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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Registry No Cl3 of 1993 In the matter of - An application for a writ of
prohibition against GROUP
CAPTAIN C.A. TYLER AM, WING
COMMANDER T.R. MARA, WING
COMMANDER I.M. LITTLE, WINGCOMMANDER P.M. HEWITSON and
WING COMMANDER W.A. EVANS
President and Members of a
General Court Martial
Ex parte -
JOHN WILLIAM FOLEY
MASON CJ
BRENNAN J
DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
| Foley(2) | 31 | 11/11/93 |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 11 NOVEMBER 1993, AT 11.40 AM
(Continued from 10/11/93)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| MASON CJ: | Mr Katz. |
| MR KATZ: | Your Honours, I had a few brief more remarks to |
make about the first part of my argume~t that
dealing with the second limb of section Sl(xi). I had got to the point of making the submission which
appears in paragraph 8 on page 4 of my written
document, to the effect that the purpose, both of
the relevant American and Australian provisions,
was to confer on the legislature a power to control
the occasions upon which the executive might use an
armed force under its command for the purpose ofexecuting the laws of the relevant jurisdiction,
rather than for its essential defensive function.
The other matters to mention are these.
First, that the construction which, I submit, is
the construction to be given to both provisions can
be seen in its operation by an American statute
which, Your Honours, I believe, have before you. A statute enacted by the American Congress roughly contemporaneously with the American Constitution.
It gives Your Honours an idea of the sorts ofoccasions upon which a legislature might choose to permit the executive to use the power being spoken of. The statute is one of 2 May 1792, and it is
popularly known as the George Washington Act, by
reason of the fact that that was the president upon
whom it conferred the relevant powers. Could I
very briefly direct Your Honours' attention to
three provisions: first, section 9 which confers
on:
the marshals of the several districts -
that is to say, the federal districts -
the same powers in executing the laws of the
United States, as sheriffs and their deputies in the several states have by law, in executing the laws of their respective states.
Then section 2, which is the crucial section for
present purposes:
whenever the laws of the United States shall
be opposed, or the execution thereof
obstructed, in any state, by combinations too
powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings, or by the
powers vested in the marshals by this act, the
same being notified to the President of the
United States, by an associate justice -
| Foley(2) | 32 | 11/11/93 |
that is to say the Supreme Court -
or the district judge, it shall be lawful for
the President of the United States to callforth the militia of such state…
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- Case
- [1993] HCATrans 347
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine the proper construction of provisions, both in the United States and Australia, that confer power on the legislature to control the circumstances under which the executive may deploy armed forces for the purpose of executing laws. This involved considering whether such provisions were intended to grant a broad power or to impose specific restraints on the executive's use of force for law enforcement.
The court examined the historical context and purpose of similar provisions, referencing a United States statute enacted around the time of the American Constitution, known as the George Washington Act of 1792. This Act provided that the President could call forth the militia to suppress combinations obstructing the execution of federal laws, but only upon notification by a judge that ordinary judicial proceedings were insufficient. The court noted that this statutory framework demonstrated a legislative concern to restrain the executive's use of armed force for law enforcement, requiring judicial notification and imposing limitations on the deployment of militia from other states. The provision also included a "sunset" clause, indicating a temporal limitation on the Act's operation.
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