NOT SUITABLE FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
GENERAL DIVISION )
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE ) NB 3268 of 1993
OF NEW SOUTH WALES )
RE:WILLIAM LLOYD STEPHENSON
Bankrupt
EX PARTE:WILLIAM LLOYD STEPHENSON
Bankrupt/Applicant
ROBERT McNALLY, RICHARD ARNOLD, RICHARD DEVESON, JOHN FERNANDEZ, RICHARD FITZPATRICK, JOHN GREEN, PAUL MENTZALIS, LEON ROSENGREN and GEOFF TAYLOR t/as HALL CHADWICK
First Respondents
RODERICK MACKAY SUTHERLAND
Second Respondent
CORAM: Burchett J.
PLACE: Sydney
DATE: 4 April 1997
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BURCHETT J.:
As a result of the withdrawal of some aspects of this claim, what is left is that the applicant, Mr Stephenson, seeks a declaration that he has been discharged from his bankruptcy; and if this be really a separate matter, alternatively, a declaration that he be taken to have been discharged upon the principle of estoppel.
The circumstances are, one hopes, unique, and it may perhaps be said that they probably arise at least in part out of the transition from the previous control of bankruptcy administration, to a significant extent by the Registrar of the Court, to the new system under which that control is divorced from the Court. It appears that, after the transition date, an electronic record, which had been maintained by the Registrar to enable convenient searching to be done against, in particular, objections to discharge, was handed over to the new administration; but in those early days there seems to have been some breakdown in the smooth and accurate continuation of the electronic record, or at any rate, if there was no defect in the record itself, there was defective utilisation at that point of the record for searching purposes. However that may be, the fact is that the applicant, who was an undischarged bankrupt nearing the end of the period of three years at the end of which he would, if no objection were lodged, be automatically discharged by virtue of the statute, was misinformed when he made inquiry as to whether or not any objection had been lodged.
The applicant appears to have started his inquiries in December 1996, being uncertain of the precise date at which the three years period would elapse. It was in fact 9 February 1997. On 29 January 1997, the applicant's wife was served with documents emanating from his Trustee, and passed them on to him promptly. Those documents indicated, quite clearly, the intention of the Trustee to lodge an objection, and to seek to have the bankruptcy extended, by virtue of the objection and of the operation of ss. 149, 149A and 149G of the Act, for a further five years. Indeed, it appears that the intention of the Trustee was carried out within a couple of days, and as at 31 January 1997 the objection became effective. Evidence of that fact was given by the affidavit of Mr Caddy, to which was annexed an extract from records, and I am quite satisfied that I should act on this extract, particularly in…
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- Case
- [1997] FCA 225
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved whether the doctrine of estoppel could prevent the trustee from maintaining that Stephenson had not been discharged and whether there were any damages that could be claimed for the misinformation. The court found that the doctrine of estoppel could not affect the operation of the statute, and the applicant's discharge was a matter of statutory operation under the given circumstances. The court also found that the applicant's claims were not utterly baseless, and thus, the traditional and almost invariable consequence of a party failing on certain claims was that the court had a judicial discretion to make an order for costs, which should normally follow the event in the litigation, and should normally be measured in accordance with the measure of party and party costs.
The court dismissed the application with costs and noted that there might be a remedy in damages if any damages were suffered by virtue of the misinformation given to the applicant. However, this was not the case that was brought before the court, and the court expressed no view on it. The court concluded that the application must be dismissed, and ordered that it be dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi