[2019] FWC 4729

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Robert Lahrmann
v
Complete Staff Solutions (3) Pty Limited
(U2019/4125)

COMMISSIONER WILSON

MELBOURNE, 8 JULY 2019

Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – casual – break in continuous service - minimum employment period not met.

[1] Robert Lahrmann has made an application for unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) against Complete Staff Solutions (3) Pty Limited (Complete Staff Solutions) which was lodged in the Commission on 11 April 2019.

[2] The matters requiring determination in this decision are whether at the time Mr Lahrmann’s employment ended he was a person protected from unfair dismissal, with it being argued by the Respondent that he was not, for reason that he had not completed the minimum employment period.

[3] Mr Lahrmann gave evidence on his behalf while Stephen Jolly, Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director, Linda Stollery, Payroll and Accounts Manager and Michelle Charles, Branch Manager, Ballarat each gave evidence on behalf of Complete Staff Solutions.

[4] At the core of the Respondent’s submissions is the argument that Mr Lahrmann commenced his employment with the Respondent on 24 September 2018 and ceased his employment on 22 March 2019 and that since Mr Lahrmann was a casual employee and there was a break in employment over the 2018 Christmas/New Year period that Mr Lahrmann has not completed the minimum employment period. It is also argued that he was a casual employee with no reasonable expectation on ongoing employment, meaning that the break in employment should also be treated as having broken his continuous service.

[5] Mr Lahrmann and Complete Staff Solutions agreed in the proceedings before me that his employment started on 24 September 2018 and that there was now no issue between them about the date on which he started employment. 1

[6] Complete Staff Solutions is a labour hire company which provides “a full range of human resource solutions, workplace health and safety consulting, labour hire services including traffic controllers”. 2 Mr Lahrmann was employed as a casual labour hire employee to fill vacancies for a Host Employer referred to as Goldwind. On 16 August 2018 Mr Lahrmann completed several forms including a Personal Information/Account Details form, a Superannuation Standard Choice Form, a Tax File Number Declaration form, a General Induction form, a Temporary Employee Agreement, a Code of Conduct as well as several policies including drug and alcohol, harassment, bullying, fatigue management, safe driving, deed of secrecy, grievance, and social media.3 As part of the Temporary Employee Agreement signed by Mr Lahrmann he agreed amongst other things that:

“…

3. I understand that I may accept or decline your offer of employment

…

5. I will only be paid for actual hours worked and that each assignment will represent a discrete period of employment.

6. My rate of pay and my conditions of employment will be as determined at the acceptance of each assignment.

…

9. Due to the nature of temporary employment each assignment can be extended or shortened, depending on the clients’ requirement.

…” 4

[7] On 31 August 2018 Mr Lahrmann was issued a statement of completion of the Stockyard Hill Wind Farm on Goldwind Contactors 5 after completing an induction course with Goldwind6 and started work at that company’s Stockyard Hill Wind Farm project site on 24 September 2018.

[8] Mr Lahrmann’s work included preparing foundations for a wind turbine at Stockyard Hill Wind Farm. Payslips have been provided by Complete Staff Solutions covering Mr Lahrmann’s working patterns although given they are photos of payslips not held by the Respondent the quality at times makes it difficult to discern their content. As far as is legible Mr Lahrmann worked as follow:

● 24 September – 29 September: 38 hours
● 30 September 2018: 38 hours
● 1 October – 5 October 2019: 45 hours
● 8 October – 13 Octobers 2018: 49.33 hours
● 15 October – 18 October 2018: 39.8 hours
● 22 October – 26 October 2018: 40 hours
● 29 October – 2 November 2018: 48 hours
● 5 November – 10 November 2018: 46 hours
● 12 November – 14 November 2018: 30 hours
● 19 – 22 November 2018: 43 hours
● 26 November – 1 December 2018: 54.5 hours
● 3 December – 8 December: 32.5 hours
● 10 December – 15 December 2018: 46 hours
● 17 December – 21 December 2018: 45.5 hours
● 3 January 2019: 8 hours
● 7 January – 12 January 2019: 55 hours
● 14 January – 18 January 2019: 37.5 hours
● 21 January – 25 January 2019: 40.83 hours
● 28 January – 1 February 2019: 48 hours
● 4 February – 9 February 2019: 51.5 hours
● 11 February – 15 February 2019: 50 hours
● 18 February – 22 February 2019: 38 hours
● 25 February – 1 March 2019: 38 hours
● 5 March – 8 March 2019: 40 hours
● 11 March – 16 March 2019: 54 hours
● 18 March – 21 March: 40 hours 7

[9] Apart from a two-week break between 21 December 2018 and 3 January 2019, Mr Lahrmann worked every week.

