Reardon and Repatriation Commission
[2003] AATA 622
•26 June 2003
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2003] AATA 622
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No N2002/1115
VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION ) Re JAMES REARDON Applicant
And
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal REAR ADMIRAL A R HORTON Date 26 June 2003
PlaceSydney
Decision The decision under review is affirmed
[sgd] REAR ADMIRAL A R HORTON, MEMBER
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ AFFAIRS – veterans entitlements – disability pension – whether applicant has anxiety disorder – RAN service – service in aircraft carriers – operational service - whether psychiatric condition has causal connection with service – whether SoP factor(s) met – reasonable hypothesis
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 sections 120,120A
Statement of Principles 1 of 2000
Byrnes v Repatriation Commission (1993) 177 CLR 564
Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 49 ALD 193
Lees v Repatriation Commission [2002] FCA 398
Roncevich v Repatriation Commission [2001] FCA 1320
Stoddart v Repatriation Commission [2003] FCA 334
Robertson and Repatriation Commission (AAT 12666, 2 March 1998)
REASONS FOR DECISION
26 June 2003 REAR ADMIRAL A R HORTON 1. This is an application to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) by James Reardon (“the Applicant”, ”the Veteran”). The application seeks review of a decision of the Veterans’ Review Board (“the VRB”) dated 6 June 2002, which affirmed a decision of the Repatriation Commission (“the Respondent”) dated 23 January 2002 refusing a claim for Generalised Anxiety Disorder, and set aside the decision of the Respondent in respect of pension, substituting its decision that pension was to be assessed at 60% of the General Rate. The latter decision is not an issue before the Tribunal.
2. At the hearing before the Tribunal on 7 May 2003, Mr Reardon was represented by Mr B Winship of Counsel. Mr J Marsh, Senior Advocate, represented the Respondent. The Applicant gave oral evidence, and concurrent evidence was heard from Dr A Hordern and Dr R Haik, Psychiatrists.
3. The Tribunal had before it the documents provided by the Respondent pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (T documents) and additional service documents (TD1). The Tribunal also took into evidence the following:
Exhibit A1 Report by Dr A Hordern dated 22 October 2002
Exhibit A2 Letter from Mrs Joyce Reardon dated 6 May 2003
Exhibit R1 Transcript of the VRB Hearing 6 June 2002
Exhibit R2 Clinical Notes by Dr P Teh, General Practitioner
Exhibit R3Report by Captain H A Josephs AM for Writeway Research Service dated 20 February 2003 and attachments
Exhibit R4Report by Dr R Haik dated 7 November 2002
ISSUES
4. On 10 October 2001, the Applicant lodged a claim for osteoporosis, stress/anxiety and left eye amblyopia. Osteoporosis was accepted and left eye amblyopia considered to be an invalid claim. Stress/anxiety was considered under the diagnosis of Generalised Anxiety Disorder and not accepted on the basis that the condition was not related to operational service. Before the Tribunal, the Respondent contended that the diagnostic criteria for generalised anxiety disorder was not met, and alternatively, Mr Reardon did not experience a severe psychosocial stressor as required under the relevant Statement of Principles (“SoP”).
5. Mr Reardon has three periods of operational service in the Royal Australian Navy, and hence this matter is to be considered under the provisions of sections 120(1) and (3) of the Act, the relevant standard of proof relating to reasonable hypothesis, and section 120A, whereby as the claim was made after 1 June 1994, the reasonableness of the hypothesis is to be assessed by reference to Statement of Principles. Both parties agreed that the applicable SoP is No. 1 of 2000.
STANDARD OF PROOF
6. Sections 120 and 120A of the Act state relevantly:
"120 Standard of proof
(1) Where a claim under Part II for a pension in respect of the incapacity from injury or disease of a veteran, or of the death of a veteran, relates to the operational service rendered by the veteran, the Commission shall determine that the injury was a war-caused injury, that the disease was a war-caused disease or that the death of the veteran was war-caused, as the case may be, unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.
...
(3) In applying subsection (1) or (2) in respect of the incapacity of a person from injury or disease, or in respect of the death of a person, related to service rendered by the person, the Commission shall be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining:
(a) that the injury was a war-caused injury or a defence-caused injury;
(b) that the disease was a war-caused disease or a defence-caused disease; or
(c) that the death was war-caused or defence-caused;
as the case may be, if the Commission, after consideration of the whole of the material before it, is of the opinion that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.
(4) Except in making a determination to which subsection (1) or (2) applies, the Commission shall, in making any determination or decision in respect of a matter arising under this Act or the regulations, including the assessment or re-assessment of the rate of a pension granted under Part II or Part IV, decide the matter to its reasonable satisfaction.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120B.
...
120A Reasonableness of hypothesis to be assessed by reference to Statement of Principles
(1) This section applies to any of the following claims made on or after 1 June 1994:
(a) a claim under Part II that relates to the operational service rendered by a veteran;
...
(2) If the Repatriation Medical Authority has given notice under section 196G that it intends to carry out an investigation in respect of a particular kind of injury, disease or death, the Commission is not to determine a claim in respect of the incapacity of a person from an injury or disease of that kind, or in respect of a death of that kind, unless or until the Authority:
(a) has determined a Statement of Principles under subsection 196B(2) in respect of that kind of injury, disease or death; or
(b) has declared that it does not propose to make such a Statement of Principles.
(3) For the purposes of subsection 120(3), a hypothesis connecting an injury suffered by a person, a disease contracted by a person or the death of a person with the circumstances of any particular service rendered by the person is reasonable only if there is in force:
(a) a Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B(2) or (11); or
(b) a determination of the Commission under subsection 180A(2);
that upholds the hypothesis.
Note: See subsection (4) about the application of this subsection.
(4) Subsection (3) does not apply in relation to a claim in respect of the incapacity from injury or disease, or the death, of a person if the Authority has neither determined a Statement of Principles under subsection 196B(2), nor declared that it does not propose to make such a Statement of Principles, in respect of:
(a) the kind of injury suffered by the person; or
(b) the kind of disease contracted by the person; or
(c) the kind of death met by the person;
as the case may be."
