Robe and Milling
[2017] FCCA 536
•23 March 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ROBE & MILLING | [2017] FCCA 536 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – De facto property – declaration of de facto relationship – short relationship – post-separation contributions to the family – child of the de facto relationship. |
| Legislation: Family Law Act 1975, ss.4AA, 44(6), 60HA, 60HB, 60H, 79, 90RB, 90RD, 90SB, 90SF, 90SK, & 90SM |
| Cases cited: Stanford & Stanford (2012) FLC 93-518 Rubenstein & Hartnett [2011] FMCAfam 876 Lee & Hutton [2013] FamCA 745 Jonah & White [2011] FamCA 221 Watson & Ling [2013] FamCA 57 In the Marriage of Hickey (2003) 30 Fam LR 355 Williams & Williams [1985] HCA 52 |
| Applicant: | MS ROBE |
| Respondent: | MR MILLING |
| File Number: | ADC 654 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Cole |
| Hearing dates: | 8, 9, 10 & 11 February 2016, 29 & 30 August 2016 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 30 August 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Adelaide |
| Delivered on: | 23 March 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr B McQuade |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Daniel Johns Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr J Bowler |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Martin Robinson Solicitors |
ORDERS
That the applicant have leave to proceed out of time pursuant to s.44(6) of the Family Law Act 1975.
That there be a declaration pursuant to s.90RD of the Family Law Act 1975 that the parties were in a de facto relationship from April to June 2009.
That the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of ONE HUNDRED AND TWELVE THOUSAND DOLLARS, FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR DOLLARS AND SEVENTY-FOUR CENTS ($112,494.74.00) within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order.
That upon payment of the sum of monies referred to in paragraph 3 hereof:
(a)any interest the applicant may have in the property in the possession or control of the respondent vest in the respondent,
(b)any interest the respondent may have in the property in the possession or control of the applicant vest in the applicant absolutely.
That the proceedings be otherwise dismissed.
That there be liberty to apply as to consequential orders.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Robe & Milling is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
ADC 654 of 2013
| MS ROBE |
Applicant
And
| MR MILLING |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The Proceedings
In these proceedings, the parties and each of their witnesses have at some time engaged in deceptive conduct.
The respondent in these proceedings engages in online gambling. He is unable to maintain an account with a number of agencies, due in part to the system he uses (and I put this in my words) of spreading the bets.
As a consequence, the applicant, the witnesses called by the applicant including her sister and her mother, and the witnesses called by the respondent including his mother and his current wife, all at one time or another held accounts in their name on his behalf.[1]
[1] See respondent’s trial affidavit filed on 28 January 2016, 146.
There was no dispute that the funds that go through these accounts save and except for any bets placed by that party, are the property of the respondent. There is some suggestion that the account holders receive 10% of the winnings in return for their name being used in this process, with the remainder to go to the respondent.
These proceedings therefore start with the common ground that everyone who gave evidence has, at some stage, engaged in a form of deceit.
The parties have been engaged in litigation in this Court since 2013. There was a five day trial in respect of children’s issues in 2014. Judgment was delivered in that matter in December 2014.
Property proceedings were instituted in 2015. The matter was listed for four days in February 2016 on the strong representation of the solicitors that the matter would conclude within that time. It did not conclude and resumed part-heard before me for a further two days on 29 and 30 August 2016.
This is Ms L’s application for:
a)a declaration that a de facto relationship existed between the parties commencing on (omitted) 2005 and ending on 22 January 2013; and
b)orders for a division of the parties’ assets with 60% of the net equity being paid to her, following what she asserts is the ending of their de facto relationship.
The application is opposed by Mr Milling who denies the existence of a de facto relationship and seeks an order that the proceedings be dismissed.
There is no dispute that there is a child of the parties’ relationship namely X who was born on (omitted) 2010 and is aged seven this year. X resides with the applicant and spends regular time with the respondent. Contravention proceedings are currently listed for hearing before me on 24 March 2017.
In the event that a de facto relationship is found to have existed, the parties:
a)take no issue with the geographical requirements of s.90SK of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”);
b)take no issue with an order being made granting leave to institute proceedings out of time, pursuant to s.44(6) of the Act; and
c)do not raise the issue of whether it is just and equitable for an order to be made acknowledging that this comes within the confines of the Reasons of the Court in Stanford (2012) FLC 93-518.[2]
[2] Stanford (2012) FLC 93-518, 42.
Chronology
The applicant submits that the parties were in a de facto relationship from (omitted) 2005 until it concluded on 22 January 2013.
The respondent denies the existence of a de facto relationship but concedes that the parties were engaged in a tumultuous and dysfunctional relationship which continued with several periods of separation between April 2005 and 22 January 2013.
He submits it was not a de facto relationship and notes that, amongst other things, there were a number of domestic violence restraining orders being obtained by the applicant, as follows:
a)In 2006 on the applicant’s evidence (which is not conceded by the respondent and is not corroborated by any documentation); and
b)Thereafter on the respondent’s evidence as follows:
i)September 2009, being a no contact order;
ii)25 November 2009 being a modification of the previous order enabling the respondent to have contact with the applicant save and except when he was under the influence of alcohol or any other intoxicating drug or substance;
iii)22 December 2011 in Noosa Magistrates Court Queensland which require the respondent be of good behaviour towards the applicant and not commit domestic violence;
iv)12 December 2012 in (omitted) New South Wales being a 12 month order which required the respondent to, amongst other things, not approach the applicant or any such premises or place at which she may from time to time reside or work, within 12 hours of consuming intoxicating liquor or illicit drugs.
v)23 January 2013 in Adelaide, South Australia.
vi)The (omitted) order was registered in South Australia by the applicant in January 2013. There is no dispute that the matter first went to Court on 10 January 2013. There is also no dispute that just before the time of the registration, the respondent travelled from Queensland to South Australia with the applicant and their daughter X. He was not told the (omitted) order was being registered nor was he told that the matter was set down for hearing on 29 January 2013;
vii)A further order was made at the hearing of 29 January 2013 which excluded the respondent from the premises at Property C. The order was subsequently varied on 24 April 2013 by deleting the paragraphs of the original order which excluded him from the premises at Property C, where he had been living; and
viii)The order was eventually dismissed in 2014.
ix)There are no current orders in place.
