Richards v Macarthur Electrical Connection Services Pty Ltd

DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY A MEMBER
CITATION:	Richards v Macarthur Electrical Connection Services Pty Ltd [2022] NSWPICPD 37
First APPELLANT:	Jye Daniel Richards
Second appellant:	Toby Aaron Richards
first RESPONDENT:	Macarthur Electrical Connection Services Pty Ltd
SECOND RESPONDENT:	Kylie-Anne Richards
INSURER:	Employers Mutual NSW Limited
FILE NUMBERs:	A1-W3323/21; A2-W3323/21
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER:	Deputy President Elizabeth Wood
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION:	12 September 2022
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:	1. The Member’s Certificate of Determination dated 16 December 2021 is confirmed.
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS COMPENSATION – Death of a worker – s 25(1)(b) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) – payment of weekly compensation to a student over the age of 16 years – whether dependants who were engaged in apprenticeships were students as defined by s 25(5) of the 1987 Act – alleged failure to refer to and deal with submissions made – Huntsman Chemical Company Australia Pty Limited v Narellan Pools Pty Limited [2011] FCAFC 7; Wang v State of New South Wales [2019] NSWCA 263 applied – alleged failure to provide reasons – whether a proper application of the principles of construction – Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory) [2009] HCA 41 applied
HEARING:	On the papers
REPRESENTATION:	First Appellant:
Mr Andrew Parker, counsel
Carroll & O’Dea Lawyers
Second Appellant:
Ms B Santoro, solicitor
Slater & Gordon Lawyers
First Respondent:
Mr S Grant, counsel
Hall & Willcox
Second Respondent:
Ms T Danjoux, solicitor
Marsdens Law Group
DECISION UNDER APPEAL
MEMBER:	Mr P Sweeney
DATE OF Member’s DECISION:	16 December 2021

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

These proceedings concern a claim brought by Jye Richards (the first appellant) and Toby Richards (the second appellant) for weekly compensation in respect of the death of their father, who died on 1 November 2018. The deceased was employed by Macarthur Electrical Connection Services Pty Ltd (the first respondent) at the time of his death. Both appellants were under the age of 21 and undertaking apprenticeships in electrotechnology at the time of their father’s death. The first appellant was apprenticed to Jade Electrical Pty Ltd and the second appellant was apprenticed to the first respondent.
The wife of the deceased, Ms Kylie-Anne Richards, brought proceedings in the Personal Injury Commission (the Commission), claiming the lump sum death benefit provided for in s 25(1)(a) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act), together with interest on the lump sum. The appellants were joined as parties to the proceedings as they were also dependant on the deceased at the date of death and were entitled to a proportion of the lump sum benefit.
The appellants additionally asserted that they were entitled to weekly payments of compensation on the basis that they were students under the age of 21 for the purpose of s 25(1)(b)(ii) of the 1987 Act in accordance with the definition of “student” contained in s 25(5) of the 1987 Act. Section 25(5) defined “student” as “a person receiving full-time education at a school, college or university.”
The first respondent denied the claim for the lump sum benefit and interest, as well as the claim for compensation brought by the appellants, asserting that the appellants did not fall within the definition of “student” contained in s 25(5). During the course of those proceedings, the issue as to liability for, and apportionment of, the lump sum was resolved. The issues in relation to the interest claimed on the lump sum and the appellants’ entitlements to weekly payments remained alive and proceeded to arbitration before a Member of the Commission. On 16 December 2021, the Member issued a Certificate of Determination, in which he determined the interest payable on the lump sum benefit and found that the appellants were not entitled to weekly payments because they were not “students” within the meaning of the legislation.
Each of the appellants lodged an appeal in respect of the weekly payments decision. The first appellant nominated three grounds of appeal and provided submissions in respect of each ground. The second appellant indicated in amended submissions filed on 21 January 2022 that he adopted the submissions made by the first appellant and sought an award in his favour in respect of the weekly payments.
Ms Richards (the applicant below) was not nominated by either appellant as a party in the appeal but was joined by the Commission as a second respondent to the appeals. The Commission also directed that, as the appeals involved the same issue, the appeals were to be determined together. By letter dated 20 January 2022, the second respondent advised the Commission that she did not wish to take an active role in the appeal proceedings.

ON THE PAPERS

Section 52(3) of the Personal Injury Commission Act 2020 provides:
“(3) If the Commission is satisfied that sufficient information has been supplied to it in connection with proceedings, the Commission may exercise functions under this Act and enabling legislation without holding any conference or formal hearing.”
The first appellant requests an oral hearing. He asserts that the matter has public importance and involves principles of statutory interpretation so that it is likely to establish an important precedent. The first appellant adds that the matter is complex, as acknowledged by the Member.
The second appellant and the first respondent indicate that a determination of the matter on the basis of the papers is appropriate.
I note that the first appellant has provided submissions to each ground of appeal, written submissions to the Member at first instance, as well as oral submissions to the Member which were recorded in the transcript of proceedings. I further note that the first appellant was provided with the opportunity to reply to the submissions made by the first respondent but did not avail himself of that opportunity.
The first appellant’s arguments relating to statutory interpretation have been well-aired, are recorded in writing or by transcript of the proceedings and refer to cases frequently cited in this jurisdiction. While the issue for determination is unusual, I do not consider that because it is different, it is complex. It is a discrete issue in relation to one section of the 1987 Act which does not require consideration of any competing legislation.
I have had regard to Procedural Directions PIC2 and WC3, the documents that are before me, and the submissions by the parties. I am satisfied that I have sufficient information to proceed ‘on the papers’ without holding any conference or formal hearing and that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.

THRESHOLD MATTERS

There is no dispute between the parties that the threshold requirements as to quantum and time pursuant to ss 352(3) and 352(4) of the 1998 Act have been met.

