Ridgeway v The Queen
[1994] HCATrans 246
•
.
~
•
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A17 of 1993
B e t w e e n -
JOHN ANTHONY RIDGEWAY
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave
to appeal
DEANE J
DAWSON JGAUDRON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM ADELAIDE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA
Ridgeway 1 11/3/94 ON FRIDAY, 11 MARCH 1994, AT 11.57 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR M.L. ABBOTT, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my
learned friend, MR C.J. CALDICOTT, for the applicant. (instructed by Caldicott & Co)
MR D.J. CHAPMAN: If the Court pleases, I appear for the
respondent. (inst~1cted by M. Rozenes, Director of
Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth))
DEANE J: Yes, Mr Abbott.
MR ABBOTT:
In this matter, if the Court pleases, it is our submission that the South Australian Supreme Court
of Criminal Appeal should have first and primarily focused on the illegality on the part of the police and the law enforcement authorities, and then, and only then, after proper assessment of the nature and extent of that illegality, should they have turned to the predisposition of the applicant. In essence, what we submit happened is that
they focused on the subjective aspects peculiar to
the applicant. Whilst not ignoring the fact of the
police illegality, they failed to focus upon the
illegality and hold it up to the proper and
appropriate scrutiny.
GAUDRON J: What is that scrutiny?
MR ABBOTT: We would submit that the proper scrutiny is the scrutiny that was given to the illegality by
Justice Legoe, who was the President of the Court
of Appeal. If I could take the Court to Justice Legoe's judgment, firstly at page 26.
His Honour said at line 1 on page 26 of the
application book:
In this case, before the heroin was even purchased the authorities organised the
commission of another crime by their own
officers and that of the Malaysian Police in
order to trap the appellant in North Adelaide.
So not only did they commit a crime in importing
authorizing Mr Butler, who was the Australian
the heroin, they also committed a crime in for the purchase of the heroin by Detective Chong
and the police informant, Lee. Justice Legoe's list of offences which had
been committed by the Australian Federal Police is
set out in part on page 27 of the application book.
He said at line 20:
Flights to Adelaide were arranged by the
Australian authorities for Lee and Chong. The
Ridgeway 2 11/3/94 heroin was actually smuggled into Australia in
a camera bag in the possession of Chong. rt would appear that the criminal offences which
were committed were:
(a) in Malaysia, the possession of a large
amount of heroin for which very severe
penalties including execution are carried out
under Malaysian law.
(b) In Adelaide there was an illegal
importation of a prohibited import, namely,
heroin.
(c) The entrance of a deportee into Australia,
namely, Lee, by arrangement with the
Australian officials including Mr Butler in
Kuala Lumpur and the Australian Federal Police
in Canberra and the Australian Federal Police
in Adelaide.
He referred to this catalogue of crimes, and I will
not read out page 28 and following, but at
page 31 - - -
DEANE J: Mr Abbott, was it established or was it common ground that the police activities in Malaysia were
illegal?
MR ABBOTT: It was common ground, Your Honour. What happened was that at the behest of Butler, Chong,
the Malaysian drug squad detective - - -
DEANE J: I am aware of the facts. MR ABBOTT: - - - travelled to the Malaysia/Thai border and got Lee to purchase the heroin with him either in
breach of Thai or Malaysian law, or both, with
money if not supplied by the Australian Federal
Police, then money which was to be reimbursed to
Chong by Mr Butler. At page 31 of the application
book at line 45 Justice Legoe said this: The nature and extent of the illegality in this matter is such that it was intentional
and carefully contrived by the two police
forces. It is not a trivial nor a technical
illegality.
DEANE J: Mr Abbott, I think you can proceed on the basis
that we are all conscious of the facts. Now, what you have to do is show us where the majority went
wrong in point of principle.
MR ABBOTT: In point of principle, we say they went wrong because of their approach to the illegality, and
that was that whilst they recognized that there had
Ridgeway 11/3/94 been some illegality, instead of focusing on it to
see whether or not it was of the type, nature and
extent that the courts should not countenance a
prosecution brought upon such illegality, they
focused instead upon the attributes of the
applicant, namely, whether or not he had a
predisposition to commit the offence.
