Rickard & Wilson & Active Safety Services Pty Ltd v Testel Australia Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 35 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

RICKARD & WILSON & ACTIVE SAFETY SERVICES PTY LTD v TESTEL AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

[2019] SASCFC 16

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Kelly and The Honourable Justice Bampton)

21 February 2019

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE DAMAGES

DAMAGES - MEASURE AND REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT - REMOTENESS AND CAUSATION - LOSS OF PROFITS

DAMAGES - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - EXEMPLARY, PUNITIVE AND AGGRAVATED DAMAGES

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - INDEMNITY COSTS - PARTICULAR CASES - UNREASONABLE CONDUCT OR DELINQUENCY RELATING TO PROCEEDINGS

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - APPEALS AS TO COSTS

EQUITY - EQUITABLE REMEDIES - ACCOUNTS AND INQUIRIES

Appeal against an order for damages in favour of the respondent for breach of contract.

The respondent is the franchisor of an electrical testing business. T&T Rickard Pty Ltd (‘T&T’) was a franchisee of the respondent. The first appellant was the former director of T&T and was also the guarantor of T&T’s contractual obligations to the respondent contained in a franchise deed. The second appellant had been an employee of T&T. The second appellant was later the sole registered director of the third appellant. The third appellant is an electrical testing business.

A District Court Judge found the first appellant liable for breach of the franchise deed and restraint covenant. He found the second and third appellants had interfered with the contractual relations between the respondent and the first appellant.  Damages were awarded against all the appellants.

The appeal is in respect of assessment of damages only. The appellants contend that the trial judge erred:

1.       in calculating the damages in relation to the loss of opportunity of the respondent to provide electrical testing services to Flinders Medical Centre by reference to one hundred percent of the revenue derived by the third appellant over the whole of the period between the date of the breach of covenant and the 30 September 2014, the last date of the restraint period contained within the covenant;

2.       in failing to properly assess and quantify damages in relation to the breach by the first appellant of the restraint covenant contained in the franchise deed and in relation to the tort of interference with contractual relations as found against the second and third appellants;

3.       in assessing damages in relation to the respondent’s loss of opportunity to earn revenue from a client, ‘Newmont’, by reference to 80% of the revenue derived by the third appellant during 2012;

4.       in ordering that the first appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the cross-action on an indemnity basis;

and on numerous other grounds.

The respondent cross-appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred:

1.       in declining to award exemplary damages against the second and third respondents;

2.       in declining to order an account of profits as a…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Rickard & Wilson & Active Safety Services Pty Ltd v Testel A... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] SASCFC 16
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a dispute between Testel Australia Pty Ltd, a franchisor of electrical testing services, and its former franchisees, Mr Rickard and Mr Wilson, and their new company, Active Safety Services Pty Ltd. Testel alleged that Mr Rickard and Mr Wilson, after their business relationship broke down, incorporated Active Safety Services Pty Ltd with the intention of taking over Testel's client, Flinders Medical Centre. Testel sought damages for loss of profits and, in a cross-appeal, exemplary damages and an account of profits. The appeal was heard by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The primary legal issues before the Full Court were whether the trial judge erred in assessing the quantum of damages awarded to Testel, specifically concerning the loss of profits from the Newmont Mine contract, and whether the trial judge was correct in refusing to award exemplary damages and an account of profits against Mr Wilson and Active Safety Services Pty Ltd. Testel also contended that the trial judge failed to attribute Mr Rickard's conduct in suppressing evidence to Active Safety Services Pty Ltd.

The Full Court dismissed the appeal concerning the assessment of damages for the Newmont Mine contract, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the probability of Testel reclaiming the work. However, the Court allowed a minor adjustment to the damages award to account for contingencies related to a thermal imaging issue, reducing the total damages from $144,812.63 to $142,526.19. Regarding the cross-appeal, the Court upheld the trial judge's decision not to award exemplary damages, agreeing that the conduct, while wrongful, was not sufficiently contumelious or outrageous to warrant such an award. The Court also dismissed the claim for an account of profits.

