Read v The Queen - [1993] HCATrans 376

'

• ~

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Hobart No H7 of 1993
B e t w e e n -
MARK BRANDON READ

Applicant

and
THE QUEEN

Respondent

Application for special leave
to appeal

DAWSON J TOOHEY J GAUDRON J

Read

9/12/93

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON THURSDAY, 9 DECEMBER 1993, AT 10.55 AM

MR D.J. PORTER:

May it please the Court, I appear for the

applicant. (instructed by A. Betts)

MR D.J. BUGG:

If the Court pleases, I appear with my

learned friend, MS C.J. GEASON, for the respondent.
(instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions,
(Tasmania))

DAWSON J: Thank you. Mr Porter?

MR PORTER:

If it please the Court, the disposition of the

applicant's appeal by the Tasmanian Court of
Criminal Appeal raise two points, or at least general points, which, in my submission, warrant
the attention of this Court. Those two points
relate to questions of majority verdicts and the
application of the proviso and, as the outline of
submissions suggests, those two general points have
discrete points within them.
The points raised, I submit, are of

fundamental importance to the administration of
criminal justice in this country, given that
majority verdicts exist not only in Tasmania, but
in South Australia, Western Australia and the
Northern Territory and, of course, the proviso

exists in all jurisdictions. As far as majority
verdicts are concerned, the minimum time before
which a jury may return a majority verdict differs
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, ranging from two
hours in Tasmania to six in the Northern Territory.

GAUDRON J: That does not arise though, does it, in this

case, any question of minimum time?

MR PORTER: No, it does not, Your Honour.

It perhaps only

shows different approaches which may show that each
jurisdiction has some difficulty assessing what is

appropriate in each case. The submissions disclose

that the applicant was convicted after somewhat
lengthy deliberations by the jury, given that it
was a single count and given that, in essence, it
was a conflict between the complainant and an eye
witness on the one hand and the accused on the
other. There was a body of evidence which, in
general terms, corroborated the complainant's story
as supported by the witness, but in simple terms it
was a contest between the complainant, one witness
and the applicant. Notwithstanding that, there was
a deliberation of some 16 hours.

DAWSON J:	What do you ask us to draw from that fact?
MR PORTER:	I am sorry, Your Honour.

Read

9/12/93

DAWSON J:

What inference do you ask us to draw from that

fact?

MR PORTER: Simply that I do not ask this Court to draw any

inference therefrom, but it is a case in which I
will be submitting, in the context of the point as
to majority verdicts, that the trial judge ought to
have taken more care, and that is the principle at
stake, that…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Read v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Read v The Queen [1993] HCATrans 376
Case: [1993] HCATrans 376
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerns an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia by the applicant, Read, against the disposition of his appeal by the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal. The applicant sought to raise two general points of importance to the administration of criminal justice: the application of majority verdicts and the operation of the proviso.

The legal issues before the High Court involved questions concerning the circumstances under which a trial judge should exercise greater vigilance when dealing with jury deliberations in cases where majority verdicts are permissible. Specifically, the applicant argued that the trial judge ought to have intervened or given a particular direction to the jury, given indications that the jury was experiencing difficulty in reaching a verdict.

The applicant's submissions contended that the trial judge failed to exercise sufficient care in managing the jury's deliberations. This was based on observations that the jury's deliberations were lengthy, particularly in a case that essentially involved a contest between the complainant, an eyewitness, and the applicant, despite some corroborating evidence. Further, the applicant highlighted comments from the jury foreman expressing reservations about being sequestered for a second night and indicating slow progress, suggesting that the trial judge should have recognised the jury's difficulties and intervened appropriately.

Orders