Re Thorpe [No 3]
[2025] VSCA 219
•12 September 2025
| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL |
| S EAPCI 2025 0023 |
IN THE MATTER of proposed judicial directions, on the application of UNCLE ROBBIE THORPE
| UNCLE ROBBIE THORPE | Applicant |
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| JUDGES: | EMERTON P and WALKER JA |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | Determined on the papers |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 12 September 2025 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VSCA 219 |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Filing – Power to direct Registrar to accept documents for filing – Registrar refused to accept documents for filing – Applicant sought review of Registrar’s decision and judicial direction to Registrar to accept documents for filing – Documents were applications other than for leave to appeal – Documents mostly sought orders that the Court would not make – Documents mostly irregular, and/or frivolous or vexatious, and/or would give rise to abuse of process – Application for direction refused for most documents – Application for direction allowed in respect of two documents.
Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015, rr 64.13, 64.43.
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| Counsel | |||
| Applicant: | In person | ||
| Respondent: | Not applicable | ||
Solicitors | |||
| Applicant: | Not applicable | ||
| Respondent: | Not applicable | ||
EMERTON P
WALKER JA:
On 20 October 2023, Uncle Robbie Thorpe (‘the applicant’) sought to file a charge sheet and summons in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria naming himself as the informant and King Charles III as the accused. The charge-sheet alleged that King Charles III had committed ‘continuing acts of genocide … against First Peoples’.
On 29 December 2023, a senior registrar of the Magistrates’ Court refused to issue the summons and did not initiate a proceeding. The applicant sought judicial review of this decision and the matter proceeded by way of a trial in July 2024 before Richards J. In her judgment delivered on 5 February 2025, Richards J found that the Magistrates’ Court was correct to refuse to issue the proposed proceeding and the application was dismissed.[1]
[1]Thorpe v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [2025] VSC 22.
The applicant has since filed an application in this Court for leave to appeal Richards J’s decision (the ‘principal proceeding’), the hearing of which is listed on 2 December 2025 alongside various joinder applications. These include applications to join to the principal proceeding the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of British of Commonwealth of Nations. In addition, the applicant has filed three other applications for leave to appeal and, within the principal proceeding, further applications other than for leave to appeal. There are currently also on foot numerous applications filed by non-parties for leave to intervene in the principal proceeding.
On 14 August 2025, pursuant to r 64.43 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (the ‘Rules’), the Registrar of the Court of Appeal refused to accept for filing six applications other than for leave to appeal made within the principal proceeding. The applications sought various orders relating to the identity or racial background of the judges who are to hear the applicant’s matters, further evidence sought to be adduced, and the ‘authentication’ of various decisions made by the Court.
The applicant now seeks that the ‘President of the Court’ review the Registrar’s decision, pursuant to s 64.43(5) of the Rules.
The various applications and rejected documents
As noted above, in addition to the principal proceeding, the applicant has filed three other applications for leave to appeal, two of which are relevant to the current application:
(a)an application for leave to appeal from a decision of O’Meara J in relation to his Honour’s failure to direct the Prothonotary to accept a writ for filing (‘proceeding 0088); [2] and
(b)an application for leave to appeal from a decision of Richards J ruling that an originating motion submitted for filing on 16 March 2024 be refused (‘proceeding 0091’).[3]
[2]Thorpe v Prothonotary [2024] VSC 360
[3]Re Thorpe (No 2) [2024] VSC 408.
In May 2025, the applicant requested via email that proceeding 0088 and proceeding 0091 be heard together with the principal proceeding and that a directions hearing be listed. On 12 June 2025, the Registry wrote to the applicant and the other parties advising them that proceeding 0088 and proceeding 0091 would not be listed at the same time as the principal proceeding and that the Court did not intend to hold a directions hearing in this matter.
