Reynes & Dionett
[2024] FedCFamC1F 174
•13 March 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Reynes & Dionett [2024] FedCFamC1F 174
File number(s): SYC 1686 of 2012 Judgment of: ALTOBELLI J Date of judgment: 13 March 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE – CHILD SUPPORT DEPARTURE – The wife seeks an increase in spousal maintenance – Where it has been 13 years since separation – The wife has long standing health issues – The husband seeks that his child support arrears be waived – The wife seeks that the administrative assessment for her to pay child support be reduced to nil – It is ordered that the husband is to pay the wife $695 per week for spousal maintenance for a period of five years – The Court declines to make any orders in relation to a child support departure. Legislation: Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) ss 116, 117
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 72, 74, 75
Cases cited: Hall v Hall (2016) 257 CLR 490; [2016] HCA 23
MS & PS (2006) FLC 93-268; [2006] FamCA 588;
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 47 Date of last submission/s: 12 March 2024 Date of hearing: 11–12 March 2024 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Dalrymple Solicitor for the Applicant: Kamara Lawyers & Advisors Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Alexander Solicitor for the Respondent: Legal Aid NSW Child Support (Parramatta) Family Law ORDERS
SYC 1686 of 2012 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR DIONETT
Applicant
AND: MS REYNES
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ALTOBELLI J
DATE OF ORDER:
13 MARCH 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.All previous orders in this matter for spousal maintenance and child support (including any stay order preventing collection of the Applicant’s child support arrears) are discharged.
2.Pursuant to s 83 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the spousal maintenance order made on 7 September 2017 be varied such that the Applicant pays to the Respondent the sum of $695 weekly, commencing as at the date of these orders and continuing for a period of five years.
3.The spousal maintenance order above be varied each year in accordance with upward variations in the consumer price index published by the Commonwealth statistician for all groups Sydney with a base date being the index applicable at the date of this order.
4.The order for spousal maintenance will cease upon the Respondent resuming full-time paid employment, should that occur before the fifth anniversary of the making of these orders.
5.All other applications of the Applicant and Respondent are dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Reynes & Dionett has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
EX-TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALTOBELLI J:
INTRODUCTION
I have made orders today following the hearing that occurred on Monday and Tuesday of this week. The case was about spousal maintenance and child support.
BACKGROUND
This is a 2012 file and the Application that I am asked to determine was filed on 5 September 2017. Despite the inexplicable antiquity of this matter, on Monday morning I was asked to adjourn the case. I declined. It was neither in the interests of the parties nor in the public interest for this long running matter not to be heard and finalised. I did stand the matter down for a few hours. Both parties were competently represented by solicitor and counsel albeit, it would seem, counsel who came into the matter on short notice. In the applicant’s (“the applicant”) case, some of his material had been prepared whilst he was representing himself. By the time of closing submissions, both counsel had acknowledged to the Court that in some respects the evidence was incomplete and that the Court would simply have to do the best it can.
The applicant is 60 years old and describes himself as a manager. The respondent (“the respondent”) is 53 years old and describes herself as unemployed. They commenced their relationship in 1989, cohabited from 1990, married in 2001, and separated on a final basis in 2011. They have one daughter, C (“the child”), who is 15 years old and who presently lives with the applicant. This arrangement commenced in about 2022, but before then, the respondent was the primary carer of the child.
The respondent is unemployed. She does not have permanent residence in Australia. She is not entitled to Centrelink benefits. Her only source of income is rental that she receives from a property in the United Kingdom and $200 per week from spousal maintenance currently paid by the applicant.
It is clear that the respondent has struggled with her health, insecure accommodation and simply making ends meet. The applicant has been diligent in paying spousal maintenance as ordered. The first such order was made on 11 August 2014, when he was required to pay spousal maintenance of $870 per week. This was part of final orders altering property interests. On 7 September 2017, the spousal maintenance was reduced to $200 per week.
Whilst the child lived with the respondent, the applicant was assessed to pay child support. By way of Court order made 27 August 2015, this was stayed. Considerable arrears have accrued. The applicant seeks that those arrears be waived.
