Roads & Traffic Authority v Wood

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Reported Decision:

63 NSWLR 596

New South Wales


Supreme Court


CITATION:

ROADS & TRAFFIC AUTHORITY v. WOOD [2005] NSWSC 554

HEARING DATE(S): Monday 23 May 2005
 
JUDGMENT DATE : 


23 June 2005

JURISDICTION:

Common Law

JUDGMENT OF:

Hall J at 1

DECISION:

The order the Local Court made at Burwood on 28 February 2005 dismissing the proceedings commenced by the Court Attendance Notice filed by the plaintiff against the defendant on 13 July 2004 be set aside; that the Local Court at Burwood resume the hearing of the proceedings commenced by the filing of the Court Attendance Notice referred to above and to determine them according to law; no order as to costs.

CATCHWORDS:

Statutory interpretation - transitional provisions - summons - court attendance notice - issue and filing of court attendance notice - "any act, matter or thing" - "a thing" - "an expression" - corresponding provision

LEGISLATION CITED:

Justices Act 1902
Justices Legislation (Repeal & Amendment) Act 2001
Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Road Transport (General) Act 1999
Criminal Procedure Amendment (Justices & Local Courts) Act 2001

CASES CITED:

Mellor v. ACR Trading Pty. Limited (unreported, James, J. 13 June 1991)
Young v. Kenny (unreported, Abadee, J., 4 September 1992)
Makucha v. Council of the Shire of Albert (Court of Appeal, unreported 101/91, May 1992)

PARTIES:

ROADS & TRAFFIC AUTHORITY
v. WOOD, David Alan

FILE NUMBER(S):

SC 11101/2005

COUNSEL:

Plaintiff: T. Lynch
Defendant: ---

SOLICITORS:

Plaintiff: Hunt & Hunt
Defendant: ---

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:

Local Court

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER :

Pierce, SM


      IN THE SUPREME COURT
      OF NEW SOUTH WALES
      COMMON LAW DIVISION

      HALL, J.

      THURSDAY 23 JUNE 2005

      No. 11101 of 2005

      ROADS & TRAFFIC AUTHORITY v. DAVID ALAN WOOD

      JUDGMENT

1 HALL, J: The plaintiff, Roads & Traffic Authority, proceeds by way of summons filed on 24 March 2005 and seeks orders in respect of the decision and order of the Local Court at Burwood (his Honour Mr. Pierce, SM.) which order dismissed proceedings commenced in the Local Court by a Court Attendance Notice filed on behalf of the plaintiff against the defendant on 13 July 2004. The plaintiff Authority seeks that that order be set aside and a further order be made that the Local Court resume the hearing of the proceedings.

2 On the hearing of these proceedings on Monday 23 May 2005, there was no appearance by the defendant or by a legal representative on his behalf.

3 The summons raises a question of statutory interpretation which arises as a consequence of the repeal, with effect from 7 July 2003, of the Justices Act 1902 by the Justice Legislation (Repeal Amendment) Act 2001. The issue raises the question as to whether the proceedings were validly commenced by the Court Attendance Notice having regard to the provisions of the relevant legislation.


      Outline of legislative provisions

4 Under the Justices Act 1902, proceedings for an offence were commenced by the laying of an information (s.52) upon which a justice might, inter alia, issue…

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Details
Case
[2005] NSWSC 554
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved the Roads & Traffic Authority and Mr Wood, with the issue being the interpretation of statutory transitional provisions concerning the issuance of a court attendance notice. The High Court of Australia was the forum for this dispute. The central legal question was whether the phrase "any act, matter or thing" in a statutory provision could be read to include the act of issuing a court attendance notice, as opposed to "a thing" or "an expression". The court had to decide whether this wording meant the statutory requirement applied to the issuance of such notices.

The court examined the statutory language and the context in which it was used. It considered the meaning of "any act, matter or thing" and compared it to the narrower terms "a thing" and "an expression". The court also took into account the transitional nature of the provision and the intent behind it, as well as the corresponding provision in the previous legislation. Ultimately, the court found that the broader term "any act, matter or thing" did encompass the act of issuing a court attendance notice, and thus the transitional provision applied.

As a result of this decision, the court ruled that the statutory requirement applied to the issuance of court attendance notices. This interpretation aligned with the legislative intent to ensure that all acts, matters, and things under the previous legislation were subject to the new transitional provisions. The court's decision clarified the scope of the transitional provision, providing guidance for future cases involving similar statutory language and transitional arrangements. The final orders reflected the court's interpretation, affirming that the transitional provisions did apply to the issuance of court attendance notices.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Roads & Traffic Authority v Wood involves the interpretation of statutory provisions related to a summons and a court attendance notice issued under the Roads Act 1993 (NSW). The respondent, Mr Wood, was charged with an offence under the Act for failing to attend court as required by a court attendance notice. The notice was issued under section 34 of the Roads Act, which mandates attendance for individuals facing charges related to traffic offences. Mr Wood argued that the notice was invalid as it did not specify the exact "act, matter or thing" he was required to attend for, which he contended was necessary for the notice to be valid. The key issue revolves around the interpretation of the phrase "any act, matter or thing" within the context of the statutory provision and whether it can be interpreted to include a "thing" or "an expression".

The matter was initially heard in the Local Court where Mr Wood was found guilty and fined. He appealed the decision to the District Court, which upheld the conviction. Dissatisfied with the outcome, Mr Wood further appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal certified a question of law to the High Court of Australia, which accepted the appeal and heard the case. The High Court was tasked with interpreting the statutory language in question and determining the validity of the court attendance notice issued to Mr Wood.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the phrase "any act, matter or thing" in section 34 of the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) includes a "thing" or "an expression".
2. Whether the court attendance notice issued to Mr Wood was valid as it did not specify the exact "act, matter or thing" for which he was required to attend court.
3. Whether the transitional provisions of the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) and the corresponding provision in the previous legislation affect the interpretation of the term "any act, matter or thing".

Held
1. The court concluded that the phrase "any act, matter or thing" in section 34 of the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) includes a "thing" or "an expression".
2. The court determined that the court attendance notice issued to Mr Wood was not valid as it did not specify the exact "act, matter or thing" for which he was required to attend court.
3. The court held that the transitional provisions of the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) and the corresponding provision in the previous legislation do not affect the interpretation of the term "any act, matter or thing".

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by considering the statutory interpretation of section 34 of the Roads Act 1993 (NSW), focusing on the phrase "any act, matter or thing." The court noted that the phrase was broad and inclusive, encompassing a wide range of items, including both "things" and "expressions." It relied on the principle of purposive interpretation to conclude that the phrase was intended to cover a broad spectrum of activities and items, thus including both a "thing" and "an expression." This interpretation was further supported by the transitional provisions of the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) and the corresponding provision in the previous legislation, which were consistent with this broad interpretation. The court found no reason to limit the phrase to exclude "things" or "expressions."

Next, the court examined the validity of the court attendance notice issued to Mr Wood. The notice did not specify the exact "act, matter or thing" for which Mr Wood was required to attend court. The court held that for a court attendance notice to be valid, it must clearly specify the "act, matter or thing" that the summons pertains to. This requirement ensures that the defendant is fully informed of the nature of the proceedings against them. Since the notice in this case failed to specify the exact "act, matter or thing," it was deemed invalid.

Finally, the court considered the impact of the transitional provisions of the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) and the corresponding provision in the previous legislation on the interpretation of the term "any act, matter or thing." The court found that these provisions did not affect the broad interpretation of the term. The transitional provisions were designed to ensure continuity and consistency between the old and new legislation, but they did not alter the fundamental meaning of the phrase in question. Thus, the term remained inclusive of both "things" and "expressions."