REEVES -v- REGAN [2016] WASC 106

Jurisdiction:	SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA	Citation No:	[2016] WASC 106
Case No:	SJA:1076/2015	Heard:	31 MARCH 2016
Coram:	CORBOY J	Delivered:	5/04/16
No of pages:	4	Judgment Part:	1 of 1
Result:	Leave to appeal refused Appeal dismissed
Category:	B
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Parties:	SEAN FRANCIS REEVES EMILEY JAYDE REGAN CHRISTOPHER JACK CHRISTIAN
Catchwords:	Criminal law Appeal against sentence Section 63(2)(c) Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) Whether permanent disqualification mandatory
Legislation:	Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 60(1), s 60(2)(c)
Case References:	Jackamarra v Orr [2003] WASCA 278 K (a child) v Panaia [2011] WASC 210 Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

CITATION : REEVES -v- REGAN [2016] WASC 106 CORAM : CORBOY J HEARD : 31 MARCH 2016 DELIVERED : 5 APRIL 2016 FILE NO/S : SJA 1076 of 2015 BETWEEN : SEAN FRANCIS REEVES

Appellant

AND

EMILEY JAYDE REGAN

First Respondent

CHRISTOPHER JACK CHRISTIAN

Second Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram : MAGISTRATE R S HUSTON

File No : FR 423 of 2015, FR 424 of 2015, FR 425 of 2015, FR 426 of 2015

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Section 63(2)(c) Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) - Whether permanent disqualification mandatory

Legislation:

Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 60(1), s 60(2)(c)

Result:

Leave to appeal refused

Appeal dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : In person

First Respondent : Mr T Pontre

Second Respondent : Mr T Pontre

Solicitors:

Appellant : In person

First Respondent : State Solicitor's Office

Second Respondent : State Solicitor's Office

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Jackamarra v Orr [2003] WASCA 278
K (a child) v Panaia [2011] WASC 210
Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473

CORBOY J

The application and the result

1 The appellant was convicted following trial of four charges:

(a) on 11 January 2015, he drove a motor vehicle registration number 1CW W138 on a road, namely, Douro Road, South Fremantle, whilst under the influence of alcohol to such an extent as to be incapable of having proper control of such vehicle, contrary to s 63(1) of the

Road Traffic Act 1974

(WA) (RTA);

(b) on 11 January 2015, he unlawfully damaged a motor vehicle, namely a Holden Commodore, registration 1EBF 462, being the property of Deborah Pratt, contrary to s 445 of the Criminal Code (WA);

(c) on 11 January 2015, in a lockup at Perth Watch House, he behaved in a disorderly manner by being verbally abusive, making threats to officers, also spitting at and attempting to bite officers, contrary to s 74A(2)(b) of the Criminal Code; and

(d) on 11 January 2015, he obstructed Senior Constable Houghton, a member of the Western Australian Police, in the performance of the officer's functions, contrary to s 172(2) of the Criminal Code.

2 The sentencing magistrate imposed a fine of $2,500 and disqualified the appellant from holding or obtaining a driver's licence permanently for the offence committed against s 63(1) RTA. The appellant seeks leave to appeal on the ground that, '[the penalty] was unfair of length of time of loss of licence'.

3 Section 9 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) provides that the leave of the court is required for each proposed ground of appeal. The court must not grant leave unless it is satisfied that the proposed ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding: Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473.

4 The proposed ground of appeal has no reasonable prospect of success for the following reasons.

Reasons

5 The appellant has two prior convictions for offences against s 63(1) RTA (the convictions were recorded on 14 June 1999 and 8 August 2002). Section 63(2)(c) RTA provides that a person convicted of an offence against s 63(1) is liable, for a third or subsequent offence, to a fine of not less than 42PU or more than 100PU, or to imprisonment for 18 months; and in any event, the court convicting that person shall order that he be permanently disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence.

6 In Jackamarra v Orr [2003] WASCA 278, Barker J held that the period of disqualification specified by s 63(2)(c) RTA for a third offence was mandatory, so that the order of the court must be that the offender is permanently disqualified from holding or obtaining a motor vehicle driver's licence [34]. As his Honour observed, there is no discretion in the matter. That aspect of his Honour's reasons has not been subsequently doubted. I also note that in K (a child) v Panaia [2011] WASC 210 [32], Hall J referred to permanent disqualification as mandatory for a third offence against s 60(1) RTA, s 60(3)(c) being in this respect identical with s 63(2)(c).

7 The meaning and effect of s 63(2)(c) is plain. The words 'shall order' are mandatory. Accordingly, the sentencing magistrate had no option but to permanently disqualify the appellant from holding or obtaining a motor vehicle driver's licence on his third conviction for an offence against s 63(1) RTA.

8 Leave to appeal is refused and the appeal is dismissed.

In the matter of Reeves v Regan, the appellant sought leave to appeal against the decision of the Magistrates Court of Western Australia. The appellant had been convicted of driving while disqualified and was subsequently disqualified from driving for a period of three years. The primary issue before the court was whether the disqualification was to be considered permanent, as per section 63(2)(c) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), or whether the court had discretion to impose a lesser period of disqualification. The appellant argued that the language of the statute was ambiguous and that the court should have considered the principles of statutory interpretation to determine whether the disqualification was intended to be mandatory.

The court considered the language of the statute and concluded that it was clear and unambiguous. The court held that the phrase "shall be disqualified" in section 63(2)(c) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) meant that the disqualification was mandatory and not subject to the court's discretion. The court further held that the principles of statutory interpretation did not support the appellant's argument that the disqualification was not mandatory. The court found that the appellant's argument was contrary to the plain meaning of the statutory language and that the court was bound to apply the statute as written.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused. The court held that the disqualification was mandatory and that the appellant's sentence was appropriate. The court found that the appellant had been adequately warned of the consequences of driving while disqualified and that the sentence was necessary to deter the appellant and others from committing similar offences. The court concluded that the appeal was without merit and that there were no grounds for leave to appeal.

Reeves v Regan

REEVES -v- REGAN [2016] WASC 106

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Orders of the court

Background to the litigation

Evidence Before The Court

Reasons for decision

Legal Principle Established