COMPETING PROPOSALS
The applicant sought orders in accordance with his Amended Application filed 5 September 2017. He sought a departure from the administrative assessment that he be required to pay child support for the child in respect of the period from 11 August 2014 to the date of these orders and that the assessment be reduced to nil. He opposes the orders sought by the respondent.
The respondent sought orders in accordance with her Further Amended Response filed 25 January 2024. By the time of closing submissions, her counsel explained that she sought spousal maintenance for a period of five years in the sum of about $800 per week with the amount to be reviewed annually in accordance with the consumer price index. This was by way of application to vary the current spousal maintenance order under s 83 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). The respondent also sought a departure in relation to the administrative assessment for her to pay child support in relation to the child. The respondent opposed the applicant’s orders. She did not, however, press an order that all previous costs orders made against her be discharged. Not pressing this order was the appropriate thing to do in the circumstances.
APPLICABLE LAW
Spousal maintenance
Spousal maintenance is governed by s 72 of the Act. In Hall v Hall (2016) 257 CLR 490 at [3], the High Court described the “gateway” requirement for the consideration of a spousal maintenance application pursuant to s 74 of the Act. The gateway requirement is set out in s 72(1) of the Act, which provides:
72 Right of spouse to maintenance
(1)A party to a marriage is liable to maintain the other party, to the extent that the first-mentioned party is reasonably able to do so, if, and only if, that other party is unable to support herself or himself adequately whether:
(a)by reason of having the care and control of a child of the marriage who has not attained the age of 18 years;
(b)by reason of age or physical or mental incapacity for appropriate gainful employment; or
(c)for any other adequate reason.
having regard to any relevant matter referred to in subsection 75(2).
As noted by the High Court in Hall v Hall, the applicant carries the onus of satisfying the Court on the balance of probabilities that she has satisfied the gateway requirement of s 72(1) of the Act.
In MS v PS (2006) FLC 93-268, Coleman J explained at [39] that in determining whether to make an order for spousal maintenance, the Court should follow a four-step process, as follows:
(1)Can the applicant support themselves adequately?
(2)If not, what are the applicant’s reasonable needs?
(3)What capacity does the respondent have to meet those needs?
(4)What order is reasonable, having regard to s 75(2) of the Act?
Child support departure applications
An application may be brought pursuant to s 116 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) (“the Assessment Act”) by a carer entitled to child support under special circumstances. Section 116 provides as follows:
Application for order under Division
(1)A liable parent or a carer entitled to child support may, in respect of an administrative assessment of child support for a child, apply to a court having jurisdiction under this Act for an order under this Division in relation to the child in the special circumstances of the case if:
(b)both of the following apply:
(i)the liable parent or carer entitled to child support is a party to an application pending in a court having jurisdiction under this Act;
(ii)the court is satisfied that it would be in the interest of the liable parent and the carer entitled to child support for the court to consider whether an order should be made under this Division in relation to the child in the special circumstances of the case; or
…
Section 117 of the Assessment Act provides matters to which a Court must be satisfied before making a child support departure order. Subsection (1) provides:
Court may make departure order
(1) Where:
(a)application is made to a court having jurisdiction under this Act for an order under this Division in relation to a child in the special circumstances of the case; and
(b) the court is satisfied:
(i)that one or more of the grounds for departure mentioned in subsection (2) exists or exist; and
(ii) that it would be:
(A)just and equitable as regards the child, the carer entitled to child support and the liable parent; and
(B) otherwise proper;
to make a particular order under this Division;
the court may make the order.
THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
The Court acknowledges that these proceedings must have been difficult for both the applicant and the respondent. Their emotion was palpable in its presence. The applicant was understandably focussed on ending, if at all possible, his financial relationship with the respondent. After all, they have been separated for almost 13 years and he has re-partnered as well as moved on with his life both financially and economically.
The respondent was also understandably focussed, but on a different thing. For her, it was financial survival. In closing submissions, her counsel referred to the respondent as living a desperate life financially. As it turns out, the fact of this is undisputable. In circumstances where there was no social security safety net for her in Australia, the application of the relevant provisions of the Act meant that the Court had to decide the extent to which, if at all, the applicant was to pay spousal maintenance and for what period of time.
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT
In support of his case, the applicant relied on the following documents:
(1)Amended Initiating Application filed 5 September 2017;
(2)His affidavit filed 4 March 2024;
(3)Financial statement filed 4 March 2024;
(4)Case outline filed 11 March 2024; and
(5)Document tendered during the proceedings and marked Exhibit A1.
In support of her case, the respondent relied on the following documents:
(1)Further Amended Response filed 24 January 2024;
(2)Her affidavit filed 9 February 2024;
(3)Financial statement filed 9 February 2024;
(4)Expert report of Dr W filed 10 October 2023;
(5)Case outline filed 4 March 2024; and
(6)Various documents tendered during the proceedings and marked Exhibits R1–R8.
SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE
Whether the respondent is in need of spousal maintenance
A number of issues presented. The first issue is whether the respondent is in need of spousal maintenance. The medical evidence from Dr W, Professor X and Ms Y all establish that the respondent suffers from a medical condition and major depression and is unlikely to be able to work in any form of gainful employment. This evidence indicates that it is an ongoing condition. There is nothing in the evidence before the Court to suggest that this will change. In particular, in circumstances where she seeks spousal maintenance for five years, there is nothing before this Court to suggest that her need for maintenance will change in that time.
The issue put in contention by the applicant is the quantum of the maintenance to be paid and the period in respect of which it should be paid. The applicant conceded that he had the capacity to continue to pay $200 per week until such time as he retired which he expected would be when he turns 67. He is currently 60 years of age.
The Court heard evidence about activities conducted by the respondent such as volunteering and baking which, according to the applicant, was indicative of an earning capacity. The respondent explained away these activities as pastimes which neither generated income nor caused her to incur significant expense. The Court accepts that some of the respondent’s activities, whether she considers them as pastimes or otherwise, might be capable of generating income, but there was no suggestion that actual income was earned or that this income would be substantial or, quite frankly, that it would make any significant difference to her financial need. Even if she was generating a modest income from these pastimes (an unlikely scenario on the evidence), it would not make a difference. I must state my concern that the applicant’s case was run on the basis of evidence about baking, Australian Business Numbers and social media messages. One wonders whether this litigation could have been curtailed if a more clear-sighted and robust view had been adopted about this issue.
The quantum of need
The second issue is how much maintenance. The quantum of the maintenance to be paid is highly problematic in this case. The respondent’s evidence about her expenditure was vague and unspecific. On the one hand, her sworn Financial Statement filed 9 February 2024 discloses personal expenditure at item 33 of $112, further average weekly expenses at item 60 of $67 which is attributable to the child, and her personal weekly needs being $187. This total is $366 weekly.
The same document discloses weekly income of $372 which prima facie establishes that the respondent is not in need of further maintenance beyond the $200 per week already paid, but this evidence is problematic for many reasons. In her Financial Statement, she does not disclose expenditure on food or household supplies, or clothing and shoes, or medical and dental expenses etc. This is unhelpful. Equally unhelpful is paragraph 108 of the respondent’s affidavit where she sets out an estimate of her reasonable and necessary personal expenses, but this evidence totals $2,411 weekly. With the greatest of respect to whoever drafted this document, it was a fanciful wish list lacking any discernible rationale. It would have been far more helpful to the Court for this information to have been contained in the Financial Statement, but with some differentiation between expenses currently incurred and expenses that could reasonably be incurred if spousal maintenance were paid. On a related issue, once again, the Court wonders what possible difference a more accurate, reasonable, and realistic case of need would have made to this litigation.
Doing the best the Court can, it will assume that paragraph 108 above represents her contention about prospective reasonable personal living expenses should an order for spousal maintenance be made.
