FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Robertson Jnr v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia [2004] FCAFC 46
TAXATION – objection decisions – administrative review of – standing – appellant bankrupt after applying to AAT – authority of McCallum v Commissioner of Taxation not challenged – whether objection decision could have adverse consequences for appellant following discharge
BANKRUPTCY – objection decisions – administrative review of – application for review to AAT – standing – appellant bankrupt after applying to AAT – no standing under authority of McCallum v Commissioner of Taxation
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 153(1)
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ss 8, 8AAZA – 8AAZN, 14Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124 referred to
McCallum v Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 75 FCR 458 appliedNATHANIEL ROBERTSON JNR v DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
W 205 of 2003
SPENDER, BRANSON and STONE JJ
8 MARCH 2004
SYDNEY (HEARD IN PERTH)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
W205 of 2003
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
NATHANIEL ROBERTSON JNR
APPELLANTAND:
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
SPENDER, BRANSON and STONE JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
8 MARCH 2004
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN PERTH)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
W205 of 2003
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
NATHANIEL ROBERTSON JNR
APPELLANTAND:
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
SPENDER, BRANSON and STONE JJ
DATE:
8 MARCH 2004
PLACE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN PERTH)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT
INTRODUCTION
The principal issue to be determined on this appeal is very narrow. It is whether the learned primary judge (Carr J) erred in concluding that the appellant did not come within the limited class of bankrupts who, on the authority of McCallum v Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 75 FCR 458, may be ‘dissatisfied’ within the meaning of s 14ZZ of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (‘the TA Act’) with an objection decision made by the Commissioner of Taxation (‘the Commissioner’). The appellant, by his counsel, expressly disavowed any challenge to the majority decision in McCallum v Commissioner of Taxation.
In McCallum v Commissioner of Taxation a taxpayer, Mr McCallum, duly objected to an assessment made by the Commissioner. Prior to the objection being disallowed Mr McCallum was made bankrupt. After the objection was disallowed Mr McCallum, in reliance on s 14ZZ of the TA Act, applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) for review of the Commissioner’s decision to disallow the objection. The Full Federal Court (Whitlam and Lehane JJ, Hill J dissenting) held that the principle laid down in Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124, namely that a bankrupt has no standing to appeal against a…
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- Case
- [2004] FCAFC 46
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory framework, including sections 14ZU and 14ZZ of the Taxation Administration Act, which govern the objection process and the rights of a person to seek review or appeal. The court also considered Part IIB of the TA Act, which deals with RBAs. The appellant argued that primary tax debts allocated to an RBA before bankruptcy could still impact him post-discharge, negating his entitlement to a refund of an RBA surplus. However, the court found that the appellant did not challenge the authority of previous cases such as McCallum v Commissioner of Taxation and Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL, which established that a bankrupt lacks standing to seek review of an objection decision.
The court concluded that the appellant's arguments did not distinguish his case from the precedent set by McCallum v Commissioner of Taxation. Since the appellant had not mounted a challenge to the correctness of the majority decision in McCallum v Commissioner of Taxation, and had not sought to distinguish it, the appeal must fail. The court dismissed the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.
The appeal is dismissed, and the appellant is ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the circumstances, the appeal against his Honour’s decision must, in our view, fail for the reasons set out below.CONSIDERATION Section 14ZU of the TA Act governs the manner in which ‘[a] person’ making a taxation objection must make the objection. Subsequent sections of the TA Act utilise the expression ‘the person’ as a shorthand reference to a particular person who has made a taxation objection. Section 14ZZ of the TA Act provides:‘If the person is dissatisfied with the Commissioner's objection decision, the person may: (a)if the decision is both a reviewable objection decision and an appealable objection decision—either:(i)apply to the Tribunal for review of the decision; or(ii)appeal to the Federal Court against the decision; or(b)if the decision is a reviewable objection decision (other than an appealable objection decision)—apply to the Tribunal for review of the decision; or(c)if the decision is an appealable objection decision (other than a reviewable objection decision)—appeal to the Federal Court against the decision.’ As is mentioned above, the appellant did not mount a challenge to the correctness of the majority decision in McCallum v Commissioner of Taxation nor seek to distinguish it. The principal submission advanced by the appellant was that he has standing to seek review of the Commissioner’s objection decisions because the objection decisions may have ramifications for him after his discharge from bankruptcy. The submission was sought to be supported by reference to Part IIB of the TA Act which authorises the Commissioner to establish running balance accounts (‘RBAs’) for primary tax debts. Part IIB of the TA Act is constituted by s 8AAZA – s 8AAZN. Division 1 of Part IIB of the TA Act contains the following relevant definitions:‘primary tax debt means any amount due to the Commonwealth directly under a taxation law (other than, except in Division 4, the Product Grants and Benefits Administration Act 2000), including any such amount that is not yet payable.’‘RBA deficit debt, in relation to an RBA of an entity, means a balance in favour of the Commissioner, based on: (a)primary tax debts that have been allocated to the RBA and that are currently payable; and(b)payments made in respect of current or anticipated primary tax debts of the entity, and credits to which the entity is entitled under a taxation law, that have been allocated to the RBA.’‘RBA surplus, in relation to an RBA of an entity, means a balance in favour of the entity, based on: (a)primary tax debts that have been allocated to the RBA; and(b)payments made in respect of current or anticipated primary tax debts of the entity, and credits to which the entity is entitled under a taxation law, that have been allocated to the RBA.’ Section 8AAZH(1) of the TA Act provides, in effect, that a taxpayer is liable to pay to the Commissioner any RBA deficit debt in relation to his or her RBA. Conversely, s 8AAZLF(1) of the TA Act places a qualified obligation on the Commissioner to refund to a taxpayer the RBA surplus in relation to his or her RBA. The appellant placed weight on the inclusion in par (a) of the definition of ‘RBA deficit debt’ of the phrase ‘that are currently payable’ and the absence of a similar phrase in par (a) of the definition of ‘RBA surplus’. The appellant argued that the definition of ‘RBA surplus’ had the effect that:‘… the tax debt is taken into account in determining surplus, not if it is payable but if it has been allocated.’Consequently, so the appellant argued, a primary tax debt allocated to a RBA before the taxpayer’s bankruptcy, whilst no longer payable by the taxpayer, could have adverse consequences for the taxpayer following his discharge from bankruptcy by negating an entitlement that he might otherwise have to a refund of an RBA surplus.