BACKGROUND
7. The Applicant was born in Liverpool, England, in August 1931, and grew up in that city. His father was a slate and roof tiler, and his mother undertook some casual work. In evidence, he stated that he vividly recalled the bombing of Liverpool during the war, and in particular the blitz in May 1941, when he and his family had to take refuge in a community air raid shelter over a 10 to 12 day period. He recalled significant damage and loss of life, and described the period as “rather traumatic”.. Whilst his own home was not bombed, a previous family home was destroyed. The home of his aunt was bombed, and an uncle was killed in France. None of his schoolmates were killed. In the early stages of the war, he was evacuated for a short period to Wales initially and then to Chester, but he had returned to his family in Liverpool before the May 1941 blitz.
8. He completed his schooling in 1945, and as his father would not agree to him joining the Royal Navy, he initially worked as a grocery boy then, obtained a job carrying coal to houses in the area, which he undertook for 3 years before migrating to Australia under the sponsorship of the Big Brother movement in 1948 aged 17. That sponsorship required him to work on the land for 2 years. He worked as a farm hand for some 3 years, mainly in the Young area, and married a local girl in July 1952. The Korean War provided the opportunity to join the Royal Australian Navy, but as he was underage, his father would not give permission. In 1952, at the age of 21, he joined the navy; his service records showing service from 20 August until discharged “engagement expired” on 19 August 1958. Following his discharge, he completed a three year apprenticeship as a butcher under the Commonwealth Rehabilitation Training Scheme, then worked in that capacity and in time as a manager of the butcher shop, for Woolworths. He subsequently joined the Department of Agriculture, became a food market reporter, and later wrote both a weekly column in the Land newspaper and a consumer “spot” in the Sydney Morning Herald, retiring in 1991. In cross-examination, he stated he had not sought medical attention during his working life after his naval service, (that is from 1958 to 1991).
NAVAL SERVICE
9. Following his recruit training, and qualification as a steward, Mr Reardon was temporarily posted to HMAS WATSON before joining the aircraft carrier SYDNEY on 14 September 1953. SYDNEY deployed to the Far East Station in October 1953 and was allotted for operational service from 27 October 1953 until 2 June 1954, subsequently returning to Australia. Mr Reardon was aware that the Korean Armistice had been signed in July 1953. He drafted from SYDNEY to the aircraft Carrier VENGEANCE on 23 August 1954. Whilst his service in VENGEANCE and subsequently the aircraft carrier MELBOURNE has relevance in that he rendered operational service in both those ships, his claim for the acceptance of generalised anxiety disorder rests primarily on incidents that he considers occurred in SYDNEY.
10. Onboard SYDNEY, Mr Reardon’s primary duty was that of a wine steward in the Wardroom Mess, whereby he performed duties as allocated by the Chief Steward. He was trained for such duties, but confirmed he had also undergone a damage control course, and in certain states of readiness, he had duties relating to ship safety and damage control. When the ship went to action stations – and he gave evidence that during his time onboard this was only done for drill purposes – his station was “action messing”, that is the provision of food for personnel who periodically rotated through the action messing facility. He was generally unaware of activities outside his area of responsibility, such as the route of the ship on passage to Korea, a situation the Tribunal accepts as being fairly normal for a sailor whose primary responsibilities did not involve ships operations. In evidence, Mr Reardon recounted a number of incidents that he became aware of during the deployment.
11. He recalled an occasion when the ship was making passage through Shiminoseki Strait in Japan, when a warning “pipe”, or broadcast, required all X and Y openings to be closed, which he stated required “every watertight door on the ship to be closed” and which led him to think “we are going to have a collision”. His understanding was that an American Landing Ship Tank (“LST”) was also transiting the Strait. The Applicant had indicated to Dr Hordern (Exhibit A1) that this incident occurred in December 1953; the ship’s Report of Proceedings at Exhibit R3 Attachment 6 refers to “a most eventful night passage of Shimonoseki Strait in which collision with no less than 3 LSTs was only narrowly averted by going astern on each occasion”, and it is accepted that this is probably the occasion to which Mr Reardon refers. In evidence, Mr Reardon stated that he did not see anything being “down below” and “really did not know what was happening…but felt a little bit apprehensive”.
12. A second incident was an occasion when an aircraft took off and a pipe (broadcast) was made to the effect that “a bomb was about to explode beneath the ship”, this presumably having been accidentally released from the aircraft. Mr Reardon stated he “went through the door to get out” but in the event nothing happened. He described this as an isolated incident. Reports of proceedings make no mention of such an incident, and at Exhibit R3, Captain Josephs notes that neither of the officers he consulted, who had been onboard at the time, could recall such an incident. In cross-examination, the Respondent sought to imply that the bomb, if it existed, was small, unlikely to explode, and not a threat as the ship would have passed well clear. These were not questions that the Applicant had the knowledge to answer.
13. A third incident referred to by the Applicant was that of a pilot being seriously injured when he walked into an aircraft propeller on the flight deck. This incident, involving a Sub Lieutenant J H McClinton RN, who subsequently died from his injuries, is referred to in the Report of Proceedings for January 1954. Mr Reardon gave evidence that prior to the hearing, he had been of the opinion, based on what he had been told that a Lieutenant Carmichael had been injured and subsequently died. He knew Carmichael “personally” (Exhibit R1 VRB transcript), and Dr Hordern reports at Exhibit A1 that he commented that he “had particularly liked Lieutenant Carmichael and so had been upset by the latter’s death”. The Applicant accepted that Lieutenant Carmichael had probably continued serving in SYDNEY (until return to Australia), but with some 120 officers onboard, he had not observed him in the ensuing months.
14. The Report of Proceedings for December 1953 refers to a sonar contact, initially classified submarine, being gained by HMS WREN, a destroyer screening the carrier. The report indicates that SYDNEY withdrew from the area, and the search by escorts continued for 24 hours until the contact was reclassified as a non-submarine. Mr Reardon stated that he had been informed that his ship had been shadowed by a Russian submarine, his comment to the Tribunal being:
“I thought it was awful that the destroyers would lose contact, you know, being at war although the Russians weren’t in it, in the Korean War, must be supplying the North Koreans with that, but whether they would have fired a torpedo I have no idea.”
15. When asked in cross-examination, why he said Russian, Mr Reardon said:
“Because that is what we heard. You see, on the ship some people find out things before you do, and it is passed down through the ship. It just said that unidentified submarine, and it came to say that someone thought it was a Russian submarine. Now you can only go on hearsay….”
