Re Uppu
[2024] VSC 729
•26 September 2024
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S ECR 2024 0191
| IN THE MATTER of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic) |
| v |
| IN THE MATTER of an application for bail by SAIRAM UPPU |
BETWEEN:
| SAIRAM UPPU | Applicant |
| and | |
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Respondent |
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JUDGE: | Champion J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 6 September 2024 |
DATE OF RULING: | 26 September 2024 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Re Uppu |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2024] VSC 729 |
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CRIMINAL LAW — Application for bail — Charges relating to kidnapping, extortion with threat to kill, robbery, contravention of an order intending to cause harm or fear of safety, persistent contravention of an order, unlawful assault, and failing to comply with a direction issued under the Crimes Act 1958 — Applicant alleged to have kidnapped and coerced former partner’s husband to return overseas — Family violence — Limited criminal history — Compelling reason not demonstrated — Unacceptable risk demonstrated — Application refused — Bail Act 1977.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Ms M Greener | Emma Turnbull Lawyers |
| For the Respondent | Mr S Devlin | Office of Public Prosecutions |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
By application dated 19 August 2024, Sairam Uppu [‘the applicant’] applies for a grant of bail from this Court. He is currently remanded on ten charges in which the Informant is Detective Senior Constable Martin Markovski [‘the informant’]. The charges are:
(a) Kidnapping;
(b) Extortion with threats to kill;
(c) Robbery;
(d) Contravention of an order, intending to cause harm or fear of safety;
(e) Persistent contravention of an order;
(f) Making a threat to kill;
(g) Unlawful assault; and
(h) Failing to comply with a direction issued under the Crimes Act 1958.
The applicant is due to appear for a committal mention before the Magistrates’ Court on 8 November 2024. The applicant was refused bail in the Magistrates’ Court on 2 August 2024.
Background
The complainant in this matter is PS. He is currently married to MH, who was previously married to the applicant. In summary, it is alleged that over a three to four day period the applicant, together with several co‑accused, kidnapped, assaulted and threatened the complainant and threatened his wife MH, before coercing the complainant to return to India, his country of origin. The following is a brief summary of the alleged offending.
The alleged offending
It is alleged that on Thursday 6 June 2024 at around 8:00am, MH received a call from a co‑accused in these proceedings, Nagander Karsala, who asked her to come to his office for a discussion. MH attended the office later that day and, during their discussion, Karsala discussed her husband, the complainant. Karsala questioned his lower‑level caste and why she would marry him. Karsala then alleged that the complainant was facing a child sex abuse case in India and faced receiving a sentence of imprisonment. Karsala further said that MH had committed a criminal offence by facilitating her husband’s travel to Australia. He claimed that the complainant would kill MH now that he was exposed as an abuser. Having known and trusted Karsala for some years as a family friend, and close‑friend of her ex‑husband the applicant, MH was scared and confused by this revelation and sought Karsala’s advice.
Karsala told MH that he would deal with the situation. Karsala told MH to call her husband, the complainant, who is a photographer, and ask him to attend Karsala’s office for a photoshoot for a shop opening event. Karsala said someone would collect the complainant from his home and bring him to the office. MH complied with the request as she had become scared and confused.
MH began to feel something was not right about Karsala’s plan and started to question him. On being questioned, Karsala revealed his coercive intention saying, ‘we have people waiting to kill you and your husband if you don’t agree with what [is] going on’. Karsala then demanded MH return home to collect her husband’s belongings, and take his passport and their marriage certificate to her workplace, so that her husband could later be coerced into returning to India. It is alleged that Karsala then made further threats to MH’s life if she did not comply with his demands.
It is alleged that MH was afraid and overwhelmed, and proceeded to carry out Karsala’s demands. Meanwhile, her husband, the complainant, was collected by a co‑accused named Vinay Chelapati and driven to Karsala’s office.
The prosecution case is that the complainant arrived at the office with his camera equipment worth $8,000, an IQZ6 mobile phone and two bank cards. On arrival, Chelapati told the complainant that the applicant was angry with him for marrying the applicant’s wife and said that ‘they are planning to kill you and MH’. On entering the office, Karsala introduced himself, confronted the complainant, and said, ‘we arranged for people to kill you. If we hand you over to them they will take you out and kill you if you don’t cooperate with us’. It is alleged that the complainant was shown a photograph of his family in India, and a number of his personal identification documents, and then threatened that he and his wife would be killed in Australia unless he accepted what they were saying for him to do. It is further alleged that another male present, Shiva Shaganti, slapped the complainant heavily to the face and ear.
It is alleged that the applicant then approached the complainant, slapped and punched him with a closed fist, and said, ‘I am [MH’s] husband. How dare you marry my wife you son of a bitch! … I will kill you bastard. You will be killed by my hands. I want to hit you with a marble plate over your head and knock you out. Once you wake up, I will plan what to do with you next’.
Karsala added: ‘You have to co‑operate with us. There is no way to escape. You are in our hands. If you want to live, then do what we say. If you don’t cooperate, you will be finished. We will kill you both’. Karsala told the complainant he was wanted by the police and stated ‘If you don’t co‑operate with us we will hand you over to the people that are waiting to take [you] and they will kill you. If [MH] loved you, she wouldn’t be doing this to you’. Karsala then confiscated the complainant’s belongings. The complainant was further struck and abused by the applicant.
It is alleged that the complainant was then forced to handwrite a statement discrediting a report that MH had made to the police about family violence by the applicant. Another co‑accused, Vishwamithra Manthripagada, arrived and approached the complainant and said, ‘It looks like he is still alive’. He further said to the applicant, ‘you didn’t do anything to him. I’m surprised. I thought he’d be already killed’. Manthripagada is then alleged to have slapped and punched the complainant, before demanding that he touch the applicant’s feet and ask for an apology for being of a lower caste and marrying his wife.
In the evening, the complainant was transported to the applicant’s house and taken to a bedroom although he was not able to sleep. During the evening, the applicant said to him, ‘I have my political background and I have a lot of money. I can do anything and get away with it. I have lots of friends that are criminals. If I order them to kill you, they will kill you without asking for a reason. They won’t ask any questions. They will kill you … I want to kill you both’.
It is then alleged that on Friday 7 June, the complainant was transported back to the applicant’s office. The complainant was forced to modify the letter he had written the day before, and then read it aloud while being filmed. The complainant was further coerced into signing the letter in the presence of a witness after it had been transcribed onto a statutory declaration form by the applicant. These events are alleged to have happened at a Post Office and a Police Station, the signing of the declaration having been witnessed by a police officer.
At 4:00pm in the afternoon, an unknown man is alleged to have provided the applicant with the complainant’s passport. At 5:00pm, Kasarla contacted MH and demanded that she pay the applicant $1,250 to be used to purchase the complainant’s flight to India. MH eventually complied and the applicant purchased the plane ticket.
The complainant continued to be abused for the remainder of the day.
The following day, in the early morning of Saturday 8 June, the applicant transported the complainant to Melbourne Airport during which time the applicant said: ‘If you contact [MH], when you are back in India I will come to India and I will kill you in your home. I could have thrown you anywhere in the forest and burnt your body. No one would’ve been able to find you’. The complainant believed the applicant would carry out this threat.
The complainant then departed Australia on an 8:30am flight to India.
On his arrival in India, the complainant contacted MH by email and established that they had both been coerced by the applicant and co‑accused. The complainant was further contacted by his former partner in India, who advised that the applicant had contacted her as well, threatening to kill the complainant.
After some visa complications, the complainant was able to return to Australia on 13 July 2024.
The investigation
The complainant has provided a detailed 21‑page statement to the police about the events that are alleged to have occurred. In part, his description of the events is supported by statements made by his wife MH, and Shiva Shaganti, who is alleged to have been present for some of the events, and to some extent appears to have been involved in the alleged offending.
Furthermore, the prosecution case is that an amount of supporting evidence exists in the form of CCTV footage, and telephone records, capable of contributing to the overall prosecution case against the applicant. Detailed descriptions of the investigation and available evidence appear in an 81‑paragraph Informant’s Report authored by the informant.
The applicable legislation
In determining an application for bail, the Court is required to have regard to the guiding principles set out in section 1B(1) of the Bail Act 1977 [‘the Act]’.
Notably, a person who is accused of an offence and is being held in custody in relation to that offence is entitled to bail unless the Court is required to refuse bail in accordance with the Act. Section 4AAA of the Act outlines the circumstances in which bail must not be refused.[1] Furthermore, section 4AA of the Act outlines the circumstances in which the two step test (which involves either the compelling reason or exceptional circumstances test and the unacceptable risk test) applies to the determination of a bail application.