Justice Matheson, who gave the judgment of the
majority, although Justice Duggan said something as
well - his approach may best be seen in the
application book page 58.
DAWSON J: Could I just understand what you are submitting.
Do you say the prosecution should have been stayed,
or do you say that the evidence which had been
illegally obtained ought not to have been admitted
on some basis such as Bunning v Cross? How do you
put it?
MR ABBOTT:
I say that is one of the two important special leave questions which is yet to be decided by the
High Court. I submitted in the alternative. What I say is the question has not yet been decided in an entrapment case as to whether or not it is appropriate to exclude on the Bunning v Cross discretionary exclusion basis, or to stay on the public policy Bunning v Cross ground. Whilst there has been discussions in cases such as Pollard, primarily by Your Honour Justice Deane, where Your Honour spoke of public policy considerations leading to exclusion of evidence, in the entrapment situation, and primarily in the case of Hsing, which I have referred to in the course of my written argument, in the entrapment situation there appears to be a divergence, namely, that in New
South Wales the Supreme Court has now decided thata discretionary exclusion is not appropriate where there has been breach of public policy considerations in an entrapment case.
South Wales, at least, the courts have adopted what They arrived at that result because in New Judge of Appeals Samuels referred to as the subjective approach and instead of focusing on what he alternatively called the objective approach, they take their starting point as focussing on the
attributes of the person so entrapped. As Your Honours will see from my written submissions, they have relied upon what fell from the High Court
during the special leave application of a Ms Sloane in Sloane's case. But I will turn to that shortly. Our submission is that the objective approach,
if there be a divergence in approaches, the
objective approach should be preferred, but
whichever approach you take, whether it be
Ridgeway 4 11/3/94 assessment primarily and foremost on the activities
of the prosecuting authorities and the law
enforcement authorities, or an assessment of those
activities and the attributes of the person
allegedly entrapped, in this particular case there
was no proper focus on the nature and extent of the
illegality of the law enforcement authorities.
Could I return to the judgment of
Justice Matheson and his approach to the illegality
aspect. He said at page 57 of the application book, line 3:
Before discussing the substantive
argument on illegality, it is necessary to
refer to the relevant provisions of the
Customs Act -
He then sets out the relevant provisions of the
Customs Act, and he says at page 58 line 20, and
this is all he says about the illegality, in
essence:
No attempt was made by the Australian Federal
Police or anyone else associated with the importation to obtain the necessary licence or
permission referred to in the Regulation, and
it is not disputed that Superintendent Butler,other officers of the Australian Federal Police, and Customs Officers at Adelaide Airport acted illegally.
In essence, what happened, without dwelling on
the facts, is that the AFP decided to make this an
AFP operation, not involving the State. So there
was no question of possibly arresting Mr Ridgeway
for the State offence of possessing heroin for
sale; rather this started off and always remained a
federal police matter, and therefore it had to
involve the illegal importation of heroin, if it
was to involve anything.
So Justice Matheson, from page 58 of the application book onwards then dealt with the
authorities - or at least what he regarded as the
relevant authorities - and I now turn to page 71
where his conclusions are set out and at line 30 -
DEANE J: Mr Abbott, I think we might advantageously hear
what Mr Chapman has to say at this stage. It may be that we will need to get you to resume your
comments.
MR ABBOTT: If the Court pleases.
Ridgeway 11/3/94
,;.
MR CHAPMAN:
If the Court pleases, my submission is that one day might arise where the High Court considers that
factually they have an appropriate case to reconsider the various principles which might be said to underlie the doctrine of en~rapment, but
this case is not one. The special leave questions which Mr Abbott has raised orally today, ever so slightly vary from those in his summary of argument, in my submission. DEANE J: But this case does fall into a very unusual
category, does it not, in that here the police have
illegally imported heroin for the purpose of
procuring an offence whose basis is the illegal
importation of heroin? I am not saying what flows
from that, but it does raise a very important
problem, and it is a problem which should really be
approached the same way in all States, otherwise if
South Australia adopts one approach and New South
Wales, for example, adopts another approach, one is
really pointing to South Australia as the
appropriate venue for illegal importation by police
to procure an offence.
