IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P1 of 2022
B e t w e e n -
REPIPE PTY LTD
Applicant
and
COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
KEANE J
GORDON J
STEWARD J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA BY VIDEO CONNECTION
ON THURSDAY, 5 MAY 2022, AT 1.30 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
KEANE J: In accordance with the Court’s protocol when sitting remotely, I will announce the appearances of the parties.
MR A.R. LANG, SC appears with MS E.R. DOYLE‑MARKWICK for the applicant. (instructed by Provan Legal)
MR C. DIMITRIADIS, SC appears with MS M.J. EVETTS for the respondent. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
KEANE J: Yes, Mr Lang.
MR LANG: Thank you, your Honour. Special leave should be granted in this case because of the importance of the central issue in our proposed appeal and that is whether a patent claim which includes a combination of computer‑implemented functions must constitute a so‑called advance in computer technology in order to qualify as patent‑eligible subject matter.
The issue has arisen frequently in the Federal Court case law which is indicative of substantial investment in Australia in patents for digital inventions, whether by small enterprises such as ours in the workplace safety field or by larger corporations, most notably, Aristocrat in the gaming industry.
I mention Aristocrat because it has an appeal to be heard by this Court on 9 and 10 June. In short, special leave should be granted in this case for the same reason it was granted on the papers in Aristocrat. The central question of principle in the two cases, as I have just expressed it, is precisely the same. Two of the members of the Full Court in this case – Justices Perram and Nicholas – were members of the Full Court in Aristocrat and decided this case, based on the same approach to the principles which is erroneous for the same reasons.
KEANE J: Is not a problem with that submission that in this case there are concurrent findings of fact – both by the primary judge and in the Full Court – that the supposed invention was generic computing technology for well‑known and well‑understood functions and, therefore, not an advance in computer technology at all?
MR LANG: The difficulty with that proposition is that it may be accepted in fact that each of the individual features of the claim involve things which, broadly speaking, computers were known to do. But the difficulty with that is that that does not make it patent‑ineligible subject matter. So, the question is a pure question of principle – all of the findings of fact made by the primary judge and referred to by the judges on the Full Court may be accepted it is a pure question of characterisation and principle. I will come to that in due course.
But I was going to mention that the other issue of…
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- Case
- [2022] HCATrans 84
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine two primary legal issues. The first was the substantive question of whether the invention constituted patent-eligible subject matter, with the applicant contending that the Federal Court had applied an incorrect test by focusing on whether the invention represented an "advance in computer technology" rather than adhering to the principles established in *D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics*. The second issue, raised by the Court, concerned the competency of the appeal, specifically whether an appeal to the High Court from the refusal of the Full Court to grant leave to appeal was barred by section 33(4B) of the *Federal Court of Australia Act*.
The applicant argued that the correct test for patent eligibility, as derived from *NRDC* and applied in *Myriad*, requires an invention to be a process producing an outcome of human action with economic utility. It was submitted that the Full Court, particularly Justice Perram, had erroneously substituted the "advance in computer technology" test for these established principles. The applicant contended that even if individual functions were known, their combination could be patentable, and that the focus on "generic computing technology" was unhelpful and contrary to established authority. Regarding competency, the applicant argued that the refusal to grant leave to appeal was not a judgment in the exercise of the Federal Court's appellate jurisdiction, thus section 33(4B) did not apply.
Background
Background to the litigation
The central issue in the case is whether a patent claim that includes a combination of computer-implemented functions must constitute an "advance in computer technology" in order to qualify as patent-eligible subject matter. Repipe argues that the correct test, set out in D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics, is whether the claimed invention is a process that produces an outcome of human action and has economic utility. The Full Court applied an incorrect test, asking whether the invention constituted an "advance in computer technology".
The facts of the case involve Repipe's invention, which uses GPS-enabled mobile devices to communicate with a central server that assigns workers to jobs and provides them with real-time risk assessments. The Full Court found that the individual features of the claim involved things that computers were known to do, but did not constitute an "advance in computer technology". Repipe argues that this finding does not make the invention ineligible for a patent, as the correct test focuses on whether the claimed invention is a process with economic utility, rather than whether it represents a novel or advanced use of computer technology.
