Re Tyler & Ors; Ex parte Foley

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Registry No Cl3 of 1993
In the matter of -

An application for a writ of

prohibition against GROUP

CAPTAIN C.A. TYLER AM, WING

COMMANDER T.R. MARA, WING
COMMANDER I.M. LITTLE, WING

COMMANDER P.M. HEWITSON and

WING COMMANDER W.A. EVANS

President and Members of a

General Court Martial

Ex parte -

JOHN WILLIAM FOLEY

MASON CJ
BRENNAN J
DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J

McHUGH J

Foley(2) 31 11/11/93

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 11 NOVEMBER 1993, AT 11.40 AM

(Continued from 10/11/93)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MASON CJ:  Mr Katz.
MR KATZ:  Your Honours, I had a few brief more remarks to

make about the first part of my argume~t that

dealing with the second limb of section Sl(xi). I

had got to the point of making the submission which

appears in paragraph 8 on page 4 of my written

document, to the effect that the purpose, both of

the relevant American and Australian provisions,

was to confer on the legislature a power to control

the occasions upon which the executive might use an
armed force under its command for the purpose of

executing the laws of the relevant jurisdiction,

rather than for its essential defensive function.

The other matters to mention are these.

First, that the construction which, I submit, is

the construction to be given to both provisions can

be seen in its operation by an American statute

which, Your Honours, I believe, have before you. A
statute enacted by the American Congress roughly
contemporaneously with the American Constitution.
It gives Your Honours an idea of the sorts of
occasions upon which a legislature might choose to
permit the executive to use the power being spoken
of.

The statute is one of 2 May 1792, and it is

popularly known as the George Washington Act, by

reason of the fact that that was the president upon

whom it conferred the relevant powers. Could I

very briefly direct Your Honours' attention to

three provisions: first, section 9 which confers

on:

the marshals of the several districts -

that is to say, the federal districts -

the same powers in executing the laws of the

United States, as sheriffs and their deputies
in the several states have by law, in
executing the laws of their respective states.

Then section 2, which is the crucial section for

present purposes:

whenever the laws of the United States shall

be opposed, or the execution thereof

obstructed, in any state, by combinations too

powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary

course of judicial proceedings, or by the

powers vested in the marshals by this act, the

same being notified to the President of the

United States, by an associate justice -

Foley(2) 32 11/11/93

that is to say the Supreme Court -

or the district judge, it shall be lawful for
the President of the United States to call

forth the militia of such state…

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Details
Case
[1993] HCATrans 347
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for a writ of prohibition brought by Mr Foley against Group Captain C.A. Tyler AM and other members of a General Court Martial, who were the President and members of that court. The dispute centred on the scope of legislative power to authorise the executive to use armed force for the execution of laws, as opposed to its primary defensive function.

The High Court was required to determine the proper construction of provisions, both in the United States and Australia, that confer power on the legislature to control the circumstances under which the executive may deploy armed forces for the purpose of executing laws. This involved considering whether such provisions were intended to grant a broad power or to impose specific restraints on the executive's use of force for law enforcement.

The court examined the historical context and purpose of similar provisions, referencing a United States statute enacted around the time of the American Constitution, known as the George Washington Act of 1792. This Act provided that the President could call forth the militia to suppress combinations obstructing the execution of federal laws, but only upon notification by a judge that ordinary judicial proceedings were insufficient. The court noted that this statutory framework demonstrated a legislative concern to restrain the executive's use of armed force for law enforcement, requiring judicial notification and imposing limitations on the deployment of militia from other states. The provision also included a "sunset" clause, indicating a temporal limitation on the Act's operation.

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