Rilak & Tsocas
[2021] FedCFamC1F 122
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Rilak & Tsocas [2021] FedCFamC1F 122
File number(s): SYC 2062 of 2010 Judgment of: ALTOBELLI J Date of judgment: 15 October 2021 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – COURTS AND JUDGES – Disqualification – Recusal application on the basis of apprehended bias – Where there is no evidence of apprehended bias – Application dismissed.
FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Proceedings – Vexatious proceedings – Leave to institute proceedings – Leave granted.
Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 102Q, 102QB, 102QG Cases cited: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63
Marsden & Winch (2013) FLC 93-560; [2013] FamCAFC 177
Rilak & Tsocas [2017] FamCA 757
Rilak & Tsocas (No. 2) [2018] FamCAFC 78
Webb & Guthrie [2016] FCCA 2285
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 54 Date of last submission/s: 25 August 2021 Date of hearing: 25 August 2021 Place: Sydney (via videoconference) The Applicant: Litigant in Person The Respondent: Litigant in Person ORDERS
SYC 2062 of 2010 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)BETWEEN: MS RILAK
Applicant
AND: MR TSOCAS
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ALTOBELLI J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 OCTOBER 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Applicant is granted leave pursuant to section 102QG of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to proceed with her Application in a Case filed 8 July 2021.
2.The application that the Honourable Justice Altobelli be recused, be dismissed.
3.The Applicant is granted leave pursuant to section 102QG of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to proceed with her Contravention Application dated 31 May 2021.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Rilak & Tsocas is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALTOBELLI J:
INTRODUCTION
Ms R. is the applicant mother in this case and will be referred to as the Applicant. Mr Tsocas is the respondent father, and will be described as the Respondent. The Applicant and the Respondent (together known as the parents) have been involved in a decade long dispute in relation to their daughter, B, who is now 11 years old.
On 4 February 2020, Justice Gill made orders under s 102QB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (hereafter referred to as “the Act”) prohibiting the Applicant from instituting further proceedings under the Act. The orders made by his Honour state:
(1)That, pursuant to s 102QB(2)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975, all extant applications filed by the Applicant Mother, Ms Rilak, be and hereby are dismissed.
(2)That, pursuant to s 102QB(2)(b) of the Family Law Act 1975, the Applicant Mother, Ms Rilak, born in 1967, be and hereby is prohibited from instituting proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 in relation to the child B, born in 2010.
(3)That, pursuant to s 102QB(2) of the Family Law Act 1975, the Applicant Mother, Ms Rilak, be and hereby is prohibited from instituting proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 in relation to the Respondent Father, Mr Tsocas, born in 1957.
Three applications came before me on 25 August 2021. The first was an Application in a Case seeking leave under s 102QG(3) of the Act to file an Application in a Case seeking my recusal. The second was an Application in a Case seeking my recusal. The third, which will be described as the substantive application, was an Application in a Case seeking leave under s 102QG(3) of the Act to file an Application – Contravention signed 31 May 2021.
BACKGROUND
The unfortunate litigation history of this matter is comprehensively referred to in the reasons for judgment of his Honour Justice Gill delivered on 4 February 2020. The present focus will be on applications made since then.
The procedural history of these proceedings is set out in Schedule A to these reasons for judgment. This litigation has involved 40 applications and three appeals.
The Applicant is neither communicating with, nor spending time with, her daughter. It would appear that there are currently three contravention applications either on foot or contemplated, subject to leave being granted. The common theme of these applications is that the Applicant alleges that contrary to the orders made by his Honour Justice Loughnan on 13 November 2015, and without reasonable excuse, the Respondent has contravened orders which would allow the Applicant to spend time with and communicate with her daughter.
The relevant order for the purposes of the application before me appears to be Order 12 which states:
(12) B shall communicate with the mother by electronic means each Tuesday and Thursday for a period of half an hour between 5.00 pm to 6.00 pm, with the father to initiate the call. The communication may occur by telephone or by Skype as the parties may agree and in default, by telephone. The father is at liberty to conclude the telephone call or Skype call in the event that he is of the opinion it is not in B’s best interests for the call to continue.
The Respondent seems to contend that Orders 25 and 27 are also relevant to the contravention application. These orders state:
(25)The parents shall forthwith make appointments to attend upon Ms RR, psychologist, telephone number …, or any other family therapist agreed to by the parties.
(27)The parents shall attend such appointments as the therapist makes and follow all recommendations made by the therapist, including but not limited to referrals to other treating professionals for either or both of the parents and for B.
