Robinson v Blackheart Industries Pty Ltd and Ors (No.3)
[2015] FCCA 2542
•17 September 2015
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ROBINSON v BLACKHEART INDUSTRIES PTY LTD & ORS (No.3) | [2015] FCCA 2542 |
| Catchwords: COSTS – Whether it is appropriate for costs to be assessed on a basis different from that provided under Schedule 1 to the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) – factors relevant to determining whether to assess costs on a basis different from that provided for in Schedule 1. |
| Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s.570(2)(b) |
| Buckland v Watts [1970] 1 Q.B. 27 Elders Trustee and Executor Company Ltd; Estate of Howard v Estate of Herbert (1996) 132 FLR 24 Hinchliffe v University of Sydney (No.2) [2004] FMCA 640 Kazar (Liquidator) v Kargarian; In the Matter of Frontier Architects Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2011] FCAFC 136 Pierson’s Pro-Health Pty Ltd & Ors v Silvex Nominees Pty Ltd & Anor (No.3) [2010] FMCA 250 Robinson v Blackheart Industries Pty Ltd & Ors [2014] FCCA 1353 Robinson v Blackheart Industries Pty Ltd (In Liq) & Ors [2013] FCCA 1829 |
| Applicant: | PAUL ROBINSON |
| First Respondent: | BLACKHEART INDUSTRIES PTY LTD ACN 128 543 304 |
| Second Respondent: | KYLE ARNOLD |
| Third Respondent | BEVERLY ARNOLD |
| File Number: | SYG 2407 of 2012 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Manousaridis |
| Hearing date: | 25 September 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 17 September 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr T Glover |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | FCB Workplace Law |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr N Smith |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Clinch Long Letherbarrow Lawyers |
ORDERS
The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of the application in a case that was the subject of the orders made on 8 November 2013.
The second respondent’s costs referred to in order 1 are set in the amount of $7,647.56.
The second respondent pay the costs of Matthew Robinson of the application in a case that was the subject of the orders made on 27 June 2014.
The costs of Matthew Robinson referred to in order 3 are set in the amount of $7,786.50
Each of the applicant and the second respondent pay the costs referred to in orders 2 and 4 by 15 October 2015.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2407 of 2012
| PAUL ROBINSON |
Applicant
And
| BLACKHEART INDUSTRIES PTY LTD (IN LIQ) ACN 128 543 304 |
First Respondent
| KYLE ARNOLD |
Second Respondent
| BEVERLY ARNOLD |
Third Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
Before the Court are two applications for orders for costs. One is brought by Mr Matthew Robinson (Mr Robinson), the solicitor for the applicant. That application relates to the orders I made on 27 June 2014 dismissing an application the second respondent, Mr Arnold, brought against Mr Robinson for an order under r.21.07 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FCC Rules).[1] The second application, which is brought by Mr Arnold, relates to the orders I made on 8 November 2013 in favour of Mr Arnold that the applicant destroy documents that came into his possession as a result of the applicant’s gaining unauthorised access to documents produced on subpoena.[2]
[1] Robinson v Blackheart Industries Pty Ltd & Ors [2014] FCCA 1353
[2] Robinson v Blackheart Industries Pty Ltd (In Liq) & Ors [2013] FCCA 1829
Mr Robinson’s application for costs
Mr Arnold does not dispute Mr Robinson is entitled to an order for costs. He submits, however, that he is entitled to no more than $6,518.50. That amount has been calculated by applying Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the FCC Rules. Mr Robinson, on the other hand, claims $22,500. This represents 60% of counsel’s fees Mr Robinson incurred in defending Mr Arnold’s application for a personal costs order against Mr Robinson under r.21.07 of the FCC Rules.
Before I examine the parties’ competing submissions, it would be useful to identify the principal provisions governing the awarding of costs in this Court, and the underlying principles that should guide me in the determination of the applications before me.
Principles
The starting point is s.79(2) of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) (FCC Act) which provides:
The Federal Circuit Court of Australia or a Judge has jurisdiction to award costs in all proceedings before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (including proceedings dismissed for want of jurisdiction) other than proceedings in respect of which any other Act provides that costs must not be awarded.
Subsection 79(1) of the FCC Act provides that s.79 does not apply to, among other things, proceedings in relation to a matter arising under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). Although Mr Arnold’s application for a personal costs order against Mr Robinson arose as a result of Mr Robinson’s acting in a proceeding brought under the FW Act, Mr Arnold does not submit that his application against Mr Robinson is a proceeding arsing under that Act.
The key expression in s.79(2) of the FCC Act is “jurisdiction to award costs”, and the central word in that expression is “costs”. Although not defined in the FCC Act, the word “costs” has a well-established meaning in legal practice. It includes the “remuneration of a solicitor for professional services rendered to a client”.[3] The word is also often used to include “disbursements”; that is, money which the client or the client’s lawyer “has actually had to pay out to other people, such as witnesses, counsel, professional advisers and so forth”.[4] In these reasons for judgment, I will use the word “costs” to mean “costs and disbursements”.
[3] Elders Trustee and Executor Company Ltd; Estate of Howard v Estate of Herbert (1996) 132 FLR 24 at page 29 (NTCA, Gallop J).
[4] Buckland v Watts [1970] 1 Q.B. 27 at page 37 (Sir Gordon Willmer)
The next word to consider is “award”. That simply means “order”. To “award costs”, therefore, is to “order costs”. The expression “order costs”, however, is shorthand. An order that only states that a party pay the costs of another party or person means that the party or person against whom the order is made is liable to pay to the beneficiary of the order an amount to be assessed for the purpose of indemnifying, in whole or in part, the beneficiary for the costs the beneficiary has paid or is liable to pay. An order that a person pay the costs of another person in a particular amount means that the person against whom the order is made is liable to pay to the beneficiary of the order that particular amount for the purpose of indemnifying, in whole or in part, the beneficiary for the costs the beneficiary has paid or is liable to pay in connection with the proceeding.
This Court may be required to consider up to four questions when hearing an application for costs. The first is whether the Court should make an order for costs. Subject to any particular statutory provision to the contrary, whether or not the Court should order costs is in its discretion; but the proper exercise of that discretion usually requires the Court to order the party or person who has not succeeded in the proceeding to pay the costs of the party who has succeeded.[5]
[5] “The exercise of the discretion takes account of all of the contextual circumstances of the litigation and the conduct of the parties. One aspect of the award of costs is a recognition that a party has been put to expense which, taking account of the merits as ultimately found on the trial of the action, might otherwise have been avoided. That consideration does not infuse the award of costs with any sense of penalty or punishment but simply recognises the compensatory nature of an award of costs, in context and according to principle. That is why an award of costs, although involving the exercise of a discretion, generally favours the successful party.” - Kazar (Liquidator) v Kargarian; In the Matter of Frontier Architects Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2011] FCAFC 136 at [9] (Greenwood, Rares and Foster JJ)
Assuming the Court decides to order costs, the second question it must decide is the scope of the order. That is, the Court must identify those activities that have generated the beneficiary’s liability to pay costs for which he or she is to be indemnified, in whole or in part, by the order for costs. The scope of the order is usually expressed in brief terms as part of the order for costs. Thus, the court may make an order that a party pay the “costs of the action” or the “costs of the proceedings” or the “costs of trial”, or the “costs in the cause” or the “costs in any event”.[6]
[6] G E Dal Pont Law of Costs Third Edition 2013 at [1.14]-[1.27]
Having decided the scope of the order for costs, the Court may do nothing more than make the order for costs. If the Court does no more, r.21.10 of the FCC Rules provides that the party entitled to costs in a proceeding (other than a proceeding to which the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) applies) is entitled to costs in accordance with Parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 1 to the Rules, and to disbursements the party has properly incurred. Schedule 1 identifies a relatively small number of, but in most cases broadly defined, activities or events that occur in a proceeding, and assigns an amount to each activity or event. The assessment of costs in accordance with Schedule 1 to the FCC Rules, therefore, consists in identifying the events that have actually occurred in the proceeding that fall within the scope of the order for costs and which also fall within the terms of the activities or events specified in Schedule 1 to the Rules, assigning the appropriate amount to each such activity or event, identifying all disbursements and the amounts of those disbursements, and adding all these amounts.
Instead of making no order other than one for costs, the Court may do one of two things. First, the Court may make an order under r.21.02 r.21.02(2)(c) of the FCC Rules to refer the costs for taxation under Part 40 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR) or Chapter 19 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) (FLR). “Taxation”, as used in r.21.02, means the procedures for assessing costs prescribed by Part 40 of the FCR and Chapter 19 of the FLR. Taking Part 40 of the FCR as an example, taxation requires the person in whose favour a costs order has been made to file and serve a bill of costs in the required form which contains particulars of the work done by the lawyers, their staff and agents, the costs claimed for the work, and the disbursements incurred. When making such order, the Court, under r.2.20(a) of the FCC Rules, may also set “the method by which the costs are to be calculated”. This expression may be taken to mean the basis on which costs are usually calculated. That at the very least includes a “party and party basis”, or “solicitor client basis”, or “indemnity basis”.[7]
[7] G E Dal Pont Law of Costs Third Edition 2013, Chap 16.
The second thing the Court may do is to set the amount of the costs pursuant to r.21.02(a) of the FCC Rules. This does not confer an unfettered discretion on the Court about the amount of costs it may set. When setting the amount of costs pursuant to r.21.02(a) of the FCC Rules, the Court must attempt to reflect the amounts that would be assessed under Schedule 1 to the FCC Rules or under a taxation pursuant to Part 40 of the FCR or Chapter 19 of the FLR. The Court must also attempt to set the amount of costs to reflect any method the Court may have set by which the costs are to be calculated.
It will therefore be seen that the Court has a discretion in relation to the manner in which, and the amount for which, costs may be assessed. What are the matters that are relevant to the exercise of that discretion?
That question was addressed, at least indirectly, by Lucev FM (as his Honour then was) in Pierson’s Pro-Health Pty Ltd & Ors v Silvex Nominees Pty Ltd & Anor (No.3).[8] In that case the Court made an order fixing the amount of costs by applying Schedule 1 to the FCC Rules. The beneficiary of the order subsequently applied to set aside or vary the order for costs. The ground on which that application was made was that the beneficiary’s legal representative had erroneously believed that the order for costs the court would have made was that the costs be agreed or taxed in default of agreement. That submission led Lucev FM to consider what order for costs the Court usually makes.
[8] [2010] FMCA 250
Lucev FM concluded that it was clear from the combined reading of the rules of this Court, information that was available on the Court’s website, cases decided by the Court, other secondary sources, and the Court’s own experience, that “it is well established and well known that the primary source used for fixing costs in general federal law proceedings (other than, arguably, in bankruptcy) in this Court is the event-based scale in Schedule 1 of the FMC Rules”, and that while “there is discretion to depart from the event-based scale, that is the exception rather than the norm”.[9] His Honour referred to[10] the decision of Driver FM (as his Honour then was) in Hinchliffe v University of Sydney (No. 2) and set out a passage from Driver FM’s reasons for judgment that included the following:[11]
Ordinarily, in human rights proceedings, costs are assessed in accordance with the event based scale appearing in schedule 1 to the Federal Magistrates Court Rules. That scale was adopted by the Court in order to provide simplicity and certainty in determining issues of costs. In some cases, as is likely to be the case here, a successful party will incur significantly more in costs than is recoverable pursuant to the Court scale. It does not follow that that is an unjust result, where it occurs. The Court scale is publicly known and parties to litigation should be aware that the scale is likely to determine their maximum recoverable costs should they succeed. If parties wish to incur significantly more costs in litigation in this Court than they could ever recover, that is a matter for them.
[9] [2010] FMCA 250 at [43]
[10] [2010] FMCA 250 at [40(c)]
[11] Hinchliffe v University of Sydney (No. 2) [2004] FMCA 640 at [10]
Although Lucev FM and Driver FM did not consider the circumstances in which it would be appropriate for the Court to order that costs be determined on a basis other than under Schedule 1 to the FCC Rules, it is implicit in their Honours’ approach that it would be appropriate for the Court to do so where the proceeding is not what the Court would consider to be a typical or usual proceeding in this Court. That, in turn, implies a sufficiently precise notion of what constitutes a typical or usual proceeding in the Court. Does such a notion exist? Or is such notion capable of being formulated in any given case? In my opinion, the answer to both questions is yes.
