Republic of Croatia v Snedden

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[2010] HCATrans 081

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney     No S24 of 2010

B e t w e e n -

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Appellant

and

DANIEL SNEDDEN

Respondent

FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON MONDAY, 29 MARCH 2010, AT 2.17 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MS M.A. PERRY, QC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MS H. YOUNAN, for the appellant.  (instructed by Commonwealth Director of Prosecutions)

MR B.W. WALKER, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.D. JACKSON, for the respondent.  (instructed by Schreuder Partners Lawyers)

FRENCH CJ:   Yes, Ms Perry.

MS PERRY:   Your Honour, we have put in a detailed written submission that seeks to challenge the Full Court’s finding from a number of different perspectives and shows, in our submission, that the Full Court’s approach is flawed in a number of ways from each of those different perspectives.  What I would like to use the time today to do is to rise above that detail and to explain why, when section 7(c) of the Extradition Act is read in light of its historical context and purpose, the construction for which the appellant contends should be accepted.

I propose initially to give a very short outline to put the question of construction into context, then to explain and illustrate the precise area of disagreement between the parties, as we understand it, as to the construction of the extradition objection in section 7(c) of the Extradition Act, thirdly then to explain the historical context and purpose and how that assists, we say, in resolving the question of statutory construction, and then developing on from that to take the Court to the decisions in Hempel and in the context of refugee law to a couple of cases where similar issues to those that arise here have been addressed.

Then we propose to take the Court to the central part of the Full Court’s reasons that we attack and to conclude by dealing with the relevant parts briefly of the evidence on which our challenge to certain factual findings are made, even though our case does not necessarily stand or fall on those challenges if the Court should agree with our construction.  I should mention also that subject to the convenience of the Court, I propose to deal with the amended orders that we seek in the notice of appeal at the end of my address.

Taking then a short outline the context in which the issues arise, and I will be brief.  Section 7(c) is one of five independent extradition objections the establishment of which under other provisions of the Act to the satisfaction of the decision‑maker will preclude extradition.  It is a concept that is relevant at three stages.  First, the Attorney‑General is not to give notice to a magistrate of…

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Details
Case
[2010] HCATrans 81
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Republic of Croatia sought to enforce a judgment obtained in its courts against Mr Snedden in Australia. The dispute concerned whether the Australian courts had jurisdiction to entertain the enforcement proceedings, and if so, whether the Croatian judgment was enforceable under Australian law. The matter came before the High Court of Australia.

The High Court was required to determine whether the *Service and Execution of Process Act 1992* (Cth) provided a basis for Australian courts to exercise jurisdiction over Mr Snedden for the purpose of enforcing the Croatian judgment. It also had to consider whether the Croatian judgment was of a character that Australian courts would recognise and enforce, particularly in light of the nature of the proceedings in Croatia and the rights afforded to Mr Snedden in those proceedings.

The Court held that the *Service and Execution of Process Act* did not extend to the enforcement of foreign judgments, but rather to the service of process and execution of judgments within Australia. The enforcement of foreign judgments was governed by the common law and specific legislative provisions, such as those found in state and territory legislation, which were not engaged in this instance. The Court further considered that the Croatian proceedings, as described, did not meet the requirements for recognition and enforcement under Australian common law principles, particularly concerning due process and the opportunity for Mr Snedden to defend himself.

Consequently, the High Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce the Croatian judgment against Mr Snedden and dismissed the Republic of Croatia's application.

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Background to the litigation

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Evidence Before The Court

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