The relationship can be considered by reference to the respondent’s accommodation and the arrangements the parties made for that period of time.
Whilst there are a number of controversial elements to the chronology of the relationship, there is no significant dispute (unless otherwise noted) that:
a)(omitted)
i)The parties commenced a relationship in 2005.
ii)The respondent was boarding at (omitted) College in (omitted) and the applicant was living in Adelaide. The applicant claims that she and the respondent were together every fortnight with either the respondent returning to Adelaide to be with her or the applicant travelling to (omitted).
iii)The parties agree that the respondent was placed for a short time at (omitted) for work experience. The applicant alleges that she took up residence with him at this time. The respondent denies this and says he was only there for two weeks.
b)Darwin 2006
i)The respondent obtained employment in Darwin in (omitted) 2006 with (employer omitted) and moved to live in shared accommodation with a work colleague (Mr B) at (omitted).
ii)In (omitted) 2006 the applicant moved to Darwin and resided at (omitted) being student accommodation at (omitted). She remained there until (omitted) 2006.
iii)The applicant says an intervention order was made in her favour during this time. She did not produce any documentation to support this. The respondent denies the allegation.
c)Darwin 2007
i)The respondent moved to reside at (omitted), Darwin in (omitted) 2007. He remained residing there until (omitted) 2008.
ii)The respondent’s evidence is that he had an intimate relationship with Ms A in 2007.
iii)During this time the respondent says the applicant was residing at (omitted). The applicant says they lived together at (omitted) from (omitted) to (omitted) 2007 and then subsequently at (omitted). She does not deny that she maintained the accommodation at (omitted) from the beginning of 2007.
d)Darwin (omitted) 2008
i)The applicant alleges that from (omitted) 2008 until (omitted) 2008 the parties lived together at (omitted). This is denied by the respondent. The respondent’s evidence was that he was at the (omitted) premises until he moved to Adelaide in (omitted) 2008.
ii)It is common ground that the respondent was in Adelaide completing the final semester of his tertiary degree from (omitted) 2008 to (omitted) 2008. The respondent however says that he did not return to Darwin until (omitted) 2009.
e)Darwin (omitted) 2009
i)The respondent’s evidence is that he returned to Darwin on (omitted) 2009. In his trial affidavit he says that for a period of three months he lived in a share house at (omitted), with the applicant. He vacated those premises in (omitted) 2009 following the applicant alleging to the police that he had assaulted her. He subsequently retracted that, saying the period was closer to two months.
ii)In (omitted) 2009 the respondent went to (country omitted) on holiday with Ms D. There are a number of emails about this where the applicant refers to Ms D as a “boyfriend stealer”.
iii)On 25 September 2009 the applicant swore an affidavit in support of an order seeking no contact with the respondent. The affidavit does not contain anything to support a conclusion that the parties were living together.
iv)An intervention order was also sought against Ms D by the applicant.
v)On 19 November 2009 an intervention order was made against the respondent in favour of the applicant. The applicant, however, alleges the parties continued to cohabit until April 2010.
f)(omitted) 2010 Brisbane
i)The respondent moved to Brisbane where he remained until his return to Adelaide in (omitted) 2013.
ii)The applicant remained in Darwin, moving to Adelaide prior to the birth of X in (omitted) 2010.
g)(omitted) 2010
i)The applicant and X remained residing in Adelaide with the maternal grandmother.
ii)The applicant applied for and received a Centrelink benefit. The records note her single status.
iii)Domestic violence restraining orders were made in that period on the 22 December 2011 at (omitted) and on 22 December 2012 at (omitted).
h)(omitted) 2013
i)The respondent returned to Adelaide in (omitted) 2013.
ii)The parties have not resided together since the respondent’s return to Adelaide in (omitted) 2013.
iii)The applicant obtained an intervention order against the respondent in February 2013. That order was subsequently dismissed in 2014.
The applicant says amongst other things:
The respondent and I lived together at a common residence for the majority of our relationship. We always lived together and if the respondent’s mother paid for another unit at times, this had nothing to do with us.[3]
…The respondent and I lived together in Darwin for about four and a half years. We lived together, ate dinner together and slept together every single night.[4]
The respondent and I inter‑mingled our finances and at times we pooled our resources together to meet some of the joint expenses of the relationship. For example, I applied funds I had acquired from gambling, as well as income received from Centrelink, towards paying off the Property C property mortgage.[5]
[3] See applicant’s trial affidavit filed on 28 January 2016, 14.
[4] Ibid, 31.
[5] Ibid, 19.
Save for a period of two to three months commencing (omitted) 2009 when the respondent concedes that the parties lived in a share house, the respondent:
a)Concedes the parties were engaged in an intimate relationship from time to time;
b)Denies the parties cohabited; and
c)Maintained his own residence at all times save for the concession set out above.
The evidence
The applicant relies on:
a)her Initiating Application filed on 28 November 2014;
b)her trial affidavit filed on 28 January 2016;
c)her Financial Statement filed on 28 January 2016;
d)the affidavit of Ms A filed on 28 January 2016; and
e)the affidavit of Ms L (her sister) filed on 28 January 2016.
The applicant, her sister, and Ms A, gave evidence and were cross-examined.
The respondent relies on:
a)his trial affidavit filed on 28 January 2016;
b)his Financial Statement filed on 28 January 2016;
c)the affidavit of Ms J (the respondent’s mother) filed on 28 January 2016;
d)the affidavit of Ms D (a friend and former girlfriend) filed on 28 January 2016;
e)the affidavit of Mr C (the respondent’s brother) filed on 28 January 2016; and
f)the affidavit of Mr T sworn on 3 February 2016.
On day four of the trial the respondent sought leave to produce affidavits from Mr W a housemate who shared premises with the respondent in (omitted) in 2006 and later at (omitted), Darwin until (omitted) 2008, and Mr P who shared premises in (omitted) 2009 to (omitted) 2009. Those affidavits were not allowed.
The respondent, his mother, his brother, Ms D and Mr T gave evidence and were cross-examined.
The applicant
The applicant, at best, can be described as a tragic romantic. While she may have been committed or wanted to have been committed to the relationship, the respondent was not. In the face of issues such as evidence of other relationships and restraining orders she presented as someone unshakeable in her belief that the respondent was meant to be with her and her daughter.
Her evidence, at times, put her at risk of being seen as, “over egging the pudding”. Statements such as we were together every night, contrasted with, amongst other things, the respondent’s evidence of the girlfriends he had had during this period of time, and the domestic violence restraining orders referred to above.
Her evidence that the parties inter-mingled their finances was not, I consider, strongly supported, if at all by the evidence. At best she allowed the respondent to use her name to run a betting account.
My strong impression was that she wanted the relationship no matter what the respondent did or said. Her goal was a happy family comprising the respondent, herself and their child and she would take all possible steps to pursue that.
Her suggestion of conspiracies involving the applicant plotting with people such as Ms D, to exact revenge against her were not supported by the evidence, and appeared to be a rationalisation to explain why people were undertaking actions such as a complaint to the Health Professional Board about what they saw as harassment by the applicant.
The communications with people such as Ms D, and the use of terms such as “homewrecker” and “boyfriend stealer” together with her interaction with Ms C go towards supporting this conclusion.
Her evidence in respect of her interaction with Centrelink was not convincing. She was in receipt of a parenting benefit for some years after the birth of her child. Her evidence was that she informed Centrelink of her relationship with the respondent. The evidence available to the Court from Centrelink, shows that she was classified as a single person.
Her evidence was that she told them that the respondent was living away from her and in the circumstances they agreed that she could be classified as a single person. She is a professional person working as a psychologist. I do not accept that she is that naïve. In the absence of any corroborating evidence I do not accept her evidence on this point.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that would suggest that she made any effort to subsequently correct her status with Centrelink.
Her counsel referred in closing submissions to the respondent as a person who earnt his income from subterfuge, deceit and secrecy. He neglected to mention until pressed that everyone in this case had participated in the exercise of deceiving the betting agencies with the respondent, including his client.
The respondent
The respondent, on the other hand, impressed as someone who was happy to take advantage of the situation. I am not convinced that any purported commitments made by him were anything other than to gain a temporary advantage.
When times were good, then he would be there. I have no doubt however that prior to the birth of X, he would not have hesitated to abandon ship.
Subsequent to the birth of X, any actions taken by him that could be interpreted by a willing and anxious mother as a commitment to the relationship were, I consider, more likely than not to be for the purposes of the temporary advantage.
I formed the impression that the respondent used Ms L as and when he saw fit. Once X was born however, she had something he wanted and was unable to sever what was a dysfunctional and toxic relationship.
At the same time he strictly maintained his boundaries when it came to his property and his relationship status. The applicant was never a party to the transactions regarding the purchase of the properties and while there was talk of an engagement according to the applicant (who said that he proposed, which was strongly denied) there was never any visible sign of commitment to the marriage pathway.
Ms D
Ms D gave her evidence in a forthright and honest manner.
I accept that she was in a relationship with the respondent from (omitted) 2008 to (omitted) 2009.
I accept that she went on a holiday with the respondent in (omitted) 2009 to (country omitted).
I accept that she stopped over in Darwin on her way to (country omitted) and stayed with the respondent at his residence in (omitted), (omitted). I accept her evidence that he was not living with the applicant at this time.
One of the more memorable moments from the trial is when counsel for the applicant put to her that she was lying because she was jealous and wanted to get back with the respondent.
Her spontaneous laughter at the suggestion that she still carried a torch for the respondent impressed me.
Remaining witnesses
I will refer to the evidence of the applicant’s sister, her friend, the respondent’s mother, his brother and Mr T as and when appropriate through the course of these Reasons.
Jurisdiction
Counsel for the applicant refers me to s.90SB of the Act (which is set out below) and appears to submit that if there is a child of the relationship I am able to make orders for the alteration of the property.
Section 90SB of the Act provides:
A court may make an order unders.90SE, s.90SG, or s.90SM, or a declaration under s.90SL, in relation to a de facto relationship only if the court is satisfied:
(a)that the period, or the total of the periods, of the de facto relationship is at least 2 years; or
(b)that there is a child of the de facto relationship; or
(c)that:
(i)the party to the de facto relationship who applies for the order or declaration made substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90SM(4)(a), (b) or (c); and
(ii)a failure to make the order or declaration would result in serious injustice to the applicant; or
(d)that the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory.
There does not appear to be any dispute that if there is a child of the de facto relationship, I can make an order pursuant to s.90SM of the Act.
Section 90RB of the Act states that:
For the purposes of this Part, a child is a child of a de facto relationship if the child is the child both of the parties to the de facto relationship.
Save for the decision of Rubenstein & Hartnett [2011] FMCAfam 876, I was not assisted by reference to other authorities on s.90SB(b) of the Act.
Section 90SB(b) of the Act was considered by Watts J in Lee & Hutton [2013] FamCA 745. In that matter there was a de facto relationship however it had not been for two years. The issue was whether there was a child of the relationship, the mother having had two miscarriages in the course of the relationship.
In the course of considering the matter Watts J noted:
… turning to the meaning of “child” in s 90SB(b) of the Act. Section 90SB contains four gateway tests. Subsections (a), (c) and (d) in s 90SB focus upon how significant features of the de facto relationship have to be before jurisdiction is conferred upon a court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to, amongst other things, alter the property of persons living in a de facto relationship. It cannot be said that the use of the word “child” in s 90SB(b) is about conferring a benefit on the child once born. It is about allowing the applicant to pass through a gateway which would allow her to make a claim under s 90SM for alteration of property.[6]
[6] Lee & Hutton [2013] FamCA 745, 158.
There is no dispute that X is a child of the relationship.
The issue is whether she is the child of the de facto relationship of the parties.
Section 60HA of the Act states that:
Children of de facto partners
(1)For the purposes of this Act, a child is the child of a person who has, or had (emphasis added), a de facto partner if:
(a)the child is a child of the person and the person's de facto partner; or
(b)the child is adopted by the person and the person's de facto partner or by either of them with the consent of the other; or
(c)the child is, under subsection 60H(1) or section 60HB, a child of the person and the person's de facto partner.
Section 60HB of the Act refers to surrogacy arrangements and s.60H of the Act refers to children born as a result of artificial conception procedures. Neither sections concern this case.
The question then is and remains as set out below. If she is a child of the de facto relationship then the requirements of one of the “gateway” provisions of s.90SB of the Act are met.
Consideration can then be given to the application for an alteration of the property interest of the parties.
Was there a de facto relationship?
Section 4AA of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”) provides:
(1)A person is in a de facto relationship with another person if:
(a)the persons are not legally married to each other; and
(b)the persons are not related by family (see subsection (6)); and
(c)having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship, they have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis.
Paragraph (c) has effect subject to subsection (5).
Working out if persons have a relationship as a couple
(2)Those circumstances may include any or all of the following:
(a)the duration of the relationship;
(b)the nature and extent of their common residence;
(c)whether a sexual relationship exists;
(d)the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them;
(e)the ownership, use and acquisition of their property;
(f)the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;
(g)whether the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory as a prescribed kind of relationship;
(h)the care and support of children;
(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.
(3)No particular finding in relation to any circumstance is to be regarded as necessary in deciding whether the persons have a de facto relationship.
(4)A court determining whether a de facto relationship exists is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the case.
(5)For the purposes of this Act:
(a)a de facto relationship can exist between 2 persons of different sexes and between 2 persons of the same sex; and
(b)a de facto relationship can exist even if one of the persons is legally married to someone else or in another de facto relationship.
Counsel for the applicant refers me to the decision of Baker J in Rubenstein & Hartnett.
I accept and adopt the consideration of Murphy J in Jonah & White [2011] FamCA 221 where she said:
a)In Jonah & White Murphy J considered a number of authorities in State jurisdictions about what constitutes a de facto relationship, before he considered Part VIIIAB of the Act.[7] His Honour said:
In that respect it seems to me also instructive that the Commonwealth legislature did not provide for relief of that type in circumstances where two people were parties to, for example, a “domestic relationship”, or, as in New South Wales, a “close personal relationship” but, rather, only where parties were in a “de facto relationship” as defined.
In my opinion, the key to that definition is the manifestation of a relationship where “the parties have so merged their lives that they were, for all practical purposes, ‘living together’ as a couple on a genuine domestic basis”. It is the manifestation of “coupledom”, which involves the merger of two lives as just described, that is the core of a de facto relationship as defined and to which each of the statutory factors (and others that might apply to a particular relationship) are directed.[8]
b)His Honour continued:
The issue, as it seems to me, is the nature of the union rather than how it manifests itself in quantities of joint time. It is the nature of the union – the merger of two individual lives into life as a couple – that lies at the heart of the statutory considerations and the non-exhaustive nature of them and, in turn, a finding that there is a “de facto relationship”.[9]
[7] Rubenstein & Hartnett [2011] FMCAfam 876, 26.
[8] Jonah & White [2011] FamCA 221, 59-60.
[9] Ibid, 66.
Did the parties at any stage of their relationship so merge their lives that they were, for all practical purposes, ‘living together’ as a couple on a genuine domestic basis? Save for the short period when they cohabited I have difficulty with the other phases of the relationship. I will again refer to them by reference to the respondent’s accommodation at that time.
Save for the period when the parties cohabited for two to three months in Darwin I have, as stated, difficulty with finding the parties were living together on a genuine domestic basis for a period of time. My comments below are made with that exception in mind.
I accept that save for those two to three months the respondent;
a)maintained a separate residence;
b)for periods of time when there was no restraining order in place or he was not involved in another relationship spent some time with the applicant; and
c)did not share a common residence with the applicant.
There is some difficulty in determining for what periods of time the relationship was in existence as there were a number of significant disruptions.
There is no dispute that the parties were engaged in a sexual relationship during their time together.
I accept that:
a)save for the applicant and her family engaging in the respondent’s gambling scheme, there is no evidence on which I can safely rely to conclude there was any degree of financial interdependence between the parties. I would note that this is supported by the fact that the applicant subsequently represented to or allowed Centrelink to pay her benefits as a single mother. It is also supported by the fact that she obtained a benefit from HomeStart as a single parent.
b)I accept that the respondent paid child support informally and formally after X was born. I do not accept the applicant’s assertion it was a form of board.
c)There is no evidence on which I can safely rely to support a conclusion that they shared the ownership, use or acquisition of their property, save for the times they stayed at each other’s place for the night. Neither of them moved in with the other although I have no doubt that from time to time that would have been strongly promoted by the applicant. At all times save as referred to previously they each maintained separate residences.
d)Any degree of mutual commitment to a shared life did not in my view cross the threshold of coupledom and was at best minimal and transitory being quickly set aside as the next crisis erupted or the next relationship came to light.
e)I cannot find anything in the parties’ actions on which I can safely rely to support the conclusion put forward by the applicant that they were in a de facto relationship for five or more years.
f)The relationship was not registered in any State or Territory.
g)The care and support of their child was addressed through:
i)The respondent’s visits to his child;
ii)The payment of child support which has significantly reduced in recent times; and
iii)The subsequent controversies which were addressed in the five day trial held in this Court.
h)The parties did from time to time present as a couple. They attended functions together and held the christening for their daughter here in Adelaide. Save for the christening, it is difficult to determine however what made this different from a boyfriend attending a function with his girlfriend.
I will refer briefly to each segment of the history of their relationship below.
(omitted)
For the first part of the relationship the respondent was a boarder at (omitted) College in (omitted). The parties spent weekends together although I do not accept that it was every weekend.
There is nothing in the evidence that would support the submission that in this period of time the parties were what could be described as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis.
There was no common residence with one party living in (omitted) and one in Adelaide. The weekend trysts do not I consider get the applicant over the threshold.
There was no degree of financial interdependence and in fact as stated I consider that is missing from the entire period of the relationship.
The degree of mutual commitment to a shared life was nothing more than that of a young couple going out together.
Darwin 2006 to July 2008
The parties maintained separate residences. The applicant was enrolled at the (omitted) College and the respondent was employed by a (employer omitted).
The applicant says that during the four and a half years in Darwin “we lived together, ate dinner together and slept together”. I do not accept that assertion.
The applicant’s evidence was that in effect the respondent stayed with her at the student accommodation she was renting. She says it was an apartment however provides minimal details. The respondent says it consisted of a small room suitable for one person with a single bed. I accept his evidence on this issue and accept that he may have stayed on some nights, but I do not accept that he lived there.
On the applicant’s evidence the relationship was interrupted when she obtained an intervention order against the respondent. As noted there is no corroborating evidence save to note that on her evidence the relationship stopped for an indeterminate period of time.
Adelaide (omitted) 2008 to (omitted) 2009
In or about (omitted) 2008 the respondent went to Adelaide to complete some tertiary studies. I accept his evidence that:
a)While away he commenced a relationship with Ms D (then known by her maiden name of (omitted));
b)He returned to Darwin in (omitted) 2009;
c)He subsequently went to (country omitted) with Ms D for a holiday in (omitted) 2009; and
d)The applicant complained in an email about Ms D referring to her as a “boyfriend stealer”.
Ms D gave evidence and I accept that evidence. That evidence included:
a)She had been in a relationship with the respondent;
b)Her evidence of writing to the Health Professionals Licensing Authority for the Northern Territory to complain about the conduct of the applicant and the consistent and unwanted contact she had received from her;
c)The applicant subsequently made a complaint about Ms D to the South Australian Legal Practitioners Conduct Board;
d)The applicant subsequently sought a restraining order against her in the Northern Territory (although she had yet to meet Ms D);
e)Her confirming that on her way to (country omitted) she stopped in Darwin and spent time with the respondent at his premises in (omitted), Darwin;
f)She purchased the Property A property on behalf of the respondent and having been informed that the applicant claimed to have been included in the purchase of the property confirmed that she had no contact with her at any time during that process;
g)She had no interest in resuming a relationship with the respondent.
(omitted) to (omitted) 2009 Darwin
The respondent returned to Darwin and commenced living with the applicant at (omitted), sharing amongst other things a bedroom.
There is no dispute that it was during this time:
a)The parties were engaged in a sexual relationship;
b)Expenses were shared;
c)The parties shared a bedroom;
d)The parties presented as a couple; and
e)Matters came to an end when the respondent moved out following allegations that he had assaulted the applicant.
The respondent then moved to reside with Mr P at the (omitted) residence.
In (omitted) 2009 the respondent went to (country omitted) with Ms D.
In September 2009 the applicant sought a restraining order against him, claiming amongst other things he had fabricated a complaint to the Health Professionals Licensing Authority for the Northern Territory.
In December 2009 the respondent obtained a position in Brisbane and subsequently moved there in January 2010.
The applicant alleges the respondent flew to Darwin every two weeks to be with her. I do not accept her evidence on this issue preferring that of the respondent.
(omitted) 2010 to (omitted) 2013
In or about (omitted) 2010 the applicant moved to reside with her mother in Adelaide.
In (omitted) 2010 X was born.
The respondent’s evidence is that he from (omitted) 2010 to (omitted) 2013 (when he returned to Adelaide) made 41 flights to Adelaide to see his daughter. Up until April 2012 he stayed in Adelaide with his family.
He did not spend time with X from (omitted) to (omitted) 2012. This coincided with him having a relationship with a work colleague Ms N.
He also concedes that the applicant brought X to Brisbane on eight occasions over the three year period.
He concedes that from (omitted) 2012 to (omitted) 2012 while visiting Adelaide he stayed with the applicant at her mother’s residence in Property A.
It is his case that the applicant insisted that she be present at all times when he was with X and that his attempt at mediation in April 2012 to change that was unsuccessful.
The applicant says that she and X would stay for longer periods of up to two weeks in Brisbane and she would undertake domestic duties while staying at his apartment. This is one of the few times she refers to her homemaking efforts in the documents.
Even if she is correct, her evidence that she offered to move to Brisbane on numerous occasions and was told to wait until he had paid off the house in Adelaide is telling. Once this was done, the respondent, she said, would marry her and return to Adelaide. This provides an excellent example of the history of this matter where the respondent on her evidence was all talk and little or no action.
I accept that matters were kept as best as possible on a friendly level and that the parties attended a number of functions with friends and family over this time. However I also note that little if anything was done to fulfil the purported commitments.
I also accept that the respondent is deeply attached to his daughter and the commute to Adelaide was becoming onerous. I therefore consider that his decision to return to South Australia was motivated by a desire to be near his daughter.
I note that during this time intervention orders were obtained in (omitted) (2011), (omitted) (2012), and that order was registered in South Australia without the knowledge of the respondent on the 10 January 2013.
I have also noted with concern the decision of the parties to travel from Brisbane to Adelaide in a car when the (omitted) order was in place.
The difficulty for the applicant in this matter is save for that period in 2009 when the parties cohabited, the respondent on her version of events may have promised a lot, however he delivered very little.
Period of Relationship
The parties were in a de facto relationship from (omitted) until June 2009. I do not accept that the parties were in a de facto relationship at other times although there is no doubt that their somewhat dysfunctional relationship continued with some significant interruptions until January 2013.
At the time the relationship ended with the respondent leaving the house in June 2009, the parties were residing and had been for the short length of the relationship in the Northern Territory(“the Territory”).
The Territory became a participating jurisdiction with respect to Part VIIIAB of the Act and the legislation took effect as at 1 March 2009.
Neither counsel took issue with the geographical requirement. I consider it needs to be addressed in any event.
Section 90SK(1) of the Act allows a Court to make an order under s.90SM in relation to a de facto relationship only if the Court is satisfied:
Geographical requirement
(1)…
(a)that either or both of parties to the de facto relationship were ordinarily resident in a participating jurisdiction when the application for the declaration or order was made (the application time ); and
(b)that either:
(i) both parties to the de facto relationship were ordinarily resident during at least a third of the de facto relationship; or
(ii) the applicant for the declaration or order made substantial contributions in relation to the de facto relationship, of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90SM(4)(a), (b) or (c);
in one or more States or Territories that are participating jurisdictions at the application time; or that the alternative condition in subsection (1A) is met.
Section 90SK(1A) states:
The alternative condition is that the parties to the de facto relationship were ordinarily resident in a participating jurisdiction when the relationship broke down.
The parties remained residing in the Territory until the respondent left to commence employment in Brisbane in (omitted) 2010 and the applicant left to reside with her family just prior to the birth of X in or about (omitted) 2010.
When the proceedings were commenced, South Australia had become a participating jurisdiction with effect from 1 July 2010.
It would therefore appear appropriate to consider this matter within the confines of the provisions of Part VIIIAB of the Act.
I therefore find the parties were in a de facto relationship from (omitted) to June 2009. At the date of the relationship breakdown they were in a participating jurisdiction and at the commencement of the proceedings they were residing in a participating jurisdiction.
I also find that one of the gateway provisions is satisfied in that there is a child of the de facto relationship and I therefore able to make an order under s.90SM of the Act.
Steps to be taken – s.90SM(3)
The High Court recently had cause to revisit the provisions of Part VIII of the Act and in particular the operation of s.79 of the Act, in respect of the division of the matrimonial assets in the matter of Stanford. How that decision affected matters arising from a de facto relationship was discussed in the matter of Watson & Ling [2013] FamCA 57, a decision of Murphy J, who concluded the same considerations applied.
There is no dispute between the parties the same considerations apply when considering s.90SM of the Act and in particular s.90SM(3) of the Act which states:
The court must not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order.
Counsel each in closing submissions accepted that should I consider that I have jurisdiction to alter the property interests of the parties then this matter would come within the matters referred to in Stanford where the majority of the Court stated:
In many cases where an application is made for a property settlement order, the just and equitable requirement is readily satisfied by observing that, as a result of the choice made by one or both of the parties, the husband and wife are no longer living in a marital relationship. It will be just and equitable to make a property settlement order in such a case because there is not and will not thereafter be the common use of the property by the husband and wife.[10]
[10] Stanford (2012) FLC 93-518, 42.
I accept the submissions of counsel.
Steps to be taken
In determining what orders should be made for the division of the matrimonial assets, I will take an approach similar to that set out In the Marriage of Hickey (2003) 30 Fam LR 355 that involves four inter-related steps, namely to:
a)identify and value the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties at the date of the hearing (“the asset pool”);
b)identify and assess the contributions of the parties within the meaning of s.90SM(4) of the Act, and determine the contribution based entitlements of the parties expressed as a percentage of the net value of the property of the parties (“the contributions”);
c)identify and assess the relevant matters referred to in s.90SM(4)(d), (e) and (f) including the matters referred to in s.90SF(3) of the Act so far as they are relevant and determine the adjustment (if any) that should be made to the contributions-based entitlements the parties established at step two (“financial resources and needs”); and
d)consider the effect of these findings and determination and review what order is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case.[11]
[11] In the marriage of Hickey (2003) 30 Fam LR 355, 39.
The asset pool
The parties managed to agree on the following noting that where there is no agreement I have noted it and will address it subsequently in these Reasons.
| Item | Respondent’s value | Applicant’s value |
| Property A (R) | $400,000.00 | |
| Property C (R) | $620,000.00 | |
| Applicant’s 4/10th interest in Property B (held with sister and mother) | Purchased | Not known |
| The respondent’s (omitted) Bank account | $80.00 | |
| The respondent’s (omitted) shares @ $7.55 | $56,866.60 | |
| The respondent’s (omitted) shares @ $18.93 | $302.88 | |
| The respondent’s (omitted) shares @ $74.46 | $670.14 | |
| The respondent’s (omitted) shares @ $7.54 | $2,608.84 | |
| The respondent’s KIA (omitted) motor vehicle | $1,500.00 | |
| The respondent’s household contents | $2,000.00 | |
| Total Non-Super Assets | $1,084,028.46 | |
| Superannuation (Exhibit W) | ||
| The respondent’s Superannuation | $47,709.18 | |
| The applicant’s Superannuation | agreed | $30,267.99 |
| Total Superannuation | ||
| TOTAL ASSETS | ||
| Liabilities | ||
| Mortgage to (omitted) Bank(R) | $448,192 | |
| Applicant’s mortgage Property B |
There are a number of matters that remain in issue. They include:
a)The value of the applicant’s property;
b)The amount owing on the mortgage on the applicant’s property;
c)The amount owing on the mortgage on the respondents property;
d)The debts claimed by the respondent that are owing to:
i)the respondent’s grandmother Ms M ($115,408.80);
ii)the personal loan from his mother Ms J ($52,000.00); and
iii)the personal loan from his mother-in-law Ms C ($26,450.00).
In addition, the respondent claims the applicant owes him $29,900 being:
a)$10,440 being funds withdrawn from an (omitted) betting account on 5 March 2012 that was in the name of the applicant but operated solely by the respondent. His claim is for $10,000 being his initial deposit of $6,000 plus winnings of $4,440 of which the applicant was entitled to commission of 10% namely $440;
b)$17,000 being funds that were held in a sporting betting account in the name of Ms A, a friend of the applicant. Those funds were deposited into the applicant’s bank account following Ms A withdrawing the sum of $18,686.44 from the sporting bet account;
c)$1,900 lent to the applicant in March 2012 by the respondent; and
d)$1,000 lent to the applicant from a betting account he had.[12]
[12] See respondent’s trial affidavit filed on 28 January 2016, 86.
Applicant’s house value
On or about 13 March 2012 the applicant applied for a $410,000 housing loan with (omitted). It is notable that despite claiming in these proceedings she was in a de facto relationship, she declared her marital status as single on the application form as at March 2012.
The evidence is that she was to purchase the property with her mother and sister using the proceeds of the sale of her mother’s house and a mortgage.
In support of the home loan, a Centrelink statement was provided dated 2 April 2012 noting that:
a)She has not partnered,
b)She had been receiving the maximum rate of Family Tax Benefit, and
c)The maximum rate of parenting payment (single), the payments which appeared to have been in place since the date of grant namely (omitted) 2010 (X having been born on that date).[13]
[13] See Exhibit “B”.
It would appear that the property was purchased and the Transfer registered on or about 23 April 2012.
In her documents sworn and filed with this Court, her ownership of the property is not disclosed.
When questioned on this issue her advice was that the property was not hers and that she held it for her mother. At the same time, she conceded she was one of the registered proprietors and that she was responsible for payment of the mortgage.
The evidence in respect of this issue is at best minimal, and I consider to bring it into account in the division of the pool may provide a misleading figure as there is no current valuation for the property.
I consider that the failure of the applicant to disclose this asset, particularly in the context of these protracted proceedings to be inadequately explained and reflects on her evidence.