Background

Background to the litigation

Prior to the hearing before this Court, the appellants indicated they no longer pressed grounds 3.9A and 3.9B contained in the Second Notice of Appeal. The Court was also advised that Testel no longer pressed paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the Second Notice of Alternative Contentions, nor the interlocutory application to adduce fresh evidence filed 22 December 2017.Background Before considering the grounds of appeal, it is necessary to briefly outline the background and facts of the matter. Testel Testel is a franchise business which provides electrical testing services. It is operated by its sole director Mr John Oszczypok. Testel provides electrical testing services to its clients so that they comply with occupational health and safety requirements. It generally charges its clients an agreed amount per appliance tested. Testel provides its electrical testing services to clients via franchisees. The dealings with clients to arrange testing, billing and payment are all undertaken by Testel, rather than the franchisees. Testel collects the fees from clients and, after deducting its franchise fee of 22% plus marketing and other charges, pays the balance to the franchisee. Testel also allocates clients to its franchisees. T&T T&T was incorporated in 2004 for the purpose of entering into a franchise agreement, by deed, with Testel. Its directors were Mr Rickard and Mrs Tracey Rickard (Mr Rickard’s wife). Mr Rickard also executed a document which guaranteed the performance by T&T of its obligations under the deed. The 2004 deed and guarantee were executed on 14 September 2004. The deed was renewed on similar terms in 2007 and 2010. There was a dispute at trial regarding the validity of the 2010 deed. The trial Judge found that the 2010 deed was validly executed. There is no appeal on this finding. The Flinders Medical Centre In around April 2005, Mr Bob Crossman, who was at the time the maintenance manager of FMC, contacted Mr Oszczypok in relation to the prospect of Testel carrying out electrical testing work for FMC. Testel subsequently won the contract. Mr Oszczypok approached Mr Rickard and asked that T&T do the FMC work. Mr Rickard agreed. From 2005 to 2011, T&T serviced the FMC as a Testel franchise. From May 2009 until shortly before 11 April 2011, Mr Wilson was an employee of T&T. During this time Mr Wilson conducted testing at the FMC as an employee of T&T. Active By April 2011 the business relationship between Mr Rickard and Mr Oszczypok had broken down. The trial Judge found that there were several factors which contributed to this breakdown. For the purposes of this appeal it is not necessary to set out those factors. Active was incorporated on 11 April 2011. Whilst its sole registered director was Mr Wilson, the trial Judge found that Mr Rickard and Mr Wilson set up Active together. His Honour found that the company was set up with the intention of both Mr Wilson and Mr Rickard owning and operating it together and primarily for the purpose of taking over the provision of testing services to Testel’s client, FMC.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellants submit the Judge erred in finding that there was “no other evidence as to what happened in 2011” in relation to Newmont. The complained of passage is found at paragraph 594 of the judgment:[5]Testel argued that the probability that Newmont would have come back to Testel in 2012 is about 80%. Mr Rickard had asked Caroline Pell at Testel to reallocate the 2011 Newmont work in an email dated 20 April 2011. This work was allocated to another ‘Test Engineer’, Steve Bolter, on 27 April 2011. Mr Rickard assisted Mr Bolter by answering a number of his questions by email. The defendants said Testel’s chances of getting the 2012 work were more like 50% if Active is taken out of the scenario. I do not see why. There is no other evidence as to what happened in 2011. I accept Testel’s assertion that the likelihood of its reclaiming the Newmont work was 80%.[Emphasis added][5] Testel Aust P/L v Rickard & Ors [2017] SADC 31 at [594]. The appellants submit that the Judge did not take into account that despite Mr Rickard asking Ms Pell to offer the Newmont work to another Testel franchisee and assisting with the proposed transfer, Newmont did not in fact use Testel for the remaining 2011 cycle. The appellants further submit that the Judge did not take into account a number of factors in assessing the likelihood of Testel reclaiming the Newmont work at 80%. Those factors include that there was no contract between Testel and Newmont to the effect that the provision of services was to continue for any particular period of time and the evidence that Newmont had used three different electrical testing contractors over the period of 2000-2013. Newmont Mine is in the Tanami Desert, NT. Newmont had been a client of Testel and was serviced by T&T until April 2011. In April 2011 Mr Rickard asked Ms Pell for Newmont to be assigned to another Testel franchisee and assisted with the proposed transfer. However, Newmont elected not to engage the other Testel franchisee for the remaining 2011 cycle. The only evidence in this regard came from Mr Oszczypok. His evidence was that Newmont used another electrical testing contractor based in the Northern Territory