Renfors v Telstra Limited - [2025] SADC 96

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Minor Civil Review)
RENFORS v TELSTRA LIMITED
[2025] SADC 96
Judgment of her Honour Judge Deuter
25 July 2025
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW
Application for review of a decision made in the Magistrates Court Minor Civil jurisdiction, whereby a Judicial Registrar refused to make orders sought by the applicant, that Telstra Limited be required to change the terms of his internet service plan, to render it to be more suitable to his requirements.
HELD: The Judicial Registrar does not have jurisdiction to make the orders sought, which are in the nature of orders requiring specific performance.
Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) ss 8(1), 31(1), 38(6) & 38(7); Fences Act 1975 (SA) ss 4 & 12; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 (SA) s 68; Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 161, referred to.
Seppo Renfors v Telstra Limited [2025] SAMC 72; City of Victor Harbor v Roeger & Anor, considered.

RENFORS v TELSTRA LIMITED
[2025] SADC 96
Background

This is an application pursuant to section 38(6) of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) (Magistrates Court Act) to review a minor civil judgment, delivered on 28 February 2025 (the judgment).[1]
[1] Seppo Renfors v Telstra Limited [2025] SAMC 72.
The Court has a number of powers under section 38(7) of the Magistrates Court Act (MCA) that are applicable to this review. Section 38(7)(e) of the MCA provides that I must act in accordance with equity, good conscience, and the substantial merits of the case. I must not have regard to technicalities or legal forms. The hearing is to take the form of an inquiry, rather than the usual adversarial contest between parties. I am also not bound by the rules of evidence and may inform myself as I see fit.
The applicant in this dispute, Mr Renfors, brought an action against the respondent, Telstra Limited (Telstra) claiming that Telstra had treated him unfairly, and wrongly charged him in relation to an internet plan held with them, and that they continued to charge him on an incorrect basis. Mr Renfors brought a claim in the Minor Civil Jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court, seeking orders to change his internet plan, and to recover the sum he said Telstra owed him. The matter was listed to be heard before Judicial Registrar Burke.
Magistrates Court proceedings
Mr Renfors filed a claim on 4 July 2024, and shortly after, on 9 July 2024, filed an amended and reduced claim. By this claim, Mr Renfors also set out that he required Telstra to provide him with a new residential internet plan, rather than he have to continue on a more expensive business plan. He also sought compensation for nine days when Telstra cancelled his plan and caused him to have no phone or internet service. This had caused Mr Renfors undue duress.
Mr Renfors also took issue with Telstra charging him for a modem at $9.00 per month when he already had a modem, and putting him on a $110 plan without his authority. He sought recovery of the total sum of $1,916.40.
Telstra responded by filing an interlocutory application to summarily dismiss the amended claim. On 4 November 2024, Judicial Registrar Burke ordered that some of Mr Renfors claims be dismissed.[2] These included:
1.An interim order for Telstra to not shape, suspend or cancel the service to Mr Renfors for any reason before the trial for this case.
2.An order (for Telstra) to leave the plan as Telstra had left it in their last reply at $66 fixed price with no additional fees for paper invoices for the next 2 years.
3.As an alternative to claim 2; provide a residential internet plan with 50 mbps fixed for two years excluding a fee for a modem – e.g. $90 plan less $9.00 modem fee (not provided or needed for two years). The billing be made according to the plan ‘Paper bills and electronic payments – free’.
[2] FDN 19 in CIV-24-6096.
Judicial Registrar Burke allowed the following orders to remain in the claim:
1.Telstra to pay Mr Renfors $1916.40 as a result of their cancelling his service without any notice on 6 June 2022.
2. Payment of the final Notice fee and the Court filing and trial fees.
3.Any other orders the Court considers justified e.g. exemplary damages or like for the stress and anxiety caused Mr Renfors for the 9 days he was without internet service, and since.
Judicial Registrar Burke allowed Mr Renfors to file an amended claim. This became Revision 2 at the Review.[3] Mr Renfors amended the claim, by increasing the payment sought to $1947.23, as a result of Telstra’s cancellation of his service. There was a further amendment made, by which Mr Renfors made a claim for ‘Any other orders the Court considers justified eg punitive or exemplary damages or like for the stress and anxiety caused Mr Renfors …’. Mr Renfors therefore amended his pleadings to claim punitive or exemplary damages against Telstra. A trial was listed in the Magistrates Court for 11 February 2024.
[3] FDN 5 in CIV-24-6096.
Telstra attempted to file a consent order a day prior to the scheduled trial, in which they agreed to pay Mr Renfors the full amount sought by him, which they calculated to be $2,122.23. This order was rejected by the Registry.
