Re Zenith Vinyl Pty Ltd
[2025] VSC 274
•16 May 2025 (ex tempore)
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMERCIAL COURT
CORPORATIONS LIST
S ECI 2024 06689
IN THE MATTER of ZENITH VINYL PTY LTD (ACN 143 800 999)
BETWEEN:
| ZENITH VINYL PTY LTD (ACN 143 800 999) | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| TIMOTHY KAINE | Defendant |
---
JUDGE: | Delany J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 16 May 2025 |
DATE OF RULING: | 16 May 2025 (ex tempore) |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Re Zenith Vinyl Pty Ltd |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VSC 274 |
---
CORPORATIONS — Winding up — Creditor’s statutory demand — Application to set aside — Whether there is a genuine dispute about the existence of the debt — Costs — Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 459H — Malec Holdings Pty Ltd v Scotts Agencies Pty Ltd (in liq) [2015] VSCA 300; Panel Tech Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Skyreach Equipment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] NSWSC 896, applied; In the matter of CharterLaw Legal Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 297, cited — Demand set aside.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) obligations upon the Court, parties and practitioners in context of applications to set aside statutory demand for modest monetary amount — Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic), ss 7, 8, 23, 24, 25, 28 — No order as to costs.
---
APPEARANCES: | Solicitors appearing |
| For the Plaintiff | Barry Fried, The Law Offices of Barry Fried |
| For the Defendant | Timothy Kaine, Kainelaw Australian Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
By originating process dated 11 December 2024, the plaintiff, Zenith Vinyl Pty Ltd (ACN 143 800 999) (‘Zenith Vinyl’) applies pursuant to s 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Act’) to set aside a statutory demand served on it by the defendant, Timothy Kaine trading as Kainelaw Australian Lawyers (‘Kainelaw’), on 22 November 2024 (‘statutory demand’). The statutory demand is for the amount of $21,612.20 and was served by Mr Kaine for unpaid legal costs.
The originating process seeks an order that the statutory demand be set aside on the grounds that:
(a) The Affidavit in Support of the Demand, as sworn by Timothy Kaine of Kaine Law, does not verify the debt stated to be owed pursuant to the Demand and;
(b) To the extent the Defendant has not sought a Costs Assessment, as per the provisions of the Part 4.3 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014, Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (“the Act”) s198 of Schedule 1 (“the Costs Assessment”); or
(c) Being a Legal Practitioner, has not complied with the Costs Disclosures required to be made to the Plaintiff under the Act:-
(i) There is a genuine dispute about the existence or amount of the debt to which the Demand relates; or
(ii) Given the Plaintiff intends to seek a costs assessment of prior invoices issued by the Defendant to the Plaintiff not being the subject of the Statutory Demand, the Plaintiff has an offsetting claim against the Defendant; and
(iii) As the Defendant has not sought a costs assessment or made sufficient costs disclosure under the Act, the Demand has been served for the improper purpose of debt collection.
Zenith Vinyl seeks to set aside the statutory demand on the following bases:
(a) there is a ‘genuine dispute’ under s 459H(1)(a) of the Act;
(b) it has an offsetting claim against Mr Kaine under s 459H(1)(b) of the Act; and
(c) there is ‘some other reason why the demand should be set aside’ under s 459J(1)(a) and (b) of the Act.
The multiple grounds in support of setting aside the statutory demand identified in the originating process were supported by the initial affidavit of Christopher Moss dated 11 December 2024 (with exhibits, 43 pages).
For the purpose of disposing of this application, it is necessary only to consider the question of whether the ground in (c) of the originating process satisfies the criteria for a ‘genuine dispute’ under s 459H(1)(a) of the Act.
Materials
On 6 February 2025 Associate Justice Gardiner made timetabling orders for the conduct of the proceeding (‘Order’). Any affidavit from the defendant was required to be filed by 24 February 2025, any affidavit in response by the plaintiff by 11 March 2025, the plaintiff’s submissions by 21 March 2025 and the defendant’s submissions by 7 April 2025. With the exception of the plaintiff’s submissions which were filed on the due date, both parties failed to comply with the timetable specified in the Order.
