IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S253 of 2009
B e t w e e n -
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Applicant
and
DANIEL SNEDDEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 12 FEBRUARY 2009, AT 9.37 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MS M.A. PERRY, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MS H. YOUNAN for the applicant. (instructed by Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions)
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.D. JACKSON, for the respondent. (instructed by Schreuder Partners Lawyers)
GUMMOW J: We will hear first from you, Mr Walker.
MR WALKER: Your Honours, the contexts in which the possibility of an extradition objection of the kind contemplated by the second limb of paragraph 7(c) of the Act might arise, that is in cases of which this would simply be an example, are so broad that it would not be appropriate for this Court to venture upon any judicial gloss of that connective phrase “by reason of” which might in future prevent its application to a very wide variety of circumstances.
GUMMOW J: The particular words here being “by reason of his”?
MR WALKER: Political opinions.
GUMMOW J: Yes.
MR WALKER: Now, that connective phrase “by reason of” notoriously has been the subject of judicial glosses in a number of different contexts, all of which, we submit, yield simply this in terms of the possibilities were this Court to grant special leave and decide a case involving that phrase, that it will be described as a phrase of wide connective function, the ambit of which remains to be ascertained case by case according to the facts and the discerned purpose of the instrument or statute in which the phrase is found. That will not have advanced what might grandiosely be called jurisprudence on the meaning of that phrase one whit.
Now, in our submission, that does enable me to put, in a case which has obvious qualities in other regards for the grant of special leave, a conventional argument with particular force, and that is that this is but a decision on a phrase in a statute unlikely to receive what might be called judicial shifting of its semantic content by a decision applied to highly particular facts.
Now, we accept that the handling by this country in this country’s administrative and judicial bodies of an extradition request from a country such as Croatia in relation to events stemming from highly notorious events, that is, notorious as a matter of international public relations as well as the internal affairs of the country in question, in relation to what might be called crimes against humanity and war crimes, may be regarded as assisting rather than detracting from the prospects of the case obtaining special leave, but in our submission, none of those…
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- Case
- [2010] HCATrans 10
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine two principal legal issues. Firstly, whether the Croatian judgment was a "final and conclusive" judgment for the purposes of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) (the Act). Secondly, if it was, whether the judgment was contrary to public policy in Australia, thereby precluding its enforcement.
The Court reasoned that the Act provided a mechanism for the enforcement of judgments from one Australian state or territory in another, and that the provisions of the Act could, in certain circumstances, extend to foreign judgments. However, the Court found that the Croatian judgment was not a final and conclusive judgment in the sense contemplated by the Act, as it was subject to appeal in Croatia. Furthermore, the Court considered whether the judgment was contrary to Australian public policy, but this question did not need to be definitively resolved given the primary finding regarding the finality of the judgment. The Court applied principles of private international law concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, particularly the requirement for such judgments to be final and conclusive.
The High Court held that the Croatian judgment was not enforceable in Australia under the Act. The Court therefore dismissed the Republic of Croatia's application.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi