RICARDO and EVANS

[2020] FCWA 210

JURISDICTION : FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

ACT: FAMILY LAW ACT 1975

LOCATION: PERTH

CITATION: RICARDO and EVANS [2020] FCWA 210

CORAM: SUTHERLAND CJ

HEARD: 11 NOVEMBER 2020

DELIVERED : 23 NOVEMBER 2020

FILE NO/S: PTW 156 of 2020

BETWEEN: MS RICARDO

Applicant

AND

MR EVANS

Respondent

Catchwords:

PROPERTY - Interim property settlement order or alternatively 'dollar for dollar' order sought - Payment of arrears of mortgage payments and ongoing mortgage payments - Case turns on its own facts

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Category: Not Reportable

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	Mr Klimek
Respondent	:	Mr Rynne
Independent Children's Lawyer	:	Excused from attendance

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	Klimek & Wijay Family Lawyers
Respondent	:	Lavan
Independent Children's Lawyer	:	RM Law

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Atkins & Hunt and Ors [2018] FamCA 14

Farnell and Farnell (1996) FLC 92-681

G and T (2004) FLC 93-176

Iphostrou & Iphostrou and Ors [2011] FamCA 20

Ricardo and Evans [2020] FCWAM 62

Strahan & Strahan (2011) FLC 93-466

Zschokke & Zschokke (1996) FLC 92-693

WORDS IN SQUARE BRACKETS REPLACE WORDS USED IN THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT – PARTIES’ NAMES AND IDENTIFYING DETAILS HAVE BEEN CHANGED

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Ricardo and Evans has been approved by the Family Court of Western Australia pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Introduction

1[Ms Ricardo] (“the wife”) and [Mr Evans] (“the husband”) have been unable to reach agreement in relation to various interim financial issues.

2The orders sought by the wife were set out in her Form 2A response filed on 21 September 2020, and as amended by her counsel at the hearing on 11 November 2020.[1] In summary, the wife sought orders that either the husband pay the wife the sum of between $89,000 and $131,000, pursuant to s 79 and s 80(1)(h) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”); or that the court make a “dollar for dollar order”, to enable the wife to meet her litigation costs. In addition, the wife also sought orders that the husband pay any arrears in relation to two specified loan accounts, together with all instalments, as and when they fell due.

[1] With the consent of the husband.

3The orders sought by the husband were set out in his amended Form 2 application filed on 6 November 2020. In short, the husband sought that the wife’s Form 2A response be dismissed.

4Both parties have been represented by solicitors throughout the proceedings, and both were represented by counsel at the interim hearing.

5A perusal of the affidavits and financial statements relied upon by the parties for the purposes of the interim hearing reveal that there are considerable factual disputes between the parties, including but not limited to the following:

a)The date they commenced cohabitation.

b)The full extent of each party’s assets, liabilities and financial resources at the commencement of their relationship.

c)The wife’s current employment arrangements.

d)The level of child support the husband is currently assessed to pay the wife.

e)Whether the funds advanced by the wife’s mother to pay the wife’s litigation costs were a gift or a loan, (albeit at least for the purposes of this interim hearing, the husband did not seek to maintain his position that the advances were gifts).

f)Whether the wife has an entitlement to receive payment of a substantial trust fund to her.

g)The ongoing parenting arrangements for [Child A], including each party’s capacity to provide for the child’s needs, having regard to various allegations made by each party in relation to the other. This includes the wife alleging that the husband subjected her to severe family violence during the relationship, and the husband alleging that the wife suffers from mental health issues that detrimentally impact on her ability to care for the child.

6These are matters that cannot be determined in this interim application, particularly as neither party has been tested by cross examination on their affidavit evidence. For the benefit of the parties what this means is that I cannot make any findings of fact where the evidence is in dispute. That will be the task of the judicial officer at trial.

What are the relevant background facts to these interim financial proceedings?

7The husband was born [in] 1976. He was formerly employed as [a logistics specialist], but has recently been made redundant from that position and instead has commenced employment as a [data analyst]. He lives in [City A] [in the Eastern States].

8The wife was born [in] 1995. She was formerly employed as a [restaurant manager], but is now employed on a part time basis as a [administrative assistant]. The wife formerly lived with the husband in City A, but since separation, has lived in Perth with her parents.

9The parties commenced a “committed relationship” in [mid] 2016 and by no later than the end of 2016, commenced cohabitation. They were married [in late] 2019 and separated on a final basis [in early] 2020 during [an overseas holiday].

10The parties have one child of their marriage, Child A, who was born [in] 2018. The child lives with the wife in Perth.

11It appeared to be common ground that:

a)At the commencement of the parties’ cohabitation, the husband was approximately 38 years old. He had been employed on a full-time basis as [a logistics specialist] for many years prior to meeting the wife. He earned a significant income. The husband’s major assets / resources included: (1) an investment apartment in [the Eastern States], subject to a mortgage, and (2) significant superannuation entitlements. At the commencement of the parties’ cohabitation, the wife was approximately 21 years old. She was employed on a full-time basis as a restaurant manager and earned a very modest income. The wife had modest assets / resources, including: (1) a motor vehicle, and (2) a small amount of superannuation.

b)During the relationship the husband continued to work on a full time-basis and was the primary income earner for the family. The wife took maternity leave at around the time of Child A’s birth and thereafter was primarily engaged in homemaking and parenting duties. It appears the wife ultimately resigned from her employment as a restaurant manager.

c)During the relationship, the parties jointly purchased a residence in [the Eastern States] for $1,350,000 plus costs. They paid a small deposit and otherwise borrowed heavily to fund the purchase of the property. The husband’s parents assisted the parties by paying some of the costs of the purchase.

d)At separation the wife removed the sum of $14,000 from the parties’ joint bank account. She subsequently applied these funds in paying part of her litigation costs.

e)Since separation the wife and child have resided in Perth with the wife’s mother and step-father and the husband has resided in City A.

f)After separation, the husband’s employment [was] severely detrimentally impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. The husband became entitled to receive a redundancy payment, based on his years of service with his employer. The husband received a redundancy payment of approximately $180,000 in October 2020.

g)After separation, the husband was solely responsible for the payment of the mortgages and other costs over the [two] properties [in the Eastern States] (albeit the re‑payments were suspended from approximately March to October 2020 due to the pandemic). The wife did not financially assist in this regard.

Brief history of the court proceedings

12The wife commenced parenting proceedings on 7 January 2020. The husband filed responding documents on 23 January 2020, also raising financial issues. He did not specify the final financial orders sought by him. On 21 May 2020, the wife filed an amended application, also raising financial issues. Although the wife sought a number of orders, including the sale of the [jointly owned property], she did not otherwise specify the final financial orders sought by her.

13On 27 August 2020, the husband filed an amended response. On a final basis, the husband sought that: (1) he retain the [Eastern States] properties, subject to the liabilities in relation thereto, and indemnify and keep indemnified the wife in relation thereto; (2) he retain a pet dog that is currently in the possession of the wife; and (3) each party otherwise retain the assets, liabilities and superannuation entitlements in their respective names and/or possession. On the husband’s figures, this amounted to approximately a 94 per cent division of the parties’ property to him.[2]

[2] As submitted by the wife’s counsel during the interim hearing, and not contested by the husband.

14Since the commencement of the proceedings, there has been significant activity in relation to parenting issues, including the husband failing in his interim application to require the child to be returned to City A.[3]

What is the current financial position of the parties?

[3] Ricardo and Evans [2020] FCWAM 62.

15In her most recent financial statement filed on 15 October 2020 the wife deposed that:

a)She worked part time as an administrative assistant and earned approximately $500 per week gross. In addition, she received various Centrelink payments totalling approximately $295 per week and child support of approximately $96 per week.

b)Her total expenditure was approximately $983 per week, including discretionary expenses of approximately $873 per week.

16In his most recent financial statement filed on 6 November 2020, the husband deposed that:

a)He now worked full time as a data analysist and earned approximately $3,212 per week gross. In addition, he received rental income from [one of the two properties in the Eastern States] of approximately $354 per week, bringing his total income to approximately $3,566 per week.

b)His total expenditure was approximately $4,169 per week, including:

i) Income tax of approximately $1,013 per week;

ii)Mortgage payments for the [jointly owned property] of approximately $1,520 per week;

iii)Mortgage payments for the [other] property of approximately $369 per week;

iv)Rates and levies for the two properties totalling approximately $182 per week;

v)Various insurances and licence costs totalling approximately $110 per week;

vi)Child support to the wife of $448 per week; and

vii)Discretionary expenditure totalling approximately $452 per week.

