaving and returning continued.

  9. It appears that over this general period the relationship between Ms Robinson and Mr Baxter was not entirely exclusive. Ms Robinson’s evidence was that she tried to distance herself from Mr Baxter, but that she always went back. In about 2019 she “started to try and have a relationship” with a woman. That failed and ended with the woman obtaining an apprehended violence order after Ms Robinson lost her temper “and said some things I probably shouldn’t have”, after discovering the woman was already seeing two other women.

  10. In the middle of 2020, while at the Yamba premises, there was a verbal altercation as Ms Robinson was attempting the leave the premises with her belongings. The police became involved. The police concluded that it was unnecessary to apply for an apprehended domestic violence order because the relationship was dissolved. Ms Robinson left the premises with a friend and her belongings.

  11. There was another incident in December 2020 involving the police. The police incident report stated that Ms Robinson and Mr Baxter often argue over money, that neither of them works and that Ms Robinson said she will leave Mr Baxter and never return. The report goes on to say that she “does however return and the cycle repeats with the honeymoon period becoming shorter and shorter”. Ms Robinson accepted that this was an accurate description of the relationship at that time. The report records that both Ms Robinson and Mr Baxter have drug and alcohol dependencies.

  12. In April 2021, Mr Baxter purchased and gave Ms Robinson a gold diamond pendant and two rings. Ms Robinson’s evidence, which I accept, is that Mr Baxter said: “we are engaged, I am so happy”.

  13. In August 2021, Mr Baxter had been drinking and “kicked” Ms Robinson out of bed and demanded her to leave because she was keeping him awake with her snoring. She left but returned later in the day to retrieve her phone. Mr Baxter refused to let her in. She became angry and broke the panel of a glass sliding door and entered the premises to recover her phone. Mr Baxter called the police and that resulted in a provisional apprehended domestic violence order being issued against her. The order meant that Ms Robinson was not to go within 200m of the Tyndale premises. It was put to Ms Robinson that Mr Baxter said something like: “leave this house and never come back”. Her answer was: “he used to say that to me a lot. In fact, he used to say to get all my stuff, as well, at the same time, and told me to get out”. Her evidence was that “we were always off and on”. A final apprehended domestic violence order was made on 14 July 2022, and it remained in place until Mr Baxter died.

  14. It is not clear where Ms Robinson was living in the months after the apprehended domestic violence order was issued in August 2021. In about early 2022, Ms Robinson began living at the Plantation Motel in Tyndale, where she was working as a cleaner.

  15. In February 2022, Ms Robinson went to Mr Baxter’s Tyndale property. Either a neighbour or Mr Baxter called the police, and Mr Baxter appears to have told the police that he considered the relationship was over. A couple of days later, Ms Robinson was arrested at the Plantation Motel, because she breached the apprehended domestic violence order and also was in breach of her bail. It appears that the Plantation Motel was within 200m of Mr Baxter’s residence. On 19 March 2022, Ms Robinson was arrested once again for breaching the apprehended domestic violence order.

  16. In late March 2022, Ms Robinson provided to police a USB stick that was said to include videos of Mr Baxter being physically abusive towards her in 2016. Mr Baxter was arrested but denied he had assaulted Ms Robinson. He was issued with an apprehended domestic violence order. Ms Robinson told the police that the relationship with Mr Baxter ended towards the end of 2021. Her evidence was that that was a lie, which she gave because of the apprehended domestic violence order that was in place. Her frank evidence was that she was prepared to lie to the police and to corrective services, who she perceived to be her enemy, because she was concerned that they were going to lock her up.

  17. Ms Robinson’s evidence was that after this time, and notwithstanding that they were both the subject of apprehended domestic violence orders, she and Mr Baxter continued to meet secretly, including at the local pub.

  18. In the latter part of December 2022, Ms Robinson was staying in Coffs Harbour, looking after the residential unit of a person she had met there. Her evidence was that she had suicidal thoughts at this time.

  19. Ms Robinson stayed with Mr Baxter at Tyndale between March 2023 and about May 2023. She left in about May “after another drunken and abusive outburst from” Mr Baxter. Ms Robinson’s evidence, which was not squarely challenged, was that before she left Mr Baxter said to her: “come back any time, it is your home and it always [will] be your home even if I am gone”. Ms Robinson’s evidence was that Mr Baxter frequently told her that “I am lucky to have you, you take care of me, you have been looking after me so well”.

  20. It does not appear that there was much or any contact between Ms Robinson and Mr Baxter from May 2023 until he died on 1 August 2023. Ms Robinson learned of his death via Facebook some six weeks after he died.