[1]Bail Act 1977 (Vic) s 4.
The compelling reason test
Because the applicant is accused of committing an indictable offence, namely kidnapping, the compelling reason test applies to this application in accordance with sections 4AA(3), 4C and Schedule 2, item 9, of the Act.
The Court is required to decide whether, taking into account the surrounding circumstances in section 3AAA, the applicant has shown a compelling reason that justifies the grant of bail. Bail must be refused unless the applicant can satisfy the Court that a compelling reason exists.[2]
[2]Ibid, ss 4AA(3) and 4C(1)–(2).
The phrase ‘compelling reason’ is not defined in the Act. The meaning of the phrase was discussed first in Re Ceylan,[3] and further in a number of subsequent decisions of this Court. The relevant principles were summarised by the Court of Appeal in Rodgers v The Queen:[4]
(1)For an applicant for bail to show a compelling reason, a synthesis or balancing of all relevant matters (including those identified in s 3AAA) must compel the conclusion that the applicant’s detention in custody is not justified.
(2)It is not, however, necessary for an applicant to show a compelling reason, to show a reason which is irresistible or exceptional.
(3)A compelling reason is one which is forceful and therefore convincing — a reason which is ‘difficult to resist’.
[3][2018] VSC 361 (Beach JA).
[4][2019] VSCA 214, [43] (Beach, Kaye and Ashley JJA) (citations omitted).
Unacceptable risk
If satisfied that a compelling reason exists, the Act provides that the Court must still refuse bail if it is satisfied by the respondent that there is a risk of the kind set out in section 4E(1)(a) of the Act, and that risk is unacceptable.[5]
[5]The Act, s 4E (1)–(2).
Section 4E(1)(a) refers to the risk that the applicant, if released on bail, would endanger the safety and welfare of any person, commit an offence, interfere with a witness or otherwise obstruct the course of justice in any matter, or fail to surrender into custody in accordance with conditions of bail.
In considering whether a risk is unacceptable, the Court must take into account the surrounding circumstances set out in section 3AAA(1) of the Act, and consider whether there are any conditions that may be imposed to mitigate the risk so that it is not unacceptable.[6]
[6]Ibid, s 4E(3).
Family violence risks
The Court is also required to make inquiries as to whether there are any family violence intervention orders [‘FVIOs’], family violence safety notices, or other recognised domestic violence orders in force against the applicant.[7] In addition, because the applicant is charged with family violence offences,[8] the Court is required to consider whether — if he were released on bail — there would be a risk that he would commit family violence and, if so, whether that risk could be mitigated by the imposition of a condition or the making of an FVIO.[9]
[7]Ibid, s 5AAAA(1).
[8]Family violence includes behaviour by a person towards a family member of that person if that behaviour is physically or sexually abusive. See the Act, s 3; Family Violence Protection Act 2008 s 5(1)(a)(i).
[9]The Act, s 5AAAA(2).
The applicant is presently the respondent in two active interim FVIOs issued by the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court on 2 August 2022. The first order protects the applicant’s ex‑wife MH and their two children. The second order protects the complainant.
I consider the risk of further family violence later in these reasons.
The applicant’s personal circumstances
The applicant is 40 years of age. He was born in India. He and MH were married in 2008 and moved to Australia in 2009. The couple have two children together: a daughter aged 13 and a son aged 10. Their son is autistic and non‑verbal.
In 2016, the applicant was granted Australian citizenship.
In 2021, the applicant established his own business, Smartville Homes, and as such he is self‑employed.
The applicant is the head of the Victorian branch of Bharat Rashtra Samithi Party, which is an Indian political party. The group is said to be a community organisation that represents the party in Australia. There are approximately 50–60 members who primarily undertake charity work for local and Indian based organisations.
Up until his arrest and remand, the applicant lived alone at a private rental property in the south‑west suburbs of Melbourne.
Criminal history
The applicant has a limited criminal history, involving appearances before the Werribee Magistrates’ Court in April 2023 and May 2024. Both matters were dealt with by way of a non‑conviction disposition.
On 20 April 2023, he was before the Magistrates’ Court charged with refusing or failing to comply with a direction, with the matter being adjourned without conviction. On 20 May 2024, the applicant pleaded guilty to one charge of persistent contravention of an Intervention Order at Werribee Magistrates’ Court and was sentenced without conviction to an adjourned undertaking for 12 months with a condition to pay $300 to the Court fund.