16. Mr Reardon gave no evidence in examination-in-chief in respect of a “near collision” between SYDNEY and a US carrier” in the approaches to Hong Kong, a question posed to Captain Josephs by the Respondent in the light of reference in Dr Horderns report and evidence to the VRB. There is no record of such an incidence. In cross examination, Mr Reardon indicated he was below decks, and “when you are down below you only hearsay what’s happening…Now whether that was true or whether not, I can’t understand anybody telling me that if it did not happen”.
17. The Applicant referred to two further incidents. The first was in respect of a boat carrying ship’s officers that ran aground and was lost in bad weather in Okinawa in April 1954. There were no casualties. Mr Reardon landed in another boat at about the same time, but did not see the incident and only heard about it after returning onboard. The final incident before the Tribunal was in respect of an occasion when the Applicant was in a hold extracting broken bottles, and was ordered to vacate because of the fumes. Dr Hordern notes that Mr Reardon wondered whether the fumes had been the cause of oesophageal reflux and heartburn but the evidence to the Tribunal was to the effect that he had not been sick thereafter.
18. When asked by Counsel to describe his reaction to the incidents referred to above, Mr Reardon stated that he used to speak with a friend about what was happening. He was sleeping “reasonably well”, but might get up during the night to go to the heads and to have a smoke, a situation he thought was unusual. His sleeping difficulties have become worse over the years.
19. In June 1954, SYDNEY returned to Australia. His wife told him he had changed, but apparently did not elaborate. He felt that he may have become a bit more aggressive, or been “brought out of his shell”. Mr Reardon stated that he had started to drink alcohol during his navy service, that he preferred scotch to beer, and drank mainly ashore but might have one or two in the evening onboard. He did not consider he drank to excess when ashore. When asked whether he found himself drinking more and more during his naval service, he stated that he did, not so much on the SYDNEY, but when back in England.
20. Mr Reardon transferred to the VENGEANCE on 24 August 1954, when the ship took passage to Korea to embark 77 Squadron RAAF for return to Australia, and then took passage to England, where Mr Reardon remained for some 11 months, before sailing for Australia in the new aircraft carrier MELBOURNE. His wife was in England for a reasonable part of that period, apparently staying with his parents and for a couple of months, with other friends. Mr Reardon was again employed as a bar steward in both ships.
21. After a period of leave, MELBOURNE sailed from Australia for the Far East, rendering operational service from 21 September to 12 October 1956. There was no evidence before the Tribunal in respect of any incidents during this period. In January 1957, he transferred to HMAS BARCOO and subsequently was posted ashore to complete his service. In evidence to Dr Hordern he stated that he enjoyed his Navy service, which he confirmed to the Tribunal. His medical records reveal nothing of significance in respect of any psychiatric condition or treatment. He stated that he gets headaches and did so in the navy. He became a smoker in the navy, cigarettes being cheap and relaxing. In response to the question as to whether he had ever become nervous, his response was “I suppose sometimes I would have done, yes”. He confirmed he felt nervous during the incidents previously referred to.
22. Prior to MELBOURNE deploying to the Far East Strategic Reserve, his wife left him and returned to Young, resuming her relationship with him some 6 months or more later. In the interim, Mr Reardon stopped her allotment. He described his reaction at the separation as “I was devastated” and “feeling terrible”, and that it had led to him drinking more. It also led to his father writing to the Chaplain onboard MELBOURNE. In her statement at Exhibit A2, Mrs Reardon describes the change in her husband on his return from Korea (in July 1954) relevantly as:
“Jim was quiet and rather a shy caring person full of life and a good mixer.
…We had been married only a couple of months when he went to Korea. We wrote regularly … Soon after his return from Korea I noticed a marked change in him…He was argumentative, irritable, had no patience…..He became angry very quickly. There was no black or white. Always definite about what he thought was right…
On his return (from England) the Melbourne went to Malaya for the emergency and it was during this time I realised I could not live with him due to the change”
MEDICAL EVIDENCE
23. The clinical notes from Dr P Teh (Exhibit R2) commence in 1986. Singular mention is made of stress in May 1991 in relation to a work situation, and again in April 1998. The Treating Doctors report by Dr Teh, which accompanied the Applicant’s claim in October 2001, does not diagnosis a psychiatric condition although the clinical notes refer to such a condition at that time. On 6 December 2001, Dr B S Keshava, Consultant Psychiatrist, examined Mr Reardon for the Respondent. He notes in his report that Mrs Reardon was present at the interview, but the Applicant says this was not the case. Thus comments attributed to Mrs Reardon were therefore presumably made by the Applicant himself. Dr Keshava notes the Applicant as having said he is “irritable, impatient and snaps at others for trivial matters …getting uncomfortable and nervous in crowded places…impatient in queues and does not travel by public transport” and having “frightening dreams from which he wakes up “hot and sweaty”.
24. Dr Keshava notes that Mr Reardon was “encouraged to drink and smoke in the navy”. This presentation was not given to the Tribunal, although Mr Reardon did state that it was easy to smoke because “everyone did” and cigarettes were cheap. Dr Keshava also notes that Mr Reardon was drinking beer and spirits, whereas the oral evidence to the Tribunal was to the effect that he was not really a beer drinker but preferred scotch. Whilst Dr Keshava diagnosed a condition of Generalised Anxiety Disorder which he considered “appears to have stemmed from his service in the navy”, no evidence in support of that opinion is offered, the naval history being quite sparse.
25. Dr K Koller, Psychiatrist, examined the Applicant on 2 February 2002. He noted the complaints of Mr Reardon, including worrying, agitation, irritability, a disturbed sleeping habit, and impatience, and that he had smoked heavily until about six years ago, and had drunk heavily until the last few years. The naval service history taken is brief and with some inaccuracies. Dr Koller records Mr Reardon went to Korea in VENGEANCE in 1954, when in fact he was onboard SYDNEY. He notes the ship was “constantly at action stations”, when the period under review follows the Korean Armistice and Mr Reardon confirmed that action stations were exercised only for drill purposes. He mentions some of the incidents earlier referred to, and the comment by Mr Reardon that “always below and you never knew what was going on”, and that this was a constant worry for him. He concluded that symptoms indicated generalised anxiety disorder, and that Mr Reardon experienced severe psychological stressors within two years of the clinical onset.