THE EVIDENCE

The first appellant’s statement evidence

The first appellant provided a statement dated 19 August 2021.[1] He advised that he commenced his apprenticeship at Wollongong TAFE in about December 2017. He described the apprenticeship as full-time and said that he initially was required to attend TAFE one day per week and for four days per week he would attend the employer’s site. He added that he finished the TAFE course in December 2020, after which he had been attending the work site five days per week in order to complete his apprenticeship. He said that he was also required to pass a final practical examination and when the examination and the work on site was completed, he would receive a Certificate III in Electrotechnology.
[1] First appellant’s (the second respondent in proceedings below) Reply to Application to Resolve a Dispute (reply), pp 1–4.
The first appellant indicated that all of his expenses associated with his apprenticeship were met by his employer.
The first appellant said that, at the date of his father’s death, he was earning approximately $500 net per week in his apprenticeship. He said that he lived with his parents, and they provided him with accommodation, food and some social expenses. He added that, after his father died, he commenced paying $50 per week board to his mother to assist with the cost of living.
The first appellant spoke of other financial contributions his father would make to his benefit, including social, sporting and financial assistance provided through his father’s company in respect of motor vehicle expenses.
The first appellant’s taxation returns were in evidence. The return for the financial year ending 30 June 2018 shows that the first appellant’s total gross income for the year was $57,051.00, of which $22,509 was derived from his employment as an electrical trades apprentice and the remainder was income flowing from investments and franked dividends from family trusts and the like.[2] In the financial year ending 30 June 2019, the first appellant earned a gross income of $35,099.00 from his employment.[3] In the financial year ending 30 June 2020, he earned $40,144 in gross income from his employment with the first respondent.[4]
[2] First appellant’s reply, pp 26–33.
[3] First appellant’s reply, pp 34–42.
[4] First appellant’s reply, pp 43–50.
The first appellant provided a supplementary statement dated 8 November 2021.[5] He advised that he had recently completed his training which would qualify him to be able to apply for his licence as an electrician. He stated that the income he received as an apprentice was not as much as he could expect to earn as a qualified electrician, as he was paid at a lower rate because he was not qualified and was studying and learning. He described the course work while attending TAFE as mainly the theory required in order to become an electrician, together with some practical work involving putting that training into practice at the TAFE site.
[5] First appellant’s Application to Admit Late Documents (AALD) dated 8 November 2021, pp 16–17.
He said that he also had to undertake “core criteria” and “supplementary criteria” on the employer’s site and had to complete “e-profiling” in which he logged the work done on site. He added that there were a minimum number of hours that had to be completed on the employer’s work site.
The first appellant said that, had his father been still alive, his father would have continued to supplement his income in respect of living and social costs.

The second appellant’s statement evidence

The second appellant provided a statement dated 18 August 2021.[6] He said that he commenced his apprenticeship in electrotechnology at Wollongong TAFE on 20 November 2017 and was due to complete his Certificate III in that course on 19 November 2021. The second appellant said that, in addition to attending that course, he was employed by the first respondent for 8 hours per day, 4 days per week, with some overtime as required. He advised that he currently earned about $850 per week.
[6] Second appellant’s reply (third respondent in the proceedings below), pp 1–3.
He stated that he resided with his mother in the family home and relied on his mother financially. He said that, prior to his father’s death, he also relied financially on his father, and his father would always pay for the family social outings. He added that he did not contribute to the household bills.

Department of Industry Training Services NSW

Mr Robert Macmaster of the Department of Industry Training Services wrote to the first appellant’s employer on 20 December 2017, advising that the employer’s application to establish an apprenticeship for the first appellant had been approved, with a full-term completion date of 3 December 2021.[7]
[7] ARD, p 29.
On 17 January 2018, Mr Wayne Jacobs from the same organisation wrote to the first respondent confirming that the first respondent’s application to set up an apprenticeship for the second appellant had been approved, with a full-term completion date of 19 November 2021.[8]
[8] ARD, p 30.

Mr George Whitehouse, Head Teacher, TAFE NSW

Mr George Whitehouse was the Head Teacher in Electrotechnology at TAFE NSW in Wollongong. In email correspondence dated 27 September 2021 directed to the first appellant’s legal representatives, Mr Whitehouse advised:
“Our records indicate [the first appellant] enrolled in the Certificate III Electrotechnology – Electrician and commenced study with us on 8th February 2018. His last day of regular attendance was 18th November 2020. He is today & tomorrow attempting the final assessments events for the course.
The attendance pattern was one day per week, 7hr. Each TAFE year is split into two semesters, each of 18 weeks duration, 36 days of onsite study per year.
We typically expect students to do additional study of approximately 40% of the delivery hours to revise and practice the content delivered onsite.”[9]
[9] First appellant’s AALD dated 8 November 2021, p 2.

Mr Craig Fensom

Mr Craig Fensom, on behalf of the first appellant’s employer, wrote to the first appellant’s legal representatives by email on 2 November 2021. He advised:
“I can confirm that [the first appellant] started his apprenticeship on 4/12/2017 as an electrical apprentice.
[He] has been involved in the electrical installation of electrical and communication wiring within a domestic and industrial setting whilst under the supervision of a licenced tradesman so he can gather the knowledge require to gain his electrical licence.
[10] First appellant’s AALD dated 8 November 2021, p 15.
[He] attends tafe 1 day a week under electrotechnology certificate 3, and is in full time training at work under the supervision of qualified electrician.”[10]

Ms Shanoah Harris

Ms Shanoah Harris, employee of the first respondent, wrote to the second appellant’s legal representatives on 3 November 2021. She confirmed that the second appellant had commenced his apprenticeship on 20 November 2017 and would complete the apprenticeship on 19 May 2022. She described the second appellant’s duties, which she said were performed under the supervision of a licensed tradesman. She further confirmed that the second appellant attended Wollongong TAFE one day per week and otherwise was in full-time training with the first respondent under the supervision of qualified electricians.[11]
[11] Second appellant’s AALD dated 5 November 2021, p 5.

THE MEMBER’S REASONS

The Member noted that the first respondent accepted liability for the deceased’s death and that the parties had agreed on the apportionment of the lump sum death benefit. He identified the remaining matters in dispute, namely the claim for interest pursuant to s 109 of the 1987 Act and the issue of whether the first and second appellants were “students” and entitled to the weekly payments pursuant to s 25(1)(b) of the 1987 Act. He noted that the word “student” was defined in s 25(5) of the 1987 Act as a “person receiving full-time education at a school college or university”. He observed that it was common ground between the parties that both the first and second appellants were dependent upon the deceased at the date of death.
The Member summarised the statement evidence provided by both appellants. He indicated that he did not intend to reproduce all of the parties’ submissions as they were either in writing or recorded in the transcript, but that he intended to deal with the “main thrust” of the arguments.
The Member turned to the first appellant’s submissions noting that the first appellant submitted that:
(a)    the issue was whether the first appellant was a person receiving full-time education;
(b)    the phrase “school, college, or university” referred to in s 25(5) was sufficiently wide to encompass TAFE NSW;
(c)    section 25 was beneficial in nature and the interpretation of the provision should take that into account;
(d)    the legislature could have stipulated the number of hours of attendance at the educational institution required, but did not do so;
(e)    it could be presumed that the legislative intent was not to place any strict or “exhaustive” definition on the words of the section, and
(f)    it could also be presumed that the student’s endeavours should be considered in context.
The Member noted the first appellant’s reference to the decision in TheExecutor of the Estate of the Late DMLC v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (Compensation),[12] and the observations made by Deputy President Constance in that matter. The Member further noted the first appellant’s submission that, as an apprentice, his education was not limited to education in the classroom and was provided in accordance with the obligations of employers and their apprentices encompassed in the Apprenticeship and Traineeship Act 2001 (NSW) and the Guidelines published pursuant to that Act.
[12] [2020] AATA 4588 (DMLC).
The Member also took into account the second appellant’s submissions that:
(a)    the term “full-time education” meant that the child was in receipt of education on a full-time basis and did not require the attendance at a school or university to be full-time;
(b)    the material from Training Services NSW supported the conclusion that the second appellant was in full-time education on the basis that the second appellant was educated on site for four days of the working week, and
(c)    the correspondence from Ms Harris, indicating that the second appellant was at TAFE one day per week and “in full-time training under the supervision of qualified electricians”, supported the conclusion that the second appellant was in full-time education.
The Member referred to the first respondent’s concession that Wollongong TAFE fell within the compass of a “school, college or university” for the purpose of s 25(5). The Member recorded, however, that the first respondent submitted that:
(a)    the appellants did not fall within the statutory language of receiving full-time education;
(b)    if the legislature had intended to include apprentices, it would have done so, and
(c)    it would be untenable that an apprentice or a law student, for example, who was working full-time while pursuing studies after hours was receiving full-time education.
The Member observed that various authorities had cautioned against frequent reliance on dictionaries for the purpose of statutory construction, which requires a consideration of the broader context of the particular provision. The Member said that, taking into account that cautionary instruction, he might gain some assistance from the definitions contained in the Macquarie Compact Dictionary, 8^th edition, in consideration of the key words of the subsection. He reproduced the definitions of “apprentice” and “student,” and concluded that apprentices could be considered to be students while receiving instruction in the classroom and while performing activities incidental to that instruction.
The Member considered that there was some force in the first respondent’s submission that if the legislature had intended to include apprentices, it would have done so and the absence of reference to apprentices meant that the legislation intended to exclude them. The Member reasoned that, if the institution described the course being undertaken as full-time, then it would undoubtedly satisfy the section. The Member observed that the approach taken by Constance DP in DMLC was that the question to consider was whether the education was the most significant factor occupying the time of the child’s activities of life, which the Member thought may involve “questions of fact and degree.”[13]
[13] Richards v Macarthur Electrical Connection Services Pty Ltd [2021] NSWPIC 524 (reasons), [29].

The Member remarked that there was “considerable force” in the submissions in favour of the appellants, but concluded, however, that they “have not established that they were receiving a full-time education at college at the date of the deceased[’s] death.”[14] The Member referred to the evidence of the Head Teacher of Electrotechnology, Mr Whitehouse, who indicated that the required attendance at TAFE was one day per week, over 36 days per year, and that it was expected that the students would revise and practise what they had learnt for an additional 40% of that time. The Member considered that that evidence was an accurate picture of the appellants’ study commitments, noting that it required 55 hours a year of coursework and the remaining time in the year was taken up with practical vocational training.
[14] Reasons, [30].
The Member noted that there was a connection between the TAFE course and the practical work performed but observed that the practical training was performed in accordance with a contract between the appellants and their respective employers and did not “readily fall within the phrase ‘education at a school, college or university.’”[15] The Member described the education received at TAFE as being “overwhelmed” by the time spent in practical work, so that the time the appellants spent in education at an educational institution could not, in ordinary language, be described as full-time. The Member reasoned that the appellants were actually performing part-time study at TAFE as part of a full-time apprenticeship. The Member added that at the conclusion of their three years of TAFE training, the appellants might continue the apprenticeship for an additional year performing practical work for their respective employers, which highlighted the difference between the education received at TAFE and the training received in the field.
[15] Reasons, [33].
The Member indicated that it was a difficult task to determine whether established facts fell within the legislation. He concluded, however, that the appellants were not receiving full-time education at a school, college or university at the time of the deceased’s death, or in the years that followed.
The Member thereafter proceeded to determine the question of interest payable on the lump sum entitlement. As the Member’s determination of that issue is not challenged on appeal, it is not necessary to summarise his reasons for his conclusion on that issue.
The Certificate of Determination issued on 16 December 2021 records:
“The Commission determines:
1.     Daniel Richards (the deceased) died of injury arising out of and in the course of his employment on 1 November 2018.
2.     At the date of his death his wife Kylie-Anne Richards and sons Jye Daniel Richards and Toby [Aaron] Richards were dependent on him for support.
3.     The evidence establishes that there was no other person dependent upon the deceased for support at the date of his death.
4. At the date of death of the deceased the compensation payable in respect of the death of a worker pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (1987 Act) was the sum of $798,100.
5.     Pursuant to s 29 of the 1987 Act apportion the lump sum as to 80% to Kylie-Anne Richards and 10% to each of the sons of the deceased, Jye Daniel Richards and Toby [Aaron] Richards.
6.     Determine that the [first and second appellants] were not students within the definition of that word contained in s 25(5) of the 1987 Act.
7.     Pursuant to s 26 of the 1987 Act the [second respondent] is entitled to reimbursement of the deceased’s funeral expenses in the sum of $14,000 paid by her on 14 October 2021.
8.     Order the first respondent to pay the lump sum compensation of $638,480 and reimbursement of funeral expenses of $14,300.
9.     Order the first respondent to pay the sum of $79,810 to the [first appellant].
10.   Order the first respondent to pay the sum of $79,810 to the [second appellant].
11. Order the first respondent to pay interest pursuant to s 109 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 at the rate of 2.5% on the lump sum compensation from 7 January 2020 and on the funeral expenses from 15 October 2021 to date of payment of the compensation.
12.   Liberty to apply in respect of the mathematics in the above orders.”

