Robertson & Wells
[2022] FedCFamC1F 1046
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 1)
Robertson & Wells [2022] FedCFamC1F 1046
File number: MLC 12423 of 2021 Judgment of: MCGUIRE J Date of judgment: 23 December 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW - PROPERTY – De facto relationship – Where the parties agree there was a de facto relationship for the purposes of Part VIIIAB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Act’) – Where the parties sought a property settlement pursuant to s 90SM of the Act - Modest property pool – Add-Backs – Orders made that property pool be distributed in the proportion of 42.5 per cent to the applicant and 57.5 to the respondent Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 90SM, 90SM(3) and (4) Cases cited: AJO & GRO (2005) FLC 93-218
C & C [ 1998] FamCA 143
Clauson & Clauson (1995) 92-595
Kowaliw & Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91–092
Lovine & Connor & Anor [2012] FLC 93-515
M & M [1998] FamCA 42
Petruski & Balewa [2013] FamCAFC 15
R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248-257
Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108
Trevi & Trevi (2018) FLC 93-858
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 65 Date of hearing: 15 and 16 December 2022 Place: Melbourne, delivered in Hobart Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Paull Solicitor for the Applicant: Haven Legal Co. Counsel for the Respondent: Mr McFie Solicitor for the Respondent: Patford-Smith Legal Services ORDERS
MLC 12423 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR ROBERTSON
Applicant
AND: MS WELLS
Respondent
order made by:
MCGUIRE J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 december 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The net property of the parties inclusive of superannuation be divided as to 57.5 per cent to the respondent, Ms Wells, and 42.5 per cent to the applicant, Mr Robertson.
2.The property situated at B Street, Suburb D, Victoria (“the Suburb D property”) be forthwith placed on the market for sale by an agent agreed between the parties and failing agreement by an agent nominated by the president or delegate of the Real Estate Institute of Victoria.
3.The Suburb D property be offered for sale at a price recommended by the agent and that the parties prudently sign any unconditional contract for sale at a sale price equal to or above that nominated by the agent from time to time.
4.The proceeds of sale of the Suburb D property be paid as follows:
(a)the reasonable costs and disbursements on the sale; and
(b)the balance to be put towards any mortgage liability secured by the Suburb D property or with collateral security of the property situate at C Street, Suburb E, Victoria.
5.The applicant elect within 21 days of the date of these orders as to whether or not to he wishes to retain the property situate at C Street, Suburb E, Victoria (“the Suburb E property”) within the ambit of his entitlement pursuant to these orders and, if so, then:
(a)within 42 days of the date of these orders the respondent transfer to the applicant all her right title and interest in the Suburb E property; and
(b)the applicant refinance any mortgage secured by the Suburb E property and (or the Suburb D property) thereby providing the respondent with a Release from any such liability.
6.That contemporaneous with order 5(a) herein the applicant make a cash payment to the respondent so as to effect 57.5/42.5 settlement of the parties’ property pursuant to these Orders.
7.Should, however, the applicant not exercise his election to retain the Suburb E property within the time limited by these orders then the parties forthwith co-operate in placing that property for sale with an agent to be agreed between the parties and failing agreement then by an agent nominated by the president or delegate of the Real Estate Institute of Victoria.
8.The Suburb E property be offered for sale at a price recommended by the agent and that the parties prudently sign any unconditional contract for sale at a sale price equal to or above that nominated by the agent from time to time.
9.The proceeds of sale of the Suburb E property be paid as follows:
(a)the reasonable costs and disbursements on the sale;
(b)the satisfying of any outstanding mortgage liability secured by the Suburb E property; and
(c)the balance to be distributed so as to effect a net distribution of the property of the parties pursuant to these orders and Reasons as to 57.5 per cent to the respondent and 42.5 per cent to the applicant.
10.Unless otherwise specified in these orders each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all personalty and chattels of whatsoever nature and kind in the possession of such party as at the date of these orders and that for this purpose bank accounts are deemed to be in the possession of the person whose name appears on the bank’s record thereof, motor vehicles and superannuation entitlements are deemed to be in the possession of the person who is named as the worker whose age or working future provides the conditions for payment out of such entitlements as set out in these Reasons.