The applicant’s contentions
Compelling reason
The applicant relies on the following matters in combination, which are argued to establish a compelling reason justifying the grant of bail.
An alternative narrative and triable issues
Counsel for the applicant submits that he has offered a plausible alternative narrative in his recorded police interview that challenges the complainant’s allegations and foreshadows the raising of several triable issues in the forthcoming trial. The applicant’s version of events was briefly recounted by Counsel during oral hearing of this application, however, a video recording of the applicant’s record of interview has since been filed and reviewed by the Court.
In summary terms, the argued ‘alternative narrative’ is that the complainant approached the applicant seeking help to return to India. Further, MH ejected the complainant from their home as she is alleged to have discovered he had two ex‑wives and a pending sexual assault charge against him in India. MH is said to have contacted the applicant asking him to assist with returning the complainant back to India, whereupon the applicant assisted out of compassion.
Thus, the applicant denies the allegations put forward in the prosecution case.
Delay
Counsel submitted that the resolution of the charges against the applicant would be delayed significantly by a number of factors, including the number of potential co‑offenders, some which have not yet been charged, the need for written materials to be translated into English, necessary ongoing correspondence with the Australian Federal Police, Interpol, and Indian police as part of the ongoing investigation, as well as the recovery of CCTV footage from a hard drive that, at the time of hearing, had proved complicated to obtain. Counsel submitted these issues would need to be resolved before delivery of the hand‑up brief and that the matter would not likely be heard for trial before 2026.
Limited prior history and first time in custody
It was submitted that while the applicant’s prior history is relevant, when properly evaluated, it is isolated to a single day of offending. The non‑conviction disposition and limited financial penalty that had resulted in the Magistrates’ Court reflected both the applicant’s very limited prior history and the low‑level severity of the offending.
Relatedly, Counsel submitted that, this being the applicant’s first time in custody, the period of remand has had a sobering and salutary impact on his understanding of the importance of complying with bail and intervention order conditions.
Period between offending and arrest
It is noted that the applicant did not commit any further offending after the events alleged to have occurred between 4 and 6 June 2024. Counsel submitted that this period of good behaviour weighed in favour of a grant of bail in the context of the complainant having returned to Australia and continuing a relationship with MH.
Business obligations
Counsel pressed the negative impacts that have resulted to the applicant’s business, Smartville Homes, since his remand into custody. It is noted that he is solely responsible for the management of nine residential housing projects that have not progressed since his remand. At the oral hearing, counsel contended that not only the applicant, but also his clients and business associates, have suffered commercially as a consequence of this matter.
Further, two character references by persons who have known the applicant in a professional capacity and had engaged the applicant to complete the construction of their homes were filed with the Court. Both referees emphasised the applicant’s work ethic and dedication, and their wish for him to be released to assist with the completion of their homes.
Stable accommodation
Counsel submitted that, if bailed, the applicant would reside in a privately rented premises and that he has submitted an expression of interest to purchase the property.
Absence of mental health or substance abuse issues
It was submitted that the applicant has no underlying mental health or substance abuse issues that would negatively affect his ability to comply with any conditions of bail. In written submissions, it was noted however that the applicant has been treated with anti‑anxiety medication for anxiety and depression following his separation from MH.
Co-accused grant of bail
Counsel submitted that it is relevant that the co‑accused Karsala was granted bail at Ringwood Magistrates’ Court on 26 August 2024, and thus considerations of parity of treatment arise.
Availability of a bail guarantor
The Court heard from a friend of the applicant, who offered a bail guarantee of $26,000. Counsel submitted that this sum was significant to the guarantor who worked as a courier. The submission was made that, although the sum was minor compared with the $400,000 guarantee accepted for Karsala’s grant of bail, the Court should be concerned with the importance of the sum to the guarantor offering it rather than its comparative financial value.
Unacceptable risk
As to the question of unacceptable risk, Counsel submitted that the factors supporting the existence of a compelling reason also support that the applicant does not pose an unacceptable risk.
In written submissions, Counsel pressed that the applicant is subject to two Intervention Orders protecting the complainant and MH respectively, which orders provide a further protective element in this matter.
The respondent’s contentions
Compelling reason
As to whether the applicant has established a compelling reason justifying a grant of bail, the respondent relies on the following matters to demonstrate that the test has not been met.
