Regina v Darren Alan Slater and Regina v Nathan Isaac Michael
[1999] NSWSC 1144
•26 November 1999
CITATION: Regina v Darren Alan Slater and Regina v Nathan Isaac Michael [1999] NSWSC 1144 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Criminal Division FILE NUMBER(S): L016/97; L018/97 HEARING DATE(S): 5 November 1999 JUDGMENT DATE:
26 November 1999PARTIES :
Regina
Darren Alan Slater
Nathan Isaac MichaelJUDGMENT OF: Sully J
COUNSEL : L. Lamprati - Crown
C. Craigie - Slater
M. King - MichaelSOLICITORS: Crown Solicitor
Legal Aid of NSW - applicantsCATCHWORDS: - ACTS CITED: Sentencing Act 1989 (NSW)
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW)CASES CITED: Reg v Twala (unreported, CCA, 4 November 1994)
Reg v Clarke (1990) ACrimR 100
Reg v Malcolm (1991) 58 ACrimR 148 at 158
Reg v Sorenson (unreported, Supreme Court of NSW, 6 September 1990)
Reg v Previtera (1997) 94 ACrimR 76 at 85
Reg v Stephens (CCA, 2 November 1993, unreported)
Reg v Purdy (CCA, 3 September 1993, unreported)DECISION: Darren Alan Slater - application granted - in lieu of life sentence, penal servitude for 24 years - minimum term of 18 years and additional term of 6 years - minimum term to commence 12 September 1989 and expire 11 September 2007 - additional term to commence 12 September 2007; Nathan Isaac Michael - application granted - in lieu of life sentence, penal servitude for 21 years - minimum term of 16 years and additional term of 5 years - minimum term to commence 12 September 1989 and expire on 11 September 2005 - additional term to commence 12 September 2005
1 HIS HONOUR: On 5 November instant the Court heard concurrently two applications, one by Darren Alan Slater, and the other by Nathan Isaac Michael. Each application is brought pursuant to s.13A of the Sentencing Act 1989 (NSW), [“the Act”]. Each application seeks the re-determination, in accordance with s.13A of the Act, of a sentence of life imprisonment to which each applicant is currently subject. 2 The Serious Offenders Review Council has submitted in connection with each application a comprehensive report. Each such report summarises as follows the relevant factual background:
SUPREME COURT OF
NEW SOUTH WALES
CRIMINAL DIVISIONSULLY J
Friday 26 November 1999
L016/97 - REGINA v Darren Alan SLATER
L018/97 - REGINA v Nathan Isaac MICHAELJUDGMENT
3 The “young female victim” to whom reference is made in that quoted material was Miss Colleen Joy McIlwain. Miss McIlwain had been born on 22 December 1963. She was, therefore, aged 25 years and not quite 9 months when she met her death at the hands of the two present applicants. 4 The facts as thus summarised were not disputed by either applicant at the recent hearing. It is, however, necessary for present purposes to look more closely at some particular aspects of the facts as thus summarised. In that connection:
“The circumstances of the offence were that on 9 September 1989 MICHAEL and SLATER (both eighteen years of age) met the young female victim outside a night club and drove her to a deserted area. They put her out of the car when she declined to have sex with MICHAEL. SLATER punched her and requested MICHAEL to hand him a baseball bat out of the vehicle. SLATER used the baseball bat to strike the victim across the back of the head. SLATER removed the victim’s jeans and boots with MICHAEL’S assistance. MICHAEL and SLATER then drove away with some of the victim’s clothes. After driving a short distance they returned, fearing that the victim may be able to identify their vehicle and report the matter to the police. They drove the victim to a deserted area near Flat Rock Creek Dam. While still alive, they dragged her to the edge of the dam and pushed her over an observation deck, where she fell more than 8-1/2 metres, falling onto a concrete pump house, valve house. She sustained gross head and brain injuries and a broken neck, dying almost immediately.”
5 The foregoing factual matters having been established, it is convenient to turn to a more particular consideration of the detailed provisions of s.13A of the Act, which provisions govern the way in which the Court is required to deal with applications of the present kind. It is convenient to look, first, at sub-section (4A) which provides, relevantly, as follows:
(1) Dr. William Ryan, a medical practitioner who inspected the victim’s body at the site where it had been left after the killing, and about 9 hours after the killing had occurred, noted, in addition to the substantial head injuries which were the immediate cause of death, the following additional injuries:(a) Injuries above the right eyebrow and to the lip area of the upper jaw, each of which was consistent with a blow or possibly a punch.