  21. Evidence was given by Ms Jennifer English, who was a neighbour at Tyndale. Her evidence was that as far as she knows, Ms Robinson was in the house with Mr Baxter for many years and she observed them regularly over the years at different times, including in April/May 2023. Ms Robinson also called evidence from an acquaintance by the name of Mr Michael Bennett. His evidence was that Ms Robinson and Mr Baxter visited him from time to time. He said that Mr Baxter told him “I am lucky and I could not ask for a better partner”. Ms Robinson sometimes told him, in Mr Baxter’s presence, that Mr Baxter was her long-term partner and that when they are at the house together “we are both fiery but we always reconcile after we apologise to each other”. He gave evidence that Mr Baxter told him in 2023 that “the AVO doesn’t stop Kylie and me seeing each other”. During the first half of 2023, they visited him together every two to three weeks, and on occasion they stayed overnight, sharing a bed. Evidence was also given by another close neighbour, Mr Chris Whitley. His evidence was that he perceived that Ms Robinson and Mr Baxter were living together as a couple from 2017. He saw them “once or twice a week at different times” and also heard them arguing.

  1. The evidence of Ms Glennon about the relationship between Mr Baxter and Ms Robinson included much of the dysfunction, but nothing of the positive aspects.

  2. Mr Baxter and Ms Glennon were both adopted at a young age. She is a retired nurse and lives in Sydney. Her evidence was that she has “a close relationship” with her brother. Her evidence was that she generally saw Mr Baxter twice a year, once around Anzac Day (an important day for their father) and again in about September or October. Her evidence was that she stayed overnight at Tyndale on one occasion in about 2017. She gave evidence that they spoke “monthly if not more often”, as she made it her business to check in with him, especially after their father died in 2020. Her evidence was that Mr Baxter told her on numerous occasions that Ms Robinson “was very volatile, abusive, aggressive and when on a drug bender she would lose it and they would then not see or speak to each other for a very extended period”.

  3. Ms Glennon’s evidence was attacked in cross-examination. It was put to her that she was overstating the connection she had with Mr Baxter, both in terms of frequency and emotional attachment. There was no objective evidence to demonstrate a close relationship between Mr Baxter and Ms Glennon. There were no photographs. Nor was there any contemporaneous evidence of communications, such as text messages. Ms Glennon says that she has no text messages because she gave up her old mobile phone (and number) when she retired as a full-time employee.

  4. Ms English’s evidence was that Mr Baxter was taken to hospital sometime before he died and she spoke to him while he was in the ambulance. She said she asked him: “Do you want me to call your sister?”, to which he replied “No, definitely not, we don’t speak”. Ms Robinson relied on this evidence to show antipathy between Mr Baxter and Ms Glennon. Ms Glennon relied on this evidence to show an absence of close relationship between Mr Baxter and Ms Robinson, because he did not ask for Ms English to call Ms Robinson.

  5. Mr Baxter did not have a strong engagement with Ms Glennon’s family. Ms Glennon’s evidence was that Mr Baxter did not attend her wedding or those of her children who have married, but that he was invited. Mr Baxter never met or spoke with Ms Glennon’s foster child.

  6. It was apparent from the cross-examination that Ms Glennon has a deep distrust and dislike of Ms Robinson; and it is evident that the feeling is mutual.

  7. Ms Glennon’s evidence was that Mr Baxter described Ms Robinson as his on-again/off-again friend or girlfriend, including in Ms Robinson’s presence. It was put to her that this was a convenient invention, which she denied. I accept that Mr Baxter described his relationship with Ms Robinson as on-again/off-again. The relationship was properly described as on-again/off-again. Ms Robinson’s own evidence was that she “had an on and off relationship” with Mr Baxter. I conclude that both Mr Baxter and Ms Robinson would have used that language to describe their relationship.

  8. Ms Glennon’s evidence is that she believed the relationship between Mr Baxter and Ms Robinson ended in 2021. While I accept that was her belief, I am satisfied that her belief was incorrect. The contact between Mr Baxter and Ms Robinson was less intensive after August 2021 when there was an apprehended domestic violence order, but they continued to meet and engage as a couple, including nights together, in defiance of apprehended domestic violence orders, until about May 2023.

  9. I do not accede to the submission that I should reject Ms Glennon’s evidence about her relationship with Mr Baxter. I accept that they spoke by telephone on a semi-regular basis (roughly fortnightly or monthly) and that they saw each other (usually for a few hours) generally twice a year. I conclude that Mr Baxter sometimes spoke to Ms Glennon about Ms Robinson in unflattering terms. I accept that at times during the relationship Mr Baxter made adverse comment about Ms Robinson’s behaviour, without disclosing his own poor conduct. If Mr Baxter was making an objective assessment, he would also admit to his own fault in the toxic aspects of the relationship. It is likely that Mr Baxter was not fulsome in discussing his relationship with Ms Robinson when he spoke with his sister. Ms Glennon’s evidence was that he did not want to talk about Ms Robinson to her. It is clear that Mr Baxter withheld matters from Ms Glennon. There is objective evidence supporting the conclusion that Mr Baxter purchased jewellery for Ms Robinson, including rings, and I have accepted that Mr Baxter spoke of them being engaged. But he did not share these matters with Ms Glennon. I conclude that Mr Baxter was conscious that Ms Glennon disapproved of Ms Robinson and so he was not forthcoming about matters concerning Ms Robinson in his discussions with Ms Glennon.

  10. The result is that while I do not accept that Ms Glennon’s evidence was untruthful, I conclude that she was not able to provide full or wholly reliable evidence about the relationship between Mr Baxter and Ms Robinson. That is because her main contact with her brother was by telephone and Mr Baxter did not discuss Ms Robinson in detail with her. Ms Glennon heard about the worst in Ms Robinson. But the evidence is that the drugs, the alcohol and the violence was fuelled as much by Mr Baxter as by Ms Robinson. Mr Baxter was not merely a victim to Ms Robinson. Mr Baxter had serious drug and alcohol dependencies and was verbally and physically abusive towards Ms Robinson. Much of Ms Glennon’s evidence about the relationship between Ms Robinson and Mr Baxter conforms with the evidence of Ms Robinson and other evidence, but it only paints the worst of that relationship. I am not satisfied that Ms Glennon was able to address other aspects of the relationship, including the positive elements or Mr Baxter’s contribution to the toxic aspects, because she was not fully informed and her perspective was shaped by antagonism towards Ms Robinson.

  11. It is impossible to draw conclusions about how many nights Ms Robinson spent with Mr Baxter at the Tyndale premises over the nine years before he died. She came and went a lot, consistently with a relationship that was, to use her words, “on and off”. It is clear that there were ferocious arguments and she would leave, but that would be followed by reconciliation and she would return. Ms Robinson’s counsel described the relationship as one that was at times “toxic” and that was a fair description. Over the course of the nine years, she probably spent hundreds of nights, if not more, living at Tyndale with Mr Baxter. When she was there it was as Mr Baxter’s partner and she was encouraged by him to stay. She never paid any rent. She did not own any property of her own. Usually, when she was not at Tyndale (and she was not incarcerated) she relied on the generosity of people she knew to provide accommodation. Sometimes she had no place to stay. There were periods where she was able to rent premises or stay at a motel.

  12. I am satisfied in these circumstances that Ms Robinson was partly dependent on Mr Baxter to provide her accommodation from time to time over nine years from 2014. It may be that Mr Baxter was also partly dependent on her, for cleaning, cooking and the provision of necessities. But that does not mean she was not partly dependent on him.

  13. I am also satisfied that Ms Robinson was a member of the same household as Mr Baxter from time to time. I did not understand this to be seriously in dispute. Henry J has observed that central to the concept of being a member of a household is people “living together” in a home: Purnell v Tindale [2020] NSWSC 746 at [159]. It is plain that Ms Robinson and Mr Baxter spent time living together at Tyndale.

  14. It follows that I am satisfied that Mr Robinson is an “eligible person”.

Section 57(1)(f)

  1. I am not satisfied that Ms Robinson qualifies as an eligible person under s 57(1)(f). In order to qualify under s 57(1)(f), Ms Robinson had to be living with Mr Baxter at the time of his death. Ms Robinson could not lawfully live with Mr Baxter after August 2021. Notwithstanding the apprehended domestic violence orders, she spent some time living in the Tyndale premises after that date. However, she had moved out of the premises in May 2023, approximately three months before Mr Baxter died. There is no evidence that she spent any time at the Tyndale premises from May 2023.

  2. Ms Robinson relied on the decision in Vaughan v Hoskovich [2010] NSWSC 706. In that case White J observed (at [53]):

… But it seems to me that the maintenance of separate residences is not inconsistent with the parties living together as a couple, provided that there is sufficient shared residence over a long enough period to amount to “living together”. Parties can live together for part of a week and also live apart, for part of a week. Although living apart for some periods, they can still live together as a couple if all the circumstances indicate that they are “a couple”. I accept that the phrase “living together as a couple” connotes that the persons will live together in a place which can be said to be their home, but a person can have more than one home…

That decision concerned the criteria for determining whether parties were in a de facto relationship, and so the context is a little different.

  1. It is true that Ms Robinson and Mr Baxter had a long history of living together, then apart, then together again. Often while they were apart they would each have considered the relationship off, and possibly over. If Mr Baxter had not died, they could easily have reunited at some point, and their on and off relationship may have continued. However, in circumstances where it had been “off” for some three months, I do not consider that it can be said that they were living together when Mr Baxter died. That conclusion is not inconsistent with Vaughan v Hoskovich.

Are there factors that warrant the making of an application?

  1. Given that Ms Robinson is an eligible person by reason of s 57(1)(e), I may make a family provision order only if I am satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances, there are factors which warrant the making of the application. This follows from s 59(1) of the Succession Act, which relevantly provides:

(1)     The Court may, on application under Division 1, make a family provision order in relation to the estate of a deceased person, if the Court is satisfied that—

(a)     the person in whose favour the order is to be made is an eligible person, and

(b)     in the case of a person who is an eligible person by reason only of paragraph (d), (e) or (f) of the definition of eligible person in section 57—having regard to all the circumstances of the case (whether past or present) there are factors which warrant the making of the application, and

(c)     at the time when the Court is considering the application, adequate provision for the proper maintenance, education or advancement in life of the person in whose favour the order is to be made has not been made by the will of the deceased person, or by the operation of the intestacy rules in relation to the estate of the deceased person, or both.

The requirements in (a) to (c) are cumulative.

  1. For the reasons given above, the requirement of s 59(1)(a) is met.

  2. As to s 59(1)(b), it is for Ms Robinson to establish that there are factors warranting her application. This is a jurisdictional question: Yee v Yee [2017] NSWCA 305 at [112]. In Re Fulop Deceasedv Public Trustee (1987) 8 NSWLR 679, McLelland J held (at 681) that the “factors” referred to in s 9 of the Family Provision Act (now reflected in s 59 of the Succession Act) are factors which when added to facts which render the applicant an “eligible person”, give him or her the status of a person who would be generally regarded as a natural object of testamentary recognition by a deceased. This passage was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Lodin v Lodin [2017] NSWCA 327 at [5] (White JA) and [114] (Sackville AJA). Sackville AJA also observed:

Those circumstances must go beyond the bare fact of a familial (or, in the case of a former spouse, a previous familial) relationship. The factors relied on must be such as to demonstrate a social, domestic or moral obligation on the testator to make some provision for the claimant.

Strictly speaking, Mr Baxter was not a testator because he died intestate. Nevertheless, these observations would seem to apply with equal force. The focus on the moral obligation on the deceased does not mean, however, that the Court should look to the obligations of the deceased on the date of death. That is because s 59(1)(b) expressly requires the Court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, “whether past or present”.

  1. One way to conceptualise the task is by reference to an imaginary will. In Re Russell [1970] QWN 22, Lucas J said the following with respect to the relevant Queensland legislation (at 22):

The shares in the estate which accrue to the various persons entitled to share in the distribution accrue to them, generally speaking, by operation of law and not as the result of any conscious or deliberate act on the part of the deceased, although it is of course possible that a man might make a deliberate decision not to make a will. It seems to me that the most practical way to look at the matter is to imagine that the deceased had made a will whereby he directed that his estate should be distributed as on intestacy, and then to consider the needs and moral claims of the persons who benefit from a distribution in this manner.

This passage was cited by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191 at 215. The imaginary will may be a convenient tool but once again it cannot distract from the fact that the Court is to consider whether circumstances after death give rise to factors which warrant the making of an application.

  1. The task for the purpose of s 59(1)(b) is to determine whether there are factors which warrant the making of an application. There may exist factors which warrant the making of an application, but at the same time other factors that would have the result that the application will fail: Lodin v Lodin at [119]. Nevertheless, it appears that for the purposes of s 59(1)(b) it is not sufficient merely to identify whether there are some factors that warrant an application, even if there be other factors that speak against an application. In Chapple v Wilcox (2014) 87 NSWLR 646; [2014] NSWCA 392, Basten JA (Gleeson JA agreeing) held (at 15]) that the “critical error” on the part of the primary judge was to fail to give adequate consideration to matters that pointed away from a social, domestic or moral obligation. I proceed on the basis that the correct approach is to weigh all the matters to determine whether there remain factors (which are not offset by countervailing considerations) that mean that there was a social, domestic or moral obligation on the part of the deceased to provide for the claimant. In ascertaining whether there is such an obligation, it is appropriate and may be necessary to take into account things about which the deceased was unaware, including because they reflect events that took place after death.

  2. In this case there are competing matters that speak for and against a social, domestic or moral obligation on the part of Mr Baxter to provide for Ms Robinson. I weigh those matters in the following paragraphs.

  3. The matters that point towards an obligation that I consider to be relevant are:

  1. Ms Robinson was the only person with whom Mr Baxter had a romantic, domestic relationship in the last nine years of his life, and was the closest thing he had to a love of his life. I accept that in happy times, Mr Baxter and Ms Robinson considered themselves engaged to be married.

  2. While Ms Robinson lived in various addresses during her relationship with Mr Baxter, the closest thing she had as a home over that period (although to a lesser degree after August 2021) was the residence at Tyndale. She kept returning there, often at Mr Baxter’s request. At times he told her that she made him happy and that the Tyndale residence was, and always would be, her home.

  3. When Ms Robinson resided at the Tyndale residence, she was the person who, generally speaking, undertook the cooking, cleaning, laundry, garden maintenance and cut his hair. She contributed to household expenses, such as groceries.

  4. Ms Robinson has no assets and relies on Centrelink payments to survive. She has been residing at the Tyndale premises since about September 2023 (shortly after she learned of Mr Baxter’s death) and has no other place to go, without relying on the charity of friends (of whom she has few). She has various health issues.