This Court will find that compliance with Order 12 is independent of compliance with Orders 25 and 27. The latter may be directly or indirectly relevant to the issue of whether the Respondent has a reasonable excuse, but as the orders are drafted Order 12 stands alone. The Respondent did not dispute that B was not communicating with her mother in accordance with this order.
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT
In support of her case, the Applicant relied on the following documents:
(a)Her Application in a Case filed 8 July 2021;
(b)Her Affidavit filed 8 July 2021;
(c)Her Application in a Case filed 8 July 2021;
(d)Her Affidavit filed 8 July 2020;
(e)Her Minutes of Order dated 27 July 2021;
(f)A document tendered as exhibit “A1”;
(g)Her Application in a Case filed 16 June 2021;
(h)Her Contravention Application signed 31 May 2021;
(i)Her Affidavit filed 16 June 2021; and
(j)Her Affidavit signed 31 May 2021.
In support of his case, the Respondent relied on the following documents:
(a)His Response to Application in a Case filed 9 August 2021; and
(b)His Affidavit filed 9 August 2021.
THE APPLICABLE LAW
The application for leave to commence proceedings is brought pursuant to s 102QG of the Act which states as follows:
Granting application for leave
(1)Before the court makes an order granting an application under section 102QE for leave to institute proceedings, it must:
(a) order that the applicant serve:
(i)the person against whom the applicant proposes to institute the proceedings; and
(ii) any other person specified in the order;
with a copy of the application and affidavit and a notice that the person is entitled to be heard on the application; and
(b)give the applicant and each person described in subparagraph (a)(i) or (ii), on appearance, an opportunity to be heard at the hearing of the application.
(2)At the hearing of the application, the court may receive as evidence any record of evidence given, or affidavit filed, in any proceedings in any Australian court or tribunal in which the applicant is, or at any time was, involved either as a party or as a person acting in concert with a party.
(3)The court may make an order granting the application. The order may be made subject to the conditions the court considers appropriate.
(4)The court may grant leave only if it is satisfied the proceedings are not vexatious proceedings.
I must be satisfied that the proceedings contemplated are not vexatious proceedings in the sense discussed by the Full Court in Marsden & Winch (2013) FLC 93-560 at [150]–[152].
The definition of vexatious proceedings is found at s 102Q(1) of the Act. As will be seen, it is an inclusive, not exclusive definition. The section provides:
vexatious proceedings includes:
(a)proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; and
(b)proceedings instituted in a court or tribunal to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and
(c)proceedings instituted or pursued in a court or tribunal without reasonable ground; and
(d)proceedings conducted in a court or tribunal in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.
The law relating to an application for disqualification of a judge on the basis of an apprehension of bias was conveniently, and comprehensively, set out by Rees J in Rilak & Tsocas [2017] FamCA 757 at [11]–[15], which is reproduced below:
[11] Mason J in Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 said:
It needs to be said loudly and clearly that the ground of disqualification is a reasonable apprehension that the judicial officer will not decide the case impartially or without prejudice, rather than that he will decide the case adversely to one party. There may be many situations in which previous decisions of a judicial officer on issues of fact and law may generate an expectation that he is likely to decide issues in a particular case adversely to one of the parties. But this does not mean either that he will approach the issues in that case otherwise than with an impartial and unprejudiced mind in the sense in which that expression is used in the authorities or that his previous decisions provide an acceptable basis for inferring that there is a reasonable apprehension that he will approach the issues in this way. In cases of this kind, disqualification is only made out by showing that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias by reason of prejudgment and this must be “firmly established”: Reg. v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group ; Watson ; Re Lusink; Ex parte Shaw . Although it is important that justice must be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour. [Footnotes omitted]
[12] In the High Court decision of Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at 492–493, the plurality (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) set out the principles to be applied in such an application as follows:
… It has been established by a series of decisions of this Court that the test to be applied in Australia in determining whether a judge is disqualified by reason of the appearance of bias (which, in the present case, was said to take the form of prejudgment) is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. [Emphasis added]
That test has been adopted, in preference to a differently expressed test that has been applied in England, for the reason that it gives due recognition to the fundamental principle that justice must both be done, and be seen to be done. It is based upon the need for public confidence in the administration of justice. “If fair-minded people reasonably apprehend or suspect that the tribunal has prejudged the case, they cannot have confidence in the decision”. The hypothetical reasonable observer of the judge’s conduct is postulated in order to emphasise that the test is objective, is founded in the need for public confidence in the judiciary, and is not based purely upon the assessment by some judges of the capacity or performance of their colleagues. At the same time, two things need to be remembered: the observer is taken to be reasonable; and the person being observed is “a professional judge whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require [the judge] to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial”. [Footnotes omitted]