(b) A wound to the back of the head which was consistent with a blow from a baseball bat.
(c) Deep bruising to the front of the throat which was consistent with attempted strangulation or throttling.
(2) Both Mr. Slater and Mr. Michael were put on trial charged with the murder of Miss McIlwain. For reasons not now material they were ultimately tried separately. Each pleaded not guilty. Each was found guilty by the verdict of a jury. Mr. Michael was the first of the two men to be dealt with. He was found guilty of murder by a verdict returned on 3 July 1990. He was sentenced on 27 July 1990, and by Finlay J of this Court, to penal servitude for life commencing on 11 September 1989. Mr. Slater was found guilty by a verdict returned on 14 August 1990. He was sentenced on 12 October 1990, and by Loveday J of this Court, to penal servitude for life, dated from 28 June 1990.
Mr. Michael was called as a witness for the Crown in the trial of Mr. Slater. His evidence was consistent, as I understand the fact, with the substance of a statement which he gave to the relevant authorities on 3 August 1990 after he had himself been tried, convicted and sentenced. It is relevant to note the detail of paragraph 16 of that statement. The paragraph is in the following terms:
“I don’t know how Darren got her into the car, but when I got back there she was already on the back seat. So I threw her clothes in the back with her and we took off. I then asked Darren “Where are we going?”. He said “To the river, just keep driving, I’ll give you directions”. He then told me to turn here, turn there. Then he said “Turn around here, we’ve already past it”. It was just a dead end where we were at the time, so I turned around and drove back and he said “It’s the dirt road here on the right”. I said “Are you sure this is it?”. He said “Yeah, I used to ride my motor bike in here”. So I turned down the road and started to follow the track up, but it got too bumpy and I said “I’m going no further”. He said “That’s alright, we’ll here(sic). It’s far enough”. So I stopped the car and Darren jumped out and put the seat forward and dragged her out by the arms. He dragged her along the dirt in front of the car and started to head down this track. While he was still in the range of my lights, he stopped and called out “Come on cunt you were in it too”. When I just stayed there for a minute he called it out again so I got out and went over to where he was and grabbed her by the legs. By this time she wasn’t moving or saying anything. I picked her legs up, Darren had hold of her under the arms and by the shoulders. He was walking backwards and we headed down along the track. As we were carrying her along, Darren was pulling and saying “Come on”. Trying to get me to hurry. It was very dark at the time and I couldn’t see where I was going and I remember stumbling once and dropping her feet. Darren then said, “Come on, pick her up”. So I did and we keep going along. When we got up the walkway a bit, Darren said “This will do, put her down here”. So I let her legs go and he put her top half down. He then said “Come on give us a hand to roll her over”. I said “What is it down there?”. He said “It’s all rock down there”. I put my hands on about her thigh area and pushed had her by the shoulder and pushed also. At the time she was on her back. I don’t remember exactly how far we pushed her, but the next thing she just went over the side and that was it. The next thing I heard was a splat sound and I panicked and ran back up to the car.” (I read this as meaning : “………and pushed her. Darren had her by the shoulder and pushed also.” )
(3) I accept for present purposes that what is thus stated in paragraph 16 of Mr. Michael’s statement is reliable. That is a matter of some significance for present purposes because, in the immediate wake of the killing, both applicants were interviewed extensively by the investigating police. In large part, the versions thus given by the two applicants are consistent each with the other; but there are significant differences. The version given by Mr. Slater, the detail of which it is not necessary to set out here, sought to give the impression, to say the very least, that Mr. Michael had been much the more active of the two men in ensuring that Miss McIlwain did in fact fall from the observation platform and onto the concrete slab lying below it.
I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, although the conduct of both applicants was criminally culpable in high degree, and although there is not a great deal of difference between their respective particular criminal culpability, it is, nevertheless, Mr. Slater who was the instigator of the plan to dispose of Miss McIlwain. I am satisfied, similarly, that it was Mr. Slater who chose the Flat Rock Creek Dam as the place where that evil deed might be done; and that he was as directly implicated as Mr. Michael in the doing of the acts which caused Miss McIlwain to fall to her death.