Supporting evidence that contradicts the alternative narrative
The respondent submits that the case put against the applicant is a clearly arguably strong case. Through the affidavit in response to the application, the respondent contends that the strength of the prosecution case is enhanced by a number of supporting pieces of evidence, including messages downloaded from the applicant’s telephone, containing:
(a) the complainant’s personal details as well as details of his family members;
(b) references to the ‘execution of a plan’ in the first week of June 2024; and
(c) statements evidencing fears that police would be called regarding a kidnapping or abduction.
Further, the respondent relies on evidence of communication records placing the applicant in the offence areas at relevant times as well as images on the applicant’s phone of the letter written by the complainant on 7 June. Both of these pieces of evidence are argued to be contrary to the applicant’s account of events given in his police record of interview.
Further, at the oral hearing of the application, the respondent provided the Court with new evidence in support of the prosecution case, including:
(a) the statement of co‑accused Shaganti that the complainant was at the applicant’s house, this being inconsistent with statements made in the applicant’s record of interview;
(b) the statement of a Mr Mogulla that the co‑accused Chelapati had asked him to supply the complainant’s passport, this being inconsistent with Chelapati’s record of interview in which he is said to deny knowing Mr Mogulla; and
(c) CCTV footage showing the applicant drafting the statutory declaration that he had said in his record of interview was written by the complainant.
Delay and seriousness of the alleged offending
As to the issue of delay, the respondent accepts that there would likely be some delay involved in preparing the hand‑up brief. However, Counsel submitted the matter would be brought to trial by the end of 2025 rather than in 2026. It is submitted that, in the event the applicant is found guilty of the serious charges he faces, he will inevitably be sentenced to a period of imprisonment exceeding the period he would be expected to serve on remand.
With regard to the nature and seriousness of the alleged offending, the respondent submits that this case involves very serious allegations of abusive, violent and controlling behaviour made towards both the complainant and MH in the context of a number of alleged occurrences of family violence towards the complainant’s wife, as referenced in the Informant’s Report. It is emphasised that the current allegations concern numerous threats to kill the complainant, and include his wife, MH, as well as having committed physical assaults on the complainant.
The prosecution points to evidence that the applicant is a ‘high‑ranking’ figure within an Indian political party and has used his influence to instil fear and force compliance with his demands, and has made serious threats to the safety of the complainant.
The informant asserts on a number of instances in his Informant’s Report that police hold ‘extreme concern’ for the ongoing safety of the complainant and MH.
Unacceptable risk
Endangering the safety or welfare of any person
The respondent emphasises and relies heavily on the Informant’s Report with respect to unacceptable risk. Some of the particularly forceful language used by the informant includes that:
(a) as mentioned above, the ‘police hold extreme concerns for the ongoing safety and welfare of the [complainant] and MH’;
(b) the applicant’s alleged behaviour was ‘abhorrent, degrading and inhumane’;
(c) police believe that [the applicant’s] attitude toward the victim suggests an extreme risk that [the applicant] will locate and further offend against [the complainant] and MH; and
(d) ‘police have grave concerns that [the applicant] will continue to contravene the current IVO and cause significant harm towards the victim’.
Interfering with a witness or otherwise obstructing the course of justice in any matter
The respondent submits that because the complainant and MH are witnesses in the prosecution case, the aforementioned risk to their safety is also relevant to the risk that the applicant would obstruct the course of justice if bail were granted.
Failing to surrender into custody in accordance with the conditions of bail
Although the applicant is an Australian citizen and would be tied to caring for his children and carrying on his business in Melbourne, the respondent contended that there is nonetheless a risk that the applicant may abscond given his overseas connections.
Analysis and conclusions
Introduction
As the applicant is accused of committing a Schedule 2 offence, the ‘compelling reason’ test applies to this application in accordance with sections 4AA(3), 4C and Schedule 2 of the Act. As above, the application of this test was not in dispute between the parties.
In determining whether a compelling reason exists, the Court must take into account the relevant surrounding circumstances, including, but not limited to, those set out in section 3AAA(1) of the Act.[10]
[10]Ibid, s 4C(3).
The Act does not define what is meant by ‘compelling reason’, however, I will apply the reasoning set out in Rodgers v The Queen[11] as discussed above.
[11][2019] VSCA 214 (Beach, Kaye and Ashley JJA).
Has the applicant shown a compelling reason?
As he is entitled to do, the applicant has outlined a number of factors which are put forward, in combination, to establish a compelling reason why he should receive a grant of bail.