A proceeding in the Court is capable of being characterised in terms of its subject matter; the procedural steps that may be taken to progress the proceeding, given its subject matter; the novelty or difficulty of any legal questions that may arise; the extent and nature of the factual issues that arise; and the manner in which the parties, and in particular, the unsuccessful party, conducts the proceeding. In any given case, the experience of a Judge of the Court will enable him or her to determine whether any given proceeding is not typical in any one or more of these respects such as may warrant a departure from having costs assessed under Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the FCC Rules. For example, the proceeding might raise a novel point, or the proceeding might involve complex factual issues requiring many witnesses or unusual expert evidence; or the unsuccessful party may have conducted the proceedings inefficiently by, for example, raising multiple but tangential issues, or by issuing unnecessary subpoenas to many persons.
Parties’ submissions
On the face of his application, Mr Robinson is not seeking an order that costs be assessed in a manner different from that provided for under Schedule 1 to the FCC Rules. Mr Robinson claims partial reimbursement of the amounts for which he incurred for retaining senior and junior counsel for appearing on his behalf. He submits that these fees are “disbursements properly incurred” within the meaning of r.21.10 of the FCC Rules. In my opinion, however, counsel’s fees do not fall within the expression “disbursements properly incurred” used in r.21.10 of the FCC Rules. That is implied from Part 1 of Schedule 1 and, in particular, item 12, which allows an “advocacy loading” of 50% of item 13, which, in turn, allows an amount for “daily hearing fee”. Counsel fees, therefore, are included as part of the daily hearing fee in the form of an advocacy loading, and not as a disbursement, at least where it is appropriate for counsel to appear. Mr Robinson’s application, therefore, is to be treated as an application that his costs be assessed on a basis other than Schedule 1 to the FCC Rules.
Counsel for Mr Robinson submitted there was a clear case for the Court not assessing his costs under Schedule 1. That case is based on Mr Robinson not being a party to the proceedings, a personal costs order was sought against him, and serious allegations were made against him that put in jeopardy Mr Robinson’s professional standing and his ability to practice. Counsel for Mr Arnold, on the other hand, submits that these matters should not by themselves lead the Court to depart from assessing costs under Schedule 1 to the FCC Rules.
Should there be a departure from Schedule 1?
That the application in relation to which Mr Robinson seeks an order for costs was one brought against him personally under r.21.07 of the FCC Rules does not by itself mean the application was not a typical proceeding. The presence of r.21.07 implies that it is part of the Court’s ordinary jurisdiction to deal with applications for personal costs orders under r.21.07 and, for that reason, costs in relation to such applications are to be assessed like costs in other matters that come before it, namely, by applying Schedule 1 to the FCC Rules. Further, that the allegations on the basis of which Mr Arnold applied for a costs order against Mr Robinson involved serious charges which, if accepted, by the court, could have adversely affected Mr Robinson’s professional standing, is not by itself a factor that should lead the Court to depart from costs being assessed under Schedule 1. It is in the nature of applications for personal costs orders made under r.21.07 of the FCC Rules that the lawyer against whom such applications are made is placed in jeopardy of findings that may adversely affect their professional standing.
I have also considered the issues that arose on Mr Arnold’s application under r.21.07 against Mr Robinson. The grounds on which that application was made extended over a large range of facts. That potentially could take Mr Arnold’s application outside what could reasonably be taken to be a typical application for a personal costs order under r.21.07. On the other hand, the issue that was the subject of the orders I made on 27 June 2014 was whether Mr Arnold established a prima facie case that Mr Robinson was liable to an order under r.21.07 of the FCC Rules. That meant that the application was less complicated than it otherwise would have been because Mr Robinson was relieved from having to put on evidence in relation to the application that was made against him.