On the day of the trial, the Telstra employee who had carriage of the action had a personal matter emerge which rendered them unable to appear on behalf of Telstra on that day. Telstra reiterated that they consented to an order that they pay Mr Renfors the full amount he was seeking of $2,122.23, plus the trial listing fee of $244.00, a total amount of $2,366.23. This again was not accepted by Mr Renfors.
Mr Renfors insisted that the matter proceed, as he was seeking twenty additional orders. These orders related to changes that Mr Renfors was seeking in his service contract with Telstra. Judicial Registrar Burke once again advised Mr Renfors that these were not changes that he had any jurisdiction to make.
Judicial Registrar Burke ordered that the trial go ahead in the afternoon. Mr Renfors made submissions that Judicial Registrar Burke had jurisdiction to grant specific performance or injunctive relief and thereby make Telstra change his service agreement. Judicial Registrar Burke confirmed that Judicial Officers in the Magistrates Court did not have the power to grant the orders that were being sought.
Mr Renfors also sought an order for exemplary or punitive damages, but Judicial Registrar Burke found that he had not identified ‘any conduct by Telstra which might give rise to a finding that Telstra's conduct was so reprehensible that it should be punished’.[4] There was no basis to find that exemplary or punitive damages should be awarded.
[4] Seppo Renfors v Telstra Limited [2025] SAMC 72 [17].
Evidence before this Court
I made the decision to swear in Mr Renfors and Telstra’s representative, Mr Cain, from the bar table, so that their statements given orally were treated as evidence.[5] I explained this to both parties. I made this decision so I was able to test the evidence of those at the bar table through making direct enquires of them. It was made clear that statements from the bar table would be used as evidence.
[5] It is to be noted that Mr Cain appeared by AVL from interstate.
I had access to, and reviewed, all the material which was before Judicial Registrar Burke. I also had access to the transcript from the trial in the Magistrates Court.
I have reviewed Mr Renfors appeal grounds. Both parties filed two sets of written submissions which I have read and considered. Mr Renfors insisted that the Magistrates Court was able to order Telstra to change their contractual terms in relation to his service agreement. I find that at the Review this was the only issue in dispute, as Telstra had settled the financial claim.
Review grounds and argument
In his written review grounds, Ms Renfors provided a detailed history of the matter, and his long and ongoing dispute with Telstra. His argument was that Judicial Registrar Burke had jurisdiction to make the orders he was seeking. These were primarily to make Telstra change his service agreement to an agreement that he wanted, but which they do not provide to customers.
Mr Renfors made submissions regarding the equitable powers of the Magistrates Court. In particular he tried to convince the Court to overturn the decision of the Honourable Justice Perry in City of Victor Harbor v Roeger & Anor.[6]
[6] [2002] SASC 218 (Victor Harbor Case).
Mr Renfors argued that Perry J had erred in not properly considering the words ‘at law or in equity’ in s 8(1) of the MCA, which were within parenthesis, and this had led Perry J to find that the Magistrates Court did not have jurisdiction to order equitable remedies. Mr Renfors described this is as a wrong interpretation of s 8(1).
The Victor Harbor case concerned the jurisdiction of a magistrate to order specific performance of a contract in relation to storm water. The Council had decided not to proceed with storm water pipes as agreed between them and several rate payers. After a thorough analysis, Perry J found that the Magistrates Court did not have jurisdiction to make a decree of specific performance, whereby a Magistrate could order the Council to proceed with the works. He noted the limits of the civil jurisdiction of the Court as set out in the MCA at Division 3.
Justice Perry conducted a thorough review of the history of the Magistrates Court jurisdiction, from the time it was known as the Local Courts in 1886. He concluded as a result that in relation to equitable claims, s 8(1) was qualified by the need for a claim for a sum of money:
The expression "action in equity", while strictly inappropriate to describe proceedings in equity, is qualified by the words which follow, namely "for a sum of money". In those circumstances, it does not seem to me that the equitable jurisdiction which is conferred would extend to a claim for equitable relief disassociated from a money claim. Insofar as account must be taken of the provisions of s31, it seems to me that that section is in its terms limited to dealing with forms of relief which may be granted in an action, rather than defining the basic jurisdiction which may be exercised by the court. While it is true that in this case the claim filed by the respondents is for a money amount, when the respondents' claimed specific performance of the contract or agreement alleged to have been entered into with the appellant, it does not seem to me that such a claim can properly be construed as a claim "for a sum of money" within the meaning of s8(1)(a). The "form of relief" referred to in s31(1) can only be a form of relief which is within the rubric of the parameters of the jurisdiction of the court defined by s8.[7]
[7] City of Victor Harbor v Roeger and Anor [2002] SASC 218 [66]-[69].