CASE LAW AND STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
26. Before considering the concurrent evidence given by Drs Hordern and Haik, and the final submissions by both parties, it is appropriate to consider the application of the law, and the relevant SoP.
27. The High Court considered the proper application of s.120 of the Act in Byrnes v Repatriation Commission (1993) 177 CLR 564 at 571 thus:
“The position may be summarised as follows: (1) First, sub-s.(3) of s 120 is applied: do all or some of the facts raised by the material before the Commission give rise to a reasonable hypothesis connecting the veteran’s injury with war service? The hypothesis will not be reasonable if it is contrary to known scientific fact or is obviously fanciful or untenable. If the hypothesis is not reasonable, the claim fails. Proof of facts is not in issue at this point. (2) If a reasonable hypothesis is established, sub-s.(1) of s 120 is applied. The claim will succeed unless: (a) one or more of the facts necessary to support the hypothesis are disproved beyond reasonable doubt; or (b) the truth of another fact in the material, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis, is proved beyond reasonable doubt, thus disproving, beyond reasonable doubt, the hypothesis”
28. The Full Federal Court has held that, in operational service matters such as this, there are four steps to be considered in assessing whether an applicant will succeed in a claim for a war-caused disability. The authority is RepatriationCommission v Deledio (1998) 49 ALD 193, the relevant steps being defined as:
“1. The Tribunal must consider all the material which is before it and determine whether that material points to a hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person. No question of fact finding arises at this stage. If no such hypothesis arises, the application must fail.
2. If the material does raise such a hypothesis, the Tribunal must then ascertain whether there is in force a SoP determined by the Authority under s 196B(2) or (11). If no such SoP is in force, the hypothesis will be taken not to be reasonable and, in consequence, the application must fail.
3. If a SoP is in force, the Tribunal must then form the opinion whether the hypothesis raised is a reasonable one. It will do so if the hypothesis fits, that is to say, is consistent with the "template" to be found in the SoP. The hypothesis raised before it must thus contain one or more of the factors, which the Authority has determined to be the minimum, which must exist, and be related to the person's service (as required by ss 196B(2)(d) and (e)). If the hypothesis does contain these factors, it could neither be said to be contrary to proved or known scientific facts, nor otherwise fanciful. If the hypothesis fails to fit within the template, it will be deemed not to be "reasonable" and the claim will fail.
4. The Tribunal must then proceed to consider under s 120(1) whether it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the death was not war-caused, or in the case of a claim for incapacity, that the incapacity did not arise from a war-caused injury. If not so satisfied, the claim must succeed. If the Tribunal is so satisfied, the claim must fail. It is only at this stage of the process that the Tribunal will be required to find facts from the material before it. In so doing, no question of onus of proof or the application of any presumption will be involved”.
29. SoP No 1 of 2000 will be relevant in this matter, by agreement of the parties, should the Tribunal determine that the material before it points to an hypothesis connecting anxiety disorder with the naval service rendered by Mr Reardon, pursuant to Step 1 of Deledio (supra). Relevantly, SoP 1 of 2000 states:
“2. (a) …
(b) For the purposes of this Statement of principles, “anxiety disorder” is defined as the anxiety spectrum disorders of generalised anxiety disorder, or anxiety disorder due to a general medical condition …
3. …
4.Subject to clause 6, at least one of the factors set out in clause 5 must be related to any relevant service rendered by the person.
5.The factors that must as a minimum exist before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised connecting anxiety disorder …with the circumstances of a person’s relevant service are:
(a)for generalised anxiety disorder or anxiety disorder not otherwise specified, only
(i)…
(ii)experiencing a severe psychosocial stressor within the two years immediately before the clinical onset of anxiety disorder: or
(iii)…
8.“generalised anxiety disorder” means a psychiatric disorder with the following features:
A.Excessive anxiety and worry (apprehensive expectation), which occur on more days than not for a continuous period of at least six months, about a number of events or activities; and
B.The person finds it difficult to control the worry; and
C.The anxiety and worry are associated with three or more of the following six symptoms, with at least some symptoms present for more days than not during the previous six months period:
(1)restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge
(2)being easily fatigued
(3)difficulty concentrating or mind going blank
(4)irritability
(5)muscle tension
(6)difficulty falling or staying asleep, or restless unsatisfying sleep: and
D.The focus of the anxiety and worry is not confined to features of any other Axis 1 disorder; and
E.The anxiety, worry or physical symptoms (as described in C. above) cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning; and
F.The anxiety and worry are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance or a general medical condition and do not occur exclusively during a mood disorder, a psychotic disorder, or a pervasive developmental disorder.
“severe psychosocial stressor” means an identifiable occurrence that evokes feelings of substantial distress in an individual, for example, being shot at, death or serious injury of a close friend or relative, assault (including sexual assault), major illness or injury, experiencing a loss such as divorce or separation, loss of employment, major financial problems or legal problems
CONCURRENT PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE
30. Drs Hordern and Haik gave concurrent evidence. It is probably fair to say that their individual positions in this matter did not change to any real extent as a result of this approach. In his report an Exhibit A1, which included a quite comprehensive history in respect of the incidents earlier, referred to, Dr Hordern diagnosed chronic, moderately severe generalised anxiety disorder, resulting from a “series of stressors he encountered during his service on HMAS SYDNEY”. He suggested Mr Reardon’s symptoms, partially controlled by alcohol, have become more severe since retirement in 1991.
31. The report notes the present symptoms previously referred to such as insomnia, irritably, short temper and a dislike of crowds, and further refers to depression and over emotional behaviour. In respect of his naval service, as recorded by Dr Hordern, Mr Reardon stated that he “had loved his job and had got on well. It had been very convivial”. In regard to the Shiminoseki Strait incident, Mr Reardon had said “at the time, he had wondered what would have happened if a collision had taken place, but subsequently, he hadn’t thought about it.” He had “felt concerned” about the submarine incident, and upset by the reported death of Lieutenant Carmichael. He had “felt shaky” about the bomb incident, and Dr Hordern went on the state ”he told me that he had feared that his ship might be damaged and that it might have to put in for local repairs, thus delaying his return home.” Mr Reardon further indicated to Dr Hordern that onboard VENGEANCE he had performed the job of a mess steward, and had liked it.
