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JUDGMENT No.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) NO. G34 of 1991 ) GENERAL DIVISION 1 ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN : ERNESTO RIZZUTI
Appellant
AND:
GERALDINE ANNE DALEY, TIMOTHY WILLIAM DALEY, RICHARD WOOLMER, IAN ROSS AND MICHAEL MILGATE T/AS COLIN DALEY OUINN & DWYER
First respondents
PETER J. DWYER
Second respondentMINUTES OF ORDER
JUDGES MAKING ORDER: Beaumont, Burchett and Hill JJ. DATE OF ORDER: 22 May 1991 WHERE MADE : Sydney THE COURT ORDERS:
Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
) )
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
) NO. G34 of 1991 ) GENERAL DIVISION ) ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: ERNESTO RIZZUTI
Appellant
AND :
GERALDINE ANNE DALEY. TIMOTHY WILLIAM DALEY, RICHARD WOOLMER. IAN ROSS AND MICHAEL MILGATE T/AS COLIN DALEY OUINN & DWYER
First respondents
PETER J. DWYER
Second respondent
CORAM: Beaumont, Burchett and Hill JJ. m: 22 May 1991 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT: Ernesto Rizzuti, the appellant, seeks to appeal from a judgment of a judge of the Court refusing to set aside a bankruptcy notice. The judgment was given on 17 December 1990. The notice of appeal was filed on 31 January
1991. It may be that the judgment from which the appeal is
sought to be brought is interlocutory and not final, in which event leave to appeal would be required. Further, the appeal may have been out of time. If it be necessary, we would extend the time for the appeal and grant leave to appeal.
The history of the bankruptcy proceedings and the litigation which preceded them is complicated. It is fully recited in the reasons of the primary judge (which should be read with these reasons) and need not be repeated here.
The subject bankruptcy notice was issued at the request of the respondents to the appeal. They had acted as solicitor for Mr. Rizzuti in 1979. In May 1985, Mr. Rizzuti sought to institute proceedings in the District Court against the solicitors for professional negligence. Mr. Rizzuti was then, and at all times since has been, unrepresented. In October 1985, the statement of claim filed by Mr. Rizzuti was struck out by Nash D.C.J. In June 1986, Mr. Rizzuti instituted fresh proceedings in the District Court. Despite Mr. Rizutti's arguments to the contrary, the proceedings were fresh proceedings, not a mere continuance of the 1985 proceedings. This action was removed into the Supreme Court. The solicitors applied for summary judgment. Master Monaghan held that the claim was statute barred and entered judgment
Studdert J. who dismissed the appeal. Mr. Rizzuti later for the solicitors with costs. Mr. Rizzuti appealed to sought, unsuccessfully, to appeal to the Court of Appeal from
the judgments of Nash D.C.J. and of Studdert J.The bankruptcy notice required payment of the sum of $5,554.63 being the costs, as taxed, pursuant to Master Monaghan's order for costs, together with interest.
As the pr imary judge n o t e d , there a r e w e l l
e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h c o n t r o l the e x t e n t t o w h i c h a
c o u r t o f b a n k r u p t c y may " g o b e h i n d " the judgment o n w h i c h a b a n k r u p t c y n o t i c e i s b a s e d . Before the pr imary judge , M r . R i z z u t i i n v i t e d the Court t o go b e h i n d the judgment. T h e
judge s a i d :
" M r R i z z u t i makes a l l e g a t i o n s a g a i n s t the f i r m and
a g a i n s t v a r i o u s j u d i c i a l o f f icers who h a v e p l a y e d a
role i n the history o f the l i t i g a t i o n . In
p a r t i c u l a r , he a s s e r t s , i n e f f ec t , t h a t the
b a n k r u p t c y notice i s b a s e d upon a judgment for costs
awarded a g a i n s t h i m i n p r o c e e d i n g s t a i n t e d by
c o l l u s i o n and f r a u d . N o p r o c e e d i n g s h a v e been
i n s t i t u t e d i n the Supreme C o u r t t o set a s i d e the
judgment for f r a u d , i n accordance w i t h the
p r i n c i p l e s e x p l a i n e d m o s t recently i n Wentwor th v.
Roaers / N o . 52 (1986) 6 NSWLR 534. R a t h e r , the
a p p l i c a n t seeks t o h a v e t h i s C o u r t enter upon and
d e t e r m i n e t h a t i s s u e . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g b u l k y
d o c u m e n t a t i o n p r o f f e r e d by Mr R i z z u t i , f rom which I
h a v e s o u g h t t o d i s t i l the a c c o u n t o f h i s l i t i g a t i o n
g i v e n e a r l i e r i n these r e a s o n s , there i s no b a s i s
upon wh ich I c o u l d f i n d a n y r e a s o n a b l e chance t h a t
he would s u c c e e d i f this C o u r t were t o ' g o beh ind '
the judgment upon wh ich the b a n k r u p t c y notice i s b a s e d . "
T h e judge a l s o h e l d t h a t there w e r e no c i r c u m s t a n c e s
t o show f r a u d or c o l l u s i o n .
D e s p i t e the wide - rang ing c o m p l a i n t s made by M r .
R i z z u t i a g a i n s t h i s n e i g h b o u r s , h i s f o rmer so l ic i tor and
v a r i o u s j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r s , the q u e s t i o n f o r t h i s C o u r t i s
quite l i m i t e d . I t i s w h e t h e r the b a n k r u p t c y notice based on
the c o s t s o r d e r made i n r e s p e c t o f the p r o c e e d i n g b e f o r e
Master Monaghan s h o u l d be s e t a s i d e . There i s n o d o u b t a t a l l that in that particular proceeding Mr. Rizutti's claim was rightly found to be statute barred. The costs order was an ordinary and correct consequence. The result clearly follows that the bankruptcy notice was properly founded and, there being no other attack on it, was not liable to be set aside. No case was, in a formal sense, raised under S. 41(7) of the BankruDtcv Act 1966, nor did the appellant adduce evidence on which any finding in his favour could be made under that provision.
Mr. Rizzuti addressed us along similar lines to his submissions at first instance. We have considered all that he has put but we have concluded that the primary judge was correct in his decision. We agree that no sufficient reason has been demonstrated for seeking to go behind the judgment here. It follows that the appeal will be dismissed with costs.
I certify that this and the preceding three (3)) pages are a true copy of the
Reasons for Judgment herein of the Court
Associate %?!+ Dated: 22 May 1991"
Counsel and Solicitors Mr. Rizzuti appeared in for Appellant: person Counsel and Solicitors Mr. Aldridge instructed by for Respondents: Mlnter Ellison Date of hearing: 20 May 1991 Date Judgment delivered: 22 May 1991
- AGLC
- Rizzuti, E. v Daley, G.A [1991] FCA 266
- Case
- [1991] FCA 266
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the principles governing when a bankruptcy court may review the judgment that forms the basis of a bankruptcy notice. It noted that Mr. Rizzuti sought to challenge the validity of the underlying judgment, asserting that it was tainted by fraud and collusion. However, the court found that Mr. Rizzuti had not presented sufficient evidence to support these claims and had not initiated proceedings to set aside the judgment for fraud. The court held that there were no circumstances to show fraud or collusion and dismissed the appeal, affirming that the bankruptcy notice was properly issued based on the costs order from the earlier proceedings.
The reasoning of the court was that Mr. Rizzuti's claims against his former solicitors and judicial officers were not relevant to the issue of whether the bankruptcy notice should be set aside. The court concluded that the bankruptcy notice was correctly founded on the costs order, which was a proper consequence of the statute-barred claim. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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