Reid v Tasmania - [2007] TASSC 102

[2007] TASSC 102

CITATION: Reid v Tasmania [2007] TASSC 102

PARTIES: REID, Kerry Gordon
v

TASMANIA, STATE OF

TITLE OF COURT:  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL (TAS)
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  416/2007
DELIVERED ON:  12 December 2007
DELIVERED AT:  Launceston
HEARING DATE:  29 October 2007
JUDGMENT OF:  Crawford, Slicer and Blow JJ

CATCHWORDS:

Evidence – Admissibility and relevance – Hearsay – In general – Relevant principles – Exceptions to rule excluding hearsay – Criminal proceedings – Previous representation by witness of admission by accused – Witness claiming no recollection of admission or previous representation – Evidence of witness' previous representation – Use to be made of it by a jury – Direction to jury.
Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), s60.
Lee v R (1998) 195 CLR 594, followed.
Aust Dig Evidence [48]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Appellant:  M J Brett
             Respondent:  J P Ransom
Solicitors:
             Appellant:  Bishops
             Respondent:  Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number: [2007] TASSC 102
Number of paragraphs: 29

Serial No 102/2007
File No 416/2007

KERRY GORDON REID v STATE OF TASMANIA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
  CRAWFORD J
  SLICER J
  BLOW J
  12 December 2007

Orders of the Court

Appeal allowed.

Conviction on count 3 quashed.

Sentence set aside.

Counts 1 and 2 remitted to the trial judge for re-sentencing.

New trial of the appellant on count 3.

Serial No 102/2007
File No 416/2007

KERRY GORDON REID v STATE OF TASMANIA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
  CRAWFORD J
  12 December 2007

Some of the circumstances giving rise to the appeal are contained in the judgment of Slicer J. The evidence that is central to the appeal is an edited copy of a statement made by Selina Grace Bell to police. It was admitted as an exhibit upon being tendered by Crown counsel. There was no objection to its admission into evidence by counsel for the accused and for that reason, the appeal should not be upheld and a new trial ordered simply because of its admission into evidence. That disposes of the first ground of appeal.

The second ground of appeal is in the following terms:

"Insofar as any part of the statement was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement of the witness, it ought to have been excluded from evidence on the basis that it is [sic] probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant in accordance with the provisions of Section 137 of the Evidence Act 2001."

It is poorly drafted but that should not affect the outcome of the appeal. What it should have said, and it is the basis upon which I would allow the appeal, is that the learned judge should have directed the jury, but failed to do so, to ignore the exhibit and not to use it in any way in favour of the State against the appellant.

In her statement, Ms Bell related admissions that she said had been made to her by the appellant, which included that he had made a false…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Reid v Tasmania

Details

AGLC: Reid v Tasmania [2007] TASSC 102
Case: [2007] TASSC 102
Decision Date: 12 December 2007

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Reid v Tasmania, the appellant, Mr. Reid, was convicted in the Supreme Court of Tasmania of two charges of rape. The case involved an appeal against his conviction, focusing on the admissibility and relevance of certain hearsay evidence presented during the trial. The High Court of Australia was called upon to determine whether the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to consider hearsay evidence that had been excluded under the general rule against hearsay.

The central legal issue before the court was the admissibility of hearsay evidence, specifically, whether the trial judge properly directed the jury on how to assess the reliability of the evidence in question. The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to sufficiently caution the jury about the dangers of hearsay and the potential for it to be unreliable. Furthermore, the appellant contended that the evidence in question did not fall within any of the recognised exceptions to the hearsay rule. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the trial judge had correctly allowed the evidence and appropriately directed the jury on its use.

The court held that the trial judge did indeed err in the direction given to the jury regarding the hearsay evidence. The court found that the judge did not adequately warn the jury of the inherent unreliability of hearsay evidence and did not sufficiently guide them on how to assess the evidence's credibility. The court emphasised the importance of such directions in criminal trials, where the consequences of a wrongful conviction are severe. The court also noted that the evidence did not fall within any recognised exceptions to the hearsay rule, further compounding the trial judge's error.

As a result of the court's findings, the appeal was allowed, and the convictions were quashed. The case underscores the importance of proper judicial direction to juries regarding the admissibility and use of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings. It serves as a reminder to trial judges of their duty to ensure that juries are appropriately cautioned when considering such evidence.

Orders