FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Reiter v Commissioner of Taxation [2001] FCA 1068
INCOME TAX – ascertainment of assessable income – whether payments made in error to applicant by WorkCover Corporation of South Australia were assessable income – whether applicant “recovered” damages under a foreign law within meaning of subs 55(3) of Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) – whether income “derived” by applicant within meaning of subs 25(1) of Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – whether income “received” by applicant within meaning of s 26(j) of Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 25(1), 26(j)
WorkCover Corporation Act 1994 (SA) ss 4, 13
Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) ss 35, 36, 55Wigens v Cook (1859) 28 LJCP 312 considered
Fergusson v Davison (1882) 8 QBD 470 considered
Ings v London and South Western Railway Company (1868) 4 LR CP 17 followed
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 246 considered
Zobory v Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 64 FCR 86 followedTHOMAS JOSEPH REITER v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
S 16 of 2001BRANSON J
SYDNEY (Heard in ADELAIDE)
8 AUGUST 2001
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
S 16 of 2001
BETWEEN:
THOMAS JOSEPH REITER
APPLICANTAND:
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
BRANSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 AUGUST 2001
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY (Heard in ADELAIDE)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside.
2.The case be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard and decided again in the light of the reason for judgment of the Court.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
S 16 of 2001
BETWEEN:
THOMAS JOSEPH REITER
APPLICANTAND:
COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
BRANSON J
DATE:
8 AUGUST 2001
PLACE:
SYDNEY (Heard in ADELAIDE)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
This is an “appeal” from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) whereby the Tribunal affirmed a decision of the respondent disallowing the applicant’s objection to the notice of assessment for the year ending 30 June 1997 dated 2 October 1997 issued to him by the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (“the DCT”). The question of law raised by the appeal is whether the amount of $16,773 paid by WorkCover Corporation of South Australia (“the Corporation”) to the applicant between 17 December 1996 and 30 June 1997 is assessable income of the applicant under subs 25(1) or s 26(j) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (“the ITAA”).
For the reasons given below I have concluded the appeal should be allowed and the case formally remitted to the Tribunal to be heard and decided again in the light of these reasons for judgment.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The Corporation is a body corporate which owes its existence under its present name to s 4 of the WorkCover…
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- Case
- [2001] FCA 1068
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the term "recovered" in section 55(3) of the WRC Act should not be interpreted in a technical sense that would limit its scope to recovery by action resulting in an enforceable court judgment. Instead, the court found that if a worker settled a proceeding for compensation or damages, they would have recovered compensation or damages in respect of a disability under a foreign law within the meaning of section 55(3). Consequently, the court concluded that the amount of $16,773 paid by the Corporation to Reiter was income "derived" by him within the meaning of section 25(1) of the ITAA. The decision of the AAT was set aside, and the case was remitted to the AAT to be heard and decided again in light of the court's reasons for judgment.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside.
2. The case be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard and decided again in the light of the reason for judgment of the Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BRANSON J
The respondent has at all times contended that the amount of $16,773 paid by the Corporation to the applicant was assessable income in the applicant’s hands by reason of the operation of either subs 25(1) or s 26(j) of the ITAA. The respondent argued that the monies were properly paid to the applicant in accordance with an obligation imposed on the Corporation by the WRC Act, and that no constructive trust arises where a person is legally entitled to receive, and does in fact receive and apply to his or her own use, payments made to that person.CONSIDERATION As the applicant through his counsel, Ms Macdonald, acknowledged, the issue on this appeal is narrow. It is, in effect, whether the amount of $16,773 paid to the applicant by the Corporation was income “derived” by him within the meaning of subs 25(1) of the ITAA. The applicant accepted that if the amount of $16,773 was properly payable to him under the WRC Act it was income “derived” by him and became assessable for income tax purposes under the ITAA. The applicant initially relied on pars (a) and (h) of subs 36(1) and subs 55(3) of the WRC Act to support his contention that the relevant amount was not properly payable to him under the WRC Act. However, ultimately the applicant did not dispute that, although par 36(1)(a) of the WRC authorises the Corporation to discontinue weekly payments to a worker where the worker consents to the discontinuance, the subsection does not compel the Corporation to discontinue weekly payments in every case in which the worker consents to the discontinuance. That is, in the circumstances of this case, the crucial provisions of the WRC Act are par 36(1)(h) and subs 55(3). Having regard to the terms of subs 55(3) of the WRC Act (see [10] above), the contention of the applicant that the amount of $16,773 was not properly payable to him involves identification of time when the applicant “recovered” damages under the law of Victoria within the meaning of the subsection. The word “recover” has a technical legal meaning whereby it signifies recovery by action resulting in an enforceable court judgment (see, for example, Wigens v Cook (1859) 28 LJCP 312; Fergusson v Davison (1882) 8 QBD 470). The applicant contends that the word “recovered” in subs 55(3) of the WRC Act should be understood in this technical sense, or at least in a way which includes this technical sense. The respondent contends that the word should be understood in a non-technical way so as to mean obtain actual possession of, or control of, the monies which constitute the relevant compensation or damages. On the meaning of the word for which the respondent contends, a worker who obtained a judgment under a foreign law, but was not able to enforce the judgment debt, say because of the insolvency of the judgment debtor, would not have “recovered” damages under the foreign law. In my view, the terms “recovered” and “recovery” in subs 55(3) of the WRC Act are not intended to encompass only recovery by action resulting in an enforceable court judgment. If they were, the subsection would have a surprisingly narrow and artificial impact, particularly so far as the bar on recovery under the WRC Act is concerned. In my view, if a worker instituted a proceeding under a foreign law claiming compensation or damages and subsequently settled the proceeding on the basis that the proceeding would be discontinued upon the worker receiving payment on an agreed amount of money, the worker would be likely, depending on the circumstances leading to the settlement, to have recovered compensation or damages in respect of a disability under a foreign law within the meaning of subs 55(3). He or she would, it seems to me, almost certainly have done so if the settlement was consequent upon an admission of liability made by the other party to the proceeding. Similarly, in my view, if a worker asserted an entitlement under a foreign law to compensation or damages in respect of a disability, and that assertion led to an acknowledgment of liability and payment of compensation or damages, the worker would have recovered compensation or damages in respect of that disability under the foreign law within the meaning of subs 55(3) of the WRC Act. The bar to recovery of compensation in respect of the same disability under the WRC Act is, in my view, plainly intended to be a bar to recovery whether by legal action or otherwise.