17The parties’ estimates of the value of their net property pool ranged between approximately $530,000 and $590,000. The parties agreed that the major items included:

a)The jointly owned property, subject to the loan secured against the property. The parties agreed the property was valued at approximately $1,260,000 to $1,265,000 and that the balance owing on the mortgage was approximately $(1,241,000) to $(1,248,000). Accordingly, there is currently little, if any, equity in the property.

b)The husband’s [other] property, which the husband estimated was worth approximately $420,000, subject to the loan secured against the property with a current balance of approximately $(321,000).

c)The husband’s savings, which he estimated to be approximately $156,000, including the remainder of his redundancy payment.

d)The husband’s superannuation entitlements, which the husband estimated were currently valued at approximately $354,000.

e)The wife’s superannuation entitlements, which the wife estimated were currently valued at approximately $26,000.

18Both parties have entered into written costs agreements with their respective solicitors, with those agreements being accepted by each party as being “on the usual terms”. Both parties provided the court with up-to-date costs notification letters at the commencement of the hearing.

19The husband’s solicitor’s costs notification letter revealed that: (1) the husband’s litigation costs incurred to date to his former and current solicitors totalled approximately $76,000, of which approximately $10,860 remained unpaid; (2) the husband’s current solicitor held approximately $18,000 in trust, including to meet the anticipated costs of the two expert witnesses appointed in relation to the parenting proceedings; and (3) the husband’s solicitors estimated that his total, additional costs to the conclusion of a trial were approximately $58,000 to $130,000.

20On the other hand, the wife’s solicitor’s costs notification letter revealed that: (1) the wife’s litigation costs incurred to date to her former and current solicitors totalled approximately $125,870, of which approximately $650 remained unpaid; and (2) the wife’s solicitors estimated that her total, additional costs to the conclusion of a trial were approximately $89,000 to $131,000.[4] In particular, the wife’s solicitor estimated that her costs:

a)for the interim hearing, ranged between $3,000 and $5,000;

b)for the conciliation conference (in relation to financial issues) ranged between $4,000 and $6,000; and

c)to prepare for a readiness hearing, including the preparation of all trial documents, ranged between $25,000 and $40,000.

[4] As submitted by the wife’s counsel during the interim hearing.

21Aside from the conciliation conference, the parties anticipate attending ADR, arranged by the Independent Children’s Lawyer through Legal Aid Western Australia, in relation to parenting issues, once the single expert reports have been published. The matter has not yet been entered into the defended list. Currently, the wait time for a readiness hearing after a matter has been entered into the defended list is approximately 12 to 15 months.

22The husband deposed that since separation he has sold various assets totalling approximately $59,000 and used the net proceeds to meet part of his litigation costs. The wife deposed that after separation, she withdrew the sum of $14,000 from the parties’ joint account and used the funds to meet part of her litigation costs. Both parties deposed that they have also borrowed funds from family members to meet their litigation costs. The husband deposed that he currently owes his family member/s $24,250 and the wife deposed that she currently owes her mother approximately $114,000 in this regard.

23There is no doubt that the parties have chosen to hotly contest the parenting aspects of the proceedings and have both incurred considerable litigation costs as a result. I concur with the submissions made by the husband’s counsel that there are significant question marks around the proportionality of the litigation costs incurred by the parties to date, having regard to the issues in dispute between them. In my view, it appears that, having regard to the relatively modest size of the available property pool, the parties have so far expended an eye‑watering amount on their litigation costs. If the parties continue to litigate in the same manner all the way to trial, then apart from superannuation, they are likely to be left with little else, or a net deficit.

Wife’s application for funds to meet her ongoing litigation costs

24The wife’s application was made in the alternative: either pursuant to s 79 and s 80(1)(h) of the Act; or a dollar for dollar order pursuant to s 117 of the Act.

25I firstly turn to consider the wife’s application for interim property settlement pursuant to s 79 and s 80(1) (h). The wife seeks a payment of between $89,000 and $131,000 to enable her to pay her ongoing litigation costs.

