IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
[1993] QCA 195
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 3 of 1993
Brisbane
[Starkey v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation]
BETWEEN:
GRAHAM LINDSAY STARKEY in his capacity as Liquidator of ALLAN FITZGERALD PTY. LTD.
(In Liquidation)
Appellant
- and -
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
The President
Mr Justice PincusMr Justice McPherson
Judgment delivered 31/05/93
SEPARATE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT PREPARED BY THE PRESIDENT AND McPHERSON JA. PINCUS JA. AGREEING WITH BOTH SETS OF REASONS. ALL CONCURRING AS TO THE ORDER.
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS
CATCHWORDS: | INCOME TAX - priority - group tax not remitted by company to respondent - whether respondent has statutory priority to payment from funds recovered by liquidator as voidable preferences Income Tax Assessment Act ss.221P, 221YHJ |
| Counsel: | Mr W. Sofronoff Q.C., with him Mr Lilley for the appellant Mrs A. Moshinsky Q.C., with her Mr Hack for the respondent |
| Solicitors: | Messrs. Sly & Weigal Cannan & Peterson for the appellant Australian Government Solicitor for the respondent |
| Hearing Date(s): | 06/05/93 |
THE COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
Appeal No. 3 of 1993
Brisbane
| Before | The President Mr Justice Pincus Mr Justice McPherson |
[Starkey v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation)]
BETWEEN:
GRAHAM LINDSAY STARKEY in his capacity as Liquidator of ALLAN FITZGERALD PTY. LTD.
(In Liquidation)
Appellant
- and -
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - THE PRESIