Robert v National Australia Bank Limited

[2025] QCA 139

[2025] QCA 139

COURT OF APPEAL

BRADLEY JA

Appeal No 700 of 2025
SC No 882 of 2024

JAMIE ROBERT  Appellant/Applicant

v

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED  First Respondent
ABN 12 004 044 937

ANDREW IRVINE, MANAGING DIRECTOR AND  Second Respondent
GROUP CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PHILIP CHRONICAN, NON-EXECUTIVE  Third Respondent
DIRECTOR AND CHAIRMAN

BRISBANE

WEDNESDAY, 30 JULY 2025

JUDGMENT

BRADLEY JA:  On 20 February 2025, the appellant filed a notice of appeal in this Court.  By it, he sought leave to appeal against four orders that were made on 7 August 2024, 10 October 2024, 10 December 2024 and 30 January 2025.  Each was an interlocutory order made by the Northern Judge in proceedings in the Townsville Registry.

The August order was in the nature of directions for hearing of two interlocutory applications.  The first, filed by the respondents, was an application to transfer a proceeding from the District Court in Brisbane to the Townsville Registry, for it to be listed and heard together with a Townsville proceeding, and some other orders.  The second was filed by the appellant.  It was an application to dismiss the respondents’ interlocutory application, and for other orders.

The October order dismissed, with costs, an interlocutory application by the applicant for a declaration and orders based on a contention that the respondents might be held in contempt of court.

The December order transferred the proceeding from the District Court in Brisbane to the Townsville Registry, ordered that it be listed and heard together with the Townsville proceeding, dismissed the contrary application the appellant had filed, and made orders in the nature of directions for a hearing on 10 March 2025 of the respondents’ interlocutory application for summary judgment.

The January order was in the nature of directions for a hearing, also on 10 March 2025, of the appellant’s application to set aside the December order.  He had filed this application on 6 January 2025.

When the appellant filed his notice of appeal from the four orders, he was still the moving party in his application to set aside the December order.  So he was maintaining simultaneously, proceedings to set aside the same order in both the Townsville Registry and in the Court of Appeal.  He did not discontinue his Townsville application or consent to it being dismissed.  It was heard on 10 March 2025 and was dismissed.  The same day, the Northern Judge granted the second and third respondents summary judgment and removed them as parties to the Townsville proceeding.

This brief history indicates some aspects of the appeal.  The appellant failed to commence the appeal within 28 days of the making of the August, October or December order.  He has applied for an extension of time to appeal.  It is an appeal from interlocutory orders about matters of practice and procedure.  So, the appellant has applied for leave to appeal.  The time for compliance with the directions included in the orders, the subject of his  appeal has passed.  The parties appear to have complied with most of the directions.  Lastly, in listing unusual features I would mention that the second and third respondents have had judgment against the appellant since 10 March 2025.  There is no appeal from that judgment.

To commence a proceeding in the Court of Appeal, a party in the position of the appellant must file a notice of appeal.  Rule 747 provides that the notice of appeal must state “briefly and specifically the grounds of appeal”.  The appellant’s notice of appeal identifies grounds of appeal for what he calls “Decision 1” and “Decision 2”.

For “Decision 1”, there are four grounds.  The first asserts that the mortgage the first respondent relies on is a forgery.  The second is that the primary Judge did not direct the respondents to produce evidence of their standing to sue him.  The third is also about the respondents’ standing.  The fourth seems to be an allegation of bias against the Northern Judge.

For “Decision 2”, there are 10 grounds of appeal, but when read, there may not be quite that many.  The first is a statement that the orders are void from when they were made.

The second is in relation to the 30 January 2025 hearing.  It seems to allege the Northern Judge was, “Trying to railroad the appellant by unnecessarily delaying a decision that could have been made immediately…”.

The third is a statement that this conduct also occurred at the 10 December 2024 hearing.

The fourth is a quote attributed to the former Chief Justice Murray Gleeson about the oaths of Judges and their impartiality.  It raises no ground of appeal.

The fifth is that the appellant says he has evidence of how orders were produced by the solicitors for the respondents and signed by the Deputy Registrar and not by the Judge.

The sixth is that the Deputy Registrar is not a judicial officer under the Australian Constitution.

The seventh is that the orders are said to not comply with a provision in the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld).

The eighth says, “It appears that such is ‘fraud upon the court’ hence.”

The ninth is a maxim that “out of fraud, no action arises”.