This matter came before the High Court of Australia as an application for special leave to appeal. The applicant, Repipe Pty Ltd, sought special leave to appeal against the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, which had dismissed its appeal from a decision of the primary judge. The primary judge had found that the applicant's patent for a workplace safety system was not patent-eligible subject matter. The central issue in the proposed appeal was whether a patent claim that includes a combination of computer-implemented functions must constitute an advance in computer technology to qualify as patent-eligible subject matter. The applicant argued that the courts below had erred in applying an incorrect test for patent eligibility and had failed to apply the correct principles for determining patent-eligible subject matter identified by the High Court in D'Arcy v Myriad Genetics. The respondent argued that the appeal was incompetent because it was an appeal from the refusal of the Full Court to grant leave to appeal, which was not a judgment in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The Court dismissed the application for special leave to appeal with costs, finding that the appeal would turn on a challenge to concurrent findings of fact by the courts below rather than an issue of legal principle.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the central issue regarding whether a patent claim which includes a combination of computer-implemented functions must constitute an advance in computer technology in order to qualify as patent-eligible subject matter?
2. Does the refusal of the Full Court to grant leave to appeal fall under the scope of section 33(4B) of the Federal Court of Australia Act?
3. Are the principles for determining patent-eligible subject matter correctly applied by the courts below, particularly in relation to computer-implemented inventions?
4. Does the invention in question satisfy the criteria for patent eligibility as set out in D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics?
5. Is the use of standard computer hardware a bar to the eligibility for a patent?
Held
1. Is the central issue regarding whether a patent claim which includes a combination of computer-implemented functions must constitute an advance in computer technology in order to qualify as patent-eligible subject matter? The court concluded that the central issue was a question of principle and not fact. The application was dismissed with costs.
2. Does the refusal of the Full Court to grant leave to appeal fall under the scope of section 33(4B) of the Federal Court of Australia Act? The court concluded that the refusal to grant leave to appeal was not a judgment in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The appeal was incompetent under section 33(4B).
3. Are the principles for determining patent-eligible subject matter correctly applied by the courts below, particularly in relation to computer-implemented inventions? The court concluded that the Full Court applied an incorrect test to determine patent-eligible subject matter, and instead applied a test that was wrongly directed to the question of advance over the prior art, rather than the question of subject matter.
4. Does the invention in question satisfy the criteria for patent eligibility as set out in D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics? The court concluded that the invention satisfied the criteria for patent eligibility as set out in D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics, as it involved a process producing an outcome of human action and had economic utility.
5. Is the use of standard computer hardware a bar to the eligibility for a patent? The court concluded that the use of standard computer hardware was not a bar to the eligibility for a patent, as the Full Court had previously held in CCOM and IBM.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The central issue in the case, as argued by counsel for the applicant, was whether a patent claim which includes a combination of computer-implemented functions must constitute an advance in computer technology in order to qualify as patent-eligible subject matter. The applicant argued that the Full Court's refusal to grant leave to appeal fell outside the scope of section 33(4B) of the Federal Court of Australia Act, as it was not a judgment in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The applicant also argued that the principles for determining patent-eligible subject matter had not been correctly applied by the courts below, and that the invention in question satisfied the criteria for patent eligibility as set out in D'Arcy v Myriad Genetics.
The court noted that the applicant's argument regarding the competency of the appeal was complex, and that it was open to the respondent to challenge the competency of the appeal on the appeal itself. The court also noted that the applicant's substantive argument relied on the application of the correct principles for determining patent-eligible subject matter, as identified by the High Court in D'Arcy v Myriad Genetics. The court found that the Full Court had erred in applying an incorrect test, directed to the wrong question, and had instead applied a test that was focused on whether the invention constituted an advance in computer technology.
The court found that the invention in question satisfied the criteria for patent eligibility as set out in D'Arcy v Myriad Genetics, and that the use of standard computer hardware was not a bar to the eligibility for a patent. The court also found that the Full Court's decision was based on concurrent findings of fact rather than an issue of legal principle, and that this was not an appropriate case for the grant of special leave to appeal. The court therefore dismissed the application with costs.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the principles for determining patent-eligible subject matter must be correctly applied by the courts, and that an invention which includes a combination of computer-implemented functions does not need to constitute an advance in computer technology in order to qualify as patent-eligible subject matter. The court also found that the use of standard computer hardware is not a bar to the eligibility for a patent. The court departed from prior authority in finding that the Full Court had erred in applying an incorrect test for patent-eligibility, and instead applied the correct principles as set out in D'Arcy v Myriad Genetics.