Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Rixon v Horseshoe Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1293 Hearing dates: 12, 13, 14, 15 July 2016 (Batemans Bay); 26 July 2016 (Sydney) Date of orders: 26 September 2017 Decision date: 26 September 2017 Jurisdiction: Equity Before: Brereton J Decision: Declare that the plaintiff is entitled to an equitable right of carriageway. Order that the defendant transfer to the plaintiff, at the plaintiff’s cost, an easement. Liberty to apply in the event of any difficulty arising in implementation. Order that the defendant be permanently restrained from interfering with or obstructing the use by the plaintiff and those authorised by her of the easement. Order that the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs.
Catchwords: REAL PROPERTY – easements – whether plaintiff entitled to implied easement of access over Torrens title land – implied easement available as a personal right enforceable against transferor but not successors in title – no easement of necessity in the context of alternative means of access – no Wheeldon v Burrows easement in the absence of sufficient evidence of continuous and apparent quasi-easement – held, plaintiff’s implied easement case fails.
EQUITY – estoppel – whether defendant estopped from denying the right of plaintiff to access her property via a track – where plaintiff purchased property with no practical means of access other than track – where plaintiff located her removable house by reference to endpoint of track – where plaintiff therefore detrimentally relied on assumption she could legally access her property via the track – where defendant used the track to show plaintiff the property for pre-purchase inspection, and indicated she should use track to install her house without relevant words of limitation – held, unconscionable for defendant to deny truth of assumption of access to property via track.
EQUITY – estoppel – remedy – where the touchstone of defining the remedy is the scope of plaintiff’s assumption to the extent that it was or ought to have been known to defendant – where the relevant assumption was general right of way for all purposes – where the assumption founds equitable equivalent of express grant of carriageway – held, plaintiff therefore entitled to transfer of that right, at plaintiff’s cost.
REAL PROPERTY – easements – Conveyancing Act 1919, s 88K – imposed easement not reasonably necessary – had it been necessary to decide, plaintiff’s case for an imposed easement under s 88K would have therefore failed.Legislation Cited: (NSW) Conveyancing Act 1919, s 88K
(NSW) Evidence Act 1995, s 54
(NSW) Real Property Act 1900, s 42, s 46Cases Cited: 117 York Street Pty Ltd v Proprietors of Strata Plan 16123 (1998) 43 NSWLR 504
Aldridge v Wright [1929] 2 KB 117
Austotel Pty Limited v Franklins Selfserve Pty Limited (1989) 16 NSWLR 582
Australian Hi-Fi Publications Pty Ltd v Gehl [1979] 2 NSWLR 618
Bartlett v Tottenham [1932] 1 Ch 114
Beck v Auerbach (1986) 6 NSWLR 454
British Railways Board v Glass [1965] Ch 538
Cannon…
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- Case
- [2017] NSWSC 1293
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the plaintiff had an implied easement of access over the defendant's land, and whether the defendant was estopped from denying the plaintiff's right to access her property via a track. The court also needed to decide on the remedy, if any, in the event the plaintiff was successful in her estoppel claim. In determining the scope of the equitable estoppel, the court had to consider the extent of the plaintiff's assumption that was known, or ought to have been known, to the defendant.
The court found that the plaintiff did not have an implied easement of access over the defendant's land, as it was not available as a personal right enforceable against the transferor, nor as a Wheeldon v Burrows easement. The court also found that the plaintiff was estopped from denying the plaintiff's right to access her property via a track, as the plaintiff had detrimentally relied on the assumption that she could legally access her property via the track when purchasing the property. The court held that the defendant had used the track to show the plaintiff the property for pre-purchase inspection and indicated she should use the track to install her house without relevant words of limitation. The court further held that the plaintiff's assumption was a general right of way for all purposes, which founded an equitable equivalent of an express grant of carriageway. The court therefore found that the plaintiff was entitled to a transfer of that right, at the plaintiff's cost. The court did not need to decide on the imposed easement under the Conveyancing Act 1919, s 88K, as it would have failed even if it had been necessary to decide.