  1. Matters that point against an obligation are:

  1. At the time of Mr Baxter’s death, his relationship with Ms Robinson was “off”, and had been for some months. Their relationship over many years had been punctuated with violence, anger, hateful episodes and estrangement. It is possible that the final estrangement would have been permanent even if Mr Baxter had not died, but the history of their relationship means it is impossible to know. Ms Robinson was trying to move on from Mr Baxter, and it is probable that he was trying to move on from her. However, their various previous attempts to “move on” had failed.

  2. At the time of Mr Baxter’s death, each was subject to an apprehended domestic violence order concerning the other. Police had been involved to deal with various disputes between them. On the face of it, one could question any obligation to make provision for a person against whom there was an extant apprehended domestic violence order.

  3. Ms Robinson has been living at the Tyndale premises rent free for nearly two years, and if there was any kind of obligation, it is now spent.

  1. Weighing these matters together, I conclude that Ms Robinson would be regarded as a natural object of testamentary recognition by Mr Baxter. At first blush it seems a strange outcome that Ms Robinson would be regarded in this way given that when he died, Mr Baxter and Ms Robinson could not lawfully come close to each other because of mutual apprehended domestic violence orders. But that would fail to give regard to their relationship as a whole. It was a relationship between two people who were both anti-social by nature, who had drug and alcohol issues and were both prone to anger and violence. But through that they shared a bond that kept bringing them together as partners. There were many times over many years where they were happy and loving. But that bond was tested time and time again by violence and rage. They continued to meet in defiance of the apprehended domestic violence orders to which each of them was bound. In thinking of the persons to whom Mr Baxter might be thought to have some kind of testamentary obligation, the woman with whom he had intimately shared much of his life over the previous nine years is such a person, notwithstanding that they had been estranged for several months before he died. For these reasons, I am satisfied of the matters in s 59(1)(b).

  2. The requirement in s 59(1)(c) is met in this case because there is no provision for the proper maintenance, education or advancement in life of Ms Robinson by the operation of the intestacy rules.

  3. It follows that the Court may make a family provision order in relation to the estate of Mr Baxter in favour of Ms Robinson.

Whether to make family provision order and the nature of any order

  1. For the purpose of determining whether to make a family provision order and the nature of any such order, the Court may have regard to the matters set out in s 60(2). They are as follows:

  1. any family or other relationship between the applicant and the deceased person, including the nature and duration of the relationship,

  1. the nature and extent of any obligations or responsibilities owed by the deceased person to the applicant, to any other person in respect of whom an application has been made for a family provision order or to any beneficiary of the deceased person’s estate,

  2. the nature and extent of the deceased person’s estate (including any property that is, or could be, designated as notional estate of the deceased person) and of any liabilities or charges to which the estate is subject, as in existence when the application is being considered,

  3. the financial resources (including earning capacity) and financial needs, both present and future, of the applicant, of any other person in respect of whom an application has been made for a family provision order or of any beneficiary of the deceased person’s estate,

  4. if the applicant is cohabiting with another person—the financial circumstances of the other person,

  5. any physical, intellectual or mental disability of the applicant, any other person in respect of whom an application has been made for a family provision order or any beneficiary of the deceased person’s estate that is in existence when the application is being considered or that may reasonably be anticipated,

  6. the age of the applicant when the application is being considered,

  7. any contribution (whether financial or otherwise) by the applicant to the acquisition, conservation and improvement of the estate of the deceased person or to the welfare of the deceased person or the deceased person’s family, whether made before or after the deceased person’s death, for which adequate consideration (not including any pension or other benefit) was not received, by the applicant,

  8. any provision made for the applicant by the deceased person, either during the deceased person’s lifetime or made from the deceased person’s estate,

  9. any evidence of the testamentary intentions of the deceased person, including evidence of statements made by the deceased person,

  10. whether the applicant was being maintained, either wholly or partly, by the deceased person before the deceased person’s death and, if the Court considers it relevant, the extent to which and the basis on which the deceased person did so,

  11. whether any other person is liable to support the applicant,

  12. the character and conduct of the applicant before and after the date of the death of the deceased person,

  13. the conduct of any other person before and after the date of the death of the deceased person,

  14. any relevant Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander customary law,

  15. any other matter the Court considers relevant, including matters in existence at the time of the deceased person’s death or at the time the application is being considered.

  1. I have already considered various matters that are covered in this list of matters for the purposes of determining whether Ms Robinson is an eligible person and whether there are factors warranting the making of an application for a family provision order.

The estate

  1. There is evidence that the Tyndale property is worth in the range of $300,000-$330,000. It is subject to a mortgage in the amount of $31,579.71 (and is currently in default). There are outstanding water rates ($364.35) and council rates ($2,013.67). Ms Robinson has been living in the premises, without permission and without paying rent, since about September 2023. A rental appraisal from December 2024 suggests that the property would generate rental income of $410-$450 per week. On the basis that Ms Robinson has been living there for about 60 weeks, that could be seen as a value to Ms Robinson of somewhere in the order of $24,600-$27,000.