(4) Two further questions, each of which is important for present purposes, can now be considered. The first of them is whether Miss McIlwain was alive at the time she fell to her death. The second of them is whether, if alive, she was conscious at that time.
I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Miss McIlwain was alive when she fell to her death. Paragraph 16 of Mr. Michael’s affidavit gives no specific assistance on the point; but I think that the evidence otherwise available is sufficient to establish that fact beyond reasonable doubt.
(5) Much more difficult to resolve is the question whether Miss McIlwain was not only alive, but conscious, as she fell to her death. Paragraph 16 of Mr. Michael’s statement suggests to me that she was not. There are suggestions to the contrary in other pieces of evidence; but I do not think that they go beyond establishing a possibility that Miss McIlwain was conscious as well as living as she fell to her death. I am not persuaded to a finding, reached beyond reasonable doubt, that Miss McIlwain was conscious at that time.6 “(A)ll the circumstances surrounding the offence for which the life sentence was imposed” indicate, in the present case, a truly appalling crime. In my opinion, the murder of Miss McIlwain is properly to be characterised as in the worst case category. I have taken into account, in forming that opinion, the following principles which were approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Reg v Twala: unreported; CCA (NSW); 4 November 1994:
“(4A) In considering such an application, the Supreme Court is to have regard to all the circumstances surrounding the offence for which the life sentence was imposed, and all offences, wherever committed, of which the person has been convicted at any time………………….”
7 As to criminal antecedents, Mr. Michael, when he stood for sentence, had none; and Mr. Slater had six previous matters noted on his record, all of which matters were either drink-driving offences or other motor vehicle-related offences. The only relevance for present purposes of those convictions is that they tend to confirm the picture, established otherwise by the evidence, of Mr. Slater as having been at the time of Miss McIlwain’s murder a young man with a severe alcohol problem. 8 It is necessary to consider, next, the provisions of sub-section (9). That sub-section provides, relevantly, as follows:
“However, in order to characterise any case as being in the worst case category, it must be possible to point to particular features which are of very great heinousness and it must be possible to postulate the absence of facts mitigating the seriousness of the crime (as distinct from subjective features mitigating the penalty to be imposed). [per Badgery-Parker J at p.7]
9 Sub-section 9(a) was considered by Finlay J in Reg v Clarke (1990) 48 ACrimR 100, which matter was one of the earliest re-determination applications brought pursuant to section 13A of the Act. In connection with the requirements of sub-section 9(a), Finlay J notes the following relevant matters:
“(9) The Supreme Court, in exercising its functions under this section, is to have regard to:
(a) the knowledge of the original sentencing court that a person sentenced to imprisonment for life was eligible to be released on licence under section 463 of the Crimes Act 1900 and of the practice relating to the issue of such licence; and
(b) any report on the person made by the Review Council and any other relevant reports prepared after sentence (including, for example, reports on the person’s rehabilitation), being in either case reports made available to the Supreme Court; and
(c) the need to preserve the safety of the community, and
(d) the age of the person (at the time the person committed the offence and also at the time the Supreme Court deals with the application),
and may have regard to any other relevant matter.”
10 I think that it is a fair application of sub-section (9)(a) to the present matters, to proceed upon the basis that the Judges who sentenced the present applicants would have understood that the murder in question was so dreadful a crime that it was likely that the applicants, if released on licence at all under the previous licence-release scheme, would not be so released until after each of them had served a sentence that was well toward the upper end of the generally accepted practical range. 11 As to the requirements of sub-section (9)(b), I have read and considered the contents of the reports made available by the Serious Offenders Review Council. I have considered, as well, all of the material put forward by each of the applicants in aid of the submission, which was advanced by each applicant, of demonstrated substantial progress towards rehabilitation. 12 In the matter of rehabilitation, the cases of the two applicants have striking similarities. Each applicant has been, generally speaking, what might be described as a model prisoner. Each prisoner has at present a C1 classification, which entails, put simply and in the terms of the relevant Regulation, confinement “by a physical barrier unless in the company of an officer”. Each appears to have benefited from psychological and the like support and counselling, so as to have come to a proper appreciation of the terrible responsibility that each man bears for what happened to Miss McIlwain. Each applicant appears to have made continuing, and significantly successful, attempts to acquire improved educational skills, together with a range of practical skills of a kind that are likely to assist in a real way in the obtaining by each applicant of lawful and gainful employment if and when he is released on parole back into the general community. 13 It is appropriate to conclude this discussion of the sub-section (9)(b) requirements by adverting to the particular comments of the Serious Offenders Review Council in connection with the present applications. 14 Of Mr. Slater, the Review Council makes the following comments:
“It is appropriate that the Court have regard to the statistics as to the former releases on licence of prisoners serving life sentences. In saying that, it must be acknowledged that such statistics can be misleading. The offence of murder encompasses a whole range of circumstances where the act of the offender causing the death charged was done with reckless indifference to human life or with intent to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person (as well as felony murder). So on the one hand, an offender under former legislation may have been sentenced to what was then a mandatory life sentence where what he did was acceding to the wishes of a terminally ill relative, or on the other hand, it may encompass an horrendous gruesome sadistic killing.