I am not satisfied, therefore, that there is any reason for assessing the costs to which Mr Robinson is entitled other than under Schedule 1 to the FCC Rules. I accept that the costs should include the costs set out in paragraph 24 of Mr Arnold’s submissions on costs. In addition, however, I am of the opinion that those costs should allow $997 for the directions hearing that took place on 22 November 2013. Although the directions hearing took less than one hour, counsel appeared for Mr Arnold, and extensive submissions were made about the manner in which Mr Arnold’s application for a personal costs order against Mr Robinson should proceed. Further, for the reasons I give later in the reasons permitting Mr Arnold to claim two amounts of $271 in relation to taking judgment, an additional amount of $271 should be added to the costs set out in paragraph 24 of Mr Arnold’s submissions on costs.
With that addition, Mr Robinson’s costs are to be set in the amount of $7,786.50. I propose, therefore, to order that Mr Arnold pay Mr Robinson’s costs set in that amount.
Mr Arnold’s application for costs
Mr Arnold seeks an order that the applicant pay costs in the sum of $7,647.56. That amount has been calculated by reference to Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the FCC Rules. The costs Mr Arnold seeks are associated to four events: the initiation by Mr Arnold of the application in a case ($1,661[12]); the directions hearing of 18 October 2013 ($997 and a 50% advocacy loading of $498.50[13]); the hearing of the application on 31 October 2013 ($1,994 and a 50% advocacy loading of $997[14]); and taking judgment on 8 November 2013 ($542[15]). Mr Arnold also seeks as disbursements transcript fees and the filing fee.
[12] FCC Rules, Schedule 1, Part 1, item 3
[13] FCC Rules, Schedule 1, Part 1, items 3(b) and 13
[14] FCC Rules, Schedule 1, Part 1, items 3(b) and 13
[15] FCC Rules, Schedule 1, Part 1, items 9 and 13
Mr Arnold submits that the events for which he seeks costs were caused by the unreasonable acts of the applicant within the meaning of s.570(2)(b) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). The acts Mr Arnold submits were unreasonable are the applicant’s issuing subpoenas which I found were an abuse of power, and the applicant’s obtaining access to documents produced in answer to those subpoenas without complying with r.15A.13(1)(b) of the FCC Rules, and the applicant’s not accepting that he was not entitled to obtain access to the documents after Mr Arnold objected to the applicant’s having obtained access to the documents. Mr Arnold also relies on other matters which I have dealt with in my reasons for judgment for the orders I made on 27 June 2014.
The applicant submits that no order for costs should be made in favour of Mr Arnold. First, the applicant submits there is no explanation of how the costs Mr Arnold claims have been incurred are a result of any unreasonable act or omission of the applicant. The applicant submits that the costs Mr Arnold claims are a subset of costs which, in my reasons for judgment of 27 June 2014, I found were not shown to have been caused by any act or omission of Mr Robinson. Second, the applicant questions two items in the amounts Mr Arnold claims. The first is Mr Arnold’s claiming a half day hearing fee for a directions hearing that took no more than an hour; and Mr Arnold’s claiming two amounts of $271 for the taking of judgment. Third, the applicant refers to his having made an offer by letter dated 14 November 2013 to pay $5,228 for Mr Arnold’s costs of the application in which I made the orders on 8 November 2013.
To make out a case for an order for costs under s.570(2)(b) of the FW Act, a party (moving party) must:
a)identify the events that have generated a liability by that party to pay legal costs;
b)identify the act or omission of the person against whom the moving party seeks an order for costs (opposing party) the moving party claims caused the event that gave rise to the moving party’s liability to pay the legal costs;
c)prove that the act or omission the moving party claims caused the events that gave rise to the moving party’s liability to pay legal costs in fact caused the events;
d)prove that the opposing party’s acts or omissions were unreasonable; and
e)assign a reasonable value to the legal costs that the moving party incurred.
Mr Arnold has identified the events which he submits gave rise to a liability to pay legal costs. These are the making of the application which led to the orders of 8 November 2013, attending the directions hearing of 18 October 2013 and the hearing on 31 October 2013, and attending court on 8 November 2013 when I pronounced my orders and published my reasons for those orders. Mr Arnold has also sufficiently identified the acts of the applicant which he submits caused these events, namely, the applicant’s obtaining unauthorised access to the documents produced by an abusive subpoena, and the applicant’s not accepting he had obtained the documents without authority.