The court ordered that the defendant transfer to the plaintiff the right of way over the disputed track, at the plaintiff's cost. The court did not impose any other remedy, as the plaintiff had already established her right to access her property via the track. The court did not make any orders in relation to the imposed easement under the Conveyancing Act 1919, s 88K, as it was not necessary to do so.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case came before the court on appeal from a lower court decision that had dismissed Rixon's claims. The lower court found that Rixon did not have an implied easement of access over the defendant's land and that no easement could be imposed under the Conveyancing Act 1919, s 88K. Rixon appealed the decision, arguing that the defendant was estopped from denying her the right to access her property via the track, and that the lower court should have imposed an easement under s 88K. The appeal was heard by the higher court which considered the arguments and evidence presented by both parties.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the plaintiff entitled to an implied easement of access over the defendant's Torrens title land?
2. Is the defendant estopped from denying the plaintiff the right of access to her property via the track?
3. If the defendant is estopped, what is the appropriate remedy?
4. Is an easement imposed under the Conveyancing Act 1919, s 88K reasonably necessary and therefore available?
Held
1. The plaintiff is not entitled to an implied easement of access over the defendant's Torrens title land. The court held that an implied easement available as a personal right enforceable against the transferor does not extend to successors in title. Additionally, there was no easement of necessity due to alternative means of access, and there was insufficient evidence for a Wheeldon v Burrows easement.
2. The defendant is estopped from denying the plaintiff the right of access to her property via the track. The plaintiff purchased the property with no practical means of access other than the track, located her removable house by reference to the endpoint of the track, and detrimentally relied on the assumption that she could legally access her property via the track. The defendant's conduct in showing the property for pre-purchase inspection and indicating the use of the track to install her house without relevant words of limitation made it unconscionable to deny the plaintiff's assumption.
3. If the defendant is estopped, the appropriate remedy is the transfer of the right of way for all purposes at the plaintiff's cost. The court held that the scope of the plaintiff's assumption was a general right of way, which is the equitable equivalent of an express grant of carriageway.
4. An easement imposed under the Conveyancing Act 1919, s 88K is not reasonably necessary. Although the court did not decide this issue definitively, it noted that had it been necessary to decide, the plaintiff's case for an imposed easement under s 88K would have failed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the plaintiff's claim for an implied easement of access over the defendant's land. It noted that while an implied easement could be available as a personal right enforceable against the transferor, it does not extend to successors in title. The court found that there was no easement of necessity because the plaintiff had alternative means of access. Furthermore, the court found insufficient evidence to establish a Wheeldon v Burrows easement, which requires a continuous and apparent quasi-easement at the time of severance. Therefore, the plaintiff's case for an implied easement failed.
Regarding the estoppel claim, the court examined the circumstances of the property purchase and the plaintiff's reliance on the assumption of access via the track. The court determined that the plaintiff's reliance was reasonable and detrimental, as she had no practical means of access other than the track and located her removable house based on the endpoint of the track. The defendant's conduct in showing the property for pre-purchase inspection and indicating the use of the track to install her house without relevant words of limitation made it unconscionable for the defendant to deny the plaintiff's assumption. Consequently, the court held that the defendant was estopped from denying the plaintiff the right of access via the track.
In determining the appropriate remedy for the estoppel, the court held that the scope of the plaintiff's assumption was a general right of way, which is the equitable equivalent of an express grant of carriageway. Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to the transfer of that right at her cost. The court emphasised that the touchstone for defining the remedy was the scope of the plaintiff's assumption to the extent that it was or ought to have been known to the defendant.
Lastly, the court briefly considered whether an easement imposed under the Conveyancing Act 1919, s 88K would be reasonably necessary but did not make a definitive decision. It noted that had it been necessary to decide, the plaintiff's case for an imposed easement under s 88K would have failed. The court's ratio decidendi in this case is that an implied easement of access is not available to successors in title, and equity may estoppel a party from denying a right of access based on reasonable reliance and unconscionable conduct. The court also implicitly found that an imposed easement under s 88K was not reasonably necessary in this case.