  2. There is evidence that Mr Baxter purchased the Tyndale property in about 1998 for $105,000. It appears that the acquisition was funded at least in part by his father (the extent of the contribution is uncertain given that the property is still subject to a mortgage). Ms Robinson made no contribution to that acquisition. She helped to clean and maintain the premises while she lived there. But it is apparent that the property was in a poor and unclean state when Mr Baxter died.

  3. The estate also includes a Subaru motor vehicle worth approximately $30,000. Mr Baxter purchased that car from an inheritance of $272,000 that he received from his father in 2021. There was no balance from that inheritance left when he died. There is evidence that the balance was withdrawn in cash and spent or was lost on Mr Baxter’s online gaming activities.

  4. There are other modest assets and liabilities. Based on an estimated value of the Tyndale premises of $330,000, Ms Glennon’s evidence is that the net assets of the estate are $315,366.84.

Ms Robinson’s circumstances

  1. Ms Robinson is about 55 years of age.

  2. She has had various paying jobs during her life, including as a kitchen hand, greyhound trainer and cleaner. She currently is unemployed and relies on “Centrelink payments to pay for food and expenses and bills”. She has no other income. Her evidence is that she has been “diagnosed with ODD, PTSD and ADHD”, although there is no medical evidence and no evidence about the expected impact of any medical conditions in the future. Her evidence was that she has no money to pay for ongoing health treatment, but there was no evidence about the anticipated expenses.

  3. Ms Robinson purchased a car in April this year for $1,800 using “my flood money”, as well as a chainsaw, whippersnipper and lawn mower, for $150. It does not appear that she has any other assets and has no savings.

  4. Ms Robinson’s evidence was that Mr Baxter told her that he bought the Subaru for her because she needed a reliable car. However, the car was in his name and the evidence is that Mr Baxter made decisions about whether she could drive the car and denied her the opportunity to do so at various times. I am not satisfied that Mr Baxter made a gift of the car to her. The car is part of Mr Baxter’s estate. It appears that the car has been in Ms Glennon’s possession since shortly after Mr Baxter’s death.

  5. Ms Robinson has children, but it appears her relationship with them is not close. There is no evidence that there is anyone she can reasonably look to for financial support. She has a distrust of people generally and does not have an extensive social network to whom she can turn to meet her needs.

  6. Ms Robinson has had a troubled life. Drug and alcohol abuse have been a cause of serious difficulties, although her unchallenged evidence was that she did not use drugs for more than nine and a half years prior to meeting Mr Baxter. She is prone to fits of anger and aggressive behaviour. While she freely admitted that she frequently lied to police and prison authorities, her evidence before me was coherent and there was no strong or effective attack to her credit on the substance of her evidence. I am satisfied that she brings an application for a family provision order in circumstances where she has a desperate need for help to provide for her basic needs associated with accommodation, food and health care.

Ms Glennon

  1. In the absence of a family provision order, and subject to legal costs (see below), Ms Glennon will receive the whole of Mr Baxter’s estate.

  2. Ms Glennon is about 56 years of age. She has some health issues that mean that she can only work on a casual basis as a nurse approximately three to four days a week. She is married. Her husband is about 67 years of age and works two days per week at Bunnings. He too has some health issues, including aortic valve and lung problems. They live in a unit in Castle Hill, which they own. Her superannuation balance is approximately $280,000 and her husband has a superannuation balance of approximately $120,000. They have savings of around $20,000.

  3. Ms Glennon and her husband are foster carers for an 11 year old Indigenous boy. They anticipate this will continue for at least 12 to 18 months. They receive a Centrelink payment of $656 per fortnight in respect of the foster arrangements, of which more than half is spent on toll and fuel costs to transport the boy to and from school (some 33 kilometres from where they live).

  4. Ms Glennon’s evidence was that she has limited contingency for life and potential surgeries (if she chose not to be on the public wait list). Her evidence was that her superannuation is limited and will not provide financial security for her future. She seeks a contingency to add to her superannuation so that she can continue to pay for the normal expenses of life.

  5. Overall, by way of summary, Ms Glennon and her husband have the security of owning their residence and continue to earn income on a part-time and casual basis. They have combined superannuation of approximately $400,000. This affords them a reasonable amount of financial security. Their savings are modest and their ability to fund the prospect of medical conditions as they age and finish work is limited, although there is little evidence about those possible costs. Their financial security is significantly superior, and their needs are significantly less, compared with Ms Robinson.

Testamentary intentions

  1. While Ms Robinson gave evidence that Mr Baxter said to her many times that “You can always live in the house, this is your home, I want you to have a roof over your head…” and that when she left the premises on the last occasion before Mr Baxter died he told her the house would be “your home even if I am gone”, I do not regard this as sufficiently definite as to evince a testamentary intention. At least for the most part, it is consistent with Mr Baxter saying that she was always welcome to live there while he was. It is also apparent that Mr Baxter’s attitude about this was not constant. I would not conclude that in the weeks before he died (or at any time) that it was his firm subjective intention to leave the house to Ms Robinson if he died. His true testamentary intention (if any) is unknown.

