Re Suncoast Restoration Pty Ltd (in liq)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pleash, in the matter of Suncoast Restoration Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] FCA 355

Citation: Pleash, in the matter of Suncoast Restoration Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] FCA 355
Parties: BLAIR ALEXANDER PLEASH AND RICHARD ALBARRAN AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF SUNCOAST RESTORATION PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 140 886 540 and SUNCOAST RESTORATION PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 140 886 540 v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
File number: QUD 617 of 2012
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 18 April 2013
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – liquidators of company that was a corporate trustee – where company was automatically removed as trustee upon entering administration by operation of clause in the trust deed – where company continued to hold trust assets as a bare trustee – where liquidators sold trust assets – where liquidators acting on legal advice and unaware company was bare trustee – whether liquidators should be excused under s 1318 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – whether liquidators should be excused under s 310 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) – whether company should be excused under s 76 of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) – whether sales should be deemed sales within the company’s powers as trustee – whether the company and liquidators should be indemnified by the trust fund
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth)
Trustee Act 1958 (Vic)
Trusts Act 1973 (Qld)
Cases cited:

Apostolovski v Total Risk Management Pty Ltd (2010) 79 NSWLR 432; [2010] NSWSC 1451
Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241
Barac v Farnell (1994) 53 FCR 193
Bruton Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 193 FCR 442; [2011] FCAFC 79
Caterpillar Financial Australia Ltd v Ovens Nominees Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 677
CGU Insurance Ltd v Porthouse (2008) 235 CLR 103; [2008] HCA 30
Clarke v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 170 FCR 473; [2008] FCAFC 106
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Dick (2007) 64 ACSR 61; [2007] NSWCA 190
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Bruton Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (2008) 173 FCR 472; [2008] FCAFC 184
Field v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1285
Fletcher, in the matter of Starrit Pty Ltd (in liq) [2012] FCA 803
Gibson v Barton (1875) LR 10 QB 329
Herdegen vFederal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 84 ALR 271
Kerferd v Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australasia Ltd (1893) 19 VLR 700
Lemery Holdings Pty Ltd v Reliance Financial Services Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 1344
R v Rahme (1993) 70 A Crim R 357
Re Spedding (deceased) [1966] NZLR 447
Re Suco Gold Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (1983) 33 SASR 99
Re Vouris; Epromotions Australia Pty Ltd and Relectronic-Remech Pty Ltd (in liq) (2003) 47 ACSR 155; [2003] NSWSC 702
Thakral Fidelity Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1997) 37 ATR 146

Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada, 2nd ed, 1984

Date of hearing:
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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 355
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involved the liquidators of Suncoast Restoration Pty Ltd, a company that was the trustee of a superannuation trust fund. The dispute arose from the sale of trust assets by the liquidators while the company was in liquidation, a transaction that was allegedly beyond their authority as liquidators. The key issue was whether the liquidators could be excused for these actions under various statutory provisions. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the liquidators could be excused under section 1318 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), section 310 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), or section 76 of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld). Additionally, the court had to decide if the sales of the trust assets should be deemed within the company’s powers as trustee and whether the company and liquidators should be indemnified by the trust fund.

The court found that the liquidators were unaware that upon their appointment, the company ceased to be the trustee of the trust fund and became a bare trustee, which lacked the power to sell trust assets. Despite this lack of awareness, the court considered the objective basis for believing that a claim might be made against the liquidators. The court weighed the factors indicating a lack of interest in the trust fund against the clear nature of the breach and concluded that there was a real possibility of a claim being made against the liquidators. Therefore, the court exercised its discretion to excuse the liquidators under section 1318 of the Corporations Act, finding that they acted honestly and that the circumstances warranted their relief from liability. Furthermore, the court deemed the sales of the trust assets as being within the company’s powers as trustee and ordered that the liquidators’ costs and expenses be paid from the trust assets.

The final orders of the court included deeming the sales of the trust assets as within the company’s powers as trustee, directing the liquidators to account for the proceeds of sale as assets in the winding up of the company, and ordering that the liquidators’ costs and expenses be paid from the trust assets. These orders effectively resolved the issues raised by the liquidators and provided clarity on the disposition of the trust assets and the liabilities of the liquidators.

Orders

Orders of the court

7. Pursuant to section 94 of the Trusts Act the sales by the Company under the control of the Liquidators of assets held on trust for the Trust as identified in the Schedule hereto be deemed to be sales within the power of the Company as Trustee of the Trust.

8. Pursuant to section 479(3) of the Corporations Act:

8.1. the proceeds of sale of any Trust assets be dealt with by the Liquidators as assets in the winding up of the Company and accounted for accordingly;

8.2. the future distribution of monies held on trust for the Trust to priority unsecured creditors and secured creditors will be valid distributions by the Liquidators in the winding up of the Company;

8.3. the costs and expenses incurred by the Company and the Liquidators and the Liquidators’ remuneration in realising any Trust assets and otherwise dealing with the Trust including the costs of the Liquidators in complying with order 8.5 herein and the costs of this proceeding be costs in the winding up of the Trust and paid from the assets of the Trust and in so far as payments have already been made such payments be deemed to be costs in the winding up of the Trust and paid from the assets of the Trust;

8.4. the costs of this proceeding be costs in the winding up of the Trust and paid from the assets of the Trust;

8.5. at least one (1) month prior to the Liquidators calling for proofs for dividend purposes the Liquidators shall cause the Company to give a return to the Commissioner of Taxation under section 35D of the SIS Act for each of the 2010, 2011 and 2012 years of income.