In the principal proceeding, the six applications that the Registrar refused to accept for filing that are the subject of the present application for review are:
(a)an application dated 23 June 2025 (inclusive of a Form 64B, affidavit, written submissions, list of authorities and draft application book index) (‘512165 documents’) seeking orders requiring the Chief Justice to write to the Attorney‑General of Victoria to request the appointment of ‘certain Aborigines’ to sit as judges in this matter and to direct the Attorney-General to ‘appear before the court to report on what steps are being taken to achieve this’;
(b)an application dated 23 June 2025 (inclusive of a Form 64B, affidavit, written submissions, list of authorities, draft application book index and email correspondence) (‘512171 documents’) seeking orders requiring the Court to provide an authenticated order and reasons for its decision made 12 June 2025 not to list proceeding 0088 and 0091 with the principal proceeding;
(c)an application dated 23 June 2025 (inclusive of a Form 64B, affidavit, written submissions, list of authorities, draft application book index and email correspondence) (‘512178 documents’) seeking orders requiring the Court to provide an authenticated order and reasons for its decision made 12 June 2025 not to hold a directions hearing for this matter;
(d)application dated 23 June 2025 (inclusive of a Form 64B, two affidavits, written submissions, list of authorities and draft application book index) (‘512193 documents’) seeking orders requiring the Prothonotary to accept or reject various documents sought to be filed in the Trial Division and to accept or reject documents sought to be filed within 3 days of being submitted;
(e)application dated 30 July 2025 (inclusive of a Form 64B, affidavit, written submissions, list of authorities and draft application book index) (‘522627 documents’) seeking that the Court receive further evidence from the applicant and from the proposed intervenors in relation to ongoing genocide, the 140 recommendations of the Yoorrook Justice Commission and the applicant’s attempt to charge the Attorney-General of Australia with genocide; and
(f)application dated 6 August 2025 (inclusive of a Form 64B, affidavit, written submissions, list of authorities and draft application book index) (‘524786 documents’) seeking orders that the Court receive further evidence of the Closing the Gap Annual Data Compilation Report dated 30 July 2025.
The Registrar’s decision
On 14 August 2025, the applicant was notified via email of the Registrar’s decision to refuse to accept the documents for filing. The Registrar provided reasons for his decision in the form of a table attached to that email.
In relation to the 512165 documents, the Registrar reasoned that the orders sought are not ones that the Court either can or would make, as a party has no entitlement to seek to:
(a)have the Chief Justice write to the Attorney-General about the appointment of judicial officers;
(b)require the Attorney-General to give a report on matters concerning the appointment of judicial officers; or
(c)have a bench of a particular composition hear a proceeding.
The Registrar considered the documents to be frivolous, vexatious and irregular, and refused to accept them for filing pursuant to rr 64.43(1)(a) and (b) of the Rules. The Registrar further determined that, if filed, the application would give rise to an abuse of process pursuant to s 64.43(1)(c) as the orders sought were previously refused by this Court in July 2025.[4]
[4]See Re Thorpe [2025] VSCA 172, [24]–[27] (‘Thorpe [No 2]’).
In relation to the 512171 and 512178 documents, the Registrar determined that the orders sought are not of a kind appropriate for an application other than for leave to appeal. The Registry’s decisions made and communicated to the applicant via email on 12 June 2025 not to list proceeding 0088 and proceeding 0091 with the principal proceeding and not to hold a directions hearing are not ‘decisions’ which require orders to be made and reasons to be given. The Registrar considered the documents to be frivolous, vexatious and irregular, and refused to accept them for filing pursuant to rr 64.43(1)(a) and (b) of the Rules.
In relation to the 512193 documents, the Registrar determined that the orders sought are not ones that the Court either can or would make, as they do not relate to a Court of Appeal proceeding. Further, a party has no entitlement to seek an order that would require the Prothonotary to assess documents submitted for filing within a particular timeframe. The documents, if filed, would therefore constitute an abuse of process and the Registrar refused to accept them for filing pursuant to r 64.43(1)(c) of the Rules. The Registrar further considered the documents to be frivolous, vexatious and irregular.