I appreciate that Mr Renfors as a self-represented litigant may struggle to understand the complexities of Perry J’s judgment and reasoning. However, his submissions make it clear that he is mistaken in his understanding of what was found in the Victor Harbor case. As demonstrated by the transcript, Judicial Registrar Burke explained to Mr Renfors during the trial what Perry J’s observations meant in relation to civil actions in the Magistrates Court. He explained that Perry J had found that wider equitable relief could be open to Magistrates in some minor civil reviews as a result of the fact that those minor civil actions extended beyond monetary claims. Judicial Registrar Burke also explained to Mr Renfors that equitable remedies may be ordered by the Magistrates Court, in relation to a variety of specific provisions in consumer legislation where the minor civil jurisdiction is vested with powers to make such orders.[8] However, what Mr Renfors misunderstood was that Perry J found these remedies were only open to the Magistrates Court in circumstances where there was a legislative authority.
[8] See Fences Act 1975 (SA) s 4 and s 12 and Retail and Commercial Leases Act1995 (SA) s 68.
Section 8 of the Magistrates Court Act on its own does not allow for claims of specific performance without a monetary dispute. There is no legislative authority which allowed the granting of the orders sought in relation to specific performance of a Telstra residential internet contract. The Magistrates Court does not have jurisdiction to make orders to the effect that Telstra must change their contract terms.
Judicial Registrar Burke specifically noted that the monetary claim involving Telstra had been resolved by Telstra agreeing to pay the monies claimed by Mr Renfors. There was thus no longer any monetary claim.
Mr Renfors also referred to the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), and specifically section 161 which states that:
(1)For the purposes of this Part, if a business is carried on (otherwise than in the capacity of trustee) by an individual, and:
(a)most or all of the work of the business is carried out at the residence of the individual; or
(b)the business does not occupy any premises other than the residence of the individual; the individual, in the individual's capacity as a customer, is taken to be a residential customer.
In referencing this section, Mr Renfors submitted that Telstra must regard him as a residential customer and therefore provide him with a residential plan. As it stands, Mr Renfors remains on a business plan. He agrees that he is still conducting a business.
In my reading of this legislation, I find that s 161 making reference to what comprises a residential customer does not assist Mr Renfors. Telstra did not make any submissions by which it denied that Mr Renfors may be considered a residential customer. It was explained however that the titles of the plans which Telstra creates are to identify the different plan features and who they may be best suited for. Mr Cain, the representative from Telstra, informed the Court that there are several differences between the residential and business plans. These include:
·The business plan requires an ABN.
·The business plan has an internet speed of 50mgps, where the residential plan has a speed of 25mgps.
·The residential plan has the potential for additional phone lines.
·A different modem is utilised.
Mr Cain submitted that Telstra has offered Mr Renfors the option of transitioning to a residential plan. Telstra takes no issue with him utilising a residential plan for his business. However, this would mean he would be transitioning to a plan which has a speed of 25mgps instead of 50mgps. The residential plan which Telstra offers is consistent with the concept that a residential customer would require a different service for their internet plan. Telstra has different titles for their plans simply because they involve different features and are usually utilised for different purposes. Telstra submitted that they often have people purchase a residential plan for their business, when that is the most appropriate option.
Decision
Mr Renfors comes before the Court seeking an order that he be put on a Telstra business internet service plan, but at the same the price as his current residential internet service plan. This is because he is a residential customer under section 161 of the Telecommunications Act. As I have previously addressed, section 161 is being utilised by Mr Renfors to show he is a residential customer, despite having his business operating from his home. This submission was made as he seeks to have the features of a Telstra business plan, but for the price of a residential plan. Mr Renfors was therefore attempting to show that he needs to be treated as a residential customer, rather than a business customer, while still receiving the benefits of a business customer.
A decision of that nature is beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court. Mr Renfors has failed to identify any authority which supports the order he seeks being granted. The only legislative authority he took the Court to, as an authority for specific performance of a term of a contract, is s 8 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991, which he incorrectly identified as providing such jurisdiction. However, given that Telstra has already provided consent to orders for the financial claims made by Mr Renfors, the orders which he is now seeking are, as stated by Judicial Registrar Burke, ‘plainly disassociated from a money claim’.[9] I cannot find in those circumstances that Judicial Registrar Burke had jurisdiction to make orders that Telstra change Mr Renfors’ internet service contract. I agree that there is no legislative authority which would have allowed him to do so.
[9] Seppo Renfors v Telstra Limited [2025] SAMC 72 [16].
I also have not been taken to any conduct by Telstra which would lead to an order for exemplary or punitive damages. Mr Renfors gave no evidence that supported such a claim.
Given my finding that Judicial Registrar Burke had no jurisdictional power to grant the orders sought by Mr Renfors, I dismiss the application for review and uphold the judgment of Judicial Registrar Burke entered on 28 February 2025.