As to the strength of the prosecution case, in my opinion, the evidence proposed to be put forward in the prosecution case indicates a case that appears clearly arguable. At the same time it is to be acknowledged the applicant has put forward an alternative narrative in his police interview. Whilst it is not appropriate for this Court at this point to assess the admissibility and credibility of the evidence that may be proffered in due course at trial, it is evident that the statements provided by the complainant and his wife are detailed and lengthy, and a number of the allegations made by the complainant and MH can to some extent be supported by reference to CCTV footage, various mobile phone and email records, as well as the creation of the false documents referred to above. Furthermore, there is arguably some support for the account provided by the complainant in the statement of his wife, MH. All of these factors, including to some extent the statement of Shaganti, are capable of providing some support for the version of events provided by the complainant.
Other factors to take into account in assessing the seriousness of the allegations made are that the applicant is alleged to have led and orchestrated a pre‑meditated set of actions, that the events took place with the involvement of other alleged offenders acting in company with him, and that violence, intimidation and serious threats were used over an extended period, in circumstances where the complainant was kidnapped and held against his will, and forced to carry out demands made of him, including to the extent of being forced to travel to India. The allegation that he was at one point shown personal documents, including a photograph of his close family in India, is capable of being seen as a serious and somewhat chilling implied threat that the complainant would have to comply with the demands made of him.
In sum, I am not prepared to conclude that as presented to this Court, the case against the applicant is weak or foredoomed to fail, but rather appears clearly arguable, as I have observed.
With regard to the issue of delay, it may be accepted that there will be some significant delay in the preparation of the hand‑up brief and the bringing of the matter to a trial conclusion. It would appear likely that in the absence of a grant of bail the applicant would spend a significant period of time in remand custody, which may be particularly difficult for him given it is his first custodial experience. I note that there will be a committal mention shortly, and that in due course a committal will be held. It can be noted that at the conclusion of the committal hearing, when witnesses may be expected to have been tested, a Magistrate can revisit the question of bail.
The applicant has a prior criminal history which is relevant, albeit limited in its impact, on the outcome of this application. However, I do not accept that the history should not be taken into account only because it occurred over a short period of time — family violence offending, even if occurring in a short burst of offending, is of significant concern to the Court.
Ultimately, having taken into account all the factors put forward, and balancing them as best as can be done at this stage, in my opinion the applicant has not satisfied the Court that the compelling reason test has been satisfied. In coming to the conclusion I have, I have taken into account all the surrounding circumstances including issues concerning parity of treatment with the alleged co‑offender, the availability of a surety amount, static bail address, letters of support, and continued availability of employment.
Has the respondent shown there is an unacceptable risk?
Having concluded that the compelling reason test has not been satisfied, it is therefore unnecessary for me to consider the application of the unacceptable risk test. However, in the event that I had concluded the compelling reason test was satisfied, I indicate that I nonetheless would have refused the grant of bail on the basis that the respondent has satisfied me that there is an unacceptable risk, as defined in the Act. In my opinion, the evidence put forward against the applicant is capable of demonstrating that he did commit actual violence against the complainant, as well as his wife, that he has previously not obeyed the orders of a Court, and that he appears to possess a concerning willingness and pattern of conduct in issuing violent threats against the life, and/or safety, of individuals unless they comply with his various requests, to ensure he obtains the outcomes he wants. The apparent ease and frequency in which these types of extreme threats appear to have been made, occasioned by actual violence in some instances, are of serious concern to the Court.
I note that the respondent alleges the applicant is a flight risk on the basis that he has connections and political influence in India. In my opinion, there is not sufficient evidence placed before the Court as to the risk of flight, and I indicate that I have not taken this matter into account in making my decision.
Bail in the circumstances must be refused if a Court is satisfied by the respondent that there is a risk the applicant would engage in any of the conduct outlined in section 4E(1)(a), and that such a risk is an unacceptable one.[12] In all the circumstances, I am satisfied by the respondent that the allegations against the applicant amount to such a risk of further offending and interfering with influencing the course of justice such that these risks cannot be ameliorated by the imposition of bail conditions. In this regard, I have considered the conditions as put forward on the applicant’s behalf.
[12]The Act, s 4E.
In my opinion, in considering all of the matters that could have been weighed in this part of the application, I am satisfied that this application should be refused on the basis the applicant poses a risk as defined in the Act.
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