Renuka Raghubir v Christine Nicolopoulos

[2022] NSWSC 387

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:	Renuka Raghubir v Christine Nicolopoulos [2022] NSWSC 387
Hearing dates:	1 April 2022
Decision date:	01 April 2022
Jurisdiction:	Common Law
Before:	Sackar J
Decision:	Motion dismissed
Catchwords:	COURTS AND JUDGES — Bias — Disqualification
Category:	Procedural rulings
Parties:	Renuka Raghubir (first plaintiff) Virenda Singh (second plaintiff) Christine Nicolopoulos (defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: Karen Conte-Mills (defendant) Solicitors: Harb Lawyers (defendant)
File Number(s):	2021/00327143
Publication restriction:	N/A

Judgment – EX TEMPORE (REVISED)

1. The motion this morning before me is brought by the defendant in what are said to be defamation proceedings commenced by Statement of Claim filed in the Court on 17 November 2021. The matter has been before me on numerous occasions. In the early part of the hearing of the matter both parties, the plaintiffs and the defendant, were self-represented. In due course Ms Nicolopoulos, the defendant, decided to retain lawyers. I asked Ms Raghubir, on one or more occasions, whether she wished to continue to appear on her own behalf, and she has continued to do so.

2. I set the matter down today for an argument of a pleading motion. There are two issues essentially. The first is whether the Statement of Claim, for any number of the reasons should be struck out or in effect dismissed. Ms Raghubir, on the other hand, has a motion for a default judgment. This morning I indicated to the parties that I would hear the question of whether the statement of claim should remain on foot, as it were, or whether it should be struck out, or dismissed. Subject to what I may decide on that issue, I then indicated that I would hear the question of the default judgment either today or subsequently.

3. In the course of discussions this morning Ms Raghubir indicated that she wished to ask me to disqualify myself from further hearing the matter, first on the basis of apprehension of bias. Apprehension of bias arises generally, on the authorities where a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.

4. The authorities also make it very clear that it is appropriate to take into account the exigencies of modern litigation and the case management activities that are necessarily to be employed by trial judges, and intervention by trial judges from time to time, in order to distil what the true issue or issues might be between the parties.

5. However, Ms Raghubir's written submissions go a good deal further. She makes assertions that I have some financial interest in the outcome of the litigation, that I have acted unfairly, that I have rudely interrupted her, that I have prevented her from putting her arguments, and further, that I have in some way acted, so it seems, fraudulently or corruptly, and as I understand it, dishonestly. I am paraphrasing from her written submissions at [15], [29] and [31]. It is entirely inappropriate and unnecessary in my view for a judge where such allegations are made to deny such allegations, in circumstances such as these. Save to say that such allegations are extremely serious.

6. So far as I am concerned, on the authorities and on the material before the Court, I do not consider that a lay observer, reasonably informed as to how judges conduct themselves, would come to a view that there is an apprehension of bias in relation to Ms Raghubir or her son.

7. The application that I disqualify myself from hearing this pleading point is refused, and I dismiss the application. Even though it is not formally put on the motion, I do not propose, because I regard it as scandalous in the extreme, to answer her allegations, which are in effect allegations of actual bias. Either way I would not disqualify myself.

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Decision last updated: 05 April 2022