26In Strahan & Strahan,[5] the Full Court considered the stages for exercise of the court’s power to make an interim property order under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) as follows:

[5] Strahan & Strahan (2011) FLC 93-466, [132] - [139].

132.In relation to the first stage, in our view, when considering whether to exercise the power under s 79 and s 80(1)(h) of the Act to make an interim property order the “overarching consideration” is the interests of justice. It is not necessary to establish compelling circumstances. All that is required is that in the circumstances it is appropriate to exercise the power. In exercising the wide and unfettered discretion conferred by the power to make such an order, regard should be had to the fact that the usual order pursuant to s 79 is a once and for all order made after a final hearing.

133.In [Harris and Harris (1993) FLC 92-378] at 79,930 the Full Court gave some examples of circumstances where it may be appropriate to exercise the power being “where both parties agree to the disposal of some assets pending the trial” and “[u]rgent situations” to avoid injustice.

Another example is where, as in this case, one party requires funds to assist in defraying the costs of litigation without which funds an injustice may be caused.

134.Then turning to the substantive step we adopt what the Full Court said in Harris at 79,930 in relation to the second and third matters which we will now discuss.

135.In relation to the second matter, as the jurisdiction under s 79 of the Act is being exercised the provisions of that section must be considered and applied but with the limitations given that it is not the final hearing. There is also no requirement of compelling circumstances in relation to the substantive step.

136.As to the third matter identified at 79,930 by the Full Court in Harris, in discussions before us it was described as the “adjustment issue” or “claw-back issue”. It was submitted by senior counsel for the Wife that it is relevant to consider whether an order would give the applicant “more than they would be indubitably entitled to on a final hearing” or alternatively “would it give them so much that it could not be adjusted on a final hearing?”. As we have observed the Full Court in [Zschokke and Zschokke (1996) FLC 92-693] at 83,220 – 221 stressed the importance of consideration of the “adjustment issue” if the power in s 80(1)(h) of the Act is being exercised. We accept the submission and observe that this matter is relevant because the discretion conferred by the power in s 79 is to make such order as the Court considers appropriate provided it is just and equitable to make the order in circumstances where the power will not be exhausted by the interim order. As Bryant CJ and Coleman J observed in Gabel v Yardley [(2008) 40 Fam LR 66] at [69] and [72] the interim order must be capable of variation or reversal without resort to s 79A of the Act or appeal. As Finn J said at [126] the interim order must be “capable of alteration at any time prior to, or as part of, the final exercise of the s 79 power”.

137.Once a court proceeds to exercise the power in s 79 of the Act, being in the substantive phase, a court is required to undertake consideration of the matters in s 79(4) including by reference to s 79(4)(e) the matters in s 75(2) so far as they are relevant. However consideration of such matters may be brief and if it is established that “it seems likely to the Court that … the applicant …will be likely [to] receive by way of property settlement a sum sufficient to cover the advance, that would seem to be sufficient to enable the order to be made”: (citations omitted).

138.The legislation does not prescribe what the Full Court in Zschokke at 83,218 described as “preconditions” and nor would we seek to exhaustively prescribe matters that may be relevant to take into account in the exercise of the discretion under s 80(1)(h) of the Act. As to the three “criteria” identified by the Full Court in Zschokke, we accept that an inability on the part of an applicant for an interim property order to defray the costs of litigation to meet his or her litigation costs would be a relevant matter to take into account at the procedural or first stage…

139.We also emphasise that in order to establish an appropriate case for an interim property settlement order more is required than the mere fact that upon a final hearing the applicant would receive the property being sought (or an amount in excess of the funds being sought) from the other party.

27Thackray J, in his separate judgment in Strahan & Strahan, at [224] and [225] said:

224.In every defended case one of the parties will claim they are entitled to a payment or transfer of property from the other party. In many cases the other party will acknowledge they are likely to be ordered to transfer property or make a payment. That, however, could not of itself be sufficient to make it appropriate for the Court to make an interim order. Circumstances may change radically during the course of proceedings, as has been seen with recent severe fluctuations in the market. The personal circumstances of the parties may change dramatically. Furthermore, although a party may anticipate ultimately being ordered to transfer property or make a payment, they may legitimately expect to obtain an order for costs against the other party which will be satisfied from funds or property that would otherwise have been transferred.