[10] Mr Lahrmann submits that on Thursday, 22 March 2019 he had an altercation with some colleagues at work. At around 4:00 PM Mr Lahrmann’s supervisor approached him and advised that his (Mr Lahrmann’s) car had been damaged in the car park but that they were aware who had been responsible and that they had been stood down. However, on Monday, 25 March 2019 Mr Lahrmann was contacted by text message by Michelle Charles of Complete Staff Solutions and advised that Goldwind was conducting an investigation over the incident and that he was not required for work until the investigation had been completed. 8 Mr Lahrmann asserts that he was again contacted by Ms Charles the following day, Tuesday 26 March 2019 and advised that he had been terminated effective immediately from Goldwind as he was found to have been an aggressor in the altercation.9

[11] While Complete Staff Solutions do not contest the facts as put forth by Mr Lahrmann regarding the altercation, during the hearing Ms Charles and Mr Jolly put forth that the last day in which Mr Lahrmann worked was not on 26 March 2019 but was 21 March 2019 10 and that this was communicated to Mr Lahrmann on 22 March 2019.11 Mr Jolly put forth that while the employment separation certificate issued to Mr Lahrmann states that his employment ended on 26 March 2019 that this did not accurately reflect his last day of employment as it included an ex-gratia payment requested by Goldwind to be made to Mr Lahrmann.12 Ms Charles submits that she advised Mr Lahrmann by telephone on Friday, 22 March 2019 that he was no longer required; that she advised Mr Lahrmann on Monday, 25 March 2019 that there was to be an investigation and that on Wednesday, 27 March 201913 she simply confirmed that he was no longer required but that Complete Staff Solutions would still keep looking for other work for him.14

[12] Mr Lahrmann contests Complete Staff Solutions’ submissions that his final pay summary included an ex-gratia payment and that he was advised by Ms Charles on 22 March 2019 that he was no longer required. 15

[13] Complete Staff Solutions puts forward that all three employees involved in the incident were terminated and that this occurred after the employees were stood down and an investigation had been completed. The Respondent submits that none of the employees have since been replaced by the Host Employer. 16

CONSIDERATION

[14] The length and nature of the minimum employment period is defined in s.383 of the Act in the following terms:

“383 Meaning of minimum employment period

The minimum employment period is:

(a) if the employer is not a small business employer—6 months ending at the earlier of the following times:

(i) the time when the person is given notice of the dismissal;

(ii) immediately before the dismissal; or

(b) if the employer is a small business employer—one year ending at that time.”

[15] Complete Staff Solutions is not a small business given they employed 966 employees on 22 March 2019 and as a result the relevant minimum employment period is six months.

[16] Section 384 of the Act defines the period of employment in the following terms:

“384 Period of employment

(1) An employee’s period of employment with an employer at a particular time is the period of continuous service the employee has completed with the employer at that time as an employee.

(2) However:

(a) a period of service as a casual employee does not count towards the employee’s period of employment unless:

(i) the employment as a casual employee was on a regular and systematic basis; and

(ii) during the period of service as a casual employee, the employee had a reasonable expectation of continuing employment by the employer on a regular and systematic basis; and

(b) if:

(i) the employee is a transferring employee in relation to a transfer of business from an old employer to a new employer; and

(ii) the old employer and the new employer are not associated entities when the employee becomes employed by the new employer; and

(iii) the new employer informed the employee in writing before the new employment started that a period of service with the old employer would not be recognised;

the period of service with the old employer does not count towards the employee’s period of employment with the new employer.”

[17] Accordingly, the minimum employment period is assessed on the basis of “continuous service” and this is defined in s.22 of the Act to take into account the impact of certain excluded periods. Relevantly, the provision is as follows:

“22 Meanings of service and continuous service

General meaning

(1) A period of service by a national system employee with his or her national system employer is a period during which the employee is employed by the employer, but does not include any period (an excluded period) that does not count as service because of subsection (2).