Mr Alexander, who represented the respondent, acknowledged that the respondent’s evidence at paragraph 108 represented a wish list. He made submissions about what the Court would accept to be reasonable, prospective expenditure of the respondent subject to the Court finding that the applicant had capacity to pay. The Court has considered those submissions but makes the following findings as to reasonable prospective expenditure based on the following factors – her own evidence about reasonable living expenses, the applicant’s evidence about reasonable living expenses and the Court’s pragmatic assessment:
·For food, $200 per week, noting that this is the amount that the Court will allow the applicant. The Court strongly rejects counsel for the applicant’s submission that the reasonable expenses of both parties should be treated differently because of their different situations. For example, that he is working and she is not. The present focus is reasonable prospective expenditure;
·Household supplies would be found at $50 per week, noting that the applicant is allowed $50;
·Gas at $5 per week and the same allowed the applicant;
·Electricity at $30 per week and the same allowed the applicant;
·Internet $9 per week as per the applicant;
·No expenses are allowed in relation to a motor vehicle as the respondent has not made out a case for need in that regard;
·Clothing and shoes, $50 per week, and the same allowed the applicant;
·Children’s activities, $50 per week, and the same allowed the applicant;
·Medical and dental at $40 per week, noting that the applicant is allowed $46 per week;
·Entertainment and hobbies, $50 per week, and the same as the applicant;
·Holidays, $50 per week;
·No allowance is made for travel to the United Kingdom;
·$40 per week for pharmaceutical;
·No allowance for cleaning;
·$15 per week for furnishing and appliances;
·$10 per week for books and magazines;
·$40 for pet supplies;
·Rent is allowed at $600 per week, noting that the applicant pays $887 per week as his share of weekly rental of $1,200 but which, of course, accommodates the child;
·Health insurance, $55 per week, noting that the applicant is allowed $88; and
·Home contents insurance, $20 per week.
This amounts to $1,264 per week, which would then be entered into item 32 on her Financial Statement. The only Part G expenses that would be added to this is income tax of $50 per week. This is because rental is already accounted for and the reality that the respondent is not paying child support for the child. This takes the total weekly expenditure to $1,316 weekly.
Capacity to pay
The next issue is the applicant’s capacity to pay. Having regard to the evidence of the applicant consisting of his affidavit and Financial Statement as well as his cross-examination, the following findings can be made. His actual income is more likely to be consistent with the child support assessment income of $230,740. The difference between that which the applicant deposes to in his Financial Statement and this amount is largely represented by annual bonuses that he receives. The Court accepts that these bonuses are discretionary both as to whether they are received and in relation to the quantum, but there is no material before the Court which cast doubt on whether the applicant is likely to receive such bonuses in future. For all practical purposes associated with the present application, therefore, his weekly income will be treated as $4,437 before tax.
The focus turns to the applicant’s expenses. If his income is higher than he deposed to, as the Court finds, it must follow that his taxation at item 19 is also higher, but the Court was not provided with a specific figure. The applicant did agree in cross-examination, however, that his net income appeared to have increased by about $240 per week. Given that his gross income had increased by $356 per week, the difference would be attributable to taxation which is about $116 per week and, thus, the item 19 amount should be increased to $1,464 per week.
There was a challenge to the reasonableness of the item 28 expenditure of $199 per week to Volkswagen Financial Services for a motor vehicle driven by the applicant’s wife. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that in the circumstances of this case, it was inappropriate for the applicant to prioritise that expense over his obligation to maintain the respondent. It is unclear to the Court why the applicant’s wife could not contribute more towards the cost of the motor vehicle that she drives. The applicant’s evidence is that she earns $1,225 per week and pays expenses totalling $517 per week towards the household expenses, but that leaves a surplus of $708 weekly. She has ample capacity to pay for her own vehicle in the circumstances of this case. Expenditure of $199 per week at item 28 will not be allowed as reasonable.
The applicant was challenged on his weekly credit card payments at item 30. The Court accepts his evidence in this regard that his weekly payment is about four times more than the minimum amount. He does dispose substantial balances at item 51.