In relation to the 522627 documents, the Registrar observed that there are many proposed intervenors and that their applications for leave to intervene have not yet been decided. He considered that, in such circumstances, the application for leave to adduce oral evidence is ‘in substance, an attempt to circumvent that process’. The Registrar also noted that the principal proceeding is in the nature of judicial review and the underlying issue concerns whether the Magistrates’ Court was correct to refuse to issue a summons and initiate a proceeding. He considered the documents to be frivolous, vexatious and irregular, and refused to accept them for filing pursuant to rr 64.43(1)(a) and (b) of the Rules.
In relation to the 524786 documents, the Registrar again noted that the principal proceeding is in the nature of judicial review and the underlying issue concerns whether the Magistrates’ Court was correct to refuse to issue a summons and initiate a proceeding. The Registrar decided that in the context of the issues for determination, the applicant has not identified a proper basis for the proposed further evidence. He determined that the documents were frivolous, vexatious and irregular and refused to accept them for filing pursuant to rr 64.43(1)(a) and (b) of the Rules.
The relevant provisions of the Rules
Rule 64.43 relevantly provides:
Further powers of Registrar
(1)The Registrar may refuse to accept for filing any application, including for leave to appeal, notice of appeal or other notice, written case, written case in response, affidavit or other document if the Registrar considers that—
(a)the document is irregular;
(b)the document is frivolous or vexatious on its face or by reference to any materials already filed or submitted for filing; or
(c)the filing of the document would give rise to an abuse of the process of the Court.
(2)The Registrar may refuse to accept for filing any application, including for leave to appeal, notice of appeal or other notice, written case, written case in response, affidavit or other document if—
(a)it is not complete;
(b)it does not comply with these Rules or the requirements of any applicable practice note;
(c)it is not properly signed, if required to be signed;
(d)it is not accompanied by all the documents required by this Order or any applicable practice note; or
(e)any applicable fee has not been paid.
…
(5)The Court of Appeal constituted by one or more Judges of Appeal may direct the Registrar to accept for filing any document which the Registrar has refused to accept under this Rule.
Importantly, this Court considered r 64.43 in Thorpe [No 2] in relation to reviewing the Registrar’s refusal to accept for filing various applications other than for leave to appeal. In that matter, the Court had regard to McLeish JA’s observations in Re Thorpe[5] that the purpose of the power of direction in r 64.43(5) ‘is to enable judicial consideration of the question whether a document should be accepted for filing’.[6] The Court went on:
In performing that function, it is not necessary for the judge to consider whether the Registrar’s reasons for refusing to accept a document are infected by error. The Registrar’s reasons may be relevant to the judge’s consideration of the matter, but the role of the judge undertaking a review is not confined to the ascertainment of error. Rather, the judge is required to form their own view as to whether the document in question should be accepted for filing, by reference to the criteria specified in the rule. In other words, the judge considers the question afresh.[7]
[5][2024] VSCA 172 (‘Thorpe [No 1]’).
[6]Thorpe [No 2] [2025] VSCA 172, [20] (Emerton P and Walker JA), quoting Thorpe [No 1] [2024] VSCA 172, [6] (McLeish JA).
[7]Thorpe [No 2] [2025] VSCA 172, [20], citing Thorpe [No 1] [2024] VSCA 172, [6].
The issue in this case is whether the documents fall within r 64.43(1).
Consideration
The 512165 documents
By these documents the applicant seeks an order that:
The court notes the repeated requests by the applicant to sit a court of all‑Aboriginal judges and acknowledges that is not presently possible due to the non-appointment of any Aboriginal judges to date and directs the thirteenth Chief Justice to write to Victoria’s Attorney-General, requesting the appointment of certain Aborigines to sit as judges in this matter — and further directs the second respondent, the Attorney-General of Victoria, to appear before the court to report on what steps are being taken to achieve this before the court makes any further decisions in these three proceedings.
