Re: KEVIN RIORDAN
And: FRANCES XAVIER LOCKINGTON CONNOR, THOMAS WILBUR WASHINGTON PYE, ARTHUR
DAVID HAMBLY and THE PAROLE BOARD OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
(1981) 53 FLR 112
No. G1 of 1981
Administrative Law - Statutes
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Lockhart J.(1)
CATCHWORDS
Administrative Law - application by prisoner for parole - opinion of parole board that information before it does not justify release on parole - application to the Court for review of opinion - whether opinion is a decision to which the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 applies.
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth.)ss. 3, 5.
Parole Ordinance, 1976 (A.C.T.) s. 19
Administrative Law - Application by prisoner for parole - Opinion of Parole Board that information before it did not justify release on parole - Application to court for review of opinion - Whether opinion is decision to which Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) applies.
Statutes - Interpretation - Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss. 3, 5 - Parole Ordinance 1976 (A.C.T.), s. 19.
HEADNOTE
The applicant was a prisoner who applied to the Parole Board of the Australian Capital Territory for release on parole. The Parole Board acted on information it had before it relating to the applicant's previous conduct and came to the opinion that the applicant should not be released on parole at the time of the application. The applicant applied to the court for the court to review the decision of the Parole Board under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. The question for the court was whether the forming of the Board's opinion was a decision to which the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 applied.
Held: (1) The word "decision" in the Act connotes an ultimate or operative determination rather than a reference to an adjudication or determination of issues arising in the course of making such an ultimate or operative determination.
Director-General of Social Services v. Chaney (1980), 47 FLR 80, applied.
(2) Where a statute is but one of a number of statutes addressed to the same general subject matter, words common to them, especially words of primacy, generally should be construed similarly, not disparately, provided that meaning is one which the words may reasonably bear according to their context in each statute.
HEARING
Sydney, 1981, February 5-6; March 5. #DATE 5:3:1981
OBJECTION TO COMPETENCY.
Notice of objection to competency of an application for an order for review of the decision of the respondent Board that the applicant be not released on parole.
T. Barrett (solicitor), for the applicant.
P. Graham, for the respondents.
Cur. adv. vult.
Solicitors for the applicant: Australian Legal Aid Office.
Solicitor for the respondents: B.J. O'Donovan, Commonwealth Crown Solicitor.
S.M. KIEFEL
ORDER
The application be dismissed. Application dismissed.
JUDGE1
This case concerns the application, if any, of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 ("the Act") to an opinion of the Parole Board of the Australian…
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- Case
- [1981] FCA 17
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central issue before the court was whether the opinion of the parole board regarding the non-justification for parole constituted a decision that could be reviewed under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. The court had to examine the nature of the decision and whether it was a decision of an administrative character. The court considered the scope of judicial review under the act and whether the opinion of the parole board was a decision that could be challenged on legal grounds.
The court held that the opinion of the parole board was not a decision that could be reviewed under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. The court found that the opinion did not constitute a final decision to refuse parole but was rather a preliminary view on the information available. The court concluded that the opinion did not have the finality required to be a decision subject to judicial review under the act. Consequently, the application for review was dismissed.
The court dismissed the application, finding that the opinion of the parole board was not a decision that could be reviewed under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. The court's decision was based on the finding that the opinion did not have the requisite finality to be subject to judicial review. As a result, the application for review was unsuccessful, and the order was that the application be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
The application be dismissed. Application dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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