225.These sorts of considerations provide a strong basis upon which the Court should maintain its traditional stance that there should ordinarily be only one hearing of disputes concerning alteration of property issues. I accept the submissions of senior counsel for the wife that something out of the usual course would need to be established before the Court could be expected to devote its resources to resolution of disputes about interim alteration of property interests. However, once the Court has determined that it is appropriate to embark upon the hearing of an interim dispute, it has no alternative other than to exercise (or decline to exercise) the power to make an interim order by application of the relevant provisions of the legislation.

28In relation to the provision of funds to a party to meet litigation costs, in Zschokke & Zschokke[6] the Full Court said that “whether the matter was determined as an interim property settlement order under section 80(1)(h), or as an interim costs (or security for costs) order under section 117(2), or indeed even a maintenance order”, three matters would all be relevant, namely:

a)A position of relative financial strength on the part of the respondent;

b)A capacity on the part of the respondent to meet his or her own litigation costs;

c)An inability on the part of the applicant to meet his or her litigation costs.

[6] Zschokke & Zschokke (1996) FLC 92-693 at 83,217.

29I have already dealt with the parties’ respective financial positions earlier in these reasons. The parties have largely reached agreement in relation to the constitution of their property pool. Some disputes remain, including whether the wife has an entitlement under a family trust arrangement and whether the advances to the wife by her mother were by way of gifts or loans.

30I am satisfied that the wife has an arguable case in relation to financial (and parenting) issues on a final basis. Although the financial proceedings are not complex, both parties agree that the parenting aspects of the case have a degree of complexity, particularly around the issues of family violence, the wife’s mental health and both parties’ psychological functioning. There are also significant factual disputes between the parties, as well as potentially some disclosure and valuation issues to be resolved.

31On the available evidence, the wife has limited assets under her control and limited income from which to service a loan to meet her further litigation costs. The wife’s position is that she is unable to borrow further from her mother.

32I am satisfied that overall, the husband is currently in a significantly stronger financial position, relative to the wife, having regard to the quantum of his savings. On the other hand, on the basis of the available evidence, I am satisfied that the wife has only a very limited capacity to meet her future litigation costs. I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to exercise the power under s 79 and s 80(1)(h) on an interim basis in favour of the wife, notwithstanding that the usual order pursuant to s 79 is a once and for all order made after a final hearing.

33As best I can assess from the parties’ respective documents, the value of the net assets and superannuation entitlements of the parties ranges between approximately $530,000 and $590,000. Of this, a significant proportion - $380,000 - comprises the parties’ superannuation entitlements. The value of the parties’ non superannuation net assets therefore range between $150,000 and $210,000. The wife did not specify the final orders sought by her. On the other hand, the husband sought orders that, on his figures, amounted to approximately a 94 per cent division of the total property in his favour.

34The parties agree that the value of the property introduced by the husband at the commencement of their relationship was significantly greater than that of the wife. During and after the relationship the husband was the primary financial provider for the family, and the wife was the primary homemaker and parent to Child A. The tenor of the husband’s case appears to be that the wife made little, if any, direct or indirect financial contributions during the relationship, that her homemaker and parenting contributions should be given little weight, and that little, if any, adjustment should be made for s 75(2) factors. On the other hand, given that the wife was not explicit about the final orders she sought, it was difficult to have any great understanding of the wife’s case. Nevertheless, the wife appeared to maintain that she had made a significant contribution, including by her homemaker and parenting role, and that s 75(2) factors significantly weighed in her favour.

35The assessment of s 75(2) issues is not straightforward, particularly given the ongoing disputes surrounding the child’s future care arrangements. The husband is much older than the wife and his career as an logistics specialist has been severely disrupted by the pandemic. However he has been able to obtain employment in another field (albeit not as well paid). On the other hand, as compared with the husband, the wife still has a very long working life ahead of her. However, she has a much lower income earning capacity than that of the husband.

36On the facts currently presented to me and assessing as best I am able the relevant factors, I consider the wife will likely receive by way of property settlement, approximately 20 per cent to 25 per cent of the parties’ property. I stress that this assessment is only for the purpose of this application and in no way pre-determines the final outcome of the financial proceedings.