  2. I do not conclude that Mr Baxter revealed a testamentary intention to favour Ms Glennon by choosing not to make a will in the expectation that she would inherit his assets by virtue of the intestacy rules in the Succession Act. I would not assume or conclude that level of sophistication on his part.

Costs

  1. Mr Baxter’s estate is modest. With an estate of that size, the issue of legal costs becomes acute.

  2. Ms Robinson had been represented by two different law firms but became unrepresented about a month before the final hearing. There is no evidence about whether she has incurred any costs or has any liability to her former solicitors. Mr Livingstone of counsel agreed to appear for Ms Robinson on a pro bono basis, after I referred the matter to the Registrar for referral to a solicitor or barrister on the panel for pro bono assistance, pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 7.36 and 7.41. Mr Livingstone’s involvement substantially assisted the administration of justice.

  3. Mr Livingstone made submissions about the way that the litigation was conducted, including that Ms Glennon was reckless in terms of the costs she was incurring or that, looking back, she took points that were not necessary and incurred costs and expenses that were entirely unnecessary. An example he gave concerned the contest that occurred about whether the three witnesses relied upon by Ms Robinson could give evidence by audio-visual link or whether they were required to travel to Sydney. In the end, two of those witnesses were not required for cross-examination and Ms English was cross-examined very briefly by audio-visual link, without any challenge to her credit. With the benefit of hindsight, it may be possible to criticise the costs incurred on this issue, but it is not easy to draw firm conclusions without a full assessment of the circumstances as they existed at the time decisions were taken.

  4. Mr Livingstone referred to Wang v D’Ambrosio [1999] NSWSC 227. In that case, Hodgson CJ in Eq was considering an application in favour of an executor on the usual trustee or indemnity basis, and held (at [76]):

In my opinion it is not appropriate to do that in this case, for two reasons. One reason is what appears to be the disproportion of the costs incurred to what was involved in the case, both in terms of the size of the estate and the issues being fought. The other is that it seems to me that the case has been conducted with some animus on the part of the executor as fairly extreme adversary proceedings. In those circumstances, while I am not prepared to deprive the executor of costs, I think the order for costs should be on a party and party basis, so there has to be some justification given for the amount of costs that have been incurred.

While it was evident from Ms Glennon’s evidence that she holds some animus towards Ms Robinson and there was a high level of distrust, I would not describe the proceedings as “fairly extreme adversary proceedings”.

  1. Ms Robinson cannot be absolved of responsibility for some unnecessary costs being incurred by Ms Glennon. Ms Robinson was antagonistic to Ms Glennon (and to her solicitor) and her lack of cooperation with them increased costs. She left it to Ms Glennon’s lawyers to prepare the Court Book. Ms Robinson failed to appear at some directions hearings when she was acting for herself, leading to wasted Court time. Court time at the final hearing was lost because of issues concerning the preparation of Ms Robinson’s affidavit evidence which had to be cured – which resulted in a hearing requiring three days when two should have been sufficient. That resulted in extra cost that can only be attributed to Ms Robinson.

  2. Practice Note SC Eq 7 provides that orders may be made capping the costs that may be recovered by a party in cases where the value of the estate is less than $1,000,000. The value of the estate in this case is less than half that amount. Mr Martin, counsel for Ms Glennon, submitted that in an estate of the size of Mr Baxter’s, there should be an expectation that costs will be capped.

  3. Ms Glennon’s solicitor, Mr Spagnolo, filed an affidavit made on 12 May 2025 that states that he expects Ms Glennon’s costs at the end of a three-day hearing, calculated on an indemnity basis, to be $154,960, made up of solicitor costs ($94,500), counsel fees ($55,500) and disbursements ($2,452.07). These costs were an estimate. Mr Livingstone railed against these numbers, submitting that it was “absolutely extraordinary” that these amounts could be incurred given the size of the estate. Mr Martin told me he has not yet rendered an account.

Orders sought

  1. The application that was advanced for Ms Robinson was that she should receive the whole of the estate (subject to the mortgage), and that the Subaru should be returned to her. It was accepted that monies paid for insurance in respect of the premises, as well as funeral and testamentary costs, should be met. It was also accepted that something should be allowed for Ms Glennon’s legal costs, but they should be capped. Otherwise, it was submitted, she should get the estate.

  2. The submission made for Ms Glennon was that the application should be dismissed. It was submitted that the claims were unmeritorious and should never have been brought. It was submitted that the Court should order that Ms Robinson pay Ms Glennon’s costs.

