Rebecca Hall v Sherkaz Pty Ltd T/A Country Acres Caravan Park
[2018] FWC 6847
•13 NOVEMBER 2018
| [2018] FWC 6847 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION NO. 2 |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Rebecca Hall
v
Sherkaz Pty Ltd T/A Country Acres Caravan Park
(U2018/5109)
| COMMISSIONER CAMBRIDGE | SYDNEY, 13 NOVEMBER 2018 |
Unfair dismissal - Small Business Fair Dismissal Code - summary dismissal - no basis to establish serious misconduct - other dismissal - not consistent with Small Business Fair Dismissal Code - no valid reason - absence of procedural fairness - compensation Ordered.
This Decision involves an application for unfair dismissal remedy which has been made under section 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). The application was made by Rebecca Hall (the applicant). The respondent employer has been identified to be Sherkaz Pty Ltd T/A Country Acres Caravan Park ABN: 65 051 875 319 (the employer).
The application was filed on 16 May 2018, and it indicated that the date of the applicant’s dismissal was 26 April 2018. Consequently the application was made within the 21 day time limit prescribed by subsection 394 (2) (a) of the Act.
Conciliation of the matter occurred on 14 June 2018. Apparently agreement had been reached to settle the matter, but subsequently the applicant indicated that she did not wish to “settle on the agreement made by myself and sherkaz pty Ltd.”
The employer raised a jurisdictional objection to the application on the basis that the dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code (the SBFD Code). The matter has proceeded to arbitration before the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) in a Hearing conducted in Newcastle on 25 September 2018. The Hearing dealt with evidence and submissions which encompassed both the jurisdictional objection raised by the employer and also the substantive issues of the alleged unfair dismissal.
At the Hearing, each of the Parties were unrepresented, as the Commission had earlier issued a Decision [2018] FWC 5793 which refused permission that had been sought by the employer to be represented by lawyers or paid agents. The applicant provided evidence as a witness, and she also called her sister, Ms Susanne Patricia Kennedy, to provide evidence as a witness in support of the unfair dismissal claim. Mr Murray William Reid, the managing director and owner of the employer’s business, appeared for the employer at the Hearing. Mr Reid was the only witness who provided evidence on behalf of the employer.
Factual Background
The employer is a small business employer, which at the time of the dismissal of the applicant, employed less than 15 persons. The employer has for the past 27 years, conducted a business as the operators and managers of the Country Acres Caravan Park (the caravan park), which is located in the New South Wales Hunter Valley town of Singleton.
The applicant was employed for a period of one year and eight days. The applicant was engaged as a “casual” cleaner working on a regular and systematic basis and she had a reasonable expectation of continuing employment with the employer on a regular and systematic basis. The work of the applicant involved the broad range of general cleaning duties associated with the cleaning of on-site accommodation and other facilities located at the caravan park.
The applicant was absent from duties at the caravan park for a period between November 2017 and February 2018 as a result of a workplace injury. During this period of the applicant’s absence, her sister, Susanne Kennedy, was engaged to undertake the regular cleaning duties that would have otherwise been performed by the applicant.
On 5 February 2018, Ms Kennedy had commenced work cleaning either cabin 16 or 17 at the caravan park when she realised that she needed to retrieve an additional blanket, and she returned to the reception area of the caravan park. Upon entering the kitchen area of a house that was located adjacent to the reception area, Ms Kennedy said that she unexpectedly discovered the employer’s managing director, Mr Murray Reid, engaging in sexual activity with one of the other casual cleaners, Ms Tanya Halpin.
Ms Kennedy said that at the time when she had discovered Mr Reid and Ms Halpin in what she described as “a compromising position together,”[1] Mr Reid had stated her name “Sue” and said little else, and then he moved himself away from where he was positioned whilst Ms Halpin straightened up her clothes. Ms Kennedy said that she then retrieved the blanket for the cabin and her mobile phone, and then, after Ms Halpin had completed straightening up her clothes, she told Ms Kennedy that she would return with her to cabin 17 and she got into the buggy and went back to cabin 17 with Ms Kennedy.
Ms Kennedy completed the remainder of her duties, and later that day, 5 February, she telephoned her sister (the applicant) to ask when her sister might be returning to work. Ms Kennedy said that she had been concerned and upset about the incident of earlier that day when she had discovered Mr Reid and Ms Halpin in “a compromising position” (the compromising incident). Ms Kennedy said that as a result of the compromising incident, she was keen to have her sister return to work, and thereby enable her to finish her employment at the caravan park, particularly as she had other employment arranged. Ms Kennedy said that during the telephone conversation on 5 February she did not tell her sister about the compromising incident but simply indicated that she did not wish to work at the caravan park any longer.
On 8 February 2018, Ms Kennedy gave notice to the employer of her resignation from employment which was effective such that her last day of work as a cleaner at the caravan park was 12 February 2018. On 9 February 2018, Ms Kennedy had a conversation with the employer’s office administration assistant, Ms Karen Cavanough. This conversation involved Ms Kennedy telling Ms Cavanough that she was finishing her employment at the caravan park and saying goodbye to Ms Cavanough and other staff. During this conversation, there was some discussion between the two women about the interaction and apparent relationship between Mr Reid and Ms Halpin. Although Ms Kennedy did not provide details, she mentioned the compromising incident to Ms Cavanough.
On or about 13 February 2018, the applicant returned to work after her absence on workers compensation. On 2 March 2018, Ms Halpin who had been undertaking cleaning work with the applicant, told Mr Reid that the applicant had said to her that she knew about the relationship between her and Mr Reid, and that she had proof of the “affair”. Ms Halpin told Mr Reid that she was upset about what the applicant had said regarding the alleged “affair”.
Mr Reid decided to conduct an internal investigation into the applicant allegedly informing Ms Halpin that she was aware of the “affair”. As part of his investigation, Mr Reid discussed the matter with his solicitor and it was decided that it would be necessary to have another person, in addition to Ms Halpin, verify that the applicant had asserted that Mr Reid and Ms Halpin were involved in the “affair”.
Subsequently, Mr Reid obtained Statutory Declarations from both Ms Halpin and Ms Cavanough which, in the case of Ms Halpin, described the incident of 2 March 2018, whereby the applicant had allegedly informed her that she had knowledge of the “affair”. Ms Cavanough provided a Statutory Declaration dated 3 April 2018, which declared and affirmed her knowledge of an incident that was said to have occurred on the evening of 5 February 2018, whereby the applicant was alleged to have told Ms Cavanough about the compromising incident.
After Mr Reid had obtained the Statutory Declarations from Ms Cavanough and then Ms Halpin, he contacted the applicant and requested that she come to a meeting in the caravan park office on 26 April 2018. At the meeting held on 26 April, Mr Reid told the applicant that she was dismissed from her employment because he believed that she had made allegations about him.
The applicant was provided with a letter of dismissal dated April 26, 2018 which advised of the termination of employment due to an allegation made by the applicant to Ms Halpin and Ms Cavanough. The letter of dismissal that was given to the applicant during the meeting stated that the allegations made the working environment hard and uncomfortable, and consequently the applicant’s employment was terminated immediately.
Following her dismissal, the applicant had apparently unsuccessfully sought alternative employment, and she has not sought reinstatement but alternatively, monetary compensation as remedy for her alleged unfair dismissal.
The Case for the Applicant
The applicant made submissions during the Hearing, and she stated that at no time had she been advised of the allegations made against her prior to the time at which she was dismissed on 26 April 2018. The applicant stated that at no time had she said to either Ms Halpin or Ms Cavanough that Mr Reid and Ms Halpin were having an affair. The applicant said that she did not use the word affair and that she knew that Mr Reid would not leave his partner, Simone, “for a hit”[2].
The applicant made further submissions which involved significant complaint about the absence of any prior indication of the allegations contained in the Statutory Declarations that were made by Ms Halpin and Ms Cavanough. The applicant acknowledged that she had had some trouble with Ms Halpin, and she had advised of her displeasure at the nature of conversations that frequently occurred between Ms Halpin and Mr Reid in the workplace. In this regard, the applicant had said that all she had ever done was to ask them to “stop talking sexual shit and doing stuff in front of me.”[3]
The applicant restated that she believed that she had been unfairly dismissed because she did not have any opportunity to speak and she knew nothing of the internal investigation regarding allegations against her. The applicant restated that she had never said that Ms Halpin and Mr Reid were having an affair.