by the name of AE solutions (NT) Pty Ltd. There was no evidence regarding Newmont’s decision to use the alternative service provider. In early 2012, Mr Rickard was contacted by a representative of Newmont. Active prepared a quote to undertake testing work for Newmont on 3 February 2012. Active subsequently won the Newmont Mine contract to undertake the testing work. Mr Wilson and Mr Rickard travelled to the Newmont Mine and tested and tagged for the first three weeks of June 2012. The total revenue derived from this activity was $33,182.00. The Judge found that the likelihood of Testel reclaiming the Newmont work was 80% if Active had not been operating. Damages were calculated at $5,840.03. Even if it is accepted that the Judge did not consider the fact that Newmont decided not to use the other Testel franchise for the remaining 2011 cycle, I am not convinced that this would justify an intrusion into his Honour’s assessment of the probability of Testel reclaiming the Newmont work. As I have said, there was no evidence led regarding Newmont’s decision not to use the Testel franchisee. The possible reasons are endless.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I would dismiss this ground of appeal. Conclusion For the reasons outlined above I would dismiss the appeal save as to reduce the amount awarded by the trial Judge by $2,286.44 to allow for the contingencies regarding the thermal imaging issue outlined above. Damages were awarded against Mr Rickard, Mr Wilson and Active in the sum of $144,812.63. I would therefore substitute an order for damages of $142,526.19. In light of the conclusions I have reached, I do not find it necessary to deal with Testel’s notice of alternative contentions or the appellants’ remaining grounds of appeal referrable to that notice.Cross-appeal I turn now to the cross-appeal by Testel. Firstly, Testel appeals the decision of the Judge not to award exemplary damages against Mr Wilson and Active. Secondly, Testel appeals the decision not to order an account of profits against Mr Wilson and Active by reason of their interference in the contractual relations between Mr Rickard and Testel. Grounds 1 & 2 – Exemplary damages Testel submits that the Judge erred in characterising the culpability of Mr Wilson and Active for the tort of interference in contractual relations as something less than that which would support an award of exemplary damages. Furthermore, Testel contends that the Judge erred in failing to attribute to Active the participation of Mr Rickard in suppressing the “Active folder” in circumstances where his Honour found that Mr Rickard was, from the start, a principal of Active. The Active folder was located on Mr Rickard’s computer pursuant to a search order during the course of the litigation. It contained electronic evidence connecting Mr Rickard to Active. The Active folder had been moved to the recycle bin on Mr Rickard’s computer the day after disclosure orders were made. His Honour concluded that Mr Rickard deleted the folder from his computer because he knew of its forensic significance. His Honour also concluded that Mr Rickard was in truth a principal of Active from the start. Testel’s submission is that Mr Rickard’s conduct in deleting the Active folder ought to therefore be attributed to Active. They submit that the Judge erred in failing to do so. Furthermore, Testel submits that the Judge found that Mr Rickard and Mr Wilson had acted together to conceal Mr Rickard’s role in Active, each knowing that it was a breach of the restraint covenant. The evidence of Mr Rickard and Mr Wilson was largely disbelieved by the Judge. His Honour found that Mr Rickard, Mr Wilson and Active had maintained a defence which was unreasonable, unmeritorious and known to be false. The whole of the circumstances found by the Judge disclose that the object of establishing the new business was specifically to take over Testel’s client FMC with the consequence that Testel lost that client. Testel submits that the Judge implicitly found that the conduct of Mr Wilson and Active was contumelious and outrageous. Paragraph 625 of the judgment provides:[7]In those circumstances, while I regard Mr Wilson’s and Active’s roles as wrongful and worthy of criticism, they were not so contumelious or outrageous as to justify an award of exemplary damages.[7] Testel Aust P/L v Rickard & Ors [2017] SADC 31 at [625].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal was tasked with assessing the correctness of the trial Judge's findings and the appropriateness of the remedies awarded. The first major issue was the trial Judge's finding that the likelihood of Testel reclaiming the Newmont work was 80% if Active had not been operating. The appellants argued that the Judge did not adequately consider certain evidence, including the fact that Newmont did not use Testel for the remaining 2011 cycle and the historical use of different electrical testing contractors by Newmont. However, the Court of Appeal found that the absence of evidence regarding Newmont's decision not to use the other Testel franchise did not undermine the Judge's assessment of the likelihood of Testel reclaiming the Newmont work. The Court concluded that the Judge's finding was supported by the evidence, particularly as Newmont ultimately chose Active over Testel in 2012.