An annexure to the report of the Serious Offenders Review Board before me in the present case sets out statistical information relating to prisoners serving life sentences:
“….. who were either released by the Indeterminate Sentence Committee (ISC) between October 1981 and September 1983, released by the Release on Licence Board between February 1984 and October 1987 or who were still in gaol on the 1st July 1989.”
That section of the report concluded:
“The mean length of time served before their first release on licence by the 161 prisoners was 11.7 years (minimum of 3, maximum of 34 years), and 149 (92.5%) prisoners had served 15 years or less. Of the 238 lifers still in prison, 32 (13.4%) have been in prison more than 12 years and 13 (5.5%) for more than 15 years.”
The report is accompanied by graphs showing in columns the percentage released in each year of imprisonment. This indicates, for example, that about 20 per cent were released in the year when they had served 10 years; a little under 15 per cent were released in the year having served 11 years; and a little over 10 per cent were released in the year having served 12 years.” [48 ACrimR, 104]
15 As to Mr. Michael, the Review Council comments:
“This inmate has shown great potential to benefit from the Inmate Development Services within the Corrective Services system. Should his life sentence be determined then, subject to any drug or association problems, he will be encouraged to continue to do so, particularly in the areas of Drug and Alcohol and Psychology with a view to further reduction in security classification when appropriate with eventual progression with unsupervised leave programs directed towards his eventual re-integration to the community.”
16 As to the requirements of sub-section (9)(c), there are two aspects of the need, in the cases of the present applicants, to ensure the continuing protection of the public. 17 There is, first, a need to ensure in a general sense that the present applications, if granted, do not lead in time to a state of affairs in which either applicant is at large in the community in circumstances likely to endanger the life, or the physical safety otherwise, of any member of the community. 18 There is, of course, an obvious need to be careful in that respect. That need does not entail, however, a need to refuse outright either of the present applications. Even if the Court accedes to the applications and fixes for each applicant a determinate sentence, the Serious Offenders Review Council will monitor constantly the implementation of the terms of that sentence. If, at the completion of any minimum term set for either of the applicants, the Review Council is of the opinion that that applicant is not yet ready to be released on parole back into the community, then the Review Council has, and will no doubt exercise, the necessary powers to ensure that the applicant is not in fact so released. Even if the applicants are released to parole at the expiration of minimum terms set for them by this Court, their conduct on parole will be the subject of constant monitoring by the proper authorities. 19 Secondly, there is a need in the present particular cases to have regard to something that is said by Mrs. Hazel McIlwain, the mother of the late Miss McIlwain, who has made a Victim Impact Statement, which has been admitted into evidence as Exhibit H. It will be necessary to refer later to this document, but for the present it is sufficient to note the following particular things said by Mrs. McIlwain:
“MICHAEL appears to have made strong efforts to benefit from his period of incarceration to date and from Inmate Development Services facilities. His attempts have been limited by the need, not his fault, to keep him in secure custody for almost all of that period.
If his sentence is re-determined the Council will continue to encourage him to progress through the correctional system to, when appropriate, minimum security classification and unsupervised pre-release programs with the objective of his being ready for re-integration into the community at the expiration of his minimum term.”