GROUNDS OF APPEAL

The first appellant

The first appellant brings the following grounds of appeal:
(a)    Ground A: denial of procedural fairness by failing to deal with submissions and evidence relied upon by the first appellant;
(b)    Ground B: denial of procedural fairness by failing to provide lawful reasons in reaching his conclusion, and
(c)    Ground C: failure to apply proper principles of statutory construction in resolving the issues.

The second appellant

The second appellant indicates that he relies upon the submissions made by the first appellant.

LEGISLATION

Section 25 of the 1987 Act relevantly provides:
“25    Death of worker leaving dependants
(cf former s 8 (1))
(1)     If death results from an injury, the amount of compensation payable by the employer under this Act shall be—
(a)the amount of $750,000 (the lump sum death benefit), which is to be apportioned among any dependants who are wholly or partly dependent for support on the worker or (if there are no such dependants) paid to the worker’s legal personal representative, and
(b)in addition, an amount of $66.60 per week in respect of—
(i)each dependent child of the worker under the age of 16 years, and
(ii)each dependent child of the worker being a student over the age of 16 years but under the age of 21 years.
…
(5)     In this section—
child of the worker means a child or stepchild of the worker and includes a person to whom the worker stood in the place of a parent.
dependent child of the worker means a child of the worker who was wholly or partly dependent for support on the worker.
student means a person receiving full-time education at a school, college or university.”
The first appellant relies on submissions made to the Member in relation to s 13 and s 16 of the Apprenticeship and Traineeship Act 2001(NSW) (the Apprenticeship and Traineeship Act). Those sections provide:
“13    Duties of employers under apprenticeships and traineeships
(1)     The employer of an apprentice or trainee must, in accordance with the relevant training plan, take all reasonable steps:
(a) to enable the apprentice or trainee to receive the work-based component of the required training, in particular by providing all necessary facilities and opportunities to acquire the competencies of the vocation concerned, and
(b) to enable the apprentice or trainee to obtain an appropriate qualification for that vocation, in particular:
(i) by releasing the apprentice or trainee as required for attendance at the relevant registered training organisation, and
(ii) by liaising with the relevant registered training organisation in relation to the apprentice’s or trainee’s attendance and participation in the training provided by the relevant registered training organisation.
(2)     The employer of an apprentice or trainee must discharge his or her obligations under the apprenticeship or traineeship as an employer of the apprentice or trainee.”
And:
“16    Duties of apprentices and trainees under apprenticeships and traineeships
(1)     An apprentice or trainee must, in accordance with the relevant training plan, make all reasonable efforts:
(a) to acquire the competencies of the vocation concerned, and
(b) to obtain an appropriate qualification or qualifications for that vocation.
(2)     An apprentice or trainee must discharge his or her obligations under the apprenticeship or traineeship as an employee of the employer.”

SUBMISSIONS

The second appellant adopts the first appellant’s submissions, so that the summary of the first appellant’s submissions is expressed as joint submissions from them both.
The appellants concede that, in order to succeed on appeal, they must show that the Member’s conclusion was wrong and submit that they must establish that “the error could possibly have affected the result.”[16] They assert that the Member’s error satisfies that requirement and the finding that they were not students within the definition of that word contained in s 25(5) of the 1987 Act was wrong.
[16] First appellant’s appeal submissions, [15].
The appellants contend that the Member focussed on where the full-time education was provided and where the appellants attended, when he ought to have considered whether full-time education facilitated by a school, college or university was received. The appellants submit that a wholistic approach should have been adopted. That is, whether the appellants were receiving full-time education facilitated through a school, college or university. The appellants assert that the only conclusion open to the Member was that the appellants were in receipt of full-time education through TAFE, while also being educated by their employers.