The Case for the Employer
Mr Reid made submissions on behalf of the employer during the Hearing held on 25 September 2018. Mr Reid said that the employer was a small family owned business that operated on the basis of only a few people who had to work together. Mr Reid said that Ms Halpin was upset, and she had worked in the business for a long time, and that her and her husband live at the caravan park and they are family friends.
Mr Reid further stated that the allegations that were made by the applicant meant that it was untenable for the employees to all work together. Mr Reid said the allegations that had been made to Ms Halpin were very upsetting to Ms Halpin and also to his partner who was now his wife. Mr Reid said that the whole circumstance involved a small working environment which became unworkable.
The submissions made by Mr Reid referred to the Statutory Declarations that he had used as support for the dismissal of the applicant. Mr Reid said that working in such a small environment with just a few people, made it hard if other people were making allegations about things that were not true. Mr Reid said that after consulting with his solicitor, he thought that he was going down the right track for a small business to terminate somebody’s employment.
Consideration
Section 385 of the Act stipulates that the Commission must be satisfied that four cumulative elements are met in order to establish an unfair dismissal. These elements are:
“(a) the person has been dismissed; and
(b) the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable; and
(c) the dismissal was not consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code; and
(d) the dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy.”
In this instance there was no dispute that the applicant had been dismissed, and that the dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy. Consequently, only the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of section 385 of the Act have any relevance.
Small Business Fair Dismissal Code
There was no dispute that the employer was a small business employer as comprehended by the meaning of small business employer stipulated by the terms of s. 23 of the Act. Therefore, the provisions of subsection 385 (c) of the Act require consideration. Specifically, by way of operation of s. 388 of the Act, it is necessary to determine whether the dismissal of the applicant was or was not consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code (referred to as “the SBFD Code”).
Logically a determination of any application of the SBFD Code should precede any more general contemplation of whether the dismissal could have been considered to have been harsh, unjust or unreasonable. Further, in the event that the dismissal of the applicant is found to have been consistent with the SBFD Code, any further consideration as to whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable would be unnecessary.
The SBFD Code is in the following terms:
“Small Business Fair Dismissal Code
Summary Dismissal
It is fair for an employer to dismiss an employee without notice or warning when the employer believes on reasonable grounds that the employee’s conduct is sufficiently serious to justify immediate dismissal. Serious misconduct includes theft, fraud, violence and serious breaches of occupational health and safety procedures. For a dismissal to be deemed fair it is sufficient, though not essential, that an allegation of theft, fraud or violence be reported to the police. Of course, the employer must have reasonable grounds for making the report.
Other Dismissal
In other cases, the small business employer must give the employee a reason why he or she is at risk of being dismissed. The reason must be a valid reason based on the employee’s conduct or capacity to do the job.
The employee must be warned verbally or preferably in writing, that he or she risks being dismissed if there is no improvement.
The small business employer must provide the employee with an opportunity to respond to the warning and give the employee a reasonable chance to rectify the problem, having regard to the employee’s response. Rectifying the problem might involve the employer providing additional training and ensuring the employee knows the employer’s job expectations.
Procedural Matters
In discussions with an employee in circumstances where dismissal is possible, the employee can have another person present to assist. However, the other person cannot be a lawyer acting in a professional capacity.
A small business employer will be required to provide evidence of compliance with the Code if the employee makes a claim for unfair dismissal to Fair Work Australia, including evidence that a warning has been given (except in cases of summary dismissal). Evidence may include a completed checklist, copies of written warning(s), a statement of termination or signed witness statements.”
In this case the applicant was dismissed for reason of conduct involving what was described as an allegation that the employer believed the applicant had made to Ms Halpin and to Ms Cavanough. Essentially, the conduct of the applicant amounted to her allegedly making an accusation to Ms Halpin and Ms Cavanough that Mr Reid and Ms Halpin were involved in a sexual relationship of some kind, a.k.a. an “affair.” The belief of the employer was supported by the two Statutory Declarations obtained by Mr Reid pursuant to legal advice that he had obtained. The dismissal of the applicant was immediate in effect.