The second major issue was whether exemplary damages should have been awarded against Mr Wilson and Active for their interference in the contractual relations between Mr Rickard and Testel. Testel argued that the Judge erred in not considering the culpability of Mr Wilson and Active as sufficient to warrant exemplary damages. The Court of Appeal noted that the Judge found the conduct of Mr Wilson and Active to be wrongful and worthy of criticism but not so contumelious or outrageous as to justify exemplary damages. The Court upheld the Judge's assessment, finding that the conduct, while wrongful, did not reach the level of outrageousness required for such damages.

The third issue was whether an account of profits should have been ordered against Mr Wilson and Active for their interference in the contractual relations between Mr Rickard and Testel. Testel contended that the Judge should have ordered an account of profits given the wrongful conduct. However, the Court of Appeal agreed with the Judge that an account of profits was not warranted in this case, as the profits were not directly attributable to the wrongful conduct of Mr Wilson and Active but rather to the legitimate business operations of Active.

The fourth issue involved the Judge's finding that Mr Rickard and Mr Wilson acted together to conceal Mr Rickard’s role in Active. Testel argued that the Judge should have attributed Mr Rickard's conduct in deleting the "Active folder" to Active. The Court of Appeal found that the Judge's conclusion that Mr Rickard was a principal of Active from the start was reasonable and supported by the evidence. However, the Court did not find error in the Judge's decision not to attribute Mr Rickard's conduct in deleting the folder to Active, as the Judge had already concluded that Mr Rickard acted with full knowledge of the significance of his actions.

The fifth issue was whether the conduct of Mr Rickard in deleting the "Active folder" should be attributed to Active. The Court of Appeal found that the Judge's conclusion that Mr Rickard was a principal of Active from the start was reasonable, but it did not consider it an error for the Judge not to attribute Mr Rickard's conduct to Active, as the Judge had already found that Mr Rickard acted knowingly and deliberately.

The final issue was whether the damages awarded to Testel were excessive or inadequate, and if they should be reduced or increased. The Court of Appeal found that the damages awarded should be reduced to account for certain contingencies regarding the thermal imaging issue. The Court substituted an order for damages of $142,526.19 instead of the $144,812.63 awarded by the trial Judge.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial Judge's assessment of the likelihood of Testel reclaiming the Newmont work was reasonable. The Court upheld the Judge's decisions not to award exemplary damages, order an account of profits, and attribute Mr Rickard's conduct to Active. The Court did, however, reduce the damages awarded to Testel by $2,286.44 to account for the contingencies regarding the thermal imaging issue.