In respect of Grounds A and B

The appellants

The appellants refer to the first appellant’s written submissions provided by him to the Member. They point out that the Member conflated those submissions into what the Member referred to as “the main thrust” of the first appellant’s arguments in what comprised of four paragraphs of the Member’s reasons. The appellants contend that, while it was open to the Member to concisely summarise the submissions, the summary was insufficient and did not adequately address those arguments.
The appellants assert that the matters referred to by the Member did not include the predominant argument put forward by the first appellant, which was:
“The [first appellant] submits that s 25 should be approached in a similar way. That is, the entire factual matrix must be considered, with a view to determining whether a particular individual, at the time of the death, was subjectively pursuing full-time ‘education’.
That would involve a consideration of the nature of the education provided, together with the rights and responsibilities of the relevant participants.”[17]
And:
“The material from TAFE, NSW, together with the legislation, encompasses that an apprenticeship contains three main participants, in order to deliver the education to an individual.
This necessarily means that the education is provided not just in the classroom, but in the workplace as well. This is directly consistent with the evidence in the case, that the [first appellant] would complete various components, that had to be checked/marked by the employer.
It is also consistent with the scheme underlying apprenticeships. That is of mandatory minimum payments that occur based on the education (and progression) received by a person.”[18] (first appellant’s emphasis)
[17] First appellant’s written submissions to the Member dated 10 November 2021, [41]–[42].
[18] First appellant’s written submissions to the Member dated 10 November 2021, [50]–[52].
The appellants concede that the Member alluded to the first appellant’s submissions in relation to the Apprenticeship and Traineeship Act, but submit that the Member did not:
(a)    reproduce the sections or the guidelines;
(b)    record the argument actually made, and
(c)    provide reasons for rejecting that argument.
The appellants assert that because the Member failed to deal with this properly articulated argument, they were denied procedural fairness and natural justice.[19] The appellants refer to and rely upon the first appellant’s submissions made to the Member in relation to:
(a)    the Apprenticeship and Traineeship Act, which the first appellant said governed the involvement of TAFE in relation to apprenticeships and set out:
(i)the employer’s obligations to release the apprentice to attend a registered training organisation, and
(ii)the role and duties of the apprentice;
(b)    the Department of Industry’s list of dates for completion of apprenticeships, and
(c)    the website which documented the role of an apprentice and of the employer, and the employer’s obligation to supervise the apprentice.
[19] Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26 (Dranichnikov).
The appellants also refer to and rely upon the first appellant’s submissions made to the Member that the above material establishes that, in an apprenticeship, there are three main participants involved in providing the education to the apprentice. The appellants submit that the Member did not reject the first appellant’s statement evidence, which was corroborated by Mr Fensom. The appellants contend that the Member failed to deal with the evidence of Mr Fensom, which evidence was critical to their case in that it corroborated the first appellant’s evidence and supported the first appellant’s submissions as to the relationship between TAFE, the employer and the first appellant. The appellants submit that they were entitled to an explanation as to whether the evidence and the submissions made about that evidence were accepted or rejected, citing Whalan v Kogarah Municipal Council[20] and Dranichnikov as authorities for that proposition.
[20] [2007] NSWCA 5.
The appellants refer to the Member’s observation at [33] of his reasons that “work on the job … [was] performed as part of a contract of apprenticeship between an employer and an apprentice.” The appellants assert that that finding was not an inference that could be drawn by the Member in circumstances where there was no contract of employment tendered and was not a fair reading of the evidence. The appellants say that, in any event, the fact that an apprentice was working on the job in accordance with such contract would not preclude the finding that the employer was providing the apprentice with education according to such contract and in accordance with the obligations and guidelines required by TAFE.
The appellants submit that the Member’s reasons do not sufficiently explain the basis for his finding or adequately deal with the evidence and the first appellant’s “case theory.” The appellants further submit that the Member failed to lawfully deal with the first appellant’s submissions in relation to statutory construction. They assert that the Member’s treatment of the submissions and of the evidence constitutes error and resulted in a denial of procedural fairness.

The first respondent

The first respondent submits that the claim made by the appellants was for weekly payments on the basis that they were “students” as defined by s 25(5). That is, it was simply that they were receiving full-time education at a school, college or university at the time of the deceased’s death. The first respondent says that the first appellant acknowledged what he was required to establish in his submissions.
The first respondent submits that authorities dealing with the requirement to give adequate reasons establish that there is no precise formula that can be applied to all cases. The first respondent also says that the Member is not required to separately address all the submissions made by a party when reaching his or her conclusion. The first respondent submits that what is required for the reasons to be sufficient is to make findings of fact and explain how those facts were applied to the relevant law. The first respondent refers to the decision of Acting Deputy President Parker SC in Thadsanamoorthy v Teys Australia Southern Pty Ltd,[21] in which the Acting Deputy President applied Beale v Government Insurance Office (NSW).[22]
[21] [2019] NSWWCCPD 61.
[22] (1997) 48 NSWLR 430.
The first respondent points out that the appellants acknowledged that it was sufficient for the Member to concisely summarise the submissions made by the parties. The first respondent refers to the first appellant’s submissions to the Member, which were lengthy and made in writing and orally, but maintains that the thrust of the submissions pertained to whether or not the first appellant was a student in full-time education at a school, college or university. The first respondent submits that the Member’s reasons at [22]–[23] of his decision acknowledge the first appellant’s submissions that the education was not simply provided in the classroom, but included the instruction received in the field. Further, the Member made reference to the Apprenticeship and Traineeship Act and the associated guidelines.
The first respondent asserts that the Member’s reasons disclose that the Member was indeed aware of the facts pertaining to the appellants and identified the issue for determination. The first respondent further asserts that the first appellant’s submission that the “entire factual matrix must be considered” was well ventilated at the arbitration hearing and acknowledged by the Member at [22] of the reasons.
The first respondent submits that the Member correctly identified the facts upon which he was relying, considered the parties’ submissions and gave sufficiently adequate reasons as to the manner in which he applied those facts to the relevant enquiry in relation to the definition of a “student” within the meaning s 25. The first respondent asserts that the Member’s approach did not constitute a denial of procedural fairness and therefore Grounds A and B should not succeed.

In respect of Ground C

The appellants

The appellants submit that the first appellant’s submissions made to the Member in relation to the principles of statutory construction went further than to merely assert that the legislation was beneficial in nature. They reiterate that the Member focussed on where the full-time education was provided, when he should have considered whether full-time education facilitated by a school, college or university was received. That is, the Member focussed on the appellants’ attendance, rather than reception of the education. The appellants say that the first appellant emphasised to the Member that the term “student” in s 25 must be considered in the context of the 1987 Act and the particular provision. They say that what is required is that the appellants’ particular circumstances as well as the purpose of the provision must be considered.
The appellants assert that the intention of the provision is “manifestly evident.”[23] That is, it is intended to benefit dependant persons between the ages of 18 and 21, who are seeking training by receiving education on a full-time basis through a school, college or university. The appellants maintain that the Member erroneously focussed on where the education was provided, rather than the fact that the appellants were in receipt of full-time education which was facilitated by such an organisation. They submit that the definition had to be interpreted as a whole, rather than in a step by step fashion, the education provided by TAFE and the employer was not mutually exclusive, and the obligations of each participant and their relationship were “intrinsically linked.”[24] The appellants describe the relationship between TAFE and the employer as “a vital, and inseverable component, of the [appellants’] TAFE course [where o]ne could not be satisfied without the other.”[25]
[23] First appellant’s appeal submissions, [49].
[24] First appellant’s appeal submissions, [53].
[25] First appellant’s appeal submissions, [54].
The appellants list a number of scenarios which they say would constitute anomalies if the attention was focussed on where the full-time education took place and submit that, in accordance with CIC Insurance Limited v Bankstown Football Club Limited,[26] an interpretation that “avoids absurd, capricious, curious, extraordinary, inconvenient, irrational, obscure, unjust, unlikely, or unreasonable constructions should be avoided.”[27] They add that, where more than one interpretation is available, the construction that falls in their favour should be preferred.
[26] [1997] HCA 2 (Bankstown Football Club).
[27] First appellant’s appeal submissions, [56].