Consequently, the employer has attempted to rely upon that part of the SBFD Code relating to summary dismissal. In particular, the dismissal of the applicant was intended to have accorded with the first sentence of the SBFD Code which is repeated: “It is fair for an employer to dismiss an employee without notice or warning when the employer believes on reasonable grounds that the employee’s conduct is sufficiently serious to justify immediate dismissal.” Further, it is relevant to construe the application of the SBFD Code having regard for the Full Bench Decision in the case of Ryman v Thrash Pty Ltd (Thrash).[4]
In this instance, the employer did not provide notice or payment in lieu of notice, and the dismissal was immediate in effect. However, apart from the absence of notice or payment of notice, the dismissal did not possess any of the elements usually associated with a summary dismissal. In particular, the conduct upon which the dismissal was founded was known to the employer from at least 2 March 2018. However, the employment was permitted to continue for a considerable period of time during which the employer gathered the Statutory Declarations to shore up the dismissal for compliance with what Mr Reid called the “Small Business Fair Work thing”.[5]
Consequently, the conduct for which the applicant was dismissed, which might be described as spreading the allegation of the “affair,” was not treated by the employer as misconduct sufficiently serious to justify immediate dismissal. Therefore, to the extent that the SBFD Code is to be applied, the summary dismissal terms of the SBFD Code are not relevant to the applicant’s circumstances, which did not involve any serious misconduct such as theft, fraud, violence and serious breaches of occupational health and safety procedures. Instead, the other dismissal provisions of the SBFD Code are applicable.
The evidence clearly established that the dismissal of the applicant was not consistent with the other dismissal provisions of the SBFD Code. The first that the applicant heard about the conduct for which she was dismissed was when she was dismissed. During the Hearing, Mr Reid was questioned by the applicant as to why he did not ask the applicant about the allegations that had been raised with him by Ms Halpin and he responded; “Because I thought you’d just deny the allegations.”[6]
The applicant was completely unaware that Mr Reid was conducting an internal investigation into what she had allegedly said to Ms Halpin and Ms Cavanough, and she had no idea that she was at risk of being dismissed. The absence of opportunity for the applicant to be heard in respect to the conduct that was alleged against her was confirmed by Mr Reid when he provided the following evidence in answer to questions from the Commission:
“During that period, certainly after 4 April and before 26 April, is there any reason why you didn’t put the statutory declarations before the applicant and ask her to respond? --- No.”[7]
It appeared from the evidence that the employer was, as a result of legal advice, endeavouring to establish an evidentiary case to support the proposition that it had reasonable grounds for a belief that the applicant had made accusations about the “affair” without, at any time, putting the allegations of that conduct squarely to the applicant. This approach appeared to have been adopted upon the assumption that the SBFD Code would provide some immunity from any requirement to allow the applicant an opportunity to respond to the allegations made against her, and thus allow the dismissal of the applicant to be made without prospect for the applicant to be capable of mounting an unfair dismissal challenge.
The employer’s misguided approach whereby it attempted to construct an evidentiary basis for a dismissal that would rely upon the summary dismissal part of the SBFD Code, in circumstances where the particular conduct was not sufficiently serious to justify immediate dismissal, was particularly ironic in this instance. The particular irony arises from the fact that if the employer had dismissed the applicant eight or more days earlier, she would not have been a person protected from unfair dismissal because as an employee of a small business employer she would not have completed the minimum employment period of one year.
Harsh, Unjust or Unreasonable
As the dismissal of the applicant was not consistent with the SBFD Code, the matter has required further consideration in respect to that element contained in s. 385 (b) of the Act, being whether the dismissal of the applicant was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. Section 387 of the Act contains criteria that the Commission must take into account in any determination of whether a dismissal is harsh, unjust or unreasonable. These criteria are:
(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and
(b) whether the person was notified of that reason; and
(c) whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and
(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and
(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person—whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and
(f) the degree to which the size of the employer’s enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(h) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.
S. 387 (a) - Valid Reason for the Dismissal Related to Capacity or Conduct
The reason for the dismissal of the applicant involved her alleged conduct whereby she was said to have conveyed to Ms Halpin and Ms Cavanough accusations about a sexual relationship between Mr Reid and Ms Halpin. Conduct of this nature, particularly in a small workplace could, conceivably, provide valid reason for dismissal of an employee.