MR CHAPMAN: In my submission, a number of things about
matters that Your Honour has raised. The divergence in views between the State courts that
my friend has referred to, in my respectful
submission, is exaggerated. The main divergence,
if any, relates to the remedy that flows once
entrapment has been established, whatever that
entrapment might be.
DEANE J: In one sense, it is an entrapment case but,
really, it is not an entrapment case. It is a case
where the offence and, indeed, the legislative
power is directed to illegal importation and one
has the problem that the illegal importation was
illegal importation by the police.
MR CHAPMAN: With respect, I quite agree, it is not an
entrapment case, and related very much to the
actual facts which also relate to this question of illegality. Now, the facts which were found by the Court of Criminal Appeal and, indeed, the learned
trial judge in his remarks were that the applicant
instigated the importation, that he travelled twiceto Singapore, that he had contact with the man Lee,
that he wrote letters and sent telegrams and
aerograms which urged that the offence of
importation be committed and committed only for his
benefit; so that once it was brought to this
country he could receive it and would receive it
and that he wanted to receive it.
His letter also contained, in my submission,
the clear inference ·that if he could not get Lee to
Ridgeway 6 11/3/94 bring heroin into Australia he would go elsewhere
and go to another person in another place. And in
that situation you would have the position that the
authorities, the police, whether they be in
Malaysia or this country, would not know who the
other person was going to be.
They had to make a decision, when Lee goes to his Malaysian police officer, about the proposal
that had been put to him: do we say "Yes", or do
we say "No"? If we say "No", how are we going to
stop this man causing heroin to be brought into
Australia? This answer is, "We may well not." It
may slip through like, unfortunately, so much
heroin does. Or if we say "Yes", we can control the activity, in this sense, that there will be no
risk of that heroin coming to this country for
distribution. Our only purpose and reason for
importing it is to, in effect, stop the applicantfrom bringing about another importation that we have not got any idea who or where or when that
will be.
So the illegality certainly was conceded, but
what we had was Chong, the Malaysian police
officer, saying that in terms of getting the heroin
in that country he had been given an indemnity by
his authorities.
DEANE J: Mr Chapman, was there any way in which the Australian Federal Police could have obtained
authority to bring in the heroin without a breach
of the law?
MR CHAPMAN: There would be but the person at the other end in this country would not be committing the offence
under the Customs Act of being in possession of
imported heroin.
DEANE J: Do you think that answer helps you?
MR CHAPMAN: I do not see that it harms me. Now, obviously
what I see does not matter so much, but the position was that, for example, there was nothing
to stop a State charge being laid of possession of
heroin for sale, once the applicant was in
possession of it. Also I suppose one could, as indeed Justice Legoe did, looked at theoretical
possibilities of charging the applicant withconspiracy before any heroin ever came to this
country, but which would rely very much upon Lee,
the informer, and in this case, as often happens
for various reasons including security and the fearfor one's safety, the man Lee did not come to give
evidence in Australia and Chong of course, as you
might be aware, died part way through thecommittal.
Ridgeway 11/3/94 My submission is that the court below was
completely aware of the illegality that was
involved and the steps throughout it but they were
equally aware of some of the matters that I just
touched upon and in fact, of course, this wc1.s not
illegality being committed by federal police but
also the Malaysian police and the authorities in
Singapore took possession - - -
DAWSON J: But it was an illegality which was a necessary
ingredient of the offence.
MR CHAPMAN: That is so. It is not necessary to prove
importation but it would be necessary for this or
its similar offence which was also charged that it
be reasonably suspected of being imported.
DAWSON J: That is what makes this an unusual case, is it
not?