[13] In Ebner v Official Trustee in [Bankruptcy] (2000) 205 CLR 337 at 345 (“Ebner”), the High Court explained the concept of apprehension of bias in the following terms:
The apprehension of bias principle may be thought to find its justification in the importance of the basic principle, that the tribunal be independent and impartial. So important is the principle that even the appearance of departure from it is prohibited lest the integrity of the judicial system be undermined. There are, however, some other aspects of the apprehension of bias principle which should be recognised. Deciding whether a judicial officer (or juror) might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a question that has not been determined requires no prediction about how the judge or juror will in fact approach the matter. The question is one of possibility (real and not remote), not probability. Similarly, if the matter has already been decided, the test is one which requires no conclusion about what factors actually influenced the outcome. No attempt need be made to inquire into the actual thought processes of the judge or juror. [Original emphasis]
The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an “interest” in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed. (Emphasis in original)
[14] Also in Ebner the High Court said, at 348:
Judges have a duty to exercise their judicial functions when their jurisdiction is regularly invoked and they are assigned to cases in accordance with the practice which prevails in the court to which they belong. They do not select the cases they will hear, and they are not at liberty to decline to hear cases without good cause. Judges do not choose their cases; and litigants do not choose their judges. If one party to a case objects to a particular judge sitting, or continuing to sit, then that objection should not prevail unless it is based upon a substantial ground for contending that the judge is disqualified from hearing and deciding the case.
[15] In Strahan & Strahan(Disqualification) (2009) FLC 93-414 the Full Court said, at 83,690:
It will be noted that the plurality in Johnson considered it unnecessary to undertake a detailed analysis of the principles relating to apprehended bias, preferring to rely on the test of “whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.” The plurality in Ebner articulated a two step process to be used in applying that test in individual cases. The first step is the identification of the matters said to give rise to the apprehended bias. The second step requires consideration of the “logical connection” between the matters identified and the possibility, real not remote, of a deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.
In applying this two step process to particular cases it must be kept firmly in mind that judicial officers have a duty to sit and should not accede too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias.
(Emphasis in original)
In this decision, Rees J dismissed the Applicant’s application that her Honour recuse herself. While the Applicant appealed this decision in Rilak & Tsocas (No. 2) [2018] FamCAFC 78, she subsequently discontinued the appeal.
THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THE RECUSAL APPLICATION
I granted this application. Whilst I had concerns about the merits of the recusal application, and acknowledge that in the historical context of this litigation the recusal application could be seen as being vexatious because of the number of previous unsuccessful recusal applications, the fact is that her most recent application before Henderson J was indeed successful. It would have been a denial of natural justice not to give to the Applicant an opportunity to make her recusal application.
THE RECUSAL APPLICATION
After considering the evidence, and hearing the submissions of both the Applicant and the Respondent, I dismissed the application on the basis that I would provide written reasons in the context of my reasons for judgment in what I considered to be the substantive application i.e. the application for leave to file the contravention application. These reasons explain why I dismissed the application for recusal.
The Applicant relied on her Affidavit sworn 8 April 2021. I understood that to be the evidence on which the Applicant relied in her recusal application. At the commencement of submissions I made the observation to the Applicant that I would be assisted by actual evidence in support of her case, rather than the statements of opinion that pervade her affidavit.
Doing the best I can, the evidence that the Applicant was relying on is found at paragraph 4 where the Applicant deposes:
After receiving that email I researched Justice Altobelli’s background on the Internet. I saw in a Lawyers Weekly article the Justice Altobelli had been a special counsel with BC Lawyers prior to his judicial appointment. That was confirmed on the Watts McCray Facebook page.
The email to which the Applicant refers above is the email referred to in paragraph 3 of her affidavit, namely an email from my Associates dated 29 June 2021 asking for submissions in relation to her applications.
At paragraphs 5 and 6 of her affidavit the Applicant explains that BC Lawyers had represented the Respondent in the litigation for the past seven years. In this regard the Respondent submitted to the Court that the said firm had in fact represented him in the proceedings, but was not doing so at the moment.
At this point, therefore, the only relevant facts in support of the Applicant’s recusal application appear to be that I was special counsel at BC Lawyers prior to my judicial appointment, and that this firm had represented the Respondent.