In this instance the evidence has not established that the applicant did make the statements to Ms Halpin and Ms Cavanough as were attributed to her in the respective Statutory Declarations of those individuals. In the absence of both Ms Halpin and Ms Cavanough as witnesses, the details of the conduct that they had attributed to the applicant has not been capable of being tested. Conversely, the applicant provided evidence as a witness and which steadfastly rejected that she had made the statements to Ms Halpin and Ms Cavanough as they had asserted.
In such circumstances the witness evidence of the applicant and her sister which was tested by way of cross examination without identifiable discredit, must be preferred over the untested Statutory Declarations of Ms Halpin and Ms Cavanough.
Consequently, the Commission is unable to make any factual finding that the applicant actually engaged in the conduct for which she was dismissed. As a result, the reason for dismissal was not sound, defensible or well-founded. There was not a valid reason for the dismissal of the applicant.
S. 387 (b) - Notification of Reason for Dismissal
The employer provided notification of dismissal in the form of the termination of employment letter handed to the applicant shortly after the commencement of the meeting held on 26 April 2018.
S. 387 (c) - Opportunity to Respond to any Reason Related to Capacity or Conduct
The employer did not provide any opportunity for the applicant to respond or provide any form of explanation for any of the conduct that was alleged in the Statutory Declarations of Ms Halpin and Ms Cavanough. The employer simply accepted the contents and accuracy of the Statutory Declarations without question or any further inquiry.
S. 387 (d) - Unreasonable Refusal to Allow a Support Person to Assist
There was no evidence that the applicant was provided with an opportunity to allow her to have a support person present during the meeting that was held on 26 April 2018. In any event, the decision to dismiss the applicant had been taken before the commencement of that meeting. Therefore the presence of any support person could not have assisted at any stage of a process involving contemplation and then determination of dismissal. Instead, the role of any support person would have been confined to aiding the applicant in respect to her reaction to the predetermined decision to dismiss.
S. 387 (e) - Warning about Unsatisfactory Performance
The applicant was not dismissed for unsatisfactory performance and therefore this factor is not relevant in this case.
S. 387 (f) - Size of Enterprise Likely to Impact on Procedures
The employer is a small business employer and appropriate recognition for a degree of informality and flexibility in respect to employment related procedures has been provided.
S. 387 (g) - Absence of Management Specialists or Expertise Likely to Impact on Procedures
There was no evidence that the employer did have dedicated human resource management specialists. However, the employer had obtained assistance by way of legal advice. The absence of human resource management specialists and the level of informality that would understandably exist in a small business enterprise could not justify the adoption of a procedure whereby the decision to dismiss the applicant was taken without providing any opportunity to hear from the applicant.
S. 387 (h) - Other Relevant Matters
There were no other relevant matters identified as requiring consideration.
Conclusion
This unfair dismissal claim has involved consideration of the application of the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code (the SBFD Code). Although the applicant was dismissed with immediate effect, and not paid any amount in lieu of notice, all other aspects of the dismissal characterise it as a dismissal that was not for conduct that was sufficiently serious to justify immediate dismissal.
In such circumstances, I have determined that the summary dismissal provisions of the SBFD Code are not applicable. Upon further analysis the dismissal of the applicant was not consistent with the other dismissal provisions of the SBFD Code. Therefore the dismissal of the applicant was not consistent with the SBFD Code.
Further, in this case, the reason for the dismissal of the applicant could not be established in fact. Therefore, the reason for the dismissal of the applicant was not sound, defensible or well-founded. There was not a valid reason for the dismissal of the applicant related to her capacity or conduct.
The procedure that the employer adopted whereby it advised the applicant of her dismissal shortly after the commencement of the meeting held on 26 April 2018, and which was for reasons that the applicant had no prior knowledge, was plainly unjust, manifestly unreasonable, and unnecessarily harsh.
In summary, the dismissal of the applicant was firstly not consistent with the SBFD Code and secondly, without valid reason involving established misconduct or capacity inadequacy. Further, the dismissal involved an entirely unjust and unreasonable process including the complete absence of any opportunity for the applicant to be heard before the decision to dismiss was made. Consequently, upon analysis of the various factors that are identified in s. 387 of the Act, an objective and balanced evaluation of all of the relevant circumstances has provided compelling basis to establish that the dismissal of the applicant was harsh, unjust and unreasonable. Therefore, the applicant’s claim for unfair dismissal remedy has been established.