(2) The following periods do not count as service

(a) any period of unauthorised absence;

(b) any period of unpaid leave or unpaid unauthorised absence, other than:

(i) a period of absence under Division 8 of Part 2-2 (which deals with community service leave); or

(ii) a period of stand down under Part 3-5, under an enterprise agreement that applies to the employee, or under the employee’s contract of employment; or

(iii) a period of leave or absence of a kind prescribed by the regulations;

(3) An excluded period does not break a national system employee’s continuous service with his or her national system employer, but does not count towards the length of the employee’s continuous service.

(3A) Regulations made for the purposes of paragraph (2)(c) may prescribe different kinds of periods for the purposes of different provisions of this Act (other than provisions to which subsection (4) applies. If they do so, subsection (3) applies accordingly.

… …”

[18] The Act does not of itself define the meaning of “6 months” but the following is clear from ss.383 and 384:

• The end of the period is to be assessed by reference to the earlier of the time when the person is given notice of the dismissal or immediately before the dismissal – this is the particular time; and

• The period is the period of continuous service the employee has completed with the employer at that time as an employee.

[19] Section 22(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 includes:

"In any Act, unless the contrary intention appears:

...

(b) `Month' shall mean calendar month;

...

(g) Calendar month' means a period commencing at the beginning of a day of one of the 12 months of the year and ending immediately before the beginning of the corresponding day of the next month or, if there is no such corresponding day, ending at the expiration of the next month."

[20] As noted above the parties now agree that Mr Lahrmann’s first date of work was 24 September 2018.

Whether casual service does not count/break on continuation of employment

[21] Determination of the matters within s.386 requires an examination of the basis of a person’s employment, with it being accepted that “[i]t is the employment which must be on a regular and systematic basis. This does not mean that the hours or days of work must be regular and systematic”. 17 Further:

“[76] In situations where there is not a clear pattern or roster of hours and days worked or a clear agreed arrangement between the employer and employee, then evidence of regular and systematic employment can be established where:

• The employer regularly offers work when suitable work is available at times when the employer knows that the employee has generally made themselves available; and

• •Work is offered and accepted sufficiently often that it could no longer be regarded as simply occasional or irregular.

[77] Positive evidence of these two situations establishes regularity and a system to the employment. It is also positive evidence of a reasonable expectation of continuing employment on a regular and systematic basis.” 18

[22] The ascertainment of whether there was regular and systematic employment was considered in Yaraka Holdings Pty Limited v Giljevic:

“It is clear from the examples that a ‘regular ... basis’ may be constituted by frequent though unpredictable engagements and that a ‘systematic basis’ need not involve either predictability of engagements or any assurance of work at all…

Engagement under contracts on a ‘systematic basis’ implies something more than regularity in the sense just mentioned, that is, frequency. The basis of engagement must exhibit something that can fairly be called a system, method or plan (cf the definition of ‘systematic’ in the Macquarie Dictionary, revised 3^rd edn, 2001).” 19

[23] Yaraka also held that it is the engagement of a casual employee that must be regular and systematic, not the hours worked pursuant to such engagement; that the term ‘regularly’ should be construed liberally, and that ‘systematic’ does not mean predictable. 20 While so, “it is important to note that the Court did not say or suggest that the hours of work are analytically unimportant. Clearly, the days on which a person works and the hours worked on those days are relevant to the consideration of whether casual employment is regular and systematic, and whether the person has a reasonable expectation of ongoing employment”.21

[24] The subject of the ascertainment of regular and systematic employment was explained further by the Full Bench in Shortland v Smiths Snackfood Co Ltd, 22 (Shortland) which analysed in careful detail the provisions of the legislation ultimately requiring application. In that matter, the Full Bench acknowledged that within the overall period of employment there may parts unable to be counted toward the minimum period for the reason they are excluded casual periods. An excluded period will, of course, be a period of casual employment in which the employee does not have BOTH regular and systematic employment AND a reasonable expectation of continuing employment by the employer on a regular and systematic basis. The employee in question had first started working for the Respondent company in July 2006, but had switched to casual employment in 2009. Taking the view that the provisions of s.384 had been misconceived, the Full Bench records the following first instance findings:

“[6] The Commissioner held:

“[32] From the evidence, I have to conclude that from June 2009 the Applicant’s engagement was intermittent until September 2009. During that period, it would have to be described as irregular in terms of weeks and hours of engagement. In terms of a system, there appears to be no evidence on which to say that the employment was systematic.

[33] From September 2009 to January 2010, there was simply no employment of the Applicant.

[34] From 17 June 2009, in my view, the Applicant’s employment was not regular and systematic in accordance with s.384(2)(i) nor had he any reasonable expectation of continuing employment in conformity with s.384(2)(ii). Consequently, at the time of his dismissal, the Applicant was not protected from unfair dismissal.””

[25] After recording that the relevant requirement for jurisdiction is whether the minimum employment period has been completed and that in the case in question the period was 6 months, considered the different terms employed within s.384, the Full Bench held as follows:

“[10] As a matter of the common law of employment, and in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, each occasion that a casual employee works is viewed as a separate engagement pursuant to a separate contract of employment. Casual employees may be engaged from week to week, day to day, shift to shift, hour to hour or for any other agreed short period. In this sense no casual employee has a continuous period of employment beyond any single engagement. Moreover, it is common for a casual employee to transition between a period in which their engagements with a particular employer are intermittent and a period in which their engagements are regular and systematic and vice versa. It is against that background that s.384 must be construed.

[11] The criteria in s.384(2)(a) make it clear that s.384 does not proceed on the basis that a casual employee’s period of employment for the purposes of the unfair dismissal remedy starts and ends with each engagement as understood in the common law of employment.

[12] Moreover, it is more than tolerably clear that s.384 is concerned with how an employee’s period of employment is calculated for the purposes of s.382(a). Section 384(2) draws a distinction between a period of service and a period of employment. It also draws a distinction between a period of continuous service and a period of service: a period of continuous service can be made up of a series of periods of service, some of which count towards the period of continuous service (ie. where the conditions in s.384(2)(a)(i) and (ii) are met) and some of which do not (ie. where one of the conditions in s.384(2)(a)(i) or (ii) is not met). It is clear from the language of s.384(2) that an employee may have series of contiguous periods of service with an employer that may count towards a single period of employment with that employer. Any given period of service in such a contiguous series of periods of service will count towards the employee’s period of employment only if the requirements in s.384(2)(a)(i) and (ii) are met. Section 384(2) is concerned only with determining which periods of service in such a contiguous series count toward the employee’s period of employment with the employer for the purposes of s.382(a).

[13] Continuous service by a casual employee who has an established sequence of engagements with an employer is broken only when the employer or the employee make it clear to the other party, by words or actions that there will be no further engagements. The gaps between individual engagements in a sequence of engagements should not be seen as interrupting the employee’s period of continuous employment within the meaning of s.384. In particular, a period of continuous service within the meaning of s.384(1) is not to be seen as broken by a period of ‘leave’ or an absence due to illness or injury.

[14] The Commissioner did not find that Mr Shortland’s employment was not continuous and correctly so. Prior to June 2009 Mr Shortland worked almost every week. There were a total of 4 isolated weeks in the period of almost three years prior to June 2009 when Mr Shortland performed no work. Those breaks should not be treated as a discontinuity in Mr Shortland’s employment such that periods of service before them should be discounted. The pattern of work disclosed by the evidence suggests that Mr Shortland’s employment in the period was regular and systematic. On any view, Mr Shortland had a reasonable expectation of continuing employment on a regular and systematic basis. In June 2009 Mr Shortland ceased work as a result of an injury that he claimed was work-related and for which he has now lodged a claim for workers compensation. Smiths has disputed that claim on the basis of causation. Mr Shortland’s absence from work from June 2009 was due to that injury and incapacity.

[15] A letter from Smiths dated 22 September 2009 informed Mr Shortland:

“. . . Please be aware that given you are unable to undertake your full duties, we are unable to roster you for any shifts as a casual packer.

Should a medical practitioner declare you fully fit for work again, please advise us and provide a copy of the certificate so that we are able to roster you for work where required.”

[16] It is clear from subsequent events that Smiths took the view that Mr Shortland was still a casual employee but he was not being allocated work because he was not fully fit for work.

[17] On the evidence before the Commissioner, Mr Shortland had a period of continuous service within the meaning of s.384 that commenced in July 2006 and continued until his employment was terminated by Smiths’ letter of 11 January 2010.

[18] For these reasons we find that the Commissioner erred in finding that the requirement in s.382(a) was not met and that consequently Mr Shortland was not protected from unfair dismissal within the meaning of s.382”.