The first respondent

The first respondent submits that the question of whether or not a person was receiving full-time education at a school, college or university is a question of fact, the finding made by the Member was open to him on the basis of the available evidence and as a consequence, is unappealable. The first respondent says that the Member made reference to this when he commented that such a consideration may involve questions of fact and degree. The first respondent asserts that the Member exposed his reasoning for reaching the finding that the appellants were not full-time students at [30]–[35] (summarised at [37]–[39] above). The first respondent contends that the Member was entitled to approach the matter on the basis that he did when applying the evidence to the definition and that this appeal ground should also fail.
The first respondent adds that the Member approached the matter by considering the language actually used in the text of the section. The first respondent submits that the Member drew a distinction between the course work and the vocational training in the field for which the appellants were paid. The first respondent asserts that this was a proper construction of the terms of the section.
The first respondent refers to its argument that if the legislature intended the section to include apprentices, it would have said so. The first respondent notes that the Member alluded to this submission. The first respondent submits that to construe the definition as to not apply to an apprentice is the correct approach in interpreting the definition. The first respondent further submits that, for that reason, the appeal also fails and the appellants have been unable to establish a denial of procedural fairness on the part of the Member.
The respondent also refers to the examples provided by the appellants that might lead to curious results if the Member’s approach was adopted. The first respondent submits that a proper interpretation of the section is that the section provides for children whose parent is deceased, who are in full-time education at a school, college or university and who would otherwise have no financial support to assist them. The first respondent says that an apprentice receives monetary support in the form of wages from his or her employer which the full-time student would not receive and so the restrictive interpretation of the definition adopted by the Member was correct.

THE RELIEF SOUGHT

The appellants seek an award of weekly payments in their favour.
The first respondent seeks to have the appeal dismissed.

CONSIDERATION

Ground A

The appellants assert that they have been denied procedural fairness because the Member failed to give consideration to their submissions and failed to deal with the evidence relied upon by them.
In respect of the assertion that the Member failed to refer to their submissions, the appellants contend that Member “failed to produce the specific arguments raised.”[28] The appellants rely upon Dranichnikov.
[28] First appellant’s appeal submissions, [29(b)].
As the first respondent submits, the Member is not required to separately address all the submissions made by a party when reaching his or her conclusion. In Huntsman Chemical Company Australia Pty Limited v Narellan Pools Pty Limited,[29] Flick J (Moore J agreeing) said:
“The duty of a Judge at first instance extends to a duty to refer to the evidence relevant to the submissions advanced and the findings relevant to the conclusions to be reached. But it is not a duty to refer to every submission and every piece of evidence.”[30]
[29] [2011] FCAFC 7 (Huntsman Chemical Australia).
[30] Huntsman Chemical Australia, [44].
In Wang v State of New South Wales,[31] McCallum JA (Macfarlan and Meagher JJA agreeing) observed:
“It was submitted that the judge failed to respond to substantial, clearly articulated arguments relying on established facts on behalf of Mr Wang, particularly the submissions as to his inability to communicate in English.
The submission invoked the decision of the High Court in Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs in which it was stated that a failure to respond to a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying on established facts was a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. The decision is not authority for the proposition that any failure to refer to any argument put to a trial judge amounts to error. It is necessary to engage with the nature and materiality of the argument in the context of the issues in the proceedings. In Dranichnikov, the Refugee Review Tribunal, in considering whether Mr Dranichnikov had a well-founded fear of persecution on the grounds of his status as a member of a particular social group, overlooked or misconceived the particular social group to which he claimed to belong. That was the central question in the proceedings.
The approach taken in the present case was to list every submission put on behalf of Mr Wang to which the primary judge did not refer in his judgment and to assert error on that basis. That reflects a wrong approach. The primary judge was not required to address every submission advanced during the course of the hearing: Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd.”[32]
[31] [2019] NSWCA 263 (Wang).
[32] Wang, [62]–[64].
The first submission identified by the appellants as one which they allege the Member failed to consider was the submission that the “entire factual matrix” must be considered in order to determine whether they were “subjectively” pursuing full-time education. While the Member did not adopt the phrase expressed by the first appellant, he did in fact consider the particular facts and circumstances pertaining to the nature of the appellants’ engagements. The Member, at [21] of his reasons, noted the appellants’ reliance on DMLC, and considered the following passages from Constance DP’s reasons:
“Constance DP held that the determination had to be based on the ‘individual circumstances of the child; not on an arbitrary definition made by a particular industry body or institution’. The question was whether ‘the education being received is the most significant factor occupying time in the child’s activities of life’.”[33]
[33] Reasons, [21].
The Member referred to the first appellant’s submission that the section had to be looked at in the context of the dependants’ endeavours at [20] of his reasons. That, together with the Member’s reference to the observations made by Constance DP in DMLC, in my view is a sufficient acknowledgment of the submission, which was essentially that all the facts and circumstances ought to be considered.
The appellants refer to the first appellant’s submission that there were three participants in the delivery of the education which means that the education was delivered in the workplace and in the classroom. The appellants submit that the Member did not make reference to that submission.
The Member noted the appellants’ submissions. The Member said:
“Mr Parker argued that in the case of apprenticeship, education was not just provided in the classroom but also in the workplace. This argument was developed by reference to the respective obligations of apprentices and their employers set out in the Apprenticeship and Traineeship Act 2001 (NSW) and in the Guidelines published pursuant to the Act.
Mr Brown [counsel for the second appellant in the proceedings before the Member] argued that the definition of student required the child to be in receipt of ‘full-time education’ as distinct from attending the school college or university full time. A consideration of the material in evidence from Training Services New South Wales led to the conclusion that the [second appellant] was receiving a ‘full-time education’. He attended TAFE one day per week ‘and is otherwise educated on site for the remaining 4 days of the working week’. This conclusion was reinforced by a letter from Ms Harris of the [first] respondent.”[34]
[34] Reasons, [22]–[23].
While the Member did not specifically mention the predicator that there were three participants in the apprenticeships, in the first sentence of the reasons quoted at [77] he clearly appreciated the submission that an apprenticeship encompasses a combination of education in the classroom and the workplace. That was certainly the gravamen of the submission put to the Member. It is also clear from the above quotation that the Member referred to the appellants’ submissions in relation to the Apprenticeship and Traineeship Act and the material from Training Services NSW.
The appellants do not point to any other submission that they say the Member did not include in the matters recorded in his reasons. In any event, the matters identified by the appellants on appeal were acknowledged by the Member and his overview of the submissions, together with his subsequent evaluation of the issues, although succinct, disclosed that he was alive to the arguments put by the appellants. I reject the appellants’ assertion that the Member’s summary of the submissions was inadequate.
The appellants assert that the Member failed to “deal” with their submissions, in particular the first appellant’s argument pertaining to the Apprenticeship and Traineeship Act and the material from Training Services NSW. The submission made at arbitration was that the material set out the obligations on the employer, which required the employer to release the apprentice so that she or he could attend a registered training organisation, and the role and duties of an apprentice.
That the employers released the appellants one day per week to attend TAFE and otherwise required the appellants to attend the worksite for 4 days per week, during which time the appellants would receive practical tuition from their employers, was an accepted fact.
The appellants’ submission was that the appellants fell within the definition of “students” receiving full-time education because of the combination of the fact that the three participants (TAFE, the employers and the appellants) were participating in the education, which was facilitated through an educational organisation, namely TAFE. The Member did not accept that the definition of “student” in s 25(5) could be interpreted in that way and concluded that what was required was that the student was “receiving full-time education at a school, college or university” (my emphasis).
It is apparent that the Member dealt with the appellants’ submissions. The appellants’ complaint that the Member failed to deal with their submissions is rejected.
The appellants also assert that the Member failed to “deal with” the evidence.
The appellants assert that the Member failed to reproduce the sections of the Apprenticeship and Traineeship Act and the guidelines from Training Services NSW. The assertion does not make it clear why the Member was required to reproduce those sections or that material. The sections of the Apprenticeship and Traineeship Act and guidelines relied upon were before the Member and he noted the submissions made in relation to the material. The Member’s reasons did not traverse the relationship between TAFE, the employers and the appellants in any adverse way.
The appellants contend that the Member ought to have dealt with their statement evidence and that the Member disregarded the evidence of Mr Fensom. The Member was not required to either accept or reject the appellants’ statement evidence, which was consistent with the accepted facts that the appellants attended TAFE one day per week and received practical training in employment four days per week, for which they received a wage. Nor was he required to deal with the evidence of Mr Fensom or indeed Ms Harris, whose evidence was also consistent with those accepted facts. In those circumstances, the observations of Flick J in Huntsman Chemical Australia recorded above at [72] are relevant.
The appellants contend that the Member’s treatment of the above evidence and submissions constituted error. For the reasons given above, I do not accept that the Member erred in the manner alleged and this ground of appeal fails.