20 Mrs. McIlwain is a lady aged some 72 years. She is, in practical terms, alone in the world. It is a terrible thing that such a person should be spending the twilight of her life under such shadows as she describes. I do not find it in the least surprising that Mrs. McIlwain has the apprehensions of which she speaks in her statement. Her entire statement will be sent, by direction of this Court, which direction I now formally give, to the Commissioner of Corrective Services and to the Serious Offenders Review Council with a request that a copy of the statement be kept at all times as part of the respective official files of the two applicants. The Court’s intention in giving such a direction is that if, in due course, the applicants are released to parole, then the conditions of their parole should be particular and explicit in requiring that the applicants not contact in any way whatsoever, or cause anybody else to contact in any such way, either Mrs. McIlwain herself, or any other surviving member of her family. 21 As to the requirements of sub-section (9)(d), the relevant particulars can be stated simply and as follows:
“I would be frightened if they were let out. As it is, I can’t have anyone walking behind me. I can’t go on holidays, as I feel something might happen to me. I am very frightened of the dark and will only drive my car in town, because if it broke down in the country, I might get murdered……………….”
22 There are additional relevant matters to which the Court should have regard in connection with each of the present applications. They are as follows:
(1) Mr. Michael was born on 21 January 1971. He was aged 18 years and about 8 months as of 9 September 1989, the date of the murder. He was aged 19 years and about 6 months when he stood for sentence on 27 July 1990. He was aged 28 years and about 10 months when this Court heard his application.
(2) Mr. Slater was born on 14 April 1971. He was aged 18 years and about 5 months as of 9 September 1989, the date of the murder. He was aged 19 years and about 6 months when he stood for sentence on 12 October 1990. He was aged 28 years and about 7 months when this Court heard his application.
· Mr. Slater was first remanded in custody by order of the Nowra Local Court made on 12 September 1989. · He was admitted to Supreme Court bail on 12 March 1990. · He remained at liberty on that bail until 20 June 1990, being the date on which his trial, originally a joint trial with Mr. Michael, commenced. · Thereafter, he has remained in unbroken custody.
1) I take it to be now well settled law that an application, made pursuant to section 13A of the Act, for the re-determination of an existing life sentence should only be refused in those cases where, after further review, the Court to which the application is made considers that the particular applicant should never be released; or, alternatively, where the Court to which the application is made is not satisfied at the time of the application that the applicant should be released: see per Wood CJ at CL in Reg v Sorenson : unreported, Supreme Court NSW, 6 September 1990; followed and applied by Abadee J in Reg v Malcolm (1991) 58 ACrimR 148 at 158. At the recent hearing, the learned Crown Prosecutor indicated, in response to a question from the Bench, that the Crown did not contend that either of the present applications should be simply dismissed.2) Each applicant has served, already, a substantial period of full-time custody. Mr. Michael has spent in continuous custody until today 10 years and about 3-1/2 months. Mr. Slater has served 9 years and about 11 months.
3) Each applicant has spent a not insignificant portion of his time in custody to date in some form of protected custody. The best available information suggests that Mr. Michael has spent some 5 years 6-1/2 months, and that Mr. Slater has spent some 3 years and 7 months in such protected custody. I think that it must be accepted that the nature of prison life is such that a prisoner who is in any form of protected custody is, without more, at greater risk from other inmates, especially inmates who are in the general prison population. That consideration is, I think, of particular importance in Mr. Michael’s case, he having been a Crown witness against his co-offender.
4) I advert, once again, to the victim impact statement of Mrs. Hazel McIlwain.
It is provided by section 23C(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) that:
“The Supreme Court ……………must receive a victim impact statement given by a family victim under this section and acknowledge its receipt and may make any comment on it that the court considers appropriate. However, the court must not consider the statement in connection with the determination of the punishment for the offence unless the court considers that it is appropriate to do so.”
In Reg v Previtera (1997) 94 ACrimR 76 at 85, Hunt CJ at CL expressed, and explained, the view that it could never be appropriate to take a victim impact statement into account in determining what actual sentence should be passed upon the offender whose crime had caused the loss to which the particular victim impact statement is addressed. The stance thus taken by Hunt CJ at CL has been consistently followed in subsequent decisions dealing with the point.The Court would wish, however, not merely to receive and to acknowledge Mrs. McIlwain’s statement; but to assure her that the Court has read and considered the contents of the statement; is moved by them; and hopes that the opportunity which Mrs. McIlwain has had to express her feelings of grief and loss, and to have a proper public respect paid to what she has had to say, will at least do something to relieve, to however small an extent, the burdens that her daughter’s cruel death have imposed upon her.