32. In oral evidence, Dr Hordern emphasised his view that Mr Reardon was a vulnerable personality by reason of his childhood, particularly in respect of the circumstances of the blitz of Liverpool which also interfered with his education, and also because his father was a strict disciplinarian. In instancing particular events or circumstances in support of this opinion, Dr Hordern referred to Mr Reardon’s home being bombed, and two of his schoolmates being killed, neither of which occurred as confirmed in the Applicant’s oral evidence. Dr Hordern considered it not unusual that such vulnerability was not evident when Mr Reardon first went to sea, and that he had kept busy then and for many later years, which had masked this vulnerability. Dr Hordern was unable to explain why no symptoms were apparently evident for a period of some 32 years (until about 1990 when he ceased work). He opined that the series of stresses Mr Reardon underwent onboard SYDNEY was sufficient to cause the illness of generalised anxiety disorder. Whether the incidents were indeed real or threatening in an objective sense was but one aspect; in his view, the perception by Mr Reardon was sufficient to constitute a stress, and sufficient to cause the illness.
33. Dr Hordern was unable to accept the view of Dr Haik that conflict between Mr Reardon and his wife had intensified after the retirement of the former, leading to symptoms of irritability, heartburn and trouble with sleeping. He affirmed his view that the experiences as described by Mr Reardon provided sufficient psycho-social stressor to meet the requirements of SoP No 1 of 2000, and that symptoms of a psychiatric disorder had not been evident because of his busy working life. Such symptoms had re-emerged after retirement, when other worries in relation to asbestosis, for example, also contributed.
34. Counsel for the Applicant took Dr Hordern to the features required under sub paragraph 8 C of the definition of generalised anxiety disorder in the SoP. Dr Hordern stated that the Applicant had indicated that he was feeling anxious onboard SYDNEY, because his place of employment was “four decks below the flight deck”.. Dr Hordern thought Mr Reardon had been feeling keyed up and on edge, but he did not put a time scale to that condition, other than to suggest “for a long time”, but he thought it could be taken back to the SYDNEY “in relationship to his work situation and the experiences he had”. He further considered Mr Reardon had been irritable and had a disturbed sleeping pattern. He thought Mr Reardon’s drinking habit was a non-medicinal tranquilliser, although the history he had taken did not identify just when he had started.
35. Dr Hordern had some uncertainty as to whether the experiences of Mr Reardon could fit into the severe psychosocial stressor definition in the SoP, in the context of the phrase “evokes feeling of substantial distress”.. He did consider that Mr Reardon would have perceived the marital separation in 1956 as a severe psychosocial stressor. Counsel for the Applicant asked Dr Hordern, if he agreed with an alternate definition in relation to “perception” of a threat as experiencing a severe stressor, which he did. When put to him, Counsel attributed this definition to the consideration of a matter of post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), under the relevant SoPs, as addressed by Mansfield J in Stoddard v RepatriationCommission [2003] FCA 334. The Respondent objected to this definition being put to the witness as it related to criteria for PTSD, rather than the condition before the Tribunal.
36. In cross examination, Dr Hordern would not agree with the Respondent that Mr Reardons experience as a child was “greater in severity than anything he experienced during his navy service”, but he reaffirmed his view that he had a very stressful childhood. In terms of the incidents before the Tribunal, he recalled Mr Reardon saying that he was most affected when the pilot he understood was Lieutenant Carmichael was killed. He considered that reaction quite appropriate notwithstanding Mr Reardon had not witnessed the incident, and that it met the stressor criteria. He re-affirmed his view that anxiety symptoms had been present during Mr Reardon’s service in SYDNEY, that they had been masked, and that masking continued whilst he was fully employed. He nonetheless believed that whilst onboard SYDNEY, Mr Reardon “was in a state of continuous fear, which he did not show” and it would not have been realistic to expect him to report it to his superiors.
37. Dr Hordern indicated that whilst he had conducted a thorough psychiatric examination of Mr Reardon in the time available, he had not specifically done so in relation to the detail in the SoP. He pointed out that in terms of the diagnostic criteria in clause 8 subparagraph C of the SoP, he had identified at least three symptoms, these being keyed up, irritable and sleep problems. He believed these symptoms were instrumental in the later separation with his wife. On further consideration, he did not see any other psychiatric condition (subparagraph 8 D).
38. Dr Haik accepted that vulnerability might be a consideration, as opined by Dr Hordern, but he saw no evidence to support such a conclusion in the case of Mr Reardon. Further, he stated he could find no evidence of any identifiable occurrences that “may be regarded as psychosocial stressors”.. He noted in his report that Mr Reardon had never been prescribed tranquillisers or antidepressants, nor had he been referred for psychiatric treatment. On leaving the navy, he had been assiduously employed until retirement. He opined that on interview, Mr Reardon did not exhibit any evidence of a psychiatric disorder and “more particularly, generalised anxiety disorder”, nor did his history and behaviour fulfil the elements required under paragraph 8 of the SoP.
39. Dr Haik gave his opinion that changes in the personality of Mr Reardon on return from Korea, as given in the evidence of the Applicant and by his wife at Exhibit A2, were not surprising, given that they had not been married long and he had been deployed with mature men in a new environment where he was exposed to a variety of experiences ashore and afloat. Dr Haik was of the firm opinion that symptoms such as irritability, insomnia and heartburn had arisen following his retirement, when he no longer had a responsible job, was getting older, and the relationship with his wife was placed under more stress. Dr Haik drew on his interview with Mr Reardon to support that view. He further opined that there was no evidence to suggest that these conditions had been present in the years preceding that retirement. He could not accept the delayed onset argument given no evident disability for 32 years. In maintaining his opinion that Mr Reardon had no anxiety condition, Dr Haik said:
“I have no evidence that he is disabled by a general anxiety disorder. When I look at the SoP requirements of that condition where they have to have fairly severe symptoms of anxiety and worry, most days, every day for six months and that is a fairly disabling condition. It also produces clinical distress or impairment and social and occupational areas of functioning. He had none of that”
40. Dr Haik seemingly was of the understanding that the separation between Mr Reardon and his wife occurred shortly after the former returned from Korea. He suggested that Mr Reardon saw some relief in that separation because of the attitude of his wife to his changed demeanour, and that Mr Reardon’s father did not want him to reconcile. There is no evidence before the Tribunal as to the reaction of Mr Reardon senior other than that he wrote to the ship’s chaplain. When advised that the separation had not occurred until some 2 years after the return from Korea, Dr Haik suggested that period had led to growing marital conflict. He could not discount the possibility that his apparently changed manner on return from Korea had contributed to this and that a psychiatric disorder could have existed, but maintained his view that the incidents referred to by Mr Reardon were insufficient to lead to any psychiatric disorder. When asked if the separation indicated an anxiety disorder or psychiatric condition, he replied “not at all”.