In submissions the Applicant acknowledged that she knew that I was previously a judge of the former Federal Circuit Court of Australia at Wollongong and, indeed, had been present in Court in Wollongong on one occasion. The Applicant professed not to know that in fact I had been appointed to the former Federal Magistrates Court of Australia in 2006, and had served on the bench continuously since then.
Returning to the Applicant’s affidavit, whilst there is much irrelevant material, it is clear that the Applicant’s concern was that I was biased because of what she described as my “close association” with the Respondent’s lawyers and, further, my history of making orders “in favour of an alleged abuser”. The Applicant’s concern was that I did not have the ability to think for myself.
The reference to my supposed history of making orders in favour of an alleged abuser is allegedly supported by a decision of mine, Webb & Guthrie [2016] FCCA 2285. The Applicant states in this regard that:
While the facts of that case and mine are not exactly on all fours, the similarities highlight that Justice Altobelli is happy to remove the child from their maternal heritage and primary care on the basis of a methodology that is neither clinical nor judicially predictable.
It is possible to discern from the Applicant’s affidavit her clear preference that the only judge suitable for hearing any application made by her would need to have no association with BC Lawyers, and to have never placed a child or children with their alleged abuser.
During submissions the Applicant submitted that the Court was “…in the pocket with Watts McCray...”. She also emphasised that while she was familiar with the fair minded observer test, this would definitely not change her opinion, and it was her opinion that I lacked impartiality that counted.
After hearing submissions from the Respondent to the effect that I should not recuse myself, I dismissed the application for recusal. Almost immediately after having done so, and despite my earlier having pressed her for actual evidence, she submitted that BC Lawyers were still advertising my association with the firm on their website and Facebook page. I professed to know nothing about this. I directed the Applicant to provide a copy of this material to my Associate and to the Respondent within 72 hours.
The documents in question became exhibit A1. There appeared to be four documents. The first document appears to be a screenshot of an announcement, or a post on the BC Lawyers Facebook page on 16 November 2020. The post in question reads as follows:
BC LAWYERS is proud to congratulate Justice Tom Altobelli on his appointment to the bench of the Family Court of Australia.
Justice Altobelli has served with distinction as a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and, prior to his first judicial appointment as a Special Counsel to Watts McCray Family Lawyers, Sydney.
Justice Altobelli is the third appointment to the Family Court from BC LAWYERS, following Justices Watts and Benjamin.
In addition, Justice Tyson of the Family Court of Western Australia and Judge Alex Harland of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia are also former BC LAWYERS “graduates”.
We wish Justice Altobelli every success in his new role and welcome him to the Family Court bench.
The second document is a reproduction of the first document. The third document is in two parts. The top part appears to be a reproduction of the Facebook post above. The bottom part is a screenshot of the Facebook profiles of those who “liked” the post in the first document.
The fourth document is what appears to be a Lawyers Weekly online article which bears the date 3 March 2012 and purports to report on my appointment to the former Federal Magistrates Court. It is unclear why this document bears the date 3 March 2012 because my appointment to the Federal Magistrates Court was in 2006.
In substance, the Applicant’s contention was that these publications confirmed in her mind the appearance of an association between the firm known as BC Lawyers, and myself. She submitted that: “…there still appears to be association with that because they are advertising that you have been former counsel for them. So they put their business attached to that as well”. Moreover, she submitted: “It is my concern because it just appears that they are still taking advantage of you being a counsel at BC Lawyers, and they might be bringing the business that way as well.”
An incontrovertible fact in this case is that I have served as a Justice under Chapter III of the Australian Constitution since 2006 and continue to do so.
DISCUSSION
At most, the fair minded lay observer would reasonably apprehend from the documents relied on by the Applicant that there was a past association between BC Lawyers and myself, based on my having been employed with them for a period before my appointment to the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia in 2006.
In any event, the relevant test is whether a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. The Applicant contends that because the Respondent was previously represented by BC Lawyers, and because of my past association with that firm, I can no longer bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of her dispute. The test, however, is not a subjective test. It does not depend on what the Applicant believes, let alone the reasonableness of her belief.
The observer is taken to be reasonable, and the judge being observed is taken to be a professional judge whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require the judge to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and prejudicial. With the greatest of respect of the Applicant, it is inconceivable that a fair minded lay observer, appraised of the following facts:
·that I was appointed as a Federal Magistrate in 2006 following a two year period of employment with BC Lawyers;
·that I have served continuously in a judicial capacity since then;
·that this litigation commenced in 2010;
·that the Respondent was represented by BC Lawyers for various periods from 2010; and
·that the Respondent is no longer currently represented by BC Lawyers
would reasonably apprehend that I could not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the determination of this dispute.