As the Registrar noted in his decision, some of the orders sought by the applicant in the 512165 documents were previously refused by this Court in Thorpe [No 2]. In that matter, the applicant requested that a ‘bench of five Aboriginal judicial officers be assembled to hear the application for leave to appeal and the appeal’ and if this was not possible, that the Chief Justice ‘write to and seek to meet with the Attorneys-General of the State of Victoria and the Commonwealth of Australia to request special appointment of sufficient Aboriginal judicial officers’.[8] In relation to the first proposed order, the Court found that this is not a suitable order to be made on the motion of a party, because a party has ‘no entitlement to seek to have a bench of a particular size or composition hear a proceeding’. The application for that order was frivolous, vexatious and irregular. In relation to the second proposed order, the Court found that the application was frivolous, vexatious and irregular as it is ‘plain that this Court cannot order Niall CJ to take the step sought’.[9]
[8]Thorpe [No 2] [2025] VSCA 172, [25]–[26].
[9]Thorpe [No 2] [2025] VSCA 172, [27].
The first aspect of the order sought in the 512165 documents — that the Court ‘notes’ the applicant’s requests — is not a proper form of order. This Court does not make orders ‘noting’ matters.
The second aspect of the order sought in the 512165 documents — that the Chief Justice write to the Attorney-General of Victoria requesting the appointment ‘of certain Aborigines to sit as judges in this matter’ — is similar in its terms to the second order sought, and refused, in Thorpe [No 2]. As we held in that case, an application seeking an order in these terms, if it were to be filed, would give rise to an abuse of process. The application is also, as it was found to be in Thorpe [No 2], frivolous, vexatious and irregular.
The third aspect of the order sought in the 512165 documents — that the Attorney‑General of Victoria appear before the Court to ‘report on what steps are being taken’ to achieve the appointment of enough Aboriginal judges to hear the appeal — is not an order that the Court of Appeal can or would make. A party has no entitlement to seek to require the Attorney-General to report on matters concerning the appointment of judicial officers. The application for this order is frivolous, vexatious and irregular.
The Registrar was thus correct to refuse to accept the 512165 documents for filing.
The 512171 documents and the 512178 documents
By these documents the applicant seeks orders that the Court of Appeal provide an authenticated order and reasons for its decisions made 12 June 2025 not to list proceeding 0081 and proceeding 0091 with the principal proceeding and not to hold a directions hearing in relation to this matter.
Both of these requests were made by the applicant via email to the Registry. The Registry responded to the requests similarly via email to the applicant and other parties.
We agree with the Registrar that these ‘decisions’, which can properly be described as case management or listing decisions, are not ones that require orders to be made. Nor do they require reasons to be given. The 512171 and 512178 documents are therefore frivolous and irregular and the Registrar was correct to refuse to accept them for filing.
The 512193 documents
By these documents the applicant seeks five orders in relation to various documents and applications sought to be filed in the Trial Division and the timing within which the Prothonotary is to make a decision about the filing of various documents and applications. The first three orders the applicant seeks are:
1. Concerning the [Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission] and [Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission] complaint against the Prothonotary’s refusal to reject or accept nine lodgements as set out in the Report “nine Aboriginal Genocide cases March-April 2023”, Prothonotary Clark is ordered to decide forthwith if each of the nine cases is to be accepted or rejected so that Uncle Robbie Thorpe and Dr Aunty Alma Thorpe can seek leave to appeal any rejected lodgements.
2. Concerning the applicant’s intention to seek judicial review of the two [Court Services Victoria] decisions not to proceed with the discrimination complaints against the Prothonotary and [the Judicial Registrar], Prothonotary Clark is ordered to make a decision within three days of the lodgement by the applicant of such judicial review applications whether to accept or reject them so that so that Uncle Robbie Thorpe can seek leave to appeal any rejected lodgements.