At the hearing Zenith Vinyl sought to rely on the affidavit of Mr Moss dated 12 March 2025 (13 pages), its submissions dated 21 March 2025 (10 pages) together with a bundle of authorities.
Mr Kaine sought to rely on his 22 November 2024 affidavit and exhibits which accompanied the statutory demand and was exhibited to Mr Moss’s initial affidavit and on two further affidavits made by him:
(a) dated 25 February 2025 and its exhibit (96 pages); and
(b) dated 14 May 2025 and its exhibit (27 pages).
Mr Kaine sought to rely on submissions dated 9 April 2025 (10 pages) together with a bundle of authorities.
Background
Zenith Vinyl conducted a vinyl record business at Factory 5, 155 Donald Street, Brunswick East.
Mr Kaine is the principal of Kainelaw.
The money the subject of the statutory demand relates to an engagement by Zenith Vinyl of Kainelaw’s services relating to a dispute with a neighbour the subject of County Court proceeding number CI‑22‑04517.
The exhibits to Mr Kaine’s 25 February 2025 affidavit include a copy of an engagement agreement that Mr Kaine states that he gave to Zenith Vinyl on 29 January 2023, a costs disclosure letter dated 18 May 2023 in which total legal costs were estimated at $30,000.00, an updated costs letter dated 30 November 2023 in which legal costs to the completion of a mediation were estimated to be approximately $9,000.00 and a document dated 14 February 2024, the day prior to the mediation, headed ’statement regarding settlement – 177 LPUL’ that estimated that if the matter settled at mediation the costs since the previous invoice would be $15,000.00‑$20,000.00 plus GST.
In his 12 March 2025 affidavit Mr Moss gave evidence that he did not receive the statement dated 14 February 2024 but only received the position paper for the mediation dated the same day to which specific reference was made in an email from Mr Kaine sent at 1:24am on 15 February 2024, the early hours of the morning of the day on which the mediation took place.
Statutory demand
The statutory demand was for the amount of $21,612.20 (‘debt’), described in the schedule to the demand as ‘tax invoice dated 23 April 2024’ (‘disputed invoice’).
The total amount of the disputed invoice which relates to work performed between 28 November 2023 and 7 April 2024 is $26,785.00, less a debit of $5,172.80. The debt the subject of the statutory demand is the same amount as the ‘total balance due’ under the disputed invoice.
Statutory provisions
Section 459E(1) of the Act relevantly provides that a creditor may serve on a company a statutory demand relating to a debt or debts owed by the company, which are ‘due and payable’.
Section 459G(1) of the Act provides that a company may apply to the Court for an order setting aside a statutory demand served on the company.
Section 459H(1)(a) of the Act provides that the Court may set aside a statutory demand where it is satisfied that there is a genuine dispute between the company and the respondent about the existence or amount of a debt to which the demand relates.
Genuine dispute: Principles
The principles relating to the meaning of ‘genuine dispute’ under s 459H(1)(a) are well established. The Court of Appeal summarised the principles in Malec Holdings Pty Ltd v Scotts Agencies Pty Ltd (in liq):[1]
[1]Malec Holdings Pty Ltd v Scotts Agencies Pty Ltd (in liq) [2015] VSCA 300 [47]–[51] (citations omitted) (‘Malec Holdings’).
[47] The terms of s 459H of the Corporations Act and the authorities make clear that, on an application to set aside a statutory demand, the applicant is required only to establish a genuine dispute or offsetting claim. The applicant is required to evidence the assertions relevant to the alleged dispute or offsetting claim only to the extent necessary for that primary task. It is not necessary for the applicant to advance a fully evidenced claim. Therefore, the task faced by an applicant is by no means at all a difficult or demanding one.
[48] In determining such an application, it is not necessary or appropriate for a court to engage in an in‑depth examination or determination of the merits of the alleged dispute. This is because an application alleging a genuine dispute or offsetting claim is akin to one for an interlocutory injunction and requires the applicant to establish that there is a ‘plausible contention requiring investigation’ of the existence of either a dispute as to the debt or an offsetting claim. It is therefore not helpful to perceive that one party is more likely than the other to succeed or that the eventual state of the account between the parties is more likely to be one result than another. Further, the determination of the ‘ultimate question’ of the existence of the debt at a substantive hearing should not be compromised.
[49] The court is required to determine whether the dispute or offsetting claim is ‘genuine’. It has been said that the criterion of a ‘genuine’ dispute requires that the dispute be bona fide and truly exist in fact and that the grounds for alleging the existence of a dispute be real and not spurious, hypothetical, illusory or misconceived. It has also been observed that the dispute or offsetting claim should have a sufficient objective existence and prima facie plausibility to distinguish it from a merely spurious claim, bluster or assertion. It must also have sufficient factual particularity to exclude the merely fanciful or futile. A rigorous curial approach is essential to the effective operation of the statutory scheme.
[50] The court is not required to accept uncritically every statement in an affidavit however equivocal, lacking in precision, inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent, or inherently improbable in itself, it may be, as it may not have sufficient prima facie plausibility to merit further investigation as to its truth.
The court is also not required to accept uncritically a patently feeble legal argument or an assertion of facts unsupported by evidence, although this should not be read as suggesting that the applicant must formally or comprehensively evidence the basis of its dispute or off‑setting claim. Except in such extreme cases, the court should not embark upon an inquiry as to the credit of a witness or a deponent whose evidence is relied on by the applicant to set aside a statutory demand.
[51] Solarite Air Conditioning Pty Ltd v York International Australia Pty Ltd involved a demand for payment of a debt alleged to be due under a contract for the supply of goods. The applicant relied on four matters, each of which had the potential to affect the respondent’s entitlement to be paid the entire amount of the debt. Barrett J held that all four matters were sufficiently plausible to raise a genuine dispute. He relevantly stated:
The [applicant] will fail in [the] task [of establishing a genuine dispute] only if ... the contentions upon which it seeks to rely ... are so devoid of substance that no further investigation is warranted. Once the [applicant] shows that even one issue has a sufficient degree of cogency to be arguable, a finding of genuine dispute must follow. The court does not engage in any form of balancing exercise between the strengths of competing contentions. If it sees any factor that, on rational grounds, indicates an arguable case on the part of the [applicant], it must find that a genuine dispute exists, even where any case apparently available to be advanced against the [applicant] seems stronger.
The authorities establish that the threshold to establish a genuine dispute is not high.[2] The statement by Barrett J in Panel Tech Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Skyreach Equipment Pty Ltd (No 2) reproduced belowis to be borne in mind.[3]
[2]In the matter of CharterLaw Legal Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 297 [14] (Black J).
[3]Panel Tech Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Skyreach Equipment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] NSWSC 896 [18].
Provisions of the Legal Professional Uniform Law
The Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (‘LPUL’) provides a detailed legislative regime which amongst other things, governs the relationship between law practices and their clients concerning legal costs.
Section 174 of the LPUL deals with disclosure obligations of law practices regarding clients. Subsection 1(a) requires disclosure as soon as practicable after instructions are initially given of the basis on which legal costs will be calculated and an estimate of the total legal costs. Subsection 1(b) requires that as soon as practicable after there is any significant change to anything previously disclosed the law practice must provide the client with information disclosing the change including information about any significant change to the legal costs that will be payable by the client.
Section 177 of the LPUL contains express disclosure obligations regarding settlement of litigious matters. Subsection 177(1) provides:
177 Disclosure obligations regarding settlement of litigious matters
(1) If a law practice negotiates the settlement of a litigious matter on behalf of a client, the law practice must disclose to the client, before the settlement is executed—
(a) a reasonable estimate of the amount of legal costs payable by the client if the matter is settled (including any legal costs of another party that the client is to pay); and
(b) a reasonable estimate of any contributions towards those costs likely to be received from another party.
Section 178 of LPUL deals with the consequences of non‑compliance with disclosure obligations. Of particular relevance to this application is s 178(1) which is relevantly in the following terms:
178 Non-compliance with disclosure obligations
(1) If a law practice contravenes the disclosure obligations of this Part—
(a) the costs agreement concerned (if any) is void; and
(b) the client or an associated third party payer is not required to pay the legal costs until they have been assessed or any costs dispute has been determined by the designated local regulatory authority; and
(c) the law practice must not commence or maintain proceedings for the recovery of any or all of the legal costs until they have been assessed or any costs dispute has been determined by the designated local regulatory authority or under jurisdictional legislation; and
Consideration
The dispute to which the legal work performed by the defendant for the plaintiff related was a litigious matter. The matter settled at mediation on 15 February 2024.