The Applicant is unable to articulate any logical connection between the matters identified above, and her concern about her case not been decided on its merits.
With great respect to the Applicant, who is no doubt aggrieved about the original decision and the outcome of the subsequent litigation, and is also no doubt grieving the loss of her relationship with her daughter, she does not get to choose her judge, any more than I get to choose the cases I hear. Moreover, the Applicant does not get to decide whether the relevant legal principle in relation to the recusal of a judge is an objective, or subjective one.
For these reasons, the application for recusal is dismissed.
THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO BRING THE CURRENT CONTRAVENTION APPLICATION
Leave should be granted only if the Court is satisfied that the proceedings are not vexatious proceedings.
At the moment there are two other contravention applications on foot.
The first application was signed 7 December 2020. It alleges contraventions of Orders 3, 29 and 14 made on 13 November 2015.
The second application was signed 11 February 2021. It alleges contraventions of Order 12 made on 13 November 2015 in respect of the period of 12 January 2021–11 February 2021.
Both contravention applications were actually filed on 12 February 2021.
The proposed contravention application alleges contraventions of Order 12 made 13 November 2015 in respect of the period of 16 February 2021 - 27 May 2021.
On 18 February 2021, her Honour Justice Henderson granted leave to the Applicant pursuant to s 102QG of the Act to proceed with her two contravention applications filed on 12 February 2021.
The bench sheet for 29 April 2021 indicates that in relation to the first contravention application, her Honour found there was a prima facie case in relation to the alleged contravention of Orders 14 and 29 made on 13 November 2015. The matter was adjourned to 19 August 2021. However, on 20 May 2021, her Honour disqualified herself from further hearing this matter in any capacity.
This means that there are two contravention applications that have not been dealt with to finality but in respect of which leave has been granted under s 102QG the Act. This is a factor that I take into account in determining whether to grant leave in respect of the proposed contravention application.
I note there is no overlap between the contravention applications, in the sense of the date, time and place of the alleged contraventions.
In order to determine whether or not leave should be granted, I sought to better understand from the parties directly what the facts in issue were in the contravention application proposed to be filed. As mentioned earlier in these reasons, the impression I formed from listening to both parents is that B is neither spending time nor communicating with the Applicant. Indeed, the impression I have formed is that the Respondent is dependent on a finding of reasonable excuse in order to avoid a finding of contravention without reasonable excuse. The reference by the parents to Orders 25 and 27, and issues of the constitutional validity of those orders has nothing to do with the issue that seems to be presented on the available facts.
In any event, and particularly in view of the fact that leave under s 102QG of the Act has already been given in relation to the other contravention applications, it is appropriate that leave also be given to the Applicant to file her Application – Contravention dated 31 May 2021.
At this particular juncture, it is not possible to form the view that the proposed contravention application falls within the definition of vexatious proceedings found in s 102Q(1) of the Act. Orders of this Court must always be capable of being enforced, even by a vexatious litigant. Notwithstanding this, after findings are made about the matters put in issue by the Applicant and/or the Respondent, it is not inconceivable that the Applicant might not be granted leave to file a further contravention application in relation to the breach of an order where certain findings have previously been made.
Recusal applications, like enforcement applications, present special difficulties with vexatious litigants. The fact that the applicant has succeeded in only one recusal application does not necessarily mean that she will not be granted leave to make such an application in future. Justice must be seen to be done. The public’s confidence in the administration of justice must be maintained. Every application must be determined on its merits. An order for costs in certain circumstances might act as a deterrent to frivolous applications. To suggest, however, that a vexatious litigant should in some arbitrary manner be precluded from making a recusal application is highly problematic. As the High Court observed in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, the apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. That possibility is perennial.
I certify that the preceding fifty-four (54) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Altobelli. Associate:
Dated: 15 October 2021
SCHEDULE A
Application for Final Orders filed on 6 December 2011
On 13 November 2015, final parenting orders are made (“the operative parenting orders”)
Application in a Case filed 17 November 2015
On 20 November 2015, Orders 2, 4 and 30 of the operative parenting orders are varied by consent and remaining orders stayed pending outcome of appeal.
Notice of Appeal filed 17 November 2015
On 26 September 2016, Applicant’s appeal to the operative parenting orders was dismissed.