The inability of the applicant to explain the payment of $88 per week as maintenance or child support for the child leads the Court to conclude that this alleged payment is a mistake and, thus, for the purposes of item 31, $88 will be disallowed.
The applicant was challenged about a number of his Part N expenses at item 60 of his Financial Statement. The Court accepts his evidence about how much of his weekly expenditure is attributed to the child as opposed to himself. The Court accepts this evidence about how much of his weekly expenses is attributable to him as opposed to other members of his family on the basis that his wife also contributes to the household income and expenses. The only issue for the Court is about the reasonableness of the expenses claimed by the applicant for himself.
Having regard to his duty to maintain the respondent, the Court finds that his reasonable expenses for food should be reduced from $240 per week to $200 per week, household supplies from $76 to $50 per week; clothing and shoes from $70 to $50 per week, holidays from $140 to $50 per week. This means that the allowable expenditure for the applicant at item 60 is reduced to $830 per week. When this figure is transposed to item 32, it reduces it from $1,375 per week to $850 per week. As item 19 has been increased to $1,464 per week, item 28 reduced by $199 per week, item 31 relating to his daughter reduced by $88, this means that the item 33 total allowable expenditure for the applicant becomes $3,942 per week.
The capacity to pay of the applicant thus becomes the difference between his total weekly income of $4,437 weekly, and his permissible weekly expenses, $3,940 per week. Namely, $495 per week. This represents his capacity to pay additional maintenance given that his expenses already include $200 weekly for maintenance.
A number of observations need to be made about s 75(2) of the Act. The applicant’s health is much stronger than that of the respondent even though he is older than her. He has significantly greater income, property and financial resources compared to the respondent even though she does have an interest in property in the United Kingdom, which is co-owned with her stepfather with whom she does not enjoy a good relationship. In addition, she has superannuation. She derives income by way of rental from that property in the United Kingdom. The applicant currently has the responsibility to care for the child, but he is in a much better financial position to do so than the respondent, and she is paying child support as assessed or not, as the case may be.
His commitment to do so has been considered by the Court. The Court has found that pursuant to s 72 of the Act, the applicant is liable to maintain the respondent because of her physical and mental incapacity for appropriate gainful employment. The respondent is not entitled to a pension, allowance or benefit. The applicant has re-partnered and, thus, the financial circumstances relating to his relationship with his wife have also been taken into account. The Court has also considered the terms of the property settlement orders made in relation to the parties and how in a practical sense that provides little assistance to the respondent other than through the receipt of rental income. The respective child support assessments in this matter have been taken into account.
It will be seen, therefore, that there is little scope in this decision for the application of personal value judgments in deciding this case. All of the values that have been applied are statutory values. The respondent’s application was based on s 83 of the Act. Under subsection (2), the Court cannot increase the existing spousal maintenance order unless it is satisfied about a number of things. The Court is satisfied that the circumstances of the respondent have deteriorated rather than stabilised particularly as a result of her ill health. The financial circumstances of the applicant have changed such that his financial situation is much improved. In any event, the current order of $200 per week is no longer proper or adequate on the evidence before the Court.
CHILD SUPPORT DEPARTURE
In the applicant’s Amended Application filed 5 September 2017, he seeks a departure order under s 117 of the Assessment Act to the effect that the administrative assessment for him to pay child support for the child for the period 11 August 2014 to date is reduced to nil.
In his affidavit, his argument seems to be that the arrears of child support was the result of the respondent’s actions which led him to be embroiled in protracted litigation. In particular, the respondent returned to the United Kingdom in 2018 without advising him which led to Hague Convention proceedings. Ultimately, there was an agreement for the child to return to Australia. In addition, he contends that the respondent has failed to pay legal costs pursuant to costs orders made against her.
This latter point can be dealt with briefly. The Court can see no relevance to the departure application of the fact of unpaid legal costs by the respondent pursuant to orders of this Court. The applicant has at all relevant times had remedies in relation to those costs, but the Court infers he has not exercised them because of the futility in attempting to do so.
