Redman v Redman

[2014] HCASL 23

REDMAN

v

REDMAN

[2014] HCASL 23
C21/2013

1. The applicant and respondent are a married couple. On 28 February 2012 the applicant and respondent filed an "Application for Consent Orders" pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") to transfer property owned by the applicant (the family home) to the applicant and respondent as joint tenants. At the time of the application there was no suggestion that the parties' relationship was broken or was about to break down.

2. On 9 March 2012 the Registrar of the Family Court of Australia dismissed the application.  On 28 March 2012 the applicant applied for a review of the Registrar's decision. Faulks Deputy CJ dismissed the application.

3. The applicant appealed to the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia (Bryant CJ, Finn and Watts JJ). The Full Court granted leave to appeal, holding that Faulks Deputy CJ erred by inferring that the sole purpose of seeking the consent orders was to avoid the cost of stamp duty. The Full Court also held that his Honour erred in concluding that the consent orders would preclude the parties from having other orders made if the marriage subsequently broke down. However, the Full Court refused to re-exercise the discretion conferred by s 79 of the Act and dismissed the appeal. The Full Court was not satisfied that the order sought by the applicant would be "just and equitable". There was no principled reason for interfering with the parties' existing legal and equitable interests. The Full Court noted that granting the order would have no utility as the same outcome could be reached if the applicant paid the stamp duty. Further, there was no evidence in relation to the contributions made to the property by the parties and whether the respondent had received independent legal advice, given her limited English language skills.

4. The applicant applies for special leave to appeal to this Court. He claims that the Full Court erred by failing to re-exercise the discretion to make the consent orders to adjust the property interests of the parties.  The application does not raise any question of principle nor does the application enjoy sufficient prospects of success to warrant a grant of special leave to appeal.  Special leave should be refused.

S.M. Kiefel
6 March 2014 P.A. Keane

1. Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.