Contravention Application filed 17 March 2016
On 22 July 2016, the application was dismissed.
Application in a Case filed 15 June 2016
On 28 June 2016, the application was dismissed.
Application in a Case filed 4 July 2016
On 7 July 2016, the application was dismissed.
Application in a Case filed 11 November 2016
On 18 January 2017, the proceedings were discontinued.
Notice of Appeal filed 5 June 2017
On 23 April 2018, the appeal was dismissed due to the Applicant’s non-compliance or delay.
Application for an Extension of Time in an Appeal filed 21 June 2017
On 12 July 2017, the application for an extension of time to appeal from the orders made from Stevenson J on 7 July 2016 was dismissed.
Application for an Extension of Time in an Appeal filed 21 June 2017
On 12 July 2017, the application for an extension of time to appeal from the order made by Rees J on 22 July 2016 was dismissed.
Application in a Case filed 29 August 2017
On 26 September 2017, the Applicant’s application for the disqualification of the Rees J was dismissed.
Notice of Appeal filed 23 October 2017
On 23 April 2018, the Applicant’s Notice of Appeal against the orders of Rees J made on 11 May 2017 was dismissed due to the Applicant’s non-compliance or delay. The Applicant discontinued her appeal against the orders of Rees J made on 26 September 2017.
Application in a Case filed 24 October 2017
On 27 October 2017, the application was rejected and consequently struck from the court record for reason of being found to be an abuse of process.
Application for Final Orders filed 15 November 2017
On 4 February 2020, the Applicant was declared a vexatious litigant and all extant applications were dismissed (“vexatious declaration”).
Contravention Application filed 15 November 2017
On 4 February 2020, the application was dismissed consequent of vexatious declaration.
Application in a Case filed 15 November 2017
On 4 February 2020, the application was dismissed consequent of vexatious declaration.
Application in a Case filed 22 November 2017
On 23 November 2017, the Application in a Case is dismissed.
Application in a Case filed 27 November 2017
On 19 January 2018, the application is discontinued.
Application in a Case filed 7 December 2017
On 21 December 2017, the application was dismissed.
Application in a Case filed 18 December 2017
On 21 December 2017, the application was dismissed.
Application in a Case filed 1 June 2018
On 21 May 2019, the application was dismissed.
Application in a Case filed 27 June 2018
On 4 February 2020, the application was dismissed consequent of vexatious declaration.
Application in a Case filed 14 August 2018
On 23 November 2018, the parties were granted leave to inspect subpoena material.
Application in a Case filed 31 October 2018
On 21 May 2019, the application was dismissed.
Application in a Case filed 30 May 2019
On 11 July 2019, the application was dismissed.
Application in a Case filed 8 December 2020
On 8 December 2020, the proceedings were stayed in light of the vexatious declaration.
Contravention Application filed 8 December 2020
On 11 December 2020, the proceedings were stayed in light of the vexatious declaration.
Application for Final Orders filed 12 February 2021
On 18 February 2021, the Court noted it would consider the issue of granting leave to proceed with this application upon the finalisation of the contravention applications.
Application in a Case filed 12 February 2021
On 18 February 2021, the application seeking to set aside the vexatious declaration orders made on 4 February 2021 was dismissed.
Application in a Case filed 12 February 2021
On 18 February 2021, the application seeking leave to proceed with the two Contravention Applications filed 12 February 2021 is granted.
Application in a Case filed 12 February 2021
On 18 February 2021, the application seeking leave to proceed with the two contravention applications filed 12 February 2021 is granted.
Contravention Application filed 12 February 2021
Contravention application is on foot
Contravention Application filed 12 February 2021
Contravention application is on foot
Application in a Case filed 12 February 2021
On 18 February 2021, the application was dismissed.
Application in a Case filed 3 March 2021
Application seeking leave to file an Application in a Case is on foot.
Application in a Case filed 3 March 2021
Applicant seeking that the vexatious declaration orders made 4 February 2020 be set aside is on foot.
Application in a Case filed 16 June 2021
Applicant seeking leave to proceed with a contravention application is finalised in this judgment.
Application in a Case filed 8 July 2021
Applicant seeking leave to proceed with application that Altobelli J be recused is finalised in this judgment.
Application in a Case filed 8 July 2021
Applicant seeking that Altobelli J be recused is finalised in this judgment.
Application in a Proceeding filed 9 September 2021
Applicant seeking leave to file a contravention application is on foot.
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