9. The disbursements of the Commissioner of Taxation fixed in the sum of $8,490.75 of and incidental to this application be paid from the assets of the Trust.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Despite this lack of opposition, Mr Looney SC, for the joint liquidators, made detailed written and oral submissions to demonstrate why the final relief sought should be granted. At the conclusion of the final hearing, I was satisfied it was appropriate to make orders essentially in the terms sought by the joint liquidators. At that time, I indicated I would provide written reasons for my decision in due course. These are those reasons.FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND THE NATURE OF THE JOINT LIQUIDATORS’ PROBLEM It is convenient to begin these reasons by providing some further details of the factual background of these proceedings and to provide more details of the nature of the joint liquidators’ problem. First, it should be noted that, following their appointment as joint administrators, Mr Pleash and Mr Albarran were appointed as joint and several liquidators of Suncoast on 21 March 2012. That appointment was made under s 499(2A) of the Act at the second meeting of creditors of Suncoast, after an earlier meeting of its creditors resolved that the company should be wound up. Suncoast was appointed as sole trustee of the Trust Fund in late 2009. Thereafter its only role was to act as trustee of the Trust Fund. As I have already noted above (at [2]), the Trust Fund was a superannuation fund. As such, it was governed by the provisions of the Superannuation Supervision Act and the Trusts Act. It was constituted by a trust deed (the Trust Fund Deed). When the joint liquidators were appointed joint administrators of Suncoast on 15 February 2012, the Trust Fund Deed contained the following pertinent clauses:3.1 Ceasing to Act as Trustee A Trustee shall cease to be a Trustee if:…3.1.6In the case of the Trustee being a company, a resolution is passed or a petition is presented for its winding up or liquidation or a receiver or administrator of its assets is appointed.…17.3Trustee’s and Directors’ Indemnity Except where, and to the extent that, the Trustees may be personally liable pursuant to Rule 17.1 [which is not relevant for present purposes], the Trustees shall be indemnified and reimbursed out of the Fund for any costs, expenses, claims, liability and damages which the Trustees may pay or incur in or about the administration of the trusts, authorities, powers and discretions contained in the Deed.PART SIX:Trustee’s Powers…1.The Trustee must invest the Fund in any of the following investments:1.1any investment authorised by law for the investment of trust funds.1.2the purchase or acquisition of shares, stocks, debentures, notes bonds, mortgages, options or other securities.…1.6the purchase, acquisition, leasing or hiring (from or to any person) of any real or personal property.…2.The Trustee shall have power to sell any investments and to vary and transpose any investments into other investments authorised by the Deed.(Emphasis in original) As can be seen from clause 3.1.6 of the Trust Fund Deed (above), where the trustee of the Trust Fund is a company, it ceases to be the trustee upon the appointment of an administrator, or upon a resolution for its liquidation. It follows that, from the time the joint liquidators were appointed as administrators of Suncoast, Suncoast ceased to be the trustee for the Trust Fund. Furthermore, there is authority that, from that point on, Suncoast became a bare trustee of the assets of the Trust Fund and, more significantly for the joint liquidators, in that capacity, Suncoast did not have the power to sell the assets of the Trust Fund: see Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Bruton Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) (2008) 173 FCR 472; [2008] FCAFC 184 (Bruton 2008) at [79] per Ryan, Mansfield and Dowsett JJ and Caterpillar Financial Australia Ltd v Ovens Nominees Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 677 (Caterpillar) at [26] and [28] per Gordon J. This meant that, in their capacity as the joint liquidators of Suncoast, the joint liquidators lacked the power to sell the assets of the Trust Fund as a part of the winding up of Suncoast.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The joint liquidators submitted that they had acted honestly and should be excused for any breaches, failure or omissions they may have committed by selling the Trust Assets. They relied on s 1318 of the Act and further, or alternatively, on s 310 of the Superannuation Supervision Act. Dealing first with s 1318 of the Act, that section relevantly provides:(1)If, in any civil proceeding against a person to whom this section applies for negligence, default, breach of trust or breach of duty in a capacity as such a person, it appears to the court before which the proceedings are taken that the person is or may be liable in respect of the negligence, default or breach but that the person has acted honestly and that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including those connected with the person’s appointment, the person ought fairly to be excused for the negligence, default or breach, the court may relieve the person either wholly or partly from liability on such terms as the court thinks fit.(2)Where a person to whom this section applies has reason to apprehend that any claim will or might be made against the person in respect of any negligence, default, breach of trust or breach of duty in a capacity as such a person, the person may apply to the Court for relief, and the Court has the same power to relieve the person as it would have had under subsection (1) if it had been a court before which proceedings against the person for negligence, default, breach of trust or breach of duty had been brought.…(4) This section applies to a person who is:…(d)a receiver, receiver and manager, liquidator or other person appointed or directed by the Court to carry out any duty under this Act in relation to a corporation.THE EVIDENCE REGARDING SECTION 1318 Mr Pleash, one of the joint liquidators, swore an affidavit in which he claimed that he and his fellow liquidator were unaware of the operation of clause 3.1.6 of the Trust Fund Deed and were therefore unaware that once they were appointed joint administrators of Suncoast it became a bare trustee of the Trust Assets and, as such, it did not have the power to sell those assets. Mr Pleash stated that he first became aware of these matters after retaining new solicitors to get advice about the correct entity liable to pay any taxation debts incurred by the Trust Fund. His new solicitors brought these matters to his attention after the contract of sale had been signed for the Woorim property and after the four motor vehicles had been sold. I was informed by Mr Looney from the bar table (without objection from Mr Brennan, counsel for the Commissioner) that Mr Pleash and his fellow liquidator first became aware of these matters on 1 November 2012, the week before the originating application was filed in these proceedings. The joint liquidators did not waive privilege over the advice (see at [22] above) that they received from their current solicitors. However, annexed to one of Mr Pleash’s affidavits was a letter of advice he received from their previous solicitors in late March 2012. This letter is significant as it does not mention any concern about Suncoast’s continuing role as trustee of the Trust Fund. Accordingly, in his affidavit, Mr Pleash stated that the joint liquidators:… genuinely and honestly, but mistakenly believed that there were no issues regarding the Trust or [their] capacity as either administrators or liquidators of the trustee of the Trust and continued to operate as if [Suncoast] was still trustee of the Trust.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having granted the administrative relief sought (or variations thereof) in the amended originating application (see above at [6(c)]), it is not necessary for me to consider whether it would be appropriate to appoint the joint liquidators as receivers of the Trust Fund: see [6(d)] above.CONCLUSION For these reasons, I made the orders sought by the joint liquidators on 17 December 2012.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

From this analysis, it can be seen that the absence of any new or replacement trustee is critical to the disposition of this matter, as it was in Caterpillar. In that event, the countering rights of the former trustee and any new or replacement trustee do not need to be considered. However, there does remain a significant issue concerning the deficit in the former trustee’s powers where a liquidator is seeking to achieve an orderly winding up of the affairs of the former corporate trustee. Before addressing that issue in this case, it is first necessary to deal with the joint liquidators’ conduct to date in the winding up of Suncoast. This brings me back to their application to be excused under s 1318 of the Act.CONSIDERATION ON SECTION 1318 In this case, there are no civil proceedings on foot against the joint liquidators. As a consequence, s 1318(1) of the Act (set out at [21] above) does not apply to them. However, s 1318(2) of the Act may apply. In order for it to do so, the joint liquidators must establish three matters, that:(a)they have reason to apprehend that a claim will, or might, be made against them;(b)that claim is in respect of any negligence, default, breach of trust or breach of duty in their capacity as joint liquidators; and(c)they acted honestly in relation thereto. There is no evidence in this case that any claim “will” be made against the joint liquidators. Instead, they rely upon an apprehension that such a claim “might” be made against them. In this context, the word “might” must be taken to require that the claim in question is a real, not fanciful or remote possibility: see CGU Insurance Ltd v Porthouse (2008) 235 CLR 103; [2008] HCA 30 at [64] per Gummow, Kirby, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ. As to the nature of the apprehension, I agree with the observations of Campbell J in Re Vouris; Epromotions Australia Pty Ltd and Relectronic-Remech Pty Ltd (in liq) (2003) 47 ACSR 155; [2003] NSWSC 702 at [116] that:The requirement [in s 1318(2)] that that person “has reason to apprehend” that a claim will or might be made against him or her means that there must be an objective basis for believing that the claim will or might be made against that person.(Emphasis added) In this case, the factors pertinent to the existence of that objective basis for belief do not all point in one direction. On the one hand, there appears to be a distinct lack of interest in the future of the Trust Fund evidenced by the absence of any move to appoint a replacement trustee to it. Furthermore, the evidence shows that all of the impugned asset sales were undertaken by the joint liquidators at, or above, their assessed market values. These facts tend to indicate that the prospect of a claim being made against the joint liquidators is unlikely. On the other hand, the absence of interest in the future management of the Trust Fund does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the possibility that a beneficiary of the Fund may decide to pursue a claim against the joint liquidators at some time in the future is fanciful or remote. This conclusion is reinforced by the patent (albeit that adjective is applied after studied and informed hindsight) nature of the joint liquidators’ breach of trust, viz all of the assets sales were undertaken when Suncoast, as a bare trustee of the Trust Fund, had no power of sale. After weighing up these factors, I consider that, in all the circumstances of this case, there is an objective basis for concluding that there is a real, rather than a fanciful or a remote, possibility that a claim might be made against the joint liquidators for their breaches of trust.