11.Each of the parties be solely responsible for and indemnify the other in respect of the following:
(a)any liabilities attaching to any asset retained by that party pursuant to these orders; and
(b)any and all liabilities incurred by that party since separation in either joint names of that party’s name alone.
12.There will be liberty to the parties or either of them to apply in respect of the execution of these orders including but not limited to the sale of Suburb D property.
13.Pursuant to s 90ST of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the parties intend that these Orders shall as far as practicable finally determine the financial relationship between them and avoid further proceedings between them.
14.All extant applications, except for costs, be otherwise dismissed and the matter be removed from the list.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym of Robertson & Wells has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
McGUIRE J
aPPLICATIONS
These are properly proceedings where Mr Robertson is the applicant. He asks for orders for an equal distribution of the parties’ property including superannuation entitlements. He says that overall the parties’ contributions viewed in a holistic sense have been equal. He argues that there should be no adjustment to either of the parties on a consideration of the factors under s 90SF(3) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The respondent, Ms Wells, argues for a 70 per cent distribution of the property pool, inclusive of superannuation entitlements, to her and 30 per cent to the applicant. She says that there should be a 15 per cent loading to her on account of superior initial and post separation contributions together with a 5 per cent loading on a consideration of the s 90SF(3) factors with emphasis on the superior earning capacity of the applicant.
Background
The applicant is 49 years of age and the respondent is 55 years.
The applicant works as a professional and is also an entertainer. His sworn financial statement discloses a gross income of approximately $81,500 per annum, although the respondent argues that his income capacity is far more where his income during the relationship was nearer $120,000 per annum and further supplemented by his work as an entertainer.
The respondent is employed as an allied health professional with an income of approximately $42,000 per annum.
The parties met in 2004 and commenced cohabitation about 2008. They separated in 2020.
There are no children of the relationship although the respondent has two daughters from a previous relationship who may have lived with the parties for short periods.
In 2007 or 2008 the parties purchased a block of land at C Street, Suburb E. The title to the property was registered solely in the name of the applicant thereby entitling him to the First Home Owner’s Grant of $12,000. The respondent contributed approximately $81,500 from her property settlement with her former husband towards the purchase. The parties attended a solicitor and a document was drawn and signed noting the contributions by the parties being $81,500 by the respondent and $6,500 together with the First Home Owner’s Grant of $12,000 by the applicant. The document then recites an agreement whereby the applicant would forthwith for 15 years make contributions equivalent to two thirds of the leading mortgage instalment liability and as to one third for the respondent thereby creating equality of interest in the property after 15 years.
The mortgage loan in respect of the Suburb E property was refinanced and drawn down from credit amounts on a number of occasions during the relationship including for the parties to establish a business around the husband’s entertainment business and involving some capital purchases.
The former matrimonial home was built on the Suburb E property and completed in about 2008.
In mid-2015 the parties purchased an investment property being a property at B Street, Suburb D at a purchase price of $515,000 plus costs and financed by the investment loan totalling E$570,000. The Suburb E property provided co-collateral for the purchase of the Suburb D property.
The Suburb D property was tenanted but has been vacant since late 2021 due to problems requiring rectification such that it has not yet been completed. The parties agree that the value of the Suburb D property is substantially less than the purchase price and where there are now arrears owing under the mortgage of some $55,000 with the mortgagee bank anticipating proceedings for recovery of the property and its debt.
Where the respondent began this trial anticipating she being able to retain the former matrimonial home at Suburb E, she resiled from this position in the witness box when confronted with the reality of the parties’ financial position in the property pool. By the time of closing addresses, however, the applicant now seeks to retain the Suburb E property if possible within the ambit of his entitlement.
The issues
The major issue is the weight to be given to various contributions made by the parties initially, during, and post the relationship.
Secondly, there is an issue as to whether there be any adjustment for the s 90SF(3) factors as argued by the applicant.