Further, I accept Mr Arnold’s submission that, had the applicant not obtained the documents, and had the applicant not insisted he was entitled to retain them, the events which gave rise to a liability by Mr Arnold to pay legal costs would not have occurred. I accept that submission. I do so, even though I made the orders on 8 November 2013 for a reason I, and not Mr Arnold, raised at the hearing of 31 October 2013, that reason being the applicant’s obtaining the documents without complying with r.15A.13(1)(b) of the FCC Rules. That is so because the applicant persisted in his submission that he was nevertheless entitled to maintain possession of the documents. I find the applicant would have maintained that position even if Mr Arnold had informed the applicant before he filed the application that because of r.15A.13(1)(b) of the FCC Rules the applicant was not entitled to keep possession of the documents for the purposes of the proceedings.
The next question, therefore, is whether the applicant’s acts were unreasonable. In my opinion, they were. The acts were those of a legal practitioner acting on behalf of the applicant. As I said in my reasons for decision of 27 June 2014,[16] practitioners who conduct litigation on behalf of their clients are expected to do so in accordance with the rules of court. That imports an obligation on legal practitioners to acquaint themselves with whatever rules of court are relevant to the particular business they are instructed to undertake. A legal practitioner, and hence, for the purposes of s.570(2)(b) of the FW Act, the party whom the legal practitioner represents, acts unreasonably if he or she undertakes a step in litigation in ignorance of a rule of this Court.
[16] Robinson v Blackheart Industries Pty Ltd & Ors [2014] FCCA 1353 at [76]
The last question is whether the value Mr Arnold has assigned to the legal costs he says he incurred is reasonable. In my opinion, the value Mr Arnold has assigned to those costs is reasonable. That includes Mr Arnold’s claiming two amounts, each for $217, in relation to the delivery of judgment on 8 November 2013. Item 9 covers final hearing costs for attendance of a solicitor at hearing to take judgment and explain orders. The item assigns two amounts. One is $271, and the other is “the daily hearing fee mentioned in item 13 that applies to the hearing”. Item 13 provides three amounts, one of which is $271 “for a short mention”.
I have also considered the applicant’s reliance on his having made an offer on 14 November 2013 to pay Mr Arnold $5,228 on account of his costs. That has no bearing on whether Mr Arnold is entitled to the order for costs he seeks.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that Mr Arnold is entitled to an order under s.570(2)(b) of the FW Act that the applicant pay to Mr Arnold the costs of the application in the case that resulted in my making orders on 8 November 2013. Those costs should be set in the amount claimed by Mr Arnold, namely, $7,647.56. I propose, therefore, to order that the applicant pay Mr Arnold’s costs of the application in the case he filed on 14 October 2013 and that those costs be set in the amount of $7,647.56.
Disposition
I propose to order that on Mr Arnold’s application for costs in relation to the matter for which I made the orders on 8 November 2013, the applicant pay Mr Arnold’s costs set in the amount of $7,647.56; and that, on Mr Robinson’s application that Mr Arnold pay Mr Robinson’s costs in relation to the matter for which I made the order on 27 June 2014, Mr Arnold pay Mr Robinson’s costs set in the amount of $7,786.50. I also propose that both amounts be paid within twenty-eight days from the date on which I pronounce these orders.
My preliminary views about the costs of the applications for costs that I have dealt with in these reasons are as follows. Mr Arnold succeeded on his application for costs. I have held that he is entitled to substantially more than the $5,228 the applicant offered to pay to Mr Arnold. He should, therefore, have the costs of the application for costs against the applicant. Mr Arnold also succeeded in resisting Mr Robinson’s application to pay costs set in the amount of $22,500. Mr Arnold, therefore, should also have his costs of that application.
Because both applications were heard at the same time, it would be appropriate to treat the applications as one application with total costs of $3,698.50 calculated as follows:
Interim hearing (applications for costs by Mr Robinson)
$1,661
Daily hearing fee (half day) (25 September 2014)
$997
Advocacy loading 50%
$498.50
Obtaining judgment including daily hearing fee for short mention
$542
It would be appropriate to treat 60% of those costs to Mr Arnold’s application for costs, and 40% of those costs to Mr Robinson’s application for costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-seven (37) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Manousaridis
Associate:
Date: 17 September 2015
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