MR CHAPMAN: It is not something that I am aware of has happened at all in any other situations except
this, that in Chow's case and also Tate's case an
agent of the police in both of those cases was
involved in the importation of heroin into this
country and in each of those cases, as in this
case, the applicant was involved from the beginning
and wanted every step along the way to happen and
take place, and he urged it and indeed really
threatened that if it did not happen he would go
elsewhere and be away from the reaches of, in this
case, the federal police.
My point that I was seeking to come to is not
to say that it is not factually unusual. In many ways it is. But that in terms of the approach
adopted by the majority, and I might say this, that
the dissenting judge, Justice Legoe, did not find
that the illegality was so great that the mattershould be stayed or the evidence excluded, but
rather sent it back to another trial when both
sides, before the Court of Criminal Appeal, had
really said, "Here are all the facts that we consider relevant, we are content for and really
want you to make a decision on this".
When those facts were examined by the two
judges in the majority, they were applying what are
reasonably well settled principles and even if we
leave aside the question of entrapment because I
agree that this is not a case of entrapment becausethe matter was instigated by the applicant, and he
not only took no persuading to become involved but
he was the man from start to finish who wanted it all to happen. But, in applying what I would sayare the Bunning v Cross-type principles, which the
majority were well aware of, and they were well
Ridgeway 11/3/94 aware of the illegality, it was a strong feature of
the applicant's argument before them and they
~roceed to basically weigh up the competing
interest.
The matters that have been put to me about it
going to the very offence charged, in my
submission, is a factor but what would have been
the situation if the applicant had been charged
with the State offence of possession of heroin for
the purpose of sale or something like that. So that, does that mean then that the situation is so
different, as a matter of principle, that the
illegality involved in the importation
automatically really leads to its exclusion? The
majority here, conscious of the test in
Bunning v Cross, conscious of the illegality, did
engage in a balancing exercise and amongst the
matters that they referred to was the seriousness of the offence, the disposition of the applicant.
I might say that what we really have here is a case
of much, much more than disposition. It is not
someone who had a previous conviction a year or two
ago for a similar offence, but someone who the
police are involved with watching and receiving his
correspondence and the like from the very beginning
of this criminal enterprise.
Also, the determination of the applicant to
commit the crime, and the nature of it being such
that detection is difficult. It is, as I said, an
unfortunate fact that a great bulk of heroin,
clearly, obviously, comes into this country, and
here the illegality - whilst, undoubtedly, it is
illegal - the purpose of that illegality was really
to carry out the purpose of the Act, namely, to
stop heroin coming into Australia and finding its
way out and being distributed.
Here the police had complete control of the heroin at every stage, including having actual
physical custody of it in Singapore and in Australia. Now, whilst that can be said, "Well, that is just more illegality," which it is, it also
has balancing against it the safety brought about
by that close involvement in every step of the way.
It is really my submission that what appears so far to be the only special leave point is the
fact that this is a case of unusual illegality and,
in my submission, the principles that ought to be
applied to illegality of that kind are no different
from, and there is no reason to think there is asignificant difference from, the normal balancing
process. The Court of Criminal Appeal was asked to exercise their own discretion afresh on the facts in the peculiar circumstances because of what had
Ridgeway 9 11/3/94 happened procedurally before the learned trial
judge. They considered those facts and they
exercised their discretion.
There is not, in my submission, any particular
point where they say or do anything that is an
error of law, and it is to be borne in mind that refers to the fact that the illegality was such,
and the gravamen of this offence, so he says, was
the element of importation, and he refers to those
matters. So he was well aware of that and put that into to the scales in the balancing process. In my
submission there is nothing special about that, and
no reason why a balancing process should be other
than that sort of similar balancing of competing
considerations, and arriving at a decision andexercising discretion accordingly. That is what
this case is about, in my submission.
DEANE J: Thank you, Mr Chapman. In this case there will be
a grant of special leave to appeal.
AT 12.28 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE
11/3/94
Ridgeway 10
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
-
Criminal Law
-
Evidence
Legal Concepts
-
Charge
-
Sentencing
-
Abuse of Process
-
Procedural Fairness
-
Appeal
0
0
0