In so saying, I note the parties agree that the amount outstanding on the mortgage secured against the property is $377,636. That amount was agreed in closing submissions.
I am also advised during the course of closing submissions that there is amount of $47,357 borrowed for legal fees for the applicant’s sister with all three registered owners being party to the loan for those fees.
There were also a number of other debts referred to in closing submissions which did not appear to be the subject of evidence being properly put before the Court.
In the circumstances, I consider regard should be had to this in considering the financial resources and needs of the parties and will address that further at that time rather than adjourn these proceedings to request further evidence be obtained (noting no application for an adjournment is made by either party).
Amount owing on respondent’s mortgage
The applicant argues that on or around the alleged date of separation in early 2013, the mortgage secured against the respondent’s property was to her knowledge $100,000. No bank statements were produced. The figure was allegedly provided to her by the respondent. There is no dispute that $448,192 is currently owing.
Taking into account my finding that the parties did not separate in 2013, I do not consider this argument has merit and consider that the mortgage should be brought to account at its full amount.
Amounts owing to respondents family
I have difficulty with the attempt to have these debts brought to account.
There is no evidence for example from the respondent’s grandmother that funds are owing to her. The funds are owing in respect of money lent at various undisclosed dates over the years. That is the highest the evidence gets.
The same is to be said of the amount owing to the respondent’s mother. The same terminology is used being money lent at various times specifically to pay mortgage payments. There is also an amount of $10,000 to assist with the costs of the wedding. No corroborating documents are produced or any loan agreement. I do note however that his mother refers to her son being unemployed and her paying his mortgage for two years.[14] She also says she helped with child support until (omitted) last year when he and Ms C married. Strangely enough when considering that an amount of $52,000 is being mentioned, there are no particulars or tables provided setting out the particulars in any significant way.
[14] See affidavit of Ms J filed on 28 January 2016, 20.
Finally, there is a loan for $26,450 from his mother-in-law Ms C. The loan is apparently to assist with mortgage payments, baby expenses and the cost of his recent wedding. The loan is to the respondent and not to her daughter. The particulars are lacking and again, there is a high degree of uncertainty about the manner in which it is pleaded.
In addition, there is a history of the respondent running betting accounts in other people’s names and leaving significant amounts of funds with them to be later subsequently withdrawn with a 10% commission being paid to the holder of the account. The question must arise as to whether these purported loans from these people were in any way related to this betting arrangement. There is no dispute that the respondent’s mother has at some stage run an account for her son although I have no evidence in respect of his grandmother. The question is unanswered on the evidence before me and with the onus on the respondent I consider the claim falls away.
The claim to bring to account these purported loans is, I consider, lacking in any detail or substance. To bring them to account in the amount sought is not appropriate. In the circumstances I would exclude them from the consideration of the asset pool.
If I am wrong, then consideration can be given to the fact that he has received financial support from his family in a significant sum however, once again, there is a strong concern as to whether or not they should be regarded properly as a loan or a gift.
Amount owing to the respondent by the applicant
There is no dispute that the respondent’s gambling activities were undertaken in such a way as to deceive the betting agencies that he gambled with. The respondent was placing bets online through the accounts held by friends and family as all parties know that if he chose to do so in his own name, he would be stopped by the agency.
Having gained those monies by deceit, he now seeks to have them repaid to him. I am not prepared to concede to that request.
The assets, liabilities and resources of the parties
This then means that the assets, liabilities and resources available for division are as follows:
| Item | Respondent’s value | Applicant’s value |
| Property A (R) | $400,000.00 | |
| Property C (R) | $620,000.00 | |
| Applicant’s 4/10th interest in Property B (held with sister and mother purchased 2012) | considered s.90SF Value not known | Not known |
| Respondent's (omitted) Bank | $80.00 | |
| The respondent’s (omitted) shares @ $7.55 | $56,866.60 | |
| The respondent’s (omitted) shares @ $18.93 | $302.88 | |
| The respondent’s (omitted) shares @ $74.46 | $670.14 | |
| The respondent’s (omitted) shares @ $7.54 | $2,608.84 | |
| The respondent’s KIA (omitted) motor vehicle | $1,500.00 | |
| The respondent’s household contents | $2,000.00 | |
| Total Non-Super Assets | $1,084,028.46 | |
| Superannuation | ||
| The respondent’s Superannuation | $47,709.18@30/6/16 | Agreed |
| The applicant’s Superannuation | Agreed | $30,267.99@30/6/16 |
| Total Superannuation | $77,977.17 | |
| TOTAL ASSETS & RESOURCES | $1,162,005.63 | |
| Liabilities | ||
| Mortgage to (omitted) Bank(R) | $448,192 | |
| Applicant’s mortgage (omitted) | To be considered s.90SF | |
| Net Total | $713,813.63 |
Contributions
There can be no dispute that the assets set out above have arisen as a result of the financial contributions made by the respondent and his family.
I do not accept that the applicant made any financial contribution to the assets of any significance.
In particular, I do not accept that there was any significant direct or indirect contribution made through engaging in the act of deceiving the betting agencies by enabling the respondent to run a betting account in her name or that of her family. Whilst there is some risk of this being seen to allow the respondent to benefit from his deceitful activity, I would note that he sought repayment of the sum of $29,000 that he alleged had been retained by the applicant, and this was disallowed.
The strong impression that I gained from the respondent, which was not shaken by the evidence, was that he was clear in his desire to maintain a fence around his assets. He may, on the applicant’s evidence, have made promises about what would happen one day, but there is no doubt that those promises were not fulfilled.
She argues that while she was living in Darwin she received higher salary than the respondent and applied a greater proportion of her income towards the parties’ joint living expenses. I do not accept that, save for the period that they cohabited, the parties shared expenses in any significant way.
I certainly do not accept that any funds from the applicant’s income were used to purchase the Property C and Property A properties as pleaded.[15] Where the evidence of the parties differs in this respect, I accept that of the respondent.
[15] See applicant’s trial affidavit filed on 28 January 2016, 142.
The applicant at best says the respondent purchased properties with the intention that it be a joint acquisition. Her argument is that it was always his intention that the property would be a home in which “he would live with X and I as a family unit”.[16] I do not accept that.