41. In responding to the same question as put to Dr Hordern by Counsel in respect of the perception factor that might be relevant to the PTSD severe stressor definition (Stoddart (Supra)), Dr Haik replied that it must be addressed in the context of a “reasonable person”. When accepted that Mr Reardon had not fabricated anything about the incidents, but “these things, these threats or worries just evaporated. They didn’t exist. They weren’t there. They didn’t happen”. When reminded that some of those incidents did happen, Dr Haik responded that “nothing happened as a result. No consequence occurred to Mr Reardon. No real threat or danger to him occurred. He was not injured. He was not damaged…”
42. In response to the Respondent, Dr Haik said that in his opinion, Mr Reardon met none of the criteria in the SoP at clause 8 for generalised anxiety disorder during naval service. Had the features referred to in the criteria been present, they would have been evident to colleagues and a general practitioner.
SUBMISSIONS
43. In referring to Exhibit R3, Counsel for the Applicant submitted that the interpretations placed on Reports of Proceedings by Captain Josephs, as against clarification and explanation, could not be accepted by the Tribunal into evidence given that he had not given evidence to support his interpretations. The Tribunal responds to that submission at this point by agreeing that some observations are indeed a personal viewpoint, which the Tribunal takes into account when reaching a decision. Mr Winship submitted that an incident in the Shiminoseki Strait was recorded in the March 1954 ROP, and Captain Josephs had supported that in the circumstances the order to close watertight openings would have been normal.
44. Counsel submitted that the incident of a sonar detection had also been recorded, and postulated that whilst no submission was made that it was a Russian submarine, it was a threat perceived by the ship’s commander having been investigated for 24 hours. The incident of a pilot being fatally wounded when struck by a propeller is also recorded. Counsel submitted that whilst the pilot was not, in fact, Lieutenant Carmichael, he was onboard and apparently assisted, and it was entirely reasonable for Mr Reardon to be upset in the circumstances. The incident of the boat grounding in Okinawa is also recorded, Mr Winship making no particular submission on that matter. Counsel submitted that whilst there was no evidence, other than that of the Applicant, in respect of the bomb under the carrier or the occasion when he believed there was a near collision entering Hong Kong harbour, they were his recollections which led to perceptions of concern.
45. Counsel referred to the decision in Stoddart (supra) at 50 - 51, submitting that following the defining of the meaning of “threat” by His Honour, Mr Reardon could reasonably have perceived the incidents as he understood them as threats or severe stressors, then he must meet the criteria in the SoP.
46. The Respondent submitted that the decision in Stoddart (supra), as drawn on by the Applicant, is distinguishable from the matter before the Tribunal as it relates to PTSD rather than Generalised Anxiety Disorder, the definitions of severe psychosocial stressor being different in the relevant SoPs. In this matter, the Respondent submitted that the only diagnosed condition under consideration is generalised anxiety disorder and there is no reference to threat – the issue addressed in Stoddart –in the relevant SoP, No 1 of 2000.
47. The Respondent also addressed each incident in turn. He referred the Tribunal to the apparent statement by the Applicant to Dr Koller that SYDNEY was “constantly at action stations”, which was initial question referred to Captain Joseph. He noted that the latter discounted this claim as the ship was operating after the Korean Armistice, and further, Mr Reardon had given evidence that action stations was exercised only for drill purposes. The Respondent submitted that action stations in the context of a drill could not be seen as a severe stressor. In respect of the Shiminoseki Strait incident, he submitted that the description of the incident by the Commanding Officer of SYDNEY was “light hearted”, there was no collision, and Mr Reardon had not conveyed an impression of substantial stress, but stated that “he was a little bit apprehensive”. The Respondent also referred to a report of an actual collision incident (noted as a “touch” in the ROP at Exhibit R3 Attachment 2) which had at no stage been mentioned in the proceedings before the Tribunal.
48. The Respondent agreed that the incident in respect of a possible submarine contact had occurred, but after investigation it had been deemed to be a non-submarine. There was no evidence that the contact had been considered a Russian submarine, and the inference that it was, as agreed by Mr Reardon, was an assumption based on rumour. Given that it was a period of peacetime, the Respondent submitted that the incident could not be considered as a severe stressor to Mr Reardon. As regards the understanding by Mr Reardon that Lieutenant Carmichael had been struck, and later died, by an aircraft propeller, the Respondent submitted that had that been the case “it would have fallen within the (stressor) definition”.. However, that was not the case, and the Respondent opined that Mr Reardon would have learnt that Lieutenant Carmichael was alive and well, and it must be concluded that he would subsequently have seen him in the mess, notwithstanding that Mr Reardon has stated this was not the case. The Respondent did not accept in the circumstances that this incident involved a severe stressor.
49. Given that the accidental release of a bomb is not recorded in the ROPs, the Respondent submitted that if it did happen, it was a minor incident, nothing eventuated, and in any event, based on Captain Joseph’s opinion, the bomb would have been unlikely to explode and the ship would have been well clear if it did. There was no evidence that the ship instigated emergency procedure. In respect of the near collision with a US carrier in the approaches to Hong Kong, the Respondent submitted that there was no record of such an incident, and Mr Reardon had heard of this instance, but had been below decks and not a witness to any event. The final incident referred to was that of the boat grounding at Okinawa. The Respondent submitted that whilst Mr Reardon had himself been in another boat, he had not witnessed the grounding, there was no loss of life or injury. His involvement was “peripheral”.
50. In summing up his views on these incidents, the Respondent submitted that the required response of evoking feelings of substantial distress was absent, and that whilst “there was justifiable concern at the time”, the responses by Mr Reardon were “perfectly normal for the circumstances”. There was also no evidence to suggest that Mr Reardon was vulnerable because of his earlier experiences, albeit the Respondent considered that he would have experienced a severe psychosocial stressor during the blitz of Liverpool.