3. Concerning the applicant’s intention to seek judicial review of the [Legal Services Board] decisions not to proceed with the discrimination/Aboriginal-Genocide complaints against the several Attorney-General’s solicitors (VGSO officers) and two barristers, Prothonotary Clark is ordered to make a decision within three days of the lodgement by the applicant of such judicial review applications whether to accept or reject them so that so that Uncle Robbie Thorpe can seek leave to appeal any rejected lodgements.
The complaint the subject of proposed order 1, and the two judicial review applications that the applicant has an ‘intention’ to apply for the subject of proposed orders 2 and 3, do not relate to the principal proceeding. The two accompanying affidavits sought to be filed by the applicant suggest that the proceedings he is referring to are proceedings sought to be commenced by the filing of multiple originating motions and writs in the Trial Division. These applications are sought to be filed by either the applicant or Aunty Alma Thorpe.
Proposed orders 1, 2 and 3, being orders that do not relate to the principal proceeding, are not orders that the Court of Appeal either can or would make in this proceeding. As such, the documents would, if filed, constitute an abuse of process, and are frivolous, vexatious and irregular.
The fourth and fifth orders sought by the applicant are:
4. Concerning any future lodgements of new case requests by Uncle Robbie Thorpe, Prothonotary Clark is ordered to make a decision within three days of the lodgement by the applicant of such judicial review applications whether to accept or reject them so that so that Uncle Robbie Thorpe can seek leave to appeal any rejected lodgements.
5. The Court of Appeal provides authenticated orders in this application and provides written reasons of decision in this application.
A party has no entitlement to seek an order from the Court requiring the Prothonotary to assess documents submitted for filing in the future within a particular time frame. Nor would this Court make an order of that kind. As such, the documents in relation to order 4 are frivolous, vexatious and irregular.
In relation to order 5, the order is in terms directed to the Court of Appeal. It is not an order that the Court of Appeal either can or would make. The documents would, if filed, constitute an abuse of process, and are frivolous, vexatious and irregular.
The Registrar was correct to refuse to accept the 512193 documents for filing.
The 522627 documents and the 524786 documents
By these documents the applicant applies, pursuant to r 64.13 of the Rules, for an order that the Court of Appeal receive further evidence.
(a)The 522627 documents seek leave to adduce ‘oral evidence by the intervenors as to the ongoing genocide of [the] head of state Charles Windsor’ and further evidence from the applicant as to:
(i) the public record showing historical genocide during the said military invasion aka colonisation/settlement and the 140 recommendations of the Yoorrook Justice Commission showing the ongoing genocide against Us.
(ii) the applicant’s attempts to charge Australia’s then Attorney-General, Hon Mark Dreyfus KC, with Aboriginal genocide.
(b)The 524786 documents seek leave to adduce further evidence, namely the ‘Closing the Gap Annual Data Compilation Report’ dated 30 July 2025.
It is convenient to set out the terms of r 64.13:
64.13 Further evidence in application for leave to appeal or appeal
(1)Unless the Court of Appeal otherwise orders, in an application for leave to appeal or an appeal—
(a) oral evidence shall not be adduced; and
(b)evidence which was not before the court or tribunal whose decision is sought to be appealed or is being appealed shall not be relied upon.
(2)A party may apply for the Court of Appeal to receive oral evidence or further evidence, as the case may be.
(3)The application shall—
(a) be in accordance with Form 64B;
(b)be filed and served at least 28 days before the hearing of the application or the appeal;
(c) be accompanied by an affidavit stating—
(i) briefly but specifically, the facts on which the party relies;
(ii) the grounds of the application for leave to appeal or the appeal to which the application relates;
(iii) the evidence the party wants the Court of Appeal to receive; and
(iv) why the evidence was not adduced in the court or tribunal the decision of which is the subject of the application or appeal; and
(d)be accompanied by any additional documents required by any applicable practice note.
