Reynolds v Chief Executive, Department of Lands
[1996] QLC 114
•28 August 1996
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ROCKHAMPTON
28 AUGUST 1996
In the matter of an appeal against a valuation
Valuation of Land Act 1944
Shire of Livingstone (V96-70)
Rodney James Reynolds
v.
Chief Executive, Department of Lands
(Hearing at Rockhampton)
D E C I S I O N
Mr RJ Reynolds is the owner of land described as Lot 97 on Registered Pan LN590, Parish of Jardine, County of Livingstone. As at 1 January 1995 that land was valued by the respondent with Lot 2 on RP 609416 Parish of Jardine, a total area at that time of 385.3 hectares, at $63,000. As a result of a change of ownership, Lot 97 was required to be valued as a separate parcel and an interim valuation was issued on 20 September 1995 for $56,000. An objection by the owner resulted in the valuation being reduced to $47,500. Mr Reynolds then appealed to the Land Court against the respondent's decision on his objection, advising that his estimate of the unimproved value is $29,500.
The subject land is situated approximately 10 kilometres north-east of Yaamba, with bitumen sealed road to within a few kilometres and thence a formed gravel road to the boundary, with the exception of a few strips of bitumen road. Electricity and telephone services are available to the property, which is zoned “Rural A” under the town planning scheme for the Shire of Livingstone. The land is used for cattle breeding and fattening.
At the hearing Mr Rodney James Reynolds gave evidence on his own behalf, while evidence for the respondent was given by Mr DW Drew, a registered valuer employed by the Department of Natural Resources. Mr Drew described the land as comprising 80 hectares (25%) of brigalow belah scrub and 240 hectares (75%) of flooded blue gum grazing flats. The 80 hectares of scrub is above flood level, while the balance is flooded to varying degrees. Mr Reynolds presented a statement which challenged the carrying capacity and compared the valuation with those applied to neighbouring properties.
He endeavoured to compare the valuation of his property with those that have been applied to three other properties. The first comparison was with the valuation applied to Lot 5 on Plan LN590, area 333.833 ha, owned by Mr John Pratt. Mr Reynolds’ description of that land was somewhat similar to the subject land, with perhaps a greater percentage of scrub. It transpired that the respondent had valued the scrub at $258 per hectare and the flooded country at $148 per hectare.
Mr Drew explained that the respondent’s valuation after objection, had applied $245 per hectare to the scrub and $116 per hectare to the flooded country. There does not seem to be too much inconsistency in that comparison and if there is any it seems to favour of the flooded country on the subject land. Therefore, I found that comparison to be of no assistance to Mr Reynolds’ case.
The second comparison used by Mr Reynolds was the valuation applied to Lot 74 on Plan LN439, owned by Mr Dan Keleher, with an area of 129.224 hectares. Mr Reynolds said that land was valued by the respondent at $6,800, as at the relevant date. He thought that about three quarters of that land consisted of flooded country, with an unimproved value of $12 per hectare. The balance was scrub land, but he was uncertain as to the valuation of that land.
Mr Drew gave his evidence that he considered that the valuation of Keleher's property was totally wrong. An area of some 100 hectares which had been classified as salt affected was not correct. Mr Drew thought that a much smaller area was affected. The balance area was low-lying country, but in his opinion could not be regarded as salt affected. He considered that the valuation should be altered and that any comparison with that valuation should not be taken into account. I agree with that reasoning. If the valuation is wrong, it is the respondent's duty to alter that valuation and should be undertaken as early as possible. However, for the purpose of determining the unimproved value in this case, the comparison was of no assistance.
The third comparison made by Mr Reynolds was with Lot 77 on Plan LN535, a property held by a Mr Hinze, of 301.617 hectares. Mr Reynolds did not know much about that property, but he thought that the flooded country had been valued between $79 and $140 per hectare. Mr Drew gave evidence that Mr Hinze held a much greater area of land and that Mr Reynolds' comparison had no validity. Therefore, I gained no assistance from the comparison of the valuations of the properties referred to by Mr Reynolds.
Mr Drew gave evidence that in arriving at the interim valuation of the subject land, he relied on the relativity of valuations applied to other properties, supported by a sale. Usually, a valuation should be made on the basis of sales of comparable land. (See the decision of the Land Appeal Court in Grahn v. Valuer-General (1992) 14 QLCR 327, and the cases cited therein). Relativity plays a secondary role to sales evidence. However, where an interim valuation has to be made relativity can assume somewhat greater importance.
Under the provisions of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 the valuations of surrounding properties are presumed to be correct until proved otherwise. When a valuer is called upon to make an interim valuation, his primary task as I see it, is to accord the “split” valuation with the relativity that “fits in” with the level of values applied to all properties in that area. In other words, relativity becomes a primary consideration in making the “split” valuation. However, if the valuations are proved to be incorrect, then the interim valuation is also wrong.
That seemed to be the approach adopted by Mr Drew. He endeavoured to justify the valuation that had been applied to the subject land by referring to a sale comprising Lot 1 on Plan LN1794 and Special Lease 35/37058, over part of State Forest Lot 794 on Plan FTY1291, part of Reserve 794, Parish of Canoona, with an area of 3,243 hectares. That property sold on 27 April 1993 for $590,000, or about $182 per hectare. Mr Drew analysed that sale to show $244,319, or about $75 per hectare. Mr Drew reasoned that as the existing unimproved value on that land was $207,500, or about $64 per hectare, the sale supported the valuation that had been applied.
There is no point in discussing the description of that country, which is dissimilar to the subject land. The reasoning adopted by Mr Drew was that that sale supported the valuation applied to that property and the valuations applied to properties in the immediate area. That is the basis on which I accept that sale. Mr Drew said that the valuations in that area of Livingstone Shire had not been altered since 1989. He relied on the relativity of values that had been applied to blocks adjoining the subject land and in that regard his evidence was not shaken by the evidence given by Mr Reynolds, or in cross-examination. He referred to a number of properties that were of assistance to him in demonstrating that the relativity of the subject valuation was correct.
In the course of his evidence, Mr Reynolds raised a number of valid points about the carrying capacity of both the scrub country and the flooded country and I accept his estimate of carrying capacity. Mr Reynolds has owned the properties for some considerable time and would know better than a valuer who spends only a short time on the property the carrying capacities for various types of country. Mr Reynolds' carrying capacities are more likely to be correct than those assessed by Mr Drew.
However, that does not affect the outcome of this appeal because Mr Drew explained that regardless of whether the carrying capacities were correct or not, the areas of various types of country were valued in the same manner as other similar properties had been valued. Therefore if the carrying capacities were wrong in respect of one parcel of land, they were wrong in respect of others. The per hectare values that were applied were more important and they had been applied relatively throughout the area. A comparison of the relative merits of land per hectare would be the better approach in such circumstances.
Mr O'Connor, counsel for the respondent, submitted that the respondent's valuation should remain unaltered because of the statutory presumption of correctness. This matter was dealt with by Gibbs J (as he then was) in the case of Brisbane City Council v. Valuer-General (1978) 140 CLR at pp.56-57. In that case His Honour was dealing with what was then s.13(7) of the Valuation of Land Act which provided for the statutory presumption of correctness. His Honour held that statutory presumption can be rebutted if it were shown that the Valuer-General acted upon a wrong principle, or made a serious error of fact. At page 57 His Honour went on to explain that the presumption can also be rebutted
if the valuation was made by a method fundamentally erroneous.
In this regard I find that the valuation has not been made by a method fundamentally erroneous, there has been no wrong principle adopted and, although there may have been an error with regard to carrying capacities, there is no serious error of fact, because the values attributed to various types of country appear to be relative.
There was another issue which arose but which I had no real evidence before me and that was with regard to the areas of the various types of country. Mr Drew in his assessment has classified the country and the subject land as containing 80 hectares of scrub and 240.58 hectares of forest grazing. To those areas he attributed $245 per hectare to the scrub and $116 per hectare to the forest grazing, which is the flooded country.
Mr Reynolds said that he had the areas surveyed by a surveyor but he could not remember what those various areas were. However, in his appeal to the Court he stated as a ground of appeal "Current break-up of country shows 240 hectares flood country plus 80 hectares scrub. Surveyed by surveyor shows 247 hectares flood country with 73 hectares scrub country."
Even if those figures were adopted and applying Mr Drew's rates per hectare, on my calculations the result arrived at comes to $46,537. I have no evidence to indicate that those were the surveyed areas and I cannot find that there has been a serious error of fact. Therefore I find that the statutory presumption contained within the provisions of the Valuation of Land Act has not been successfully rebutted and the appeal should be dismissed.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the unimproved value of the subject land determined by the respondent is affirmed.
PRESIDENT OF THE LAND COURT
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