5) In fixing determinate sentences, as I propose to do, I am of the opinion that such a sentence passed upon Mr. Slater should be somewhat heavier than one passed upon Mr. Michael. Given the facts of the present case, I do not think that the difference should be very great; but I think that it should be distinct. My reasons are:
(a) I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was Mr. Slater who suggested that Miss McIlwain should be silenced and her body disposed of; and who thereafter chose the location and the method.
(b) Mr. Michael gave evidence for the Crown at Mr. Slater’s trial. This cooperation, and its practical consequences for Mr. Michael, deserve some real, albeit prudently measured, recognition.
6) The dating of any determinate sentence passed upon Mr. Slater needs some thought in the light of section 13A(5) of the Act. The relevant facts are these:
23 It is now necessary to bring together all of the foregoing considerations and to distil them into determinate sentences. 24 It is unavoidable, on the view that I take of the enormity of this particular murder, that each applicant must spend a further substantial period in full-time custody. The proper maintenance both of the rule of law, and of a proper public confidence in the law, requires no less. But, in setting each such period, I have endeavoured to give proper weight to the rehabilitation already achieved, and to the need to encourage the steady continuation of that process. 25 Darren Alan Slater: your application for a re-determined sentence is granted. In lieu of the sentence of penal servitude for life which was previously passed upon you, you are sentenced to penal servitude for 24 years, to comprise a minimum term of 18 years and an additional term of 6 years. The minimum term will commence on 12 September 1989 and will expire on 11 September 2007. The additional term will commence on 12 September 2007. 26 Nathan Isaac Michael: your application for a redetermined sentence is granted. In lieu of the sentence of penal servitude for life which was previously passed upon you, you are sentenced to penal servitude for 21 years, to comprise a minimum term of 16 years and an additional term of 5 years. The minimum term will commence on 12 September 1989 and will expire on 11 September 2005. The additional term will commence on 12 September 2005. 27 I direct the Registrar of the Court to transmit forthwith to the Serious Offenders Review Council and to the Commissioner of Corrective Services a copy of these remarks on sentence so that the same may be included in the relevant official files of each prisoner.
Section 13A(5) has been the cause of some division of judicial opinion as to its precise meaning and application: Reg v Stephens (CCA, 2 November 1993, unreported); Reg v Purdy (CCA, 3 September 1993, unreported). In the present case there is not, in my opinion, any need for me to add to that controversy. The fact is that Mr. Slater was first remanded in custody for this murder on 12 September 1989. Whether it follows that I must choose that date as the commencing date; or that I may, but need not, choose that date for that purpose, I propose to choose it in fact. It seems to me to accord better with what a reasonable mind would think just and sensible that both of the determinate sentences which are now to be passed should have a common starting date.Finlay J, when his Honour came to sentence Mr. Michael, dated the life sentence then passed upon Mr. Michael so as to deem it to have commenced on 11 September 1989, being the date upon which Mr. Michael first entered custody in connection with the murder of Miss McIlwain. His Honour took that course at the express request of Mr. Michael’s then legal representative, and in aid of any section 13A application that might be made in the future.
It seems to me, however, that Mr. Michael, like Mr. Slater, was not remanded in custody, in the sense in which that terminology is normally understood, until an order in that behalf was made by a Court of competent jurisdiction. I think, therefore, that in the case of each applicant the appropriate commencing date of any redetermined sentence is 12 September 1989.
7) I advert, finally, to the requirements of sub-section (10A) of section 13A of the Act. It provides:
“The Supreme Court, in exercising its functions under this section:
(a) must have regard to and give substantial weight to any relevant recommendations, observations and comments made by the original sentencing court when imposing the sentence concerned, and
(b) must give consideration to adopting or giving effect to their substance and the intention of the original sentencing court when making them, and
(c) must, to the extent that it declines to adopt or give effect to those matters, state its reasons for doing so.”
I have read and considered the remarks on sentence of both Finlay J and Loveday J. Both of their Honours denounced the criminality of the relevant offender in clear and strong terms which do not differ in substance from my own views. Each of their Honours made observations which indicated clearly an expectation that a section 13A application might well be made at some appropriate future time. Neither of their Honours recommended that the particular offender being sentenced should have his file marked ‘Never to be Released’.
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