On 30 November 2023 the defendant provided an updated costs disclosure to the plaintiff which contained a statement that the defendant expected further costs to be incurred in relation to finalising the affidavit of documents and arranging and attending the mediation of the matter to be approximately $9,000.00 plus GST.
There is a factual dispute about whether or not the defendant provided the s 177 costs estimate dated 14 February 2024 that referred to costs to the end of the mediation if the case settled of $15,000.00‑$20,000.00 plus GST to the plaintiff.
On 23 April 2024 the defendant issued an invoice to the plaintiff for $26,785.00. The invoice was for work performed between 28 November 2023 and 7 April 2024, including the mediation.
The disclosure obligation in s 177(1)(a) of the LPUL requires a reasonable estimate to be provided of the amount of costs payable by the client if the matter is settled. The estimate provided on 30 November 2023 appears to be an estimate of costs to settlement, if settled at mediation. The same is the case concerning the costs estimate dated 14 February 2024, the receipt of which is in dispute. Whether one or other estimate or both satisfies the statutory criteria requiring the costs estimate to be a reasonable estimate is a separate matter.
The disclosure obligation in s 174(1)(b) of the LPUL requires the provision of information when there is a significant change in relation to anything previously disclosed. The 30 November 2023 letter and the 14 February 2024 document, if received, appear to generally accord with what is required by the section, leaving to one side the reasonableness of the estimates.
There are three problems for the defendant on this application. The first is that the amount of the disputed invoice for work performed between 28 November 2023 and 7 April 2024, $26,785.00, was almost three times the amount of the 30 November 2023 cost estimate. The second problem is that the plaintiff disputes the receipt of the costs estimate dated 14 February 2024, which estimated the costs at $15,000.00‑$20,000.00 plus GST. The third problem is that the amount of the disputed invoice is more than 20% higher than the costs estimate in the 14 February 2024 letter.
My attention was not directed to any cases that explain what is meant by a ’reasonable estimate’ of legal costs in s 177(1)(a). For the purpose of determining the disputed application, I do not have to decide and is not my role to determine whether there has been a breach by the defendant of s 177 or s 174(1)(b) of the LPUL.
What is clear is that if there is a contravention of either section the consequence under s 178 is that the client is not required to pay the legal costs until they have been assessed or any costs dispute has been determined by the designated local regulatory authority. It is also the case that the law practice must not commence and maintain proceedings for recovery of any or all of the costs until one or other of those matters has occurred.
In support of its application the plaintiff submitted that given the variance in the amount of $9,000.00 in comparison to $26,000.00 the determination of whether proper disclosure was made is a matter for the Costs Court to determine, not this Court, and that this sufficiently raises a genuine dispute as to the claimed debt the subject of the statutory demand. That submission is made by reference to the 30 November 2023 letter. It is also the case that assuming the document dated 14 February 2024 complies with the statute, the plaintiff by its director has given evidence that he did not receive that document. That document is not referred to in the covering email.
As stated by the Court of Appeal in Malec Holdings, ‘there is a plausible contention requiring investigation of the existence of… a dispute as to the debt’. As stated by Barrett J in Panel Tech Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Skyreach Equipment Pty Ltd (No 2):[4]
Once the company shows that even one issue has a sufficient degree of cogency to be arguable, a finding of genuine dispute must follow. The Court does not engage in any form of balancing exercise between the strengths of competing contentions. If it sees any factor that, on rational grounds, indicates an arguable case on the part of the company, it must find that a genuine dispute exists, even where any case apparently available to be advanced against the company seems stronger.
[4]Panel Tech Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Skyreach Equipment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] NSWSC 896 [18].
The evidence to which I have referred, in particular, the discrepancy between the further estimated costs of $9,000.00 to completion of the mediation and the amount of the disputed invoice, $26,785.00, and the dispute concerning the receipt of the document dated 14 February 2024, together with the discrepancy between the amounts of the disputed invoice and the amounts referred to in those documents calls into question whether there has been compliance by the defendant with his disclosure obligations in the LPUL and whether s 178 of the LPUL applies.
For those reasons I am satisfied that there is a genuine dispute under s 459H(1)(a) of the Act between the plaintiff and the defendant about the existence or amount of the debt to which the statutory demand relates.
Having made that finding there is no need for me to consider the other grounds relied on in the originating process or to determine whether the statutory demand should be set aside because the plaintiff has an offsetting claim or for ‘some other reason‘.
On 17 January 2025 the plaintiff issued a summons for taxation of costs. The substantive dispute about costs will be determined on the return of that summons. Nothing in my reasons should be taken as suggesting that the work the subject of the disputed invoice which is recorded in detail in that invoice and is the subject of a draft detailed bill of costs exhibited to the affidavit of Mr Kaine dated 14 May 2025 was not done or was not reasonable.
Costs and compliance with the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic)
Ahead of the hearing, my Chambers asked the parties to be in a position at the hearing to advise of their legal costs of the proceeding. That request was made because of my concern that the legal costs incurred by the parties appeared likely to be disproportionate to the amount in dispute the subject of the statutory demand.
At the hearing I was informed that the plaintiff has spent $28,000.00 and the defendant estimates his own costs of this application are $20,000.00. Both costs of the parties are disproportionate to the amount of the disputed debt.
The parties and their legal representatives have statutory obligations pursuant to s 24 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) (‘CPA’) to use reasonable endeavours to ensure that legal costs in connection with the proceeding are reasonable and proportionate to the amount in dispute. I do not consider the costs of this magnitude are reasonable and proportionate having regard to the amount in dispute.
The parties and their legal representatives have a statutory obligation pursuant to s 23 of the CPA to narrow the issues in dispute and to resolve by agreement any issues in the dispute which can be resolved in that way.
The materials filed by the parties in this case are extensive. While it may be understandable for an applicant to raise multiple grounds and factual issues in the originating process and initiating affidavit, thereafter, in accordance with their statutory obligations, both the parties and their practitioners need to focus on the identification of and to narrow the real issues in dispute. That did not happen in this case.
If that had occurred in this case, given the provisions of the LPUL to which I have referred, the well‑established and straightforward nature of the test concerning the existence of a ‘genuine dispute’, the discrepancy between the amount of the 30 November 2023 costs estimate and the total amount of the disputed invoice and the dispute about the receipt or otherwise of the 14 February 2024 costs estimate it seems likely the matter would not have proceeded much beyond the initial hearing.
If the practitioners turned their minds to the actual issues in dispute, they would have realised there was one main issue. The clients would either have resolved the dispute or filed targeted evidence and submissions directed to that one narrow point rather than filing further evidence and submissions directed to the wide variety of grounds raised in the application and initial affidavit.
The parties and their legal representatives are bound by the overarching obligation in s 25 of the CPA to use reasonable endeavours in connection with a proceeding such as this to act promptly and to minimise delay. The parties should have acted promptly and in accordance with the orders concerning the filing of evidence and submissions. They did not comply with the Order and neither party filed an application seeking leave to vary the Order. Neither party provided an explanation on affidavit for that party’s non‑compliance.
Section 28 of the CPA provides that in exercising its discretion as to costs, a court may take into account any contravention of the overarching obligations. Section 29 lists in a non‑exclusive way the types of orders that a court may make in relation to costs where it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that a person has contravened any of that person’s overarching obligations.
On 5 May 2025, after the matter was allocated to me for hearing, my Chambers sent an email to the parties in the following terms:
The statutory demand exhibited to the affidavit of Mr Christopher Moss dated 11 December 2024 which underlies this proceeding is in the amount of $21,612.20. Both parties have filed submissions of 10 pages and it appears likely to his Honour that the parties have already spent more than the amount in dispute on legal costs.
Consistent with Practice Note SC CC 1 of 2024 (‘Practice Note’), by no later than 4:00pm on 8 May 2025, counsel retained in the matter or the solicitor responsible for the conduct of the proceeding on behalf of the moving party and the responding party are required to confer by telephone, by audio‑visual means, or in person to seek to resolve the dispute as per s 23 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) (‘CPA’). By no later than 12:00pm on 9 May 2025, the practitioners for both parties are required to confirm via email to Chambers that they have conferred as required by the Practice Note and advise Chambers as to the outcome of the conferral.
