DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Resimac Asset Finance Pty Limited v Lette & Anor [2025] QDC 98
PARTIES:
RESIMAC ASSET FINANCE PTY LIMITED
(plaintif)
v
DONALD LESLIE LETTE
(first defendant)
DAMIEN THOMAS SHEERIN(second defendant)
FILE NO/S: BD 114/25
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
22 July 2025
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
On the papers – 8 July 2025
JUDGE:
Grigg DCJ
ORDER:
Application dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – SERVICE – IN LIEU OF PERSONAL SERVICE – SUBSTITUTED AND INFORMAL SERVICE – Where there is an application for substituted service– Where the applicant elected to have the application heard on the papers – Whether impracticability of personal service is demonstrated on the evidence
LEGISLATION:
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 ss 104, 105, 106, 112(1),(3), 116, 120, 430(2)
CASES:
Attorney General for Western Australia v Lashansky [2014] WASC 42
Foxe v Brown (1984) 58 ALR 542
Kendell v Sweeney [2002] QSC 404
SOLICITORS: Dentons for the plaintiff
No appearance for the defendantsIntroduction
This is an ex-parte application to dispense with the personal service requirements of rule 105 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR).
The plaintiff commenced proceedings by claim on 20 January 2025 against the first and second defendant for money said to be owed to the plaintiff pursuant to an agreement under which the plaintiff advanced credit to Freightshift Pty Ltd (Credit Agreement). In conjunction with the Credit Agreement, the statement of claim alleges the first and second defendants provided a written guarantee and indemnity of Freightshift Pty Ltd’s obligations under the Credit Agreement. The plaintiff alleges Freightshift Pty Ltd has defaulted under the Credit Agreement by failing to make repayments when due and proceeds against the first and second defendant pursuant to the guarantee and indemnity.
The plaintiff asserts that to date it has not been able to effect personal service of the claim and statement of claim on the first defendant.
Relevant Legislative Requirements
Chapter 4 of the UCPR contains the rules for service. The starting point, where individuals are concerned, is that a person must be personally served.[1] Rule 105 requires that the originating process, the claim, and the statement of claim, be served personally.
[1] UCPR r 104.
Rule 106 sets out how personal service or is performed as follows:
106 How personal service is performed
(1) To serve a document personally, the person serving it must give the document, or a copy of the document, to the person intended to be served.
(2) However, if the person does not accept the document, or copy, the party serving it may serve it by putting it down in the person’s presence and telling him or her what it is.
(3) It is not necessary to show to the…
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- Case
- [2025] QDC 98
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that personal service of the first defendant was impracticable. The affidavit provided by the plaintiff's representative, Mr Torto, included hearsay and did not comply with the requirements of rule 430(2) of the UCPR. The court highlighted that the affidavit did not provide the necessary sources and grounds for Mr Torto's belief that the address provided was the first defendant's relevant address for service. Additionally, there was no evidence of steps taken to validate the address or any attempts to personally serve the first defendant since their initial email contact with the plaintiff's solicitors. As a result, the court was not satisfied that it had been demonstrated that personal service of the first defendant was impracticable.
The court dismissed the plaintiff's application for substituted service, as the evidence did not meet the required threshold. There were no further orders made by the court in this case.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Since the 22 March email there has been no further communication between the plaintiff’s solicitors and the first defendant.Consideration The threshold issue to be determined before the discretion to make an order for substituted service is enlivened under rule 116, is whether it is “impracticable” to serve the proceedings on the first defendant.[7] The Court also has to be satisfied the service methods proposed are “likely to bring the proceeding to the knowledge of the defendant or someone representing his interests: Miscamble v Phillips & Anor [1936] [1936] St R Qd 136”: Permanent Custodians Limited v Massey [2009] QSC 4 at [6].[8][7]Embrey v Smart [2014] QCA 75 at [15]; National Australian Bank Limited v Garner [2022] QDC 221 at [2].[8] See also Foxe v Brown (1984) 58 ALR 542; Miscamble v Phillips & Anor [1936] [1936] St R Qd 136; Permanent Custodians Limited v Massey [2009] QSC 4 at [6]. Impracticability in the context of substituted service has been held to mean an inability to serve after reasonable efforts have been undertaken.[9][9] See Foxe v Brown (1984) 58 ALR 542 at 546 and other decisions cited by Edelman J in Attorney-General (WA) v Lashansky [2014] WASC 42, at [8]-[11]; The difficulty with this application is that there is insufficient evidence before the court of the first defendant’s “relevant address” for service and therefore whether reasonable efforts have been made. The affidavit of Mr Torto, deposes that an employee of the plaintiff, David Cuddington, instructed him “that he was able to locate the following potential contact details for the first defendant”. This evidence appears to be hearsay. It also appears to not be in conformity with rule 430(2) of the UCPR which provides:(2) … an affidavit for use in an application because of default or otherwise for relief, other than final relief, may contain statements based on information and belief if the signatory for the affidavit states the sources of the information and the grounds for the belief [emphasis added] Muir J explained in A-G v Watego [2003] QSC 367:[26] The requirements of subsection (2) are not met by a broad reference to unspecified documents and classes of documents. The object of the requirement to disclose the deponent’s sources is to provide identification of those sources sufficient to enable the party against whom the evidence is adduced to investigate, assess and, where appropriate, challenge the evidence. Although Mr Torto’s belief is admissible in this proceeding by virtue of r 430(2), the evidence provided is insufficient. There is no evidence of what steps and actions were taken by Mr Cuddington, what the records indicated and why they demonstrated a reasonable belief that the Ogden Steet Address was the first defendant’s relevant address for service. What are the grounds for his belief? There has been no title search, or any other material, provided to demonstrate that the claimed address is, on the balance of probabilities, a relevant address of the first defendant. As a result, I am not satisfied that it has been demonstrated the first defendant can be contacted at that address. That is, it has not been demonstrated that personal service of the first defendant is impracticable. I note that no attempts to personally serve the first defendant have been made since the first defendant contacted the plaintiff’s solicitors by email. There is no evidence that the plaintiff has conducted any searches or made any additional inquiries to validate or confirm the potential contact details provided to it by the plaintiff’s employee.