On the applicant’s evidence on 27 August 2015, this Court made an order staying the operation of the child support assessment pending determination of his departure application at the time. In July 2020, the stay order was varied to allow an assessment to be issued but on the basis that the collection of child support was to be stayed. In January 2021, the applicant was advised that his child support debt was $29,500. By 6 December 2022, as the applicant had continued to pay child support, the arrears had reduced to about $17,500. In fact, by December 2023, the arrears had reduced to just over $10,000. More recently, the respondent sought a change of assessment due to the period between 29 January 2021 and 11 April 2022, when the child was in her care for 100 per cent of the time. This period seems to correlate in part at least with COVID-19. In any event, the agency notified the respondent of an additional $13,585 being due because of this. This has, apparently, increased the current arrears to $29,736.
During the closing submissions, the applicant’s counsel explained that the real basis for the departure order which would have the effect of nullifying the arrears is that the order for spousal maintenance did not contemplate the assessment of child support and the totality of the spousal maintenance and child support burden on the applicant was quite unjust and inequitable. In short, if he had been forced to pay child support, he could not have met his own reasonable needs. The Court does not accept the contention either express or implied in the applicant’s case that when the order for spousal maintenance was made that it did not contemplate child support. In fact, I think that is quite incorrect and the opposite is true.
There is no dispute about the Court having jurisdiction to consider this departure application. The matters as to which the Court must be satisfied before making a departure order are set out at s 117 of the Assessment Act. With the greatest of respect to the applicant, the Court neither read anything nor heard anything which would suggest that there are special circumstances, that any of the grounds of subsection (2) are established, that it would be just and equitable and otherwise proper to make the departure order. The onus of proof was at all times on the applicant and he has failed to discharge the same.
The Court can understand the applicant’s frustration that because of what he considers to be the unilateral acts of the respondent, he was denied time with the child and, moreover, has been assessed to pay child support on the basis that the child was in the respondent’s full-time care. However, the objects of the Child Support Departure Scheme include that the child has their proper needs met from reasonable and adequate shares in the income earning capacity, property and financial resources of both their parents and that the parents shared equitably in the support of their children.
There is simply no evidence before the Court to suggest that either during the period when the respondent was allegedly not facilitating time between the child and the applicant, nor before nor after that, the child was not in need of support and that the applicant enjoyed a greater capacity to meet those needs. The difficulty with the applicant’s case was further illustrated by reference to the very useful table found at paragraph 7 of annexure (a) to the respondent’s case outline filed 4 March 2024. Even if the applicant’s case were taken at its absolute highest, it is clear from this evidence that arrears of child support continued to accrue for several years after the weekly spousal maintenance decreased from $870 per week to eventually $200 per week.
Counsel for the applicant agreed that there was no evidence that would enable the Court to somehow calculate what part of the arrears was attributable to the period during which the applicant contends it was unjust and inequitable for him to pay child support. The applicant’s case fails. Of course, this is a factor that the Court must take into account for the purposes of the spousal maintenance order as the payment of arrears becomes another liability of the applicant. In this regard, however, the Court notes that the applicant has already lodged an objection, as yet undetermined, in relation to the additional $13,585 of child support levied. Nothing in these orders is intended to detract from that objection process.
The liability for child support arrears does not change the Court’s findings in relation to spousal maintenance. At Part 1 of the applicant’s Financial Statement, he deposes to cash savings of about $26,000 which, notwithstanding the other personal liabilities that he refers to, has not been applied towards those liabilities. The applicant, thus, has capacity to pay any child support arrears. Conversely, the receipt by the respondent of child support arrears will also not change the Court’s findings about her need for maintenance. The respondent’s application for child support departure, likewise, fails. As I understood the evidence, she is not paying child support and her arrears have been offset against the applicant’s child support arrears.
To the extent that her case was based on the voluntary payments she makes for the benefit of the child, she should pursue such avenue as may be available under the Child Support Scheme. On the basis of these reasons for judgment, I make the orders that I have made.
I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the ex-tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Altobelli delivered on 13 March 2024. Associate:
Dated: 13 March 2024
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