…
In accordance with r 64.13, the applicant sought to file the following documents in support of his application,:
(a)an accompanying affidavit stating the facts on which he relies;
(b)the grounds of the application for leave to appeal;
(c)the evidence that he wants the Court to receive; and
(d)why that evidence was not adduced before the trial court.
He submitted that the evidence of the intervenors was not available at trial because ‘there were no intervenors in that proceeding’ and that the Yoorrook Justice Commission recommendations were not made available until 1 July 2025, after the trial had concluded. Similarly, the further evidence of the applicant’s attempts to charge the Commonwealth Attorney-General with genocide ‘only occurred after the hearing’.
It will be recalled that the Registrar refused to accept these documents for filing on the following two bases:
(a)First, in relation to the 522627 documents, on the basis that, insofar as they concern evidence to be given by persons who have sought leave to intervene, they seeks to ‘circumvent’ the process of determining the intervention applications; and
(b)More generally, on the basis that, in light of the issues for determination in the application for leave to appeal, no proper basis for the proposed further evidence application is identified.
In relation to the first basis, we do not consider it is correct to say that an application to adduce further evidence from a person who is also a person who has sought leave to intervene is properly characterised as an attempt to circumvent the intervenor process. First, the existence of an application for leave to adduce further evidence from a proposed intervenor will have no impact on the Court’s consideration of the application for leave to intervene. Secondly, if leave to intervene were to be granted, including potentially with limitations as to the manner in which the intervenor could participate in the hearing, that would be no barrier to a grant of leave to Uncle Robbie Thorpe to adduce further evidence from that person, should the Court be persuaded that course was appropriate; that would be quite different from participation as an intervenor. Thirdly, if leave to intervene were to be refused, that would also be no barrier to a grant of leave to Uncle Robbie Thorpe to adduce further evidence from that person, should the Court be persuaded that course was appropriate. Of course, the prospects of a grant of leave to adduce further evidence in the third circumstance may well be affected by the Court’s reasons for refusing leave to intervene. But, in short, the two processes are different and one does not involve an attempt to circumvent the other.
As for the more general basis on which the Registrar refused the applications to adduce further evidence, we observe that a person has an entitlement to seek leave from the Court to adduce further evidence on an application for leave to appeal. True it is that leave to adduce further evidence will only be granted if there is a high probability that the result would have been different had the evidence been received.[10] We also accept that, on the face of the materials upon which the applicant seeks to rely, it is not entirely clear how the further evidence is relevant to the determination of the issues raised by Uncle Robbie Thorpe’s grounds of appeal. However, the question of whether the evidence is relevant and, if so, whether it would likely result in a different outcome from that reached at trial, are questions properly to be determined by the Court upon a substantive consideration of the application. That question turns on a consideration of the further evidence in light of the specific grounds of appeal. An evaluation of those questions will rarely be appropriate to be undertaken at the point of deciding whether to accept a document for filing. It will not, in our view, provide a basis for refusing to accept the documents for filing unless it is plain on the face of the documents that they bear no relationship whatsoever to the issues raised by the application for leave to appeal. We do not consider that can be said in the present case.
[10]See Timelio Pty Ltd v Petris [2024] VSCA 17, citing Giles v Jeffrey [2016] VSCA 314, [207] (Santamaria and Kyrou JJA and Elliot AJA); Yin v Wu [2023] VSCA 130, [153]–[154] (Kyrou, T Forrest and Hargrave JJA).
Disposition
We will not direct the Registrar to accept the 512165, 512171, 512178 and 512193 documents for filing.
However, we will direct the Registrar to accept the 522627 and 524768 documents for filing. That acceptance for filing, of course, says nothing about whether the Court will grant leave to Uncle Robbie Thorpe to adduce the further evidence as sought in the applications.
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