(references omitted)

[26] What may be drawn from the foregoing, so far as is relevant to this matter, are the following:

• a person’s continuous employment is broken only when the employer or the employee make it clear to the other that there will be no further engagements; 23

• the gaps between individual engagements do not necessarily interrupt the employee’s continuous employment; 24

• a series of contiguous periods of service may count toward a single period of employment; 25

• contiguous periods of employment will only count toward the person’s period of employment if the conditions within s.384(2)(a)(i) and (ii) are met; 26 further, in such assessment it is the engagement that must be regular and systematic, not the hours and that ‘regularly’ should be construed liberally, and that ‘systematic’ does not mean predictable;27 however the hours of work are not unanalytically unimportant.28

[27] An analysis of the payslips provided by Complete Staff Solutions as provided earlier in this decision reveal that Mr Lahrmann worked each week between Monday, 24 September 2018 and Friday, 21 December 2018 (both dates inclusive). He then worked again on Thursday, 3 January 2019, working periodically from that date onwards.

[28] Analysis of the timesheets shows that he worked every Monday to Thursday from 6:30 AM to either 3:00 PM or 5:00 PM at least, with some shifts finishing well after 5:00 PM. He also worked regularly on Fridays and occasionally on Saturdays.

[29] Mr Lahrmann’s work in the period between 24 September and 21 December 2018 was both regular and systematic with him working regular hours and days every week. Similarly, his work in the period from 3 January 2019 to the end of his employment, whether that be 22 March 2019 or a few days later, was also regular and systematic with him working regular hours and days every week.

[30] Mr Lahrmann submits that the break from the end of 21 December 2018 to the start of 3 January 2019 was for the purposes of a Christmas/New Year shut-down. 29 His evidence is that all but four staff were sent away during that period and that he fully expected to return on 3 January.30 While Complete Staff Solutions has been rather coy about the reason staff, including Mr Lahrmann, were sent away between the dates in question, it has not provided a coherent alternative explanation for not needing Mr Lahrmann in the period, other than simply saying that the host employer did not require staff. There is no evidence that would lead to a finding that Mr Lahrmann was informed proximate to 21 December 2018 that Complete Staff Solutions had make it clear to him that there will be no further engagements and that he would not return in January.

[31] Accordingly, Mr Lahrmann’s continuous service was not broken in December 2018.

[32] Complete Staff Solutions submit that the casual work being undertaken by Mr Lahrmann in late March 2019 did not have a reasonable expectation of continuing as six to nine employees engaged with Goldwind were to have their casual employment terminated. 31 Mr Lahrmann appears to have been informed of this information on 20 February 2019 by way of a text message from Michelle Charles. It is unclear what was told to Mr Lahrmann before this time, other than what is detailed in his Temporary Employee Agreement discussed above.

[33] The patterns of work performed by Mr Lahrmann shows that his employment was regular and systematic and that, until the point of termination, he had a reasonable expectation of continuing employment. While, necessarily, project employment will usually eventually come to an end there is no evidence that would lead to a finding that, at the point in time of the altercation on Thursday, 22 March 2019 that Mr Lahrmann was on notice that his job would soon finish, or that he should reasonably have other than an expectation of continuing regular and systematic employment, for a time at least.

[34] While the commencement date is agreed between the parties, the end date of employment is not.

[35] Mr Jolly, Chief Executive Officer of Complete Staff Solutions argues that Mr Lahrmann was told by Ms Charles by no later than Friday, 22 March 2019 that he would no longer be required at the Stockyard Hill Wind Farm project site operated by Goldwind. However, Mr Lahrmann argues that on Friday, 22 March 2019 he was told to go home and not come into work on Monday, 25 March 2019; that he was then informed by text message on Monday, 25 March 2019 by Ms Charles that an investigation was being held and that she would let him know the results on Tuesday, 26 March 2019. The text message read “Rob WBHO are doing a full investigation you are not required at Stockman Hill tomorrow they will let me know in the morning. Thanks Michelle” 32

[36] Mr Lahrmann recollects that Ms Charles then contacted him on Tuesday, 26 March 2019 and communicated to him that he was no longer required at the project site. Ms Charles’ oral evidence was that this conversation was on Wednesday, 27 March 2019. Notwithstanding, that there are problems with recollection of the evidence from each party with neither having particularly grounded their evidence of critical dates against objectively acceptable facts, I prefer and accept Mr Lahrmann’s chronology and find that he was not dismissed until Tuesday, 26 March 2019.