Ground B

The appellants contend that the Member failed to provide lawful reasons for his conclusions.
The appellants refer to the Member’s conclusion that “the work on the job … [was] performed as a part of a contract of apprenticeship between an employer and an apprentice.”[35] The appellants submit that the conclusion was not open to the Member, no such contract was tendered in evidence and was not a fair reading of the evidence. The extract must be considered in its context. The Member reasoned as follows:
“I appreciate that there is a connection between the TAFE course and the work on the job but the latter is performed as part of a contract of apprenticeship between an employer and an apprentice. It does not readily fall within the phrase ‘education at a school, college or university.’ In this case, it is evident that the education received at or in connection with a school, college, or university was overwhelmed in terms of time by work in the field. The [appellants’] education at a school could not in ordinary language be said to be ‘full-time’. Rather, they were receiving a part-time education at TAFE as part of a full time apprenticeship.”[36]
[35] First appellant’s appeal submissions, [39].
[36] Reasons [33].
The first appellant’s evidence was that he was undertaking an apprenticeship with Jade Electrical Pty Ltd, in which he was required to attend his employer, Jade Electrical Pty Ltd, four days per week.[37] The first appellant says that he earned approximately $500 net per week from Jade Electrical Pty Ltd[38] and his taxation returns disclosed that he earned taxable income paid by Jade Electrical Pty Ltd.[39] Mr Macmaster of the Department of Industry Training Services wrote to Jade Electrical Pty Ltd on 20 December 2017, advising that its application to establish an apprenticeship for the first appellant had been approved, with a full-term completion date of 3 December 2021.[40]
[37] Statement dated 19 August 2021, first appellant’s reply, p 1, [4]–[6].
[38] Statement dated 19 August 2021, first appellant’s reply, p 1, [10].
[39] First appellant’s reply, pp 14–43.
[40] ARD, p 29.
Similarly, the second appellant’s evidence was that he was “employed at [the first respondent], as an apprentice electrician”, and was at the time of his statement earning approximately $850 per week.[41] On 17 January 2018, Mr Jacobs from Department of Industry Training Services wrote to the first respondent confirming that its application to set up an apprenticeship for the second appellant had been approved, with a full-term completion date of 19 November 2021.[42]
[41] Statement dated 18 August 2021, second appellant’s reply, p 2, [16]–[17].
[42] ARD, p 30.
That evidence is sufficient for the Member to conclude that there was in place an apprenticeship contract between each of the appellants and their respective employers, despite the fact that the actual written contract was not in evidence. The appellants’ assertion that the Member’s conclusion was not an inference available to him to draw and was not a fair reading of the evidence is rejected.
The appellants submit that the Member’s reasons “do not adequately disclose the basis for his decision”.[43] The Member’s determination was a factual determination. He reasoned:
“It is evident that the TAFE course required the apprentice to spend up to 55 hours a year on course work although there may have been additional time necessary for studying and completing examinations. The balance of the year was spent in vocational training with his employer on the job.”[44]
[43] First appellant’s appeal submissions, [42].
[44] Reasons, [33].
The Member’s reasons that followed were those recorded at [89] above. In essence he reasoned that:
(a)    the appellants were required to spend a number of hours per year doing coursework;
(b)    the education provided on the work site could not be classed as “education at a school, college or university”;
(c)    the evidence of the education at a school, college or university was overwhelmed by the work performed over the four days on site;
(d)    in ordinary language, the appellants’ education at a school college or university could not be considered full-time, and
(e)    the appellants were receiving part-time education at a school, college or university as part of a full-time apprenticeship.
In describing the time spent at TAFE as being “overwhelmed” by the practical work on site, the Member clearly had in mind the observations of Constance DP in DMLC, a decision relied upon by the appellants. That is, the question was whether “the education being received is the most significant factor occupying time in the child’s activities of life.”[45]
[45] Reasons, [21].
In my view, the Member’s reasoning provided an adequate basis upon which to conclude that the practical work on site could not be considered education at TAFE and that he was not satisfied that the appellants were receiving a full-time education at TAFE at the date of the deceased’s death.
It follows that Ground B of the appeal fails.