51. Turning to the diagnostic criteria that must be met within the two year period following the incidents which it was claimed by the Applicant were severe psychosocial stressors, the Respondent submitted that it had not been met, that there was no evidence of psychiatric features as defined in the SoP in that period. That criteria must all be met, the Respondent relying on Lees v RepatriationCommission [2002] FCA 398 which “was directly on point” with this matter. Heerey, Moore and Keifel JJ rejected a submission on appeal that it was sufficient to meet the SoP (1 of 2000) if some of the clinical indicia were met stating at 16 that:
“However, this approach overlooks the clear words of the applicable Statements of principle and the functions they perform in the legislative scheme. In relation to SoP1, the definition of "“generalised anxiety disorder” does not suggest that the disease exits if only some but not all of the symptoms (or features) are manifest”.
52. The Respondent observed that the Full Court referred to both diagnosis and causation, and the two year period in which symptoms must be evident, and in considering clinical onset, followed “what was said both in Gosewinckel and Cornelius”, where in the latter, Her Honour accepted the approach in Robertson v Repatriation Commission (AAT 12666, 2 March 1998), namely:
“…there is a clinical onset of the disease, either when a person becomes aware of some feature or symptom which enable a doctor to say the disease was present at the time, or when a finding is made on investigation which is indicative to a doctor of the disease being present…”
53. The Respondent went on to submit that there was an absence of material to allow retrospectively a diagnosis or a finding of clinical onset of generalised anxiety disorder no later than 1956. The Respondent considered that the first acknowledgment of anxiety symptoms was in 2000 by Dr Teh, the earlier single reference in 1991 being related to work. As to the views of Dr Hordern that an anxiety condition had re-emerged, the Respondent submitted that there was no evidence to support such a contention. As for the Applicant himself, he did not convey the impression that his drinking was to disguise any on-going anxiety type symptoms, he loved his job and the navy was convivial. The separation from his wife in 1956 could be considered a severe psychosocial stressor, but it was not service related and Mr Marsh drew on the decision in Roncevich v Repatriation Commission [2001] FCA 1320 to support that contention.
54. In response, Counsel for the Applicant again turned to Stoddart (supra), drawing on the view of Mansfield J at 42 in respect of the act or the incident, and the requirement to consider the perception factor. Mr Winship cautioned the reliance on the opinion of doctors only, as against the evidence of the individual, in the consideration of clinical onset, and in the objective consideration of the clinical features in clause 8 subparagraphs A to F of the SoP. That is, the questions asked of Mr Reardon in this instance did not necessarily elicit the correct response, whereas the evidence from Mr Reardon himself satisfied C and that of Dr Hordern satisfied the remaining criteria.
APPLICATION OF THE LAW AND DECISION
55. Section 120(4) of the Act is relevant to the determination of the appropriate diagnosis. Drs Keshava, Koller and Hordern are all of the opinion that the Applicant has generalised anxiety disorder. Whilst Dr Teh did not apparently diagnosis a psychiatric condition when providing his report in support of the claim by Mr Reardon, the Tribunal notes that shortly thereafter, the Respondent arranged the psychiatric assessment by Dr Keshava. Dr Haik subsequently takes the view that there is no evidence of a psychiatric disease. Considering all facets of these reports, the Tribunal is satisfied to its reasonable satisfaction that a diagnosis of generalised anxiety disorder is correct.
56. The decision in Deledio (supra) requires the Tribunal to now consider this matter through four discrete steps, the first being whether the material before it points to a hypothesis connecting generalised anxiety disorder with the circumstances of naval service. The hypothesis as put before the Tribunal in this matter is that as a result of various incidents that occurred during Mr Reardon’s service onboard SYDNEY in 1953 and 1954, he experienced severe psychosocial stressors, resulting from which, he developed the psychiatric condition of generalised anxiety disorder, the clinical onset of which occurred within two years of experiencing the severe stressors. The material before the Tribunal points to such a hypothesis and thus Step 1 is satisfied.
57. Step 2 requires the Tribunal to determine whether there is in force a statement of Principles determined by the Repatriation Medical Authority under section 196b(2) or (11) of the Act. The parties are agreed that SoP No 1 of 2000 is relevant to this matter.
58. Step 3 requires the Tribunal to consider whether the hypothesis is reasonable, that is, does it fit and is it consistent with the SoP. The hypothesis raised must contain one or more of the factors, which the Authority has determined to be the minimum that must exist, and this factor must be related to the Mr Reardon’s service. Clause 5 of the SoP sets out the accepted factors or causal links between operational service and generalised anxiety disorder. The relevant factor in this instance, as agreed by both parties, and observing that neither the Applicant nor the Respondent submitted that any other factor might be relevant, is:
“5. (a) for generalised anxiety disorder or anxiety disorder not otherwise specified:
(i)…
(ii)experiencing a severe psychosocial stressor within two years immediately before the clinical onset of anxiety disorder: or
59. The evidence given by the Applicant, both orally and as given during psychiatric examination to Dr Hordern and Dr Haik, is that he was onboard the SYDNEY when a number of incidents occurred. Those incidents ranged from near collisions in the Shimonoseki Strait and in the approaches to Hong Kong, to the death of a pilot when struck by an aircraft propeller on the flight deck, to the presence of a submarine which he though to be Russian, to a bomb being dislodged from an aircraft on take off and passing under the ship, to the grounding of a ship’s boat at Okinawa. The hypothesis is that these incidents, together or individually, are to be considered as severe psychosocial stressors, which in turn led to a generalised anxiety disorder, that occurring within two years of the clinical onset of that condition.
60. The SoP requires that those incidents evoked feelings of substantial distress. As to clinical onset, there is no definition of that term in the SoP. However, the Tribunal in Robertson (supra) reached the definition earlier referred to in paragraph 52, this definition being followed by Branson J in Cornelius (supra) and acknowledged by the Full Court in Lees (supra). The Tribunal follows that definition, that is “when a person becomes aware of some feature or symptom which would enable a doctor to say the disease was present at the time, or when a finding is made on investigation which is indicative to a doctor of the disease being present”. Neither party disagreed that the date of clinical onset had to be 1956 in order to meet the two year period which must “immediately” follow a severe stressor, the latter being related only to service onboard SYDNEY in 1953-54. The Tribunal agrees with the view of the Respondent that such evidence of clinical onset might not be evident until some time later.