Evaluation

  1. Given that Mr Baxter died intestate and there was no reliable evidence of any testamentary intentions, there is no question in this case of the Court departing from the testamentary acts or wishes of Mr Baxter. His failure was in not making a will or taking some other step to seek to give effect to his testamentary wishes (if he had any). The intestacy rules would apply to leave his entire estate to Ms Glennon. I have found that Ms Robinson is an eligible person to make an application for a family provision order. Ms Glennon, never having been dependent on Mr Baxter, would not have been an eligible person if the intestacy rules had left the estate to Ms Robinson.

  2. In terms of need, there is no question that Ms Robinson’s are much greater than those of Ms Glennon. Ms Glennon owns her home with her husband. They are employed, although not full-time. They have a not immaterial amount of superannuation. I accept that their earning capacity will diminish as they age and they have some health issues that may involve expense in future years. Further assets will provide them with some additional financial security.

  3. By contrast, Ms Robinson really has no financial or other resources. She has no assets and no income, save for social security. She too has health issues and anticipates medical needs.

  4. Ms Robinson’s final separation from Mr Baxter may have been final, but based on the history of their relationship that is impossible to say. Over the nine years since they commenced a relationship, there had been many occasions where they had broken apart but only to reunite. Despite the violence and rage that was a constant between them, there was also a connection that brought them times of happiness and love.

  5. If I consider the issue by reference to what I consider to be moral duty or obligation, I do not consider that Mr Baxter had any such duty or obligation to Ms Glennon. She was an adult sibling who was financially, physically and socially in a far superior position to Mr Baxter. She has fared better in life than her brother and is in a stable domestic and relatively secure financial position. As I have indicated, if Mr Baxter had left his estate to anyone else, she could not have made any application for a family provision order. I do not consider that she has a relevant competing moral claim to the estate.

  6. In the circumstances of this case, once I was satisfied that Ms Robinson is an eligible person and that there are factors which warrant the making of an application by Ms Robinson, the conclusion that Ms Robinson’s application should succeed is a relatively easy step. Ms Robinson is the only person to whom Mr Baxter owed a moral duty to make provision. She was a partner who cared for and loved him and, I would conclude, brought him the most happiness that he was able to enjoy in the last nine years of his life. I accept that at times he wished to have nothing more to do with her, or her with him. She was violent towards him and he towards her. But there was a connection that kept bringing them together, even notwithstanding mutual apprehended domestic violence orders. I do not accept that the only thing that brought them together was a mutual attraction or addiction to drugs.

  7. Given Ms Robinson’s circumstances, including through to the date of the trial, and taking into account the whole of the relationship between Mr Baxter and Ms Robinson, I conclude that Mr Baxter should have made whatever provision he could (modest though it was) to give Ms Robinson the prospect of having accommodation and her daily needs met.

  8. It follows that Ms Robinson’s application will succeed.

  9. I have some insight into Ms Glennon’s costs but not a great deal. Applying a broad brush, I am inclined to cap the costs at $100,000. That is about two-thirds of the expected total costs calculated on a full indemnity basis. As presently informed, I consider that those costs should come from the estate. Ms Glennon should also be reimbursed on an indemnity basis for steps undertaken to secure and perform the administration of the estate, including funeral expenses and costs associated with any reasonable upkeep or protection of the premises. I do not have complete details of all those matters. The estate will have to bear the cost of discharging the mortgage and cover outstanding amounts for rates and the like.

  10. I assume that it will (unfortunately) be necessary to sell the Tyndale premises in order for Ms Glennon to recover the costs and expenses that I refer to in the previous paragraph. The Subaru will likewise have to be sold (or transferred to Ms Robinson).

  11. I am anxious to avoid further and unnecessary legal costs being incurred. However, there will inevitably be some further costs in giving effect to these reasons.

  1. I would give Ms Glennon the opportunity to provide: (1) brief submissions about whether she would wish to contest the cap of $100,000; and (b) a full list of testamentary and like expenses in respect of which she seeks an indemnity. Ms Robinson will have an opportunity to respond.

  2. There are some important steps to be taken in the administration of the estate, including the likely sale of the Tyndale premises. Ms Robinson, in particular, is interested in the sale price being as high as possible.

  3. Inevitably, there will need to be co-operation between Ms Glennon and Ms Robinson. That has proved to be very difficult in the past.

  4. This is Ms Robinson’s application. I will need to hear from her (or her legal representatives) about how she considers the Court should give effect to these reasons. I cannot of course compel her to secure the services of solicitors. It seems to be clear, however, that the sale of assets will occur more efficiently and satisfactorily for Ms Robinson if she engages solicitors to assist her in the steps to be taken to secure for her the full fruits of this judgment.

Orders

  1. The parties are to propose orders to give effect to these reasons by 4pm on 24 July 2025.

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Decision last updated: 17 July 2025

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Cases Citing This Decision

1

Robinson v Glennon (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 1120
Cases Cited

15

Statutory Material Cited

3

Chisak v Presot [2022] NSWCA 100
Chisak v Presot [2022] NSWCA 100
Chapple v Wilcox [2014] NSWCA 392