| [2025] FWCFB 216 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.604—Appeal of decision
Rhylie De Graaff
v
Uconnex Pty Ltd
(C2025/8435)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT COLMAN | MELBOURNE, 24 SEPTEMBER 2025 |
Appeal against decision on transcript of Deputy President Bell at Melbourne on 21 August 2025 in matter number C2025/5072 – permission to appeal refused
Rhylie De Graaff has lodged an appeal under s 604 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Act) against a decision of Deputy President Bell made on transcript on 21 August 2025 in which the Deputy President dismissed Mr De Graaff’s application under s 365 after concluding that he had not been dismissed by the respondent, Uconnex Pty Ltd. The matter was listed before us for permission to appeal only. The parties consented to the Full Bench determining the matter without holding a hearing, and we are satisfied that it can be adequately determined without the parties making oral submissions (see s 607(1) of the Act).
Section 365 states that if a person has been dismissed and alleges that the dismissal contravened Part 3-1, the person may apply to the Commission to deal with the dispute. The respondent objected to the application on the ground that Mr De Graaff was not dismissed but had instead voluntarily resigned after three months of employment. In his decision, the Deputy President read out s 386 of the Act, which defines when a person has been ‘dismissed’, and cited Mr De Graaff’s resignation letter of 30 May 2025. The Deputy President noted Mr De Graaff’s contention that his employment had become untenable because of a pattern of conduct by the respondent, which was said to include its failure to address his concerns about the impact of the working environment on his physical and mental health, and numerous other matters. The Deputy President concluded that he was not satisfied that Mr De Graaff’s evidence rose to a level that demonstrated that he had been forced to resign. In particular, the Deputy President did not consider that Mr De Graaff was publicly blamed for systemic problems outside his control, that there was any threat or action by the respondent that gave him no choice but to resign, or that he was directed to participate in discriminatory practices. The Deputy President further found that there was insufficient evidence of alleged award breaches. The Deputy President accepted that Mr De Graaff had been labouring under significant mental health challenges but that these were not caused by the employer. The Deputy President concluded that Mr De Graaff was not dismissed within the meaning of s 386 and dismissed his s 365 application.
Permission to appeal
An appeal may only be brought with the permission of the Commission under s 604(1). Section 604(2) provides that the Commission must grant permission to appeal if it is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so. Consideration of the public interest involves a broad value judgment (Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty…
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- Case
- [2025] FWCFB 216
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Full Bench found that none of the appeal grounds presented an arguable case of appealable error. Mr De Graaff's first ground, concerning the application of section 386 to his general protections claim, was dismissed as the definition of 'dismissed' in section 386 does indeed apply to section 365 claims. The second ground, which argued for a reverse onus in section 365 applications, was also rejected as the reverse onus applies only to the prohibited reason for adverse action, not to whether such action occurred. The Full Bench noted that the Deputy President was correct to focus on whether Mr De Graaff had been dismissed, as this was the threshold issue raised by the respondent's objection. The fourth ground, regarding procedural fairness and the application of an 'unfair dismissal' framework, was dismissed as there was no evidence of a denial of procedural fairness. Finally, the fifth ground, which claimed that the Deputy President failed to engage with Mr De Graaff's evidence, was rejected as the Full Bench found that the Deputy President had indeed considered the evidence in question.
The Full Bench concluded that the appeal grounds did not disclose an arguable case of appealable error and that the Deputy President's decision was orthodox and appropriately assessed the case. As such, the Full Bench refused permission to appeal, finding that it was neither in the public interest nor appropriate to grant permission on general discretionary grounds. The decision was made without a hearing, based on the parties' consent and the Full Bench's assessment of the appeal grounds.
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