61. The established facts in this matter are:
a.Mr Reardon was serving onboard SYDNEY when various “incidents” (defined in the Oxford dictionary as “occurrences, especially minor ones”) occurred.
b.Ship’s records confirm incidents in Shiminoseki Strait, a sonar contact initially though to be a submarine, the fatal injury to a pilot and the grounding and loss of a ship’s boat at Okinawa.
c.There are no records to support the contention that a bomb was accidentally dropped and passed under the ship, that the ship went to action stations (other than as a drill), that a near collision occurred in the approaches to Hong Kong or that he had been exposed to fumes when extracting bottles from a compartment.
d.No evidence has have been put forward in respect of any incidents that could be interpreted as being severe stressors during Mr Reardon’s operational service in VENGEANCE or MELBOURNE.
e.The marriage separation did not occur until about two years after 1954 operational service in Korea.
f.There are no medical records available to the Tribunal that indicate any psychiatric condition, examination or treatment prior to 2000 with the exception of the singular referral to a work related stress in the clinical notes of Dr The in 1991.
62. Addressing the ‘incidents’ first, the evidence before the Tribunal is that Mr Reardon did not witness any of those incidents. He heard and responded to a pipe to close watertight openings whilst the ship was transiting Shiminoseki Strait, and gave no evidence of the ship going to any emergency state, or of being directly aware of any incident that might have been occurring. He thought, “something might happen”, and “felt a little bit apprehensive”. He heard that an escort had been tracking what was thought to be a Russian submarine, but agreed that there was no warlike situation in existence at the time, and that he had based his surmise on rumour. He gave no evidence of distress, other than thinking it “awful that contact had been lost”.. He had not witnessed the grounding of the ship’s boat, which was subsequently lost. There had been no injuries to personnel as a result of that incident. His evidence did not indicate any feeling of distress
63. There is a more personal element in the matter of the death of Sub Lieutenant McClinton. The Tribunal notes that Mr Reardon was upset when he heard that an officer he seemed to know reasonably well and liked, Lieutenant Carmichael, had been killed, but is difficult to comprehend that he would not have subsequently heard that it was not Carmichael, or that he did not see him in the ensuing months onboard. In the circumstances, and on the evidence, the Tribunal cannot accept that this incident led to feelings of substantial distress. For the remainder of the reported incidents, there is again no indication that the Applicant suffered the substantial distress required by the definition of severe psychosocial stressor under the SoP. Account must also be taken of his evident enjoyment in his naval service and in his meeting his wine steward responsibilities.
64. Reference was made both parties to the decision by Mansfield J in Stoddart.. (supra). This was a matter in which the appellant submitted that the AAT had misconstrued or misapplied the SoP in respect of incapacity from PTSD (and ALD). His Honour addressed the interpretation of “threat”, as it is incorporated in SoP 3 of 1999 as amended by No 54 of 1999, and resiled from the strict objective interpretation of the wording in order to require the decision maker to properly consider events and incidents as they may have been perceived at the time. In the matter before this Tribunal, the only psychiatric condition under consideration is that of generalised anxiety disorder, and severe psychological stressor in the relevant SoP is defined as “an identifiable occurrence that evokes feelings of substantial distress…for example, being shot at, death or serious injury of a close friend or relative, assault, major illness or injury”, or experiencing a loss as defined.
65. Nowhere does the Applicant in this matter allude to “substantial distress” or descriptive language that might have the same connotation. Nor did he experience any of the losses referred to. In terms of his separation in 1956, this occurred some two years after his service in SYDNEY. There is evidence from the Mr Reardon and his wife that he had changed to the extent that she found him different and difficult, and this led to her leaving him. It was put by Counsel for the Applicant, and Dr Hordern, that changes in his demeanour had arisen from the effect of the various incidents. The Respondent and Dr Haik, on the other hand, saw no such connection, and that any changes in his manner had arisen as a result of exposure in a different environment. The Tribunal accords with this view on the evidence before it. It is also relevant and appropriate that the Tribunal follows Roncevich (supra) in which von Doussa J at 8 affirmed that the eligibility criteria pursuant to section 70 of the Act requires a connection between the incident (or loss in this instance) and service.
66. Having considered all the material, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the hypothesis raised is not a reasonable one. That is, it is not consistent with the template. Whether or not the Applicant had a generalised anxiety disorder at the time of the claimed clinical onset is debatable. Dr Hordern strongly argued that such a condition existed, but that it was effectively obscured both then and in the subsequent work environment until he retired when it re-emerged. Dr Haik, on the other hand, was of the equally strong view that no such condition existed in 1956, nor was it presently evident. SoP requires that all six clinical features (A to F) be in evidence, and Full Court has endorsed this requirement in Lees (supra). In the case of C, there is latitude in that three or more of the listed six symptoms are required.
67. Dr Hordern, in the view of the Tribunal, had some difficulty in justifying his conclusions that all indicae were met, notably “excessive anxiety and worry occurring on more days than not for a continuous period of at least six months, about a number of events or activities” (sub paragraph A) and sub paragraphs E in respect of anxiety and panic attacks causing distress. Dr Haik for the Respondent considered those indicae were not met.
68. Step 3 of Deledio (supra) requires that the Tribunal form an opinion that the hypothesis raised is a reasonable one, and it will do so if the hypothesis fits, “that is to say, is consistent with the template” in SoP 1 of 2000. The Tribunal has considered all the material before it, but has formed the opinion that it does not fit the template. That is, the material does not point to the raised hypothesis meeting a factor which “the Authority has determined to be the minimum which must exist”.. That factor, as agreed by the parties is factor 5(a)(ii). Nor does the material raised point to a hypothesis containing any other factor. The hypothesis fails to fit the template for the reasons earlier expounded, and it must accordingly be deemed not to be reasonable. The claim must therefore fail.
DECISION
69. The decision before the Tribunal that refused the claim for generalised anxiety disorder and assessed pension at 60% of the General Rate is therefore affirmed.
I certify that the 69 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of REAR ADMIRAL A R HORTON
Signed: Georgie Zuzak
AssociateDate/s of Hearing 7 May 2003
Date of Decision 26 June 2003
Counsel for the Applicant Mr B Winship
Counsel for the Respondent Mr J Marsh
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