[37] Such founding is grounded in three matters of objective fact; first, the company paid him what he characterises as an ex gratia payment for time on Monday, 25 March 2019, broadly equivalent to the money he would have otherwise earned had he been at work; secondly Ms Charles’ text on Monday, 25 March 2019 communicates that he would be told the outcome of the investigation the next day; and thirdly, it was on Tuesday, 26 March 2019 that Ms Charles spoke with Mr Lahrmann and communicated there would be no further placements for him at Stockyard Hill Wind Farm.

[38] In relation to the last matter, when Ms Charles says the conversation took place on Wednesday, 27 March 2019, she is plainly mistaken; with the assertion not being consistent with the other material before the Commission.

[39] In relation to the ex gratia payment – not referred to in the employer’s written submissions – and notwithstanding that it is a payment that was at the instigation of the host employer, it would be implausible that such payment be made to a person who had already had their employment terminated.

[40] The evidence received in the matter leads to the conclusion that the period of Mr Lahrmann’s continuous service was between Monday, 24 September 2018 and Tuesday, 26 March 2019.

[41] The only significant break Mr Lahrmann had in his employment was for a period of 12 days after work had finished on Friday, 21 December 2018 and before it resumed on 3 January 2019. At the time of the 2018 Christmas break Mr Lahrmann was sent away from the site for the period between those two dates, a period of slightly less than two weeks. Mr Lahrmann understood the break to be for the purposes of the Christmas closedown and he understood he would be called back to work after the New Year. That period should be treated as not breaking Mr Lahrmann’s continuous service and also should be treated as a period of casual service that should not be counted towards Mr Lahrmann’s employment period. Nonetheless, it was reasonable for Mr Lahrmann, during the period in question to have a reasonable expectation of continuing employment with Complete Staff Solutions. The product of this analysis is that a period of 12 days requires deduction from Mr Lahrmann’s overall continuous service for the reason of the Christmas break. On that basis, Mr Lahrmann’s period of employment comprises 2.87 months between 24 September 2018 and 21 December 2018 and then 2.74 months between 3 January 2019 and 26 March 2019. In total Mr Lahrmann’s employment was 5.61 months minus 12 days, which is less than the applicable minimum employment period.

[42] Because that is the case, Mr Lahrmann was not a person protected from unfair dismissal at the time of his dismissal. As a result, I must dismiss his application and an order to that effect is issued at the same time as this decision.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

Mr R. Lahrmann on his own behalf.

Mr S. Jolly for the Respondent.

Hearing details:

2019.

Melbourne (by phone);

21 June.

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

1 Transcript, PN 39; 43 – 44.

3 Exhibit R1, Respondent Submissions; Jurisdictional Objection, 5 June 2019, Attachments A – C.

4 Ibid, Attachment C.

5 Ibid, Attachment E.

6 Exhibit R4, Witness Statement of Michelle Charles, 4 June 2019.

7 Exhibit R1, Attachment F.

8 Exhibit A2, Bundle of Documents, 25 March 2019,Attachment A.

9 Form F2, Application for Unfair Dismissal, Item 3.2; Exhibit A1, Witness Statement of Robert Lahrmann, 19 June 2019.

10 Transcript, PN 188.

11 Ibid, PN 210.

12 Ibid, PN 190.

13 Ibid, PN 210; 222; 236.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid, PN 213.

16 F3, Employer Response Form, dated 10 May 2019, Item 3.1.

17 Ponce v DJT Staff Management Services Pty Ltd T/A Daly’s Traffic[2010] FWA 2078, [66].

18 Ibid.

19 [2006] ACTCA 6, [89] – [91], [(2006) 149 IR 399].

20 Ibid, [65] – [69]; adopted by the Full Bench in Bronze Hospitality Pty Ltd v Janell Hansson[2019] FWCFB 1099, [24].

21 Bronze Hospitality Pty Ltd v Janell Hansson[2019] FWCFB 1099, [24].

22 [2010] FWAFB 5709.

23 Shortland, [13].

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid, [12].

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid, [65] – [69]; adopted by the Full Bench in Bronze Hospitality Pty Ltd v Janell Hansson[2019] FWCFB 1099, [24].

28 Bronze Hospitality Pty Ltd v Janell Hansson[2019] FWCFB 1099, [24].

29 Transcript, PN 243 – 249.

30 Ibid, PN 249.

31 Exhibit R1, Attachment 2h.

32 Exhibit A2, Attachment 4, Text Message, dated 25 March 2019.

Robert Lahrmann v Complete Staff Solutions (3) Pty Limited

[2019] FWC 4729

8 JULY 2019

DECISION