[16] Ibid, 12.
Nor do I consider that there is any indirect financial contribution that can be brought to account.
Some effort was made to attempt to argue that there had been a non-financial contribution to the acquisition, conservation and improvement of the assets through the efforts made by the applicant to find the property for the respondent to purchase.
I have already noted that I accept the evidence of Ms D.
I therefore do not accept that the applicant had anything to do with the sourcing or subsequent purchase of the properties now in the respondent’s name.
The applicant also attempts to take credit for the betting program developed by the respondent that enable him to place many bets each day with a maximum individual bet of $300.[17] I do not accept her evidence on this aspect.
[17] Ibid, 128.
Each of the parties have made some contribution to the welfare of the family. The respondent would submit that he was denied the opportunity to make a greater contribution. However the fact remains that the applicant has been X’s primary carer since birth.
The High Court in Williams v Williams [1985] HCA 52 concluded that the care by the respondent (in that matter) of the child “after cohabitation had ceased was a factor within s.79(4)(c): Section 90SM(4)(c) which mirrors the provisions of s.79(4)(c) of the Act is the applicable provision for parties in a de facto relationship requiring the Court to have regard to:
(c)the contribution made by a party to the de facto relationship to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the de facto relationship and any children of the de facto relationship, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent
The applicant’s evidence in respect of her care of X was not challenged.
Her evidence that she did all of the cooking, washing, gardening, ironing and cleaning for the respondent, X and herself is accepted in as far as it refers to the efforts she took on behalf of herself and her daughter.
She has received child support for X from the respondent. That child support since the respondent’s return to Adelaide has been substantially reduced.
The respondent, taking into account his gambling scheme which involved enlisting others to provide their name to accounts which he operated, clearly had the capacity to generate sufficient profits to cause the betting agencies to terminate any accounts that he may seek to run in his own name should the entire operation have been run without the assistance of family and friends.
There is no explanation as to why this is no longer available.
No accounts are produced to show the returns on the gambling investment over the years. I have difficulty understanding why with an operation such as this accounts are not kept and why they are not disclosed.
I therefore do not understand why child support that was previously provided in reasonable and proper sums is now reduced to a minimal amount.
I therefore consider it open to me to draw a favourable conclusion about the contribution to the welfare of the family undertaken by the applicant during the short relationship and after the parties separated.
In the circumstances, I consider, particularly in view of the post separation contributions of the applicant, there should be an allowance of 10% in the applicant’s favour.
Financial resources and needs
I am required pursuant to the provisions of s.90SF(3) to have regard to the parties’ financial resources and needs.
The applicant was born on (omitted) 1983 and is aged 34 this year. She is currently working as a (occupation omitted) for (employer omitted) and is earning approximately $65,000 per annum.
The respondent was born on (omitted) 1983 and is aged 34 this year. He is currently unemployed and is undertaking some study.
Both parties appear to be in reasonable health.
The applicant resides with her mother and sister in a house owned by them which has been the subject of discussion previously in these proceedings.
The respondent resides with his wife in a property owned by him, and maintains another investment property.
The applicant has the care of the parties’ child with the respondent spending five nights per fortnight with the child, X.
The respondent is married to Ms C, and they have a small child. At the date of trial Ms C was not working.
The respondent may be eligible for a Commonwealth government pension or benefit.
The applicant re-entered the workforce in 2014. Prior to that time she was absent from the workforce for a number of years. The applicant makes a number of allegations about the reason for this, however regardless of those allegations she was supporting their daughter on a supporting parent’s benefit albeit with payment of child support from the respondent.
The applicant currently receives the minimal rate of child support from the respondent. As I have previously mentioned in respect of his gambling schemes, there is a significant question about the respondent’s financial capacity.
Whether or not the respondent is correctly disclosing his current financial circumstances, the applicant continues to support their daughter with minimal financial assistance from him. There is no prospect of this changing in the immediate future.
The applicant however is in a house that she currently owns with her mother and sister. Her assertion that she holds the house for her mother is not accepted. She is on the title, there is no documentary evidence to suggest that she is holding that interest on trust, and she is responsible for a significant loan that she has taken out with (omitted).
The applicant swore a Financial Statement on 28 January 2016. Under Part I of the statement she declared a 50% interest in the properties owned by the respondent however failed to declare the ownership or the fact that she was the registered proprietor of 4/10th of the property at Property B. In the context of a case where she has complained about the respondent not telling the truth, her failure to disclose this property is a significant omission when considering her credit.
It is acknowledged that her mother is responsible for a significant amount of the equity in the property. There remains however the issue of the remaining equity and what that may be. That has not been provided however I do not consider it can be ignored. It is therefore a matter that I have elected to bring to account pursuant to the provisions of s.90SF(r) of the Act.
I therefore consider when regard is had to all of the circumstances set out above that there should be a further adjustment of 10% in the applicant’s favour in the division of the assets set out above.
Review
This means that the applicant will receive 20% and the respondent will receive 80% of the defined asset pool.
The net value of the combined pool is $713,813.63. 20% of that amount is $142,762.73.
The applicant has superannuation worth $30,267.99 which is included in the consideration of the combined pool. This would then mean that the respondent would be obliged to pay the applicant $112,494.74
The respondent has to date been able to access a significant amount of financial support from his family. It is uncertain as to whether that remains available to assist him in concluding this matter.
It would be in accordance with the usual practice to allow him 30 days to pay this amount. In these circumstances however, where amongst other things he lists his occupation as student, I consider it appropriate to allow him 60 days to complete the transaction.
Conclusion
I do not accept that these parties were, save for the short period of time they cohabited in Darwin, in a de facto relationship.
I accept that during the time the parties resided in Darwin in 2009, X was conceived and that she is a child of parents who had been in a de facto relationship.
The remainder of their time could at its highest, considering the factors set out, be considered to vary from that of boyfriend/girlfriend to the separated parents of X. The frequent intervention orders, the separate finances and representations to government bodies are but some of the factors that support that conclusion.
Having said that, the contributions to anything other than the welfare of the family were limited and in the circumstances, the orders made are just and equitable.
I therefore make the orders as set out at the commencement of these Reasons.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and ninety two (192) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Cole
Date: 23 March 2017
0
5
0