The tenth is “A man affected by both a void and a voidable Order has the right… to have the said Orders set aside.”

None of these grounds of appeal identifies any arguable basis upon which any of the decisions the subject of the appeal could be set aside.  It is possible that within these brief perfunctory grounds of appeal, the appellant may have some point.  His failure to identify any in his notice of appeal creates significant difficulty for the future conduct of the appeal.  One cannot have parties proceed to a hearing of an appeal on the basis of Delphic maxims unconnected to any facts, matters or laws relevant to the decisions that are the subject of the appeal.

In order to succeed in an appeal to this Court, the appellant must demonstrate that the order, or any of the orders, made by the Northern Judge, was vitiated by some legal, factual or discretionary error.[1]  He does not identify any such error.  Even if he could, it would be necessary for him to overcome the fact that the appeal seeks to have the Court review a decision on a matter of practice and procedure.  These matters often call for a degree of appellate restraint against interference with decisions made in the trial division.  Generally, an appellate Court will not interfere unless, in addition to some error of principle, the appellant demonstrates that the order will work a substantial injustice to one of the parties.[2]

There is no suggestion in any of the appellant’s material that the orders made by the Northern Judge could work a substantial injustice against him.  I have considered the appeal notice as it stands.  I have read the other material that the appellant relies upon, and considered his oral submissions made in court this morning.  There does not appear to be the slightest suggestion that the orders, the subject of the appeal, worked any injustice.

If the appellant wishes to proceed with the appeal, he will need to do better.  He will need to identify grounds of appeal that are directed at the orders that are actually the subject of the appeal.  It is not clear at present that there is any prospect that he could do so, but I am not wishing to close the door on the possibility that there may be something that he could find within the broad scope of his challenge that might amount to a ground of appeal.

It seems highly improbable that such a ground could be found in respect of the programming directions made in the orders below.  It seems equally improbable that the transfer of proceedings from the Brisbane District Court to the Townsville Registry could be thought to give rise to some appealable point that could cause a substantial injustice.  I say that only against the known background.  The appellant commenced his proceedings in the Supreme Court in Townsville, so that that does not seem to be an inconvenient forum for him as a party to litigation.

In the circumstances, the notice of appeal should be struck out.  I will direct that, if the appellant wishes to persist with the appeal, he is to file and serve a fresh notice of appeal within 21 days.  The appellant’s application to dismiss the respondents’ application was and is entirely unnecessary.  It is the sort of cost and time-wasting exercise that is discouraged by the philosophy of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules.  That application should also be dismissed.

Mr O’Brien is there anything else you want to say?

MR O’BRIEN:  Yes, your Honour.  I provided a draft order.  There is one typographical error, which I just identified in paragraph 2.  Should be the application “24 April”, not 4.  That was the date of the application to strike out – my client’s strike out application.  And then you’ll see in order 3, your Honour, my instructions are no order as to costs are sought.

[1]Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at 180–181.

[2]Adeva Home Solutions Pty Ltd v Queensland Motorways Management Pty Ltd (2021) 9 QR 141 at 12–14.

BRADLEY JA:  Yes.  Now, the appellant’s application of 5 March, he did not read that today, but that is a general application, is it not, for an extension of time?

MR O’BRIEN:  Yes.

BRADLEY JA:  So why should that be dismissed?

MR O’BRIEN:  Well, it was sought to be dismissed in the context of the notice of appeal being struck out.

BRADLEY JA:  Yes.  But I have given him 21 days in which ‑ ‑ ‑

MR O’BRIEN:  Yes.

BRADLEY JA:  ‑ ‑ ‑ to produce another one, so I do not see any point in striking out or dismissing the application for leave.

MR O’BRIEN:  Yes.  So I think, your Honour, that means paragraph 2 would be, “The appellant’s application filed 24 April 2025 is dismissed.”

BRADLEY JA:  Yes.  I will direct that the appellant file and serve any fresh notice of appeal within 21 days.  I will also direct that if the appellant does not file a fresh notice of appeal within 21 days, then the appeal is dismissed.  Now, could your solicitors prepare a draft order in those terms?

MR O’BRIEN:  Yes, your Honour.

BRADLEY JA:  If you submit that to my Associate, I can arrange to have it issued through the registry.

MR O’BRIEN:  Yes.  Thank you, your Honour.

BRADLEY JA:  Thanks.  Adjourn the court.