Ground C

The appellants assert that the Member failed to “apply proper principles of statutory construction in resolving the issues.” The appellants submit that their submissions as to how the definition of “student” ought to be interpreted went further than simply that the section was beneficial in nature. The appellants assert error on the part of the Member in that he focussed on where the education was provided instead of considering whether the appellants received full-time education which was facilitated by a school, college or university. The appellants add that their submission to the Member included that:
(a)     the word “student” contained in the section must be considered in its context;
(b)    consideration should be given to the appellants’ particular circumstances, and
(c)    consideration should also be given to the particular purpose of the provision.
The appellants contend that the definition must be interpreted as a whole, rather than a step-by-step process and that the obligations of those involved were “intrinsically linked.” They refer to Comcare v Heffernan.[46]
[46] [2013] FCA 299.
They also refer to the 1997 High Court authority of Bankstown Football Club Ltd. The relevant passage relied upon appears to be from the joint judgment of Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ as follows (citations omitted):
“It is well settled that at common law, apart from any reliance upon s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), the court may have regard to reports of law reform bodies to ascertain the mischief which a statute is intended to cure. Moreover, the modern approach to statutory interpretation (a) insists that the context be considered in the first instance, not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise, and (b) uses ‘context’ in its widest sense to include such things as the existing state of the law and the mischief which, by legitimate means such as those just mentioned, one may discern the statute was intended to remedy. Instances of general words in a statute being so constrained by their context are numerous. In particular, as McHugh JA pointed out in Isherwood v Butler Pollnow Pty Ltd, if the apparently plain words of a provision are read in the light of the mischief which the statute was designed to overcome and of the objects of the legislation, they may wear a very different appearance. Further, inconvenience or improbability of result may assist the court in preferring to the literal meaning an alternative construction which, by the steps identified above, is reasonably open and more closely conforms to the legislative intent.”[47]
[47] Bankstown Football Club Ltd, 408.
The first respondent nominates the High Court authorities of Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority[48] and Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory)[49] as relevant authorities.
[48] [1998] HCA 28 (Project Blue Sky).
[49] [2009] HCA 41 (Alcan).

In Project Blue Sky, in a joint judgment of McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ, their Honours said (citations omitted):
“The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute. The meaning of the provision must be determined ‘by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole’. In Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos, Dixon CJ pointed out that ‘the context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed’. Thus, the process of construction must always begin by examining the context of the provision that is being construed.”[50]
And:
“Furthermore, a court construing a statutory provision must strive to give meaning to every word of the provision. In The Commonwealth v Baume Griffith CJ cited R v Berchet to support the proposition that it was ‘a known rule in the interpretation of Statutes that such a sense is to be made upon the whole as that no clause, sentence, or word shall prove superfluous, void, or insignificant, if by any other construction they may all be made useful and pertinent’.”[51]
[50] Project Blue Sky, [69].
[51] Project Blue Sky, [71].
In Alcan in the joint judgment of Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ, their Honours observed (citations omitted):
“This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the text itself. Historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text. The language which has actually been employed in the text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision, in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy.”[52]
[52] Alcan, [47].
The Member considered that each of the appellants could be described as a “student” as that word is defined in the Macquarie Compact Dictionary, 8th edition.[53] He noted the submission made by the first respondent that if the legislature had intended an apprentice to fall within the definition of student contained in s 25(5) of the 1987 Act, it would have said so. He referred to the evidence of the Head Teacher as to the outline of the requirements of the course offered at TAFE. He concluded that, while there was a connection between the TAFE course and the apprenticeship, the education delivered through the apprenticeship could not be considered to fall within the phrase “education at a school college or university.” He further concluded that:
“The [appellants’] education at a school could not in ordinary language be said to be ‘full-time’. Rather, they were receiving a part-time education at TAFE as part of a full-time apprenticeship.”[54]
[53] Reasons, [26].
[54] Reasons, [33].
Thus, the Member rested his determination on the ordinary language of the provision. The Member’s treatment of the definition does not offend the requirement for the construction of the definition to be consistent with the language and purpose of the statute.
The construction put forward by the appellants, that is that the appellants satisfied the definition of “students” cannot be accepted. Applying the principles quoted above, the definition must be read as a whole. As observed in Alcan, the starting point is the text itself. That is, the appellants must be “receiving full-time education at a school, college or university.”
The appellants submit that the Member ought to have focused on the reception of the education and not where it took place. There is no proper reason as to why there should be a greater focus on the receipt of the education or that the requirement for it to be at a school, college or university should be read down. The text is clear in its meaning.
The appellants contend that because the education is “facilitated” “by” or “through” TAFE, the definition is satisfied. Those words do not appear in the definition and are not synonymous with the word “at.” To interpret the definition in such a manner is inconsistent with the rules of statutory interpretation and requires reading into the definition words that could have been used by the legislature but were not. In essence, the appellants assert that the word “at” is either void or insignificant, which is again contrary to the principles of statutory construction.
The Member did not fail to apply proper rules of statutory construction and thus did not err in his interpretation of the definition of “student”. It follows that Ground C of the appeal fails.

CONCLUSION

The appellants have failed to disclose error on the part of the Member. As none of the appellants’ grounds of appeal have been successful, the Member’s Certificate of Determination is confirmed.

DECISION

The Member’s Certificate of Determination dated 16 December 2021 is confirmed.

Elizabeth Wood
Deputy President

12 September 2022

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established