RJCS v Queensland Police Service

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

RJCS v Queensland Police Service [2023] QDC 18

PARTIES:

RJCS

(Applicant)

v

QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

(Respondent)

FILE NO:

2232/22

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal pursuant to section 222 of the Justices Act 1886

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court of Queensland

DELIVERED ON:

17 February 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

7 February 2023

JUDGE:

Loury KC DCJ

ORDER:

1.   The appeal is allowed

2.   The orders made by the learned Magistrate on 30 August 2022 are confirmed. 

3. Pursuant to section 159A of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, it is stated that the appellant has spent 149 days in presentence custody between 21 December 2021 and 18 May 2022 and it is declared that 149 days is taken to be imprisonment already served under the sentences imposed on 30 August 2022.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - whether the learned Magistrate failing to state the dates and calculate the time spent in pre-sentence custody is an appealable error– whether the learned Magistrate ought to have declared the pre-sentence custody as time served - whether the loss of opportunity to be employed in a certain field should be considered a form of extra-curial punishment – where the making of a protection order should be considered a form of extra-curial punishment – whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.

LEGISLATION:

Domestic Violence and Family Protection Act 2012 (Qld) ss 37, 86

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) ss 12A,159A(3B)

CASES:

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612
R v Crawford [2020] QCA 68
R v DAB [2022] QCA 268
R v Daetz: R v Wilson (2003) 139 A Crim R 398
R v Galeano [2013] QCA 51
R v Gatica [2020] ACTSC 22
R v Hayes [2008] QCA 236
R v Lidbetter [2009] QCA 6
R v Lui [2009] QCA 366
R v Oliver [2019] 3 Qd R 221

Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679

COUNSEL:

K Fuller for the applicant

D Sampey (solicitor) for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Fuller and White Solicitors for the applicant

Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent

Introduction

  1. On 30 August 2022 the appellant pleaded guilty to four offences arising out of the one event on 21 December 2021. Those offences were deprivation of liberty; wilful damage; and two offences of threatening violence. He was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment for each of the offences of deprivation of liberty and threatening violence. He was convicted and not further punished for the offence of wilful damage. An immediate parole release date was imposed. Each of the offences was averred to be a Domestic Violence Offence pursuant to section 12A of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld).

  2. The appellant appeals against his sentences on the grounds that the learned Magistrate erred in failing to declare 149 days of pre-sentence custody and that the sentences were manifestly excessive.

    Nature of appeal

  3. The appellant appeals pursuant to section 222…

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Details
Case
[2023] QDC 18
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of RJCS v Queensland Police Service, the appellant, RJCS, appealed against his sentence on several grounds. RJCS had been sentenced to a total of 17 months imprisonment, with parole release after approximately five months, following his conviction for serious offences involving violence against his own mother. The appeal centred on the magistrate’s handling of pre-sentence custody, the calculation of the time served, and whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.

The legal issues before the court included whether the learned Magistrate’s failure to state the dates and calculate the time spent in pre-sentence custody constituted an appealable error, whether the pre-sentence custody should have been declared as time served, and whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. The court examined these issues in light of statutory requirements under section 159A(3B) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), which mandates that a sentencing court must declare the part of the time that is taken to be imprisonment already served under the sentence or declare that no time is taken to be imprisonment already served under the sentence. The court also considered the overall proportionality of the sentence given the circumstances of the case and the appellant’s background.

The court found that while the learned Magistrate did not explicitly state the dates and calculate the time the appellant was held in pre-sentence custody as required by law, this omission alone was not sufficient to compel the appellate court to resentence the appellant. The court reasoned that the magistrate had effectively taken into account the pre-sentence custody by reducing the sentence he would otherwise have imposed, including the period of actual custody. Therefore, the court did not find the error to be compelling enough to warrant resentencing. Regarding the appellant’s contention that the sentence was manifestly excessive, the court found that the sentence was proportionate to the seriousness of the offences and the need for deterrence and condemnation.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The orders made by the learned Magistrate on 30 August 2022 are confirmed.
3. Pursuant to section 159A of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, it is stated that the appellant has spent 149 days in pre-sentence custody between 21 December 2021 and 18 May 2022, and it is declared that 149 days is taken to be imprisonment already served under the sentences imposed on 30 August 2022.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed

2. The orders made by the learned Magistrate on 30 August 2022 are confirmed.

3. Pursuant to section 159A of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, it is stated that the appellant has spent 149 days in presentence custody between 21 December 2021 and 18 May 2022 and it is declared that 149 days is taken to be imprisonment already served under the sentences imposed on 30 August 2022.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant was 32 years of age at the time of the offences. He had no previous criminal convictions. He was diagnosed by a general practitioner with anxiety/depression on 24 May 2022 and referred to a psychiatrist. The appellant had received a Bachelor of Psychological Science degree conferred by Griffith University on 21 July 2020. The learned Magistrate’s decision The learned Magistrate took into account that the appellant had pleaded guilty at an early stage and reduced the sentence that he would otherwise have imposed to reflect his co-operation with the administration of justice and his remorse. He referred to the appellant’s lack of any criminal convictions and to the considerable period that the appellant had spent in pre-sentence custody. He did not declare the pre-sentence custody because of a submission that had been made by the appellant’s legal representative to him to not do so. The learned Magistrate acknowledged that the offences involved violence and that imprisonment was not a sentence of last resort. He considered the offences extremely serious and referred to the threats made over a long period of time and the ability that the appellant had to carry out those threats. The learned Magistrate considered the appellant offending against his own mother in the manner he did when she loved him and was devoted to him, as an aggravating feature. He took into account the wishes of the complainant expressed in a victim impact statement given orally in court in which she expressed her love for the appellant. The learned Magistrate referred to the absence of any material before him as to the impact that the recording of a conviction would have upon the appellant’s career as a psychologist. He considered that the appellant’s failure to attend upon a psychologist in the three months since his release from prison undermined the confidence he could have about the appellant’s commitment to his own rehabilitation. The learned Magistrate said that he considered the 149 days that the appellant had spent in custody to be sufficient. He went on to say that had the appellant not served that time in pre-sentence custody, he would have sentenced the appellant to actual imprisonment for a longer period than 149 days. The learned Magistrate considered that a deterrent penalty was necessary and that a period of imprisonment was the just penalty. Probation with no conviction recorded did not accurately reflect the serious nature of the offending and the necessity to condemn the behaviour and to deter it into the future. The contentions The appellant contends that the learned Magistrate was required to declare the pre-sentence custody unless he ordered otherwise. It is further contended that the sentence was not ameliorated to any degree to reflect the five month period that the appellant had spent in pre-sentence custody. The respondent contends that it can be inferred that the learned Magistrate reduced the penalty that he would otherwise have imposed from 18 months to 12 months imprisonment to take account of the pre-sentence custody. That inference can be drawn, it is argued, from the learned Magistrate’s statement that had the appellant not spent five months in pre-sentence custody and been released on bail that he would have imposed a longer period in actual custody. That suggests, it is argued, that the learned Magistrate had in mind a sentence of 18 months imprisonment. Consideration

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent contends that it can be inferred that the learned Magistrate reduced the penalty that he would otherwise have imposed from 18 months to 12 months imprisonment to take account of the pre-sentence custody. That inference can be drawn, it is argued, from the learned Magistrate’s statement that had the appellant not spent five months in pre-sentence custody and been released on bail that he would have imposed a longer period in actual custody. That suggests, it is argued, that the learned Magistrate had in mind a sentence of 18 months imprisonment. Consideration By section 159A(3B) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) the learned Magistrate was required to state the dates between which the appellant was held in custody and calculate the time that he was held in custody. Whilst he did state the time, he did not state the dates. More significantly he did not state that none of the 149 days held in presentence custody was taken to be imprisonment already served under the sentence. Section 159(3B) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 requires that a sentencing court which orders that time held in custody not be taken as imprisonment already served under the sentence, to: state the dates between which the offender was held in presentence custody; calculate the time that the offender was held in presentence custody; and, declare the part of the time that is taken to be imprisonment already served under the sentence or declare that no time is taken to be imprisonment already served under the sentence. Section 159(3B) is mandatory in its terms. The Court of Appeal in R v DAB[4] however has held that an omission to state the dates and calculate the relevant time would not of itself be an error which would compel an appellate court to resentence. [4] [2022] QCA 268 at [7] per Mullins P, Dalton JA and North J. The learned Magistrate said he would take the 149 days the appellant spent in pre-sentence custody into account as a factor amongst many other factors. I do not consider, as was argued, that the failure to state the dates and calculate the time the offender was held in presentence custody is an error of itself, that requires this court to resentence the appellant. The submission that was made by the appellant’s legal representative at first instance was that the appropriate sentence was two years probation with no conviction recorded. It was in that context that the appellant’s representative submitted that the pre-sentence custody ought not be declared. The learned Magistrate appears, from his comments, to have taken into account the pre-sentence custody by reducing the sentence that he would otherwise have imposed, including the period he considered the appellant ought to serve in actual custody. I do not consider that error has been established. The effective sentence imposed on the appellant was 17 months imprisonment with parole release after approximately five months. The appellant argues that such a sentence is manifestly excessive.