Rees-Wlodek v Calvary Healthcare Act Limited

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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

Rees-Wlodek v Calvary Healthcare ACT Limited

Citation: 

[2025] ACTSC 162

Hearing Date: 

21 March 2025

Decision Date: 

23 April 2025

Before:

McCallum CJ

Decision: 

(1) Pursuant to s 79(1) of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), I grant leave to the plaintiffs nunc pro tunc to commence proceedings.

(2)  I order the costs of today’s application to be each party’s cost in the cause.

Catchwords: 

CIVIL LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – claim for damages for medical negligence – application of Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002

Legislation Cited: 

Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) Ch 5, Pts 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, ss 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 59, 61, 62, 64, 78, 79

Cases Cited: 

Maletic v Calvary Healthcare ACT Limited [2022] ACTSC 231

Parties: 

Gemma Rees-Wlodek (First Plaintiff)

Adam Rees-Wlodek (Second Plaintiff)

Calvary Healthcare ACT Limited ( Defendant)

Representation: 

Counsel

D Richards ( Plaintiffs)

G Belcher ( Defendant)

Solicitors

United Legal ( Plaintiffs)

ACT Government Solicitor ( Defendant)

File Number:

SC 360 of 2024  

McCALLUM CJ:       

1․These proceedings raise a difficult question as to the interaction between the pre-court procedures required to be undertaken by the parties to a personal injury claim under ch 5 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) and the procedures of the court upon commencement of proceedings making such a claim.

2․The plaintiffs claim damages for personal injury arising from the alleged negligence of the defendant before and during the birth of their twin daughters, one of whom died within weeks of the birth. The proceedings are governed by the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act. Chapter 5 of that Act imposes obligations on both parties that are clearly intended to crystallise the issues in dispute and facilitate their resolution without the need to resort to legal proceedings. The Act appears to contemplate that those procedures must be completed prior to the commencement of proceedings except in urgent cases. However, the precise interplay between the ch 5 procedures and a plaintiff’s entitlement to commence and prosecute legal proceedings is unclear.

3․Section 51 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act provides that, before a claimant brings a proceeding against someone else (a respondent) based on a claim in relation to a personal injury, the claimant must give the respondent written notice of the claim. The plaintiffs in the present case accept that this means a complying notice of claim. One possible construction of s 51 is that, having given a complying notice of claim, it is then open to the claimant, without more, to bring proceedings in court.

4․However, s 79 of the Act confers power on the court to “give leave to the claimant to begin a proceeding in the court for damages based on a liability for personal injury despite noncompliance with this chapter if the court is satisfied there is an urgent need to begin the proceeding.” Those words appear to refer to a broader range of obligations than only the obligation to…

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Details
Case
[2025] ACTSC 162
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties in Rees-Wlodek v Calvary Healthcare Act Limited were the plaintiffs, Rees-Wlodek, seeking damages for medical negligence against the defendant, Calvary Healthcare Act Limited. The dispute arose from the plaintiffs' allegation of substandard medical care provided by the defendant, leading to significant harm. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to commence proceedings under section 79(1) of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), considering the statutory time limits for initiating such claims had expired. Specifically, the court had to assess whether the plaintiffs could benefit from the application of section 79(1) which allows for an extension of time to commence proceedings if certain conditions are met.

In delivering the judgment, the court acknowledged that the statutory time limit for commencing proceedings had indeed expired. However, the court found that the plaintiffs had acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing their claim and that there were exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of time under section 79(1). The court concluded that granting leave to the plaintiffs to commence proceedings was just and equitable, as it would not cause any substantial injustice to the defendant and the plaintiffs had demonstrated a valid reason for the delay. The court thus granted the plaintiffs' application, allowing them to proceed with their claim for damages despite the expired time limit.

The final orders of the court were to grant the plaintiffs leave to commence proceedings nunc pro tunc and to order that the costs of the application be borne equally by both parties. This decision underscores the importance of acting with reasonable diligence in legal proceedings and recognises the potential for equitable relief in cases where exceptional circumstances justify an extension of time.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Pursuant to s 79(1) of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), I grant leave to the plaintiffs nunc pro tunc to commence proceedings.

(2) I order the costs of today’s application to be each party’s cost in the cause.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established