If an agreement is reached, consent orders are to be provided to Chambers and his Honour will dispose of the matter. If agreement is not reached having regard to the amount in dispute and the amount already spent, consistent with the CPA, the hearing will be restricted to one hour and counsel retained in the matter or the solicitor responsible for the conduct of the proceeding on behalf of the moving party and the responding party will be required to divide their time accordingly.
I was informed by the practitioners appearing at the hearing that conferral had taken place in accordance with Practice Note SC CC 1 of 2024 (‘Practice Note’) but that they were unable to reach agreement on the disposition of the application.
Concerning the costs of this application, while no page limit was imposed for submissions, there was no real reason for submissions to exceed 6 pages at the most. The multiple affidavits filed by each side were in my opinion unnecessary and disproportionate having regard to the amount in dispute. If it were appropriate to order that either party pay the costs of the other side, having regard to the amount in dispute, I would order that those costs be limited to $10,000.00, an amount that I consider on the borderline of being reasonable and proportionate.
However, the discretion as to costs is at large. It is clear from the submissions that have been made to me that the defendant has made very considerable efforts to try and resolve this dispute in a cost‑effective and appropriate manner. Before the directions were made for affidavits and submissions, on 12 December 2024, the defendant made an offer expressed to be a Calderbank offer to resolve the dispute upon payment of costs of $14,000.00 by two instalments.
On 23 December 2024, the plaintiff rejected that offer and proposed that the defendant abandon his claim for costs and that each party pay their own costs.
Importantly for costs purposes, on 14 January 2025, the defendant made an offer to the plaintiff expressed to be a Calderbank offer to resolve the proceeding on the basis that the statutory demand be unconditionally withdrawn and be set aside with no order as to costs. Alternatively, the offer proposed that the further hearing of the proceeding be adjourned by consent until after assessment of costs is completed or resolved. That offer was made in the context of the application by the plaintiff for an assessment of costs by the Costs Court.
On 6 March 2025, the defendant made a further offer to resolve the matter.
Although it is correct as submitted by the plaintiff that the plaintiff has been successful in its application to set aside the statutory demand, having regard to the offers to which I have referred and in particular to the Calderbank offer of 14 January 2025, it is appropriate that there be no order as to costs. That is noting the submission made by the plaintiff that as a solicitor there may be an issue as to whether the defendant can recover the costs of representing himself.
Before leaving this application I wish to make some observations about the future conduct of application such as this. I make those observations bearing in mind that s 8 of the CPA requires the Court in the exercise of any of its powers to seek to give effect to the overarching purpose in s 7(1) of the CPA, namely, to facilitate the just, efficient, timely and cost‑effective resolution of the real issues in dispute.
To ensure the Court gives effect to that purpose, I think it is desirable in cases such as the present that timetabling orders record a statement in Other Matters that if the orders are not complied with, evidence or submissions filed out of time will not be considered at the hearing of the application without a formal application on summons for leave supported by an affidavit explaining why there has been non‑compliance with the order.
I also consider that it is desirable that directions for the conduct of the proceeding include directions imposing a limit of no more than 6 pages for submissions. Practitioners should endeavour to structure their submissions to put their best point first, clearly and concisely, and to give serious consideration as to whether there is any need to say anything about other points that are merely arguable or potentially arguable.
Consistent with the obligation upon the Court to seek to give effect to the overarching purpose and so as to facilitate compliance by parties and practitioners with their statutory obligation to seek to narrow the issues in dispute, it is also important that initial directions impose a requirement upon counsel and solicitors to confer by telephone, by audio‑visual means or preferably in person in accordance with the Practice Note to seek to resolve the dispute immediately following the service of any affidavit by the defendant in opposition to the application to set aside a statutory demand.
As I have done in this case, I think it is also appropriate for the Court to impose an appropriate time limit for the hearing of such applications.
Disposition
I will make a formal order that the statutory demand is set aside.
I will make a formal order that there be no costs of the application.
0
3
0