RJM v The Police - [2013] HCATrans 75

[2013] HCATrans 075

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A19 of 2012

B e t w e e n -
RJM
Applicant
and
THE POLICE
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

HAYNE J
GAGELER J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM CANBERRA BY VIDEO LINK TO ADELAIDE

ON FRIDAY, 12 APRIL 2013, AT 10.36 AM

MR G.P.G. MEAD, SC: If your Honours please, I appear with MR M.J. LUTT, for the applicant. (instructed by Legal Services Commission (SA))

MR M.G. HINTON, QC, Solicitor‑General for the State of South Australia: May it please the Court, I appear with MR K.W. SOETRATMA, for the respondent. (instructed by Crown Solicitor (SA))

HAYNE J: Yes, Mr Mead.

MR MEAD: This case involves a question of law which requires the consideration of this Court. It is a matter of public importance. It is in the interests of the administration of justice in the Youth Court of South Australia that this Court should consider the Full Court judgment. The question the appeal raises, whether section 31(4) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act prevents the imposition of cumulative sentences on youths such that section 18A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act cannot be used to impose a sentence which is composed of elements which have been accumulated to give the final result, is then imposed as a single sentence using section 18A.

The importance of this question for the administration of justice can be shortly stated. The Youth Court is often called upon to sentence youths who have pleaded or been found guilty of multiple offences. It is a daily occurrence. Whether or not cumulative sentences can be imposed is an important practical question relevant to the day‑to‑day operations of the Youth Court. On the interpretation of the legislation for which our opponents contend, judicial officers will be able to choose whether or not to impose cumulative sentences whereas our contention is that it is clearly Parliament’s intention that the accumulation of sentences is one instrument of a sentencing that is not available to the Youth Court judiciary.

South Australian legislature has, over many years, evinced an intention that courts should sentence youths in a different way to adults. This intention is manifested in a number of ways. Section 3 of the Young Offenders Act mandates a specific philosophy for the sentencing of youths. The section speaks of care, correction and guidance where in adult courts the relevant principle is punishment, parents and retribution.

Secondly, the legislation prohibits the sentencing of a youth to imprisonment. It provides that the ultimate sanction is a period of detention in a training centre. It limits the potential length of a sentence of detention to three years where a judge is presiding but two years where it is a magistrate. These differences in approach have existed since the advent of the more modern forms of juvenile justice legislation in the 1970s, but through the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2013] HCATrans 75
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In RJM v The Police, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal concerning the admissibility of evidence obtained during a police interview. The appellant, RJM, sought to challenge the admission of certain statements made during a police interview, arguing they were obtained in contravention of his rights. The dispute centred on whether the interview was conducted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the *Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002* (NSW) and the common law.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the police had complied with their obligations to inform RJM of his rights before commencing the interview, and if not, whether the statements made were therefore inadmissible. This involved an examination of the requirements for lawful questioning of a suspect and the consequences of non-compliance, particularly in relation to the admissibility of evidence obtained in breach of those requirements.

The Court analysed the statutory provisions and relevant common law principles governing police interviews. It was held that the police had failed to adequately inform RJM of his rights, specifically his right to communicate with a lawyer and his right to remain silent, prior to the commencement of the interview. Applying the principles established in cases such as *Dietrich v The Queen*, the High Court determined that the admission of the improperly obtained statements would have been unfair and prejudicial to the appellant. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the conviction was quashed.

Orders