Remedy
The applicant has not sought reinstatement as a remedy for her unfair dismissal. In the circumstances, particularly as the employment of the applicant was irreparably damaged by the unfortunate circumstances surrounding the “affair”, reinstatement would not be an appropriate remedy.
I have decided that compensation would be an appropriate remedy for the applicant’s unfair dismissal, and I turn to the factors which involve the quantification of any amount of compensation.
Section 392 of the Act prescribes certain matters that deal with compensation as a remedy for unfair dismissal. I have approached the question of compensation having regard for the guidelines that have been established in the Full Bench Decisions of; Sprigg v Paul’s Licensed Festival Supermarket[8] and, Smith and Ors v Moore Paragon Australia Ltd [9] and, more recently, the cases of McCulloch v Calvary Health Care Adelaide[10] and Balaclava Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Nurcombe[11].
Firstly, I confirm that an Order for payment of compensation to the applicant will be made against the employer in lieu of reinstatement of the applicant.
Secondly, in determining the amount of compensation that I Order, I have taken into account all of the circumstances of the matter including the factors set out in paragraphs (a) to (g) of subsection 392 (2) of the Act.
There was no evidence provided which established that an Order of compensation would impact on the viability of the employer’s enterprise.
The applicant had been employed for a period of one year and 8 days. The applicant would have been likely to have received remuneration of approximately $460 per week if she had not been dismissed.
There was evidence to provide some basis to conclude that the employment of the applicant may not have continued for a significant period of time because of, inter alia, the deteriorating relationship between the applicant and the employer arising from the difficulties that arose between the applicant and Ms Halpin.
For the purposes of calculation of remuneration that the applicant would have received or would have been likely to receive if she had not been dismissed, I have notionally considered that the employment of the applicant would have continued for at least a further 12 weeks. Therefore, the total remuneration that would have been received in the notional period of 12 weeks following dismissal amounted to a figure of $5,520.
The total amount of remuneration received in alternative employment, as identified, and that which may be reasonably likely to be earned between dismissal and the making of the Order for compensation, has been calculated to be 0.
Thirdly, in this instance there was no established misconduct of the applicant, and consequently I have decided to make no reduction to the amount of compensation to be provided to the applicant on account of any established misconduct.
Fourthly, I confirm that any amount Ordered does not include a component by way of compensation for shock, distress or humiliation, or other analogous hurt caused to the applicant by the manner of the dismissal.
Fifthly, the amount Ordered does not exceed the compensation cap as prescribed by s. 392 (5) of the Act.
Consequently, for the reasons outlined above I have determined that the amount of compensation to be provided to the applicant should be $5,520.
Accordingly, separate Orders [PR702099] providing for unfair dismissal remedy in these terms will be issued.
COMMISSIONER
Appearances:
Ms R Hall appeared unrepresented.
Mr M Reid appeared for the employer.
Hearing details:
2018.
Newcastle:
September, 25.
<PR702098>
[1] Exhibit 3.
[2] Transcript @ PN102.
[3] Transcript @ PN340.
[4] Jeremy Ryman v Thrash Pty Ltd t/a Wisharts Automotive Services [2015] FWCFB 5264.
[5] Transcript @ PN290.
[6] Transcript @ PN289.
[7] Transcript @ PN307.
[8] Sprigg v Paul’s Licensed Festival Supermarket, (Munro J, Duncan DP and Jones C), (1998) 88IR 21.
[9] Smith and Ors v Moore Paragon Australia Ltd, (Lawler VP, Kaufman SDP and Mansfield C), (2004) PR942856.
[10] John McCulloch v Calvary Health Care Adelaide, (Ross P, Hatcher VP and Gostencnik DP), [2015] FWCFB 873.
[11] Balaclava Pastoral Co Pty Ltd t/a Australian Hotel Cowra v Darren Nurcombe, (Hatcher VP, Gostencnik DP and Cribb C) [2017] FWCFB 429.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
0
1
0