37The wife seeks the sum of between $89,000 and $131,000 to meet her ongoing litigation costs. I am not persuaded that the quantum sought by the wife is appropriate, particularly having regard to the fact that the parties’ superannuation entitlements comprise a substantial component of the parties’ total property pool. Even a payment of $89,000 to the wife would amount to her receiving approximately 15 to 16 per cent[7] of the total net assets and superannuation as a cash payment and over 40 per cent of the parties’ non superannuation net assets.

[7] Based on the range of values referred to in paragraph 33 of these reasons.

38The husband’s counsel conceded that if the court was minded to make an interim property settlement payment, then it should be limited to a range of between 5 to 10 per cent. On the husband’s case, this amounted to a payment of between $26,500 and $53,000. I am satisfied that the amount of $40,000 is appropriate, and will enable the wife to continue to fund her reasonable litigation costs for the purposes of attending the conciliation conference and Legal Aid ADR, as well as preparing for trial if necessary (and calculated at the lower level assessed by her solicitor in the costs notification letter).[8] This is notwithstanding that given the wife’s expenditure on her litigation costs to date, I am satisfied that there will be no “asset” remaining from the funds provided to the wife from which an adjustment could be made. Nevertheless I am satisfied that the amount of $40,000 is within the range of her likely entitlements on a final basis and that there will remain sufficient other assets / superannuation entitlements with which to make any necessary adjustments to both parties on a final basis.

[8] Based on the range of estimated costs referred to in paragraph 20 of these reasons.

39In the alternative, the wife also sought that the court make orders in the nature of a “dollar for dollar order” in relation to her anticipated litigation costs. The court has power to make a “dollar for dollar” order pursuant to s117 of the Act.[9] The making of a dollar for dollar order is discretionary and usually made only as an order of last resort. Examples of circumstances which may attract the exercise of the discretion include where: (1) the party who apparently controls significant financial purse strings pleads impecuniosity; and (2) the financially disadvantaged party cannot point to any particular fund or asset that might be available to help assist that party fund their litigation; but (3) the financially advantaged party seems to be able to fund their litigation through personal exertion income or structures that they directly or indirectly control.[10] Once the relevant matters in s 117(2A) have been considered, then the overriding question is whether or not there are circumstances that justify making a costs order which is just in the circumstances of a particular case.[11]

[9] For example: refer to Farnell and Farnell (1996) FLC 92-681; G and T (2004) FLC 93-176; Iphostrou & Iphostrou and Ors [2011] FamCA 20; Atkins & Hunt and Ors [2018] FamCA 14.

[10] Atkins & Hunt and Ors [2018] FamCA 14, [46].

[11] Atkins & Hunt and Ors [2018] FamCA 14, [47].

40On the evidence currently before the court, I am not persuaded that there are circumstances that justify the court departing from the usual rule pursuant to s 117(1) to make an interim costs order in favour of the wife, in circumstances where: (1) provision has now been made for the wife to receive a lump sum payment by way of an interim property settlement order, sufficient to meet her estimated future litigation costs up to the trial; and (2) there are significant question marks around the reasonableness and proportionality of the litigation costs incurred by the parties to date, having regard to the issues in dispute between them.

Payment of loans secured over the Eastern States properties

41Although the wife sought an interim order that the husband pay any arrears in relation to the loans secured over the [Eastern States] properties, together with all instalments, as and when they fell due, the issue was largely ignored by the parties’ counsel during the interim hearing. I am not persuaded that it is appropriate to make an order on an interim basis, in circumstances where: (1) the husband’s evidence was that he has voluntarily been making all the re-payments, apart from the period in 2020 when the repayments were suspended; and (2) I am not persuaded on the available evidence that the husband should be solely responsible for the payment of the arrears, given the impact of the pandemic on his financial circumstances in 2020. I consider that the issue of the arrears, if not resolved in the meantime, is more appropriately dealt with at trial.

Proposed orders:

42I intend to make the following orders:

1.Pursuant to s 79 and s 80(1)(h) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), within 14 days of the date of these orders, the husband pay to the wife the sum of $40,000.

2.All interim proceedings be otherwise dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Family Court of Western Australia.

KV

Associate

23 NOVEMBER 2020