There remains some issue between the parties as to the content of the property pool and valuations but, in particular, where each of the parties argues for specific “add-backs” to the pool.
The evidence
The applicant
The applicant relied on two Affidavits dated 23 November and 12 December 2022 with the latter being an affidavit in reply. He also relied on his Amended Financial Statement sworn 22 November 2022.
The applicant gave evidence and was cross-examined. He presented as unsophisticated but generally honest in his evidence albeit with some naïveté as to the process under s 90SM of the Act. I observed the applicant to be keen to emphasise what he perceived to be his own contributions as against those of the respondent. His evidence as to him leaving his long-term employment which brought him an E$120,000 per annum for his current employment at an E$81,500 per annum and coincidentally with these proceedings was less than persuasive although not successfully challenged. Similarly his evidence as to his earnings from his employment as an entertainer was again not persuasive and perhaps understated.
The Respondent
The respondent relied on her Trial Affidavit the sworn 6 December 2020 together with an Amended Financial Statement sworn the same day.
The respondent gave evidence and was cross-examined. She was not an impressive witness as to her relevant memory recall. She too presented as extremely naïve as to the process under s 90SM of the Act to such an extent that her presentation was at times unconvincing and deliberately affected. She prevaricated and deflected frequently in her responses in cross‑examination.
The respondent also relied on an affidavit of her brother, Mr F, sworn 19 October 2020 but where objection was taken to that affidavit being read into evidence where nevertheless, the parties were able to agree a “Statement of Agreed Facts” in respect of [6] and [12] of that affidavit which provides as follows:
[6]In 2011 [the applicant] wanted to build [an extension] at the former matrimonial home. I was paid $7,100 to construct the frames of two small rooms for the [extension] and ensure they were [fit for purpose].
[12]Upon separation between [the applicant] and [the respondent], I attended the former matrimonial home at [the respondent’s] request to keep the peace whilst [the applicant] attended the property to remove his property. He stripped out with a friend the [extension] of all items - all that was left was the display cabinet.
The relevant law
The power to alter the interests of parties in properties is provided at s 90SM of the Act where “property” includes both assets and liabilities with superannuation to be “treated as property” although usually not crystallised in the sense of a tangible asset. The broad discretion in the Court allows consideration of property to be on a “one-pool” basis including both tangible property and superannuation or, alternatively, where superannuation is considered separately than the tangible property. Given the quantum of superannuation entitlements, the length of the relationship and the likelihood of such entitlements being accrued during the relationship, I determine to deal with the property on a “one-pool” basis.
The discretion of s 90SM(1) of the Act is a broad one limited only by the statue itself.[1]
[1] R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248–257.
Importantly, s 90SM(3) of the Act requires the Court to firstly be satisfied, in all the circumstances of the case, that it is just and equitable to enter into a consideration of altering the property interests. Such a consideration is to be an independent one and not one conflated simply by a consideration of the parties' contributions pursuant to s 90SM(4) of the Act.[2]
[2] Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108.
Consequently, the task for the Court is a more fluid one than previously thought and where considerations of justice and equity permeate the entire process. Firstly, however, the Court is to identify the property pool being the legal interest and equitable interests of the parties in property and then to attribute value to the contents of the pool and hence to the pool itself. The consideration of s 90SM(3) must then be independently made.
The Court must then consider the contributions by the parties, or on their behalf, to the property pool. Contributions may be of a direct financial or indirect financial type. Contributions may also be of a non-financial type including as homemaker and parent.
After a determination of and attribution of weight to the various contributions of the parties, the Court then turns to consider whether there should be any further adjustment to either of the parties on a consideration of the factors that s 90SM(4)(d)-(e) and with reference to any of the relevant matters set out in s 90SF(3) of the Act.
There is no argument here as to the status of the parties relationship being a de facto one pursuant to s 90SB of the Act. The evidence before me satisfies me that the relationship has broken down and where the parties share legal and equitable interests in various items of property including real property then I am satisfied that it is just and equitable to enter into a consideration of altering those property interests.
The property pool
The applicant seeks “add-backs” to the property pool of, firstly, an amount of $40,547 being the balance of the respondent’s bank account at separation and now diminished. Secondly, it is agreed that the respondent has sold Motor Vehicle 1 since separation and achieved $8,000 which the applicant argues should be added back to the pool. Thirdly, the respondent withdrew $21,000 from a joint bank account after separation and again where the applicant seeks this to be added back to the pool. Fourthly, the respondent received $11,332 in rental from the Suburb D property post separation which he says was retained by the respondent and not put towards the mortgage and should therefore be added back to the pool.
The respondent similarly argues that the applicant had a sum of $30,000 in his bank account at the date of separation which should then be added back to the pool consistent with the arguments in respect of the respondent’s savings. Counsel for the applicant concedes such an add-back.
The Full Court in Trevi & Trevi[3] confirmed the authorities and guidelines for making add‑backs to a property pool at trial noting first that a previous Full Court in AJO & GRO[4] saw add-backs as falling into “three clear categories” where firstly, the parties have expended money on legal fees; secondly, where there has been a premature distribution of matrimonial assets; and thirdly where there has been waste or wanton, negligent, or reckless dissipation of the assets.[5]
[3] (2018) FLC 93–858.
[4] (2005) FLC 93–218.
[5] Kowaliw & Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91–092.
The Full Court in Trevi & Trevi (supra) emphasised, however, that the mere expenditure of money or dissipation of an asset does not necessarily result in an add-back describing such a proposition as “unduly simplistic” and confirming the statement of an earlier Full Court in C & C[6] that making an add-back is “the exception rather than the rule”.
[6] [1998] FamCA 143.
Where prima facie a trial Judge is to take the property of the parties to a marriage as found at the trial and where noting that the parties do not “go into a state of suspended economic animation” after separation[7], it follows that reasonably incurred expenditure will not, as a matter of course, be added back to the property pool. In this sense, the making of an add-back is very much a discretionary exercise on the circumstances of the case and where justice and equity might require there to be an add-back. Notably, the Court in Trevi & Trevi (supra) identified an alternative course for trial judges in dealing with the dissipation of assets or expenditure from joint funds and as follows:
30.…The second premise is its corollary: in cases that are not “exceptional” justice and equity can be achieved, not by adding back, but by the exercise of a different discretion – usually by taking up the same as a relevant s 75(2) factor. Indeed, it has been said that the latter is “a course which is, perhaps, technically more correct” than adding back to the list of existing interests in property.[8]
[7] Marker & Marker [1998] FamCA 42.
[8] Footnotes omitted.
Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that the expenditure on legal fees by a party from joint funds or funds that existed at separation will result in an “add-back” as distinct from funds used to pay legal fees which have been generated by a party post-separation either through their remunerative employment or by personal borrowings.
The respondent here concedes paying an amount of some $14,000 towards her legal costs pre‑trial. She has retained significant monies from what could be called joint funds as at the date of separation and specifically $40,547 (her savings), $8,000 (Motor Vehicle 1 sale), $21,000 (removed unilaterally by her from joint funds) and $11,332 (rentals received) it is of some significance that for about four months following separation the applicant paid his wages into the joint account from which the respondent unilaterally withdrew $21,000.
The parties separated in late August 2020. The tenant continued in occupation of and presumably to pay rent until late 2021. The Suburb D mortgage has not been paid since mid‑2021 with current arrears in excess of $50,000. The tenant vacated the property in about late 2021 and it has remained vacant since.
The respondent argues, without any particular realisation, that the remainder of the monies in her possession other than payment of legal fees was spent on “reasonable expenditure”. She particularises only paying, after mid-2021, the mortgage in respect of the former matrimonial home in which she had sole occupation and where the monthly mortgage payments totalled only some $1,100.
She claims that the monies retained and removed by her have now been almost exhausted. The respondent maintained full-time employment during the relevant period albeit with an income of just gross $42,000 per annum.
Where the respondent does not attempt to particularise her claim of “reasonable expenditure”, where she was in employment, and where she accounts with particularity only to $14,000 in paid legal costs, I do not accept the respondent as discharging her onus to show on the balance of probabilities that the monies have been reasonably spent. Consequently, where the respondent had the benefit of rental with which to pay the mortgage and such rental paid until late 2021, within my discretion I will add-back to the pool the $21,000 retained by the wife from the joint account, the $8,000 proceeds of sale of the Motor Vehicle 1 together with the balance of the respondent’s own bank account at separation being $40,547. It seems clear that the respondent collected rent between mid and late 2021 but did not pay the mortgage during this period. This is a matter in its imprecision better dealt with under s 90SF.
As mentioned above, the applicant’s counsel concedes to the sum of $30,000 retained by him at separation being added back to the property pool. This being the case, there is no need for me to examine with any particularity the applicant’s loan of these monies to his brother and the partial repayment, which I infer to have provided the source of the loan and represented $30,000 repaid. Similarly, it is asserted that the applicant has loaned his current partner some $10,000. The applicant asserts that these monies have been provided post-separation and I accept that this is the case where they come from either his post-separation earnings or the partial repayment by his brother of the above-mentioned loan and hence essentially from the $30,000 retained by the applicant at separation. The balance outstanding of the loan to the brother of $4,000 is an asset in the hands of the applicant.
On the balance sheet provided by the applicant’s counsel as an aide-mèmoire, the applicant appears to claim a “liability” of $12,748 which in reality is monies spent by him towards rectification of the Suburb D property together with owner’s corporation fees. It is now accepted by counsel for the applicant this is more properly treated as a contribution rather than a “liability”.
The applicant volunteered that he had an entitlement to a further $23,000 from his former employment. This is a gross figure which will be dealt with under s 90SF.
The applicant withdrew two amounts of $10,000 from his superannuation during Covid-19 entitlements. He did so in mid and late 2020. The parties separated in August 2020 according to the respondent. Where the applicant remained in employment and without contrary evidence of expenditure of these monies I infer that this amount of $20,000 is represented in the applicants savings at that time of $30,000.
Consequently, I can find the property pool of these parties to comprise of the following where some values are properly the result of compromises between the parties during the course of the trial where proper valuation evidence was seriously lacking:
Assets The former matrimonial home (Suburb E) $735,000 Suburb D property (agreed to be sold) $475,000 Commonwealth Bank account (applicant) $1,551 H Bank account (applicant) $5,690 Motor Vehicle 2 (applicant) $25,000 Motor Vehicle 3 (respondent) $8,300 Applicant’s bank account at separation (add-back) $30,000 Balance of loan to applicant’s brother (applicant) $4,000 Respondent bank account at separation (add-back) $40,547 Motor Vehicle 1 sale proceeds (respondent) $8,000 Withdrawals from joint account (respondent) $21,000 Total $1,354,088
The liabilities are:
Liabilities NAB home loan (Suburb E) $43,240 Second NAB home loan (Suburb E) $137,584 NAB investment loan (Suburb D) $594,785 Total $775,609
The superannuation is:
Superannuation Superannuation Fund 1 policy (applicant) $71,645 Superannuation Fund 2 policy (respondent) $46,914 Total $118,559
The total net property pool of the parties is $697,038.
contributions
The respondent came into this relationship with $81,500 from a previous property settlement together with a motor vehicle, furniture and contents.
The Agreement signed between the parties identifies the applicant as bringing in $6,500. The evidence satisfies me otherwise that he was not a person of any wealth at this stage and had some outstanding debts.
The applicant argues that he also contributed the benefit of the First Home Owners Grant of $12,000 towards the relationship and specifically to the purchase of the Suburb E property. I do not accept this contention. The parties were in a relationship. They jointly entered into the purchase albeit with the property being registered in the name of the applicant alone so as to give them the benefit of the First Home Owners Grant where the respondent had previously had her name on a property title. The mere fact of the title to the property being registered in the applicant’s name does not, in my view, in these circumstances constitute a contribution by him.
Both parties worked for the duration of the relationship. The applicant had higher earnings. Nevertheless, each of the parties worked to their capacity in respect of their qualifications, experience and aptitude. It is not the task for this Court to conduct a detailed financial audit but I prefer that the contributions of these parties are identified more by their effort[9] Each party claims to have also made contributions as a homemaker which I generally accept within the context of the applicant also contributing financially to a degree by working in another area of employment in circumstances which I expect would have then added some emphasis to the respondent’s role as homemaker.
[9] Petruski & Balewa [2013] FamCAFC 15; Lovine & Connor & Anor [2012] FLC 93–515.
Where there were no other significant financial injections or windfalls during the relationship, I consider the contributions of the parties during the relationship to have been equal.
Post-separation the applicant has made some direct financial contributions towards the Suburb D property including towards rectification of some damage and paying the Owners Corporation fees. His evidence is essentially unchallenged in this regard. The circumstances of those contributions are relevant where, as mentioned above, the respondent has retained rentals and not met mortgage liabilities from those monies and others retained by her at separation. This has resulted in mortgage arrears of some $55,000. Where it could be argued that this is then a “negative contribution” by the respondent, the issue has otherwise been dealt with by of “add-backs” to the property pool for monies retained by the respondent and therefore to consider any “negative contribution” would be to “double-dip”.
The respondent appears to claim a contribution by paying the mortgage at the Suburb E property. However, where the instalment payments were relatively low and where the respondent had sole use and occupancy of the property, I do not accept this as a contribution by her deserving of weight.
It remains, however, that the applicant should be given some credit for his post-separation contribution.
The applicant argues some ‘negative contribution’ by the respondent in failing or refusing to sign a Contract for Sale of the Suburb D property at $470,000. The evidence of the parties was confusing and where I can fathom no motive in either party in refusing to sell a depreciating asset, I cannot reach the conclusion submitted by the applicant.
Given the length of the relationship, and the quantum of their superannuation entitlements, and an admission by the applicant that his superannuation was effectively accrued during the relationship, I am satisfied that the entitlements of both parties were primarily accrued during their relationship.
Consequently, and given the length of the relationship, and the quantum of the property pool with some consideration being given to the respondent’s superior initial contribution which, of course, remains evident in the equity in the Suburb E property but also giving weight to the post-separation contributions by the applicant, within the context of the myriad of contributions made by the parties during the 12 years of their relationship. I am of the view that on the basis of contributions there should be a loading to the respondent of 2.5 per cent of the property pool inclusive of superannuation.
Section 75(2) factors
Both parties are in full-time employment. The respondent’s income is approximately $42,000 per annum. She has been in this employment for some time and it perhaps represents the capacity of her earning potential.
The applicant works as a professional. His current income is around $82,500 per annum. Whilst somewhat suspicious as to coincidence in time for the applicant leaving his long-term employment which brought in $120,000 per annum and the conduct of these proceedings, I generally accept his evidence that he left his previous employment for proper reasons. The applicant is, however, an experienced and apparently talented entertainer. I generally doubt his evidence as to the extent of his remuneration from his exploits and where I have noted his financial contributions from this employment during the relationship, I similarly expect that he derives both a regular and healthy extra income from these activities.
The applicant has re-partnered but where there is no evidence of the respondent having done so. There is there is no evidence, however, of any support or dependency in respect of the applicant’s new relationship.
The respondent is 55 years of age and some six years older than the applicant. Consequently, she will have less time to superannuate herself in circumstances where her income is approximately half of that of the applicant. The respondent seems to have retained rental income between mid and late 2021.
The applicant can reasonably expect to receive the net benefit of the $23,000 which he says remains owing to him from his former employment.
In all of these circumstances, and again taking into account the quantum of the property pool where the Court is to give some sense of “reality” to these considerations[10] I am of the view that there should be a further adjustment to the respondent of 5 per cent of the property pool.
[10] Clauson & Clauson (1995) 92-595.
conclusion
Consequently, there will be orders which divide the property pool on a one-pool basis, inclusive of superannuation entitlements, as to 57.5 per cent to the respondent and 42.5 per cent to the applicant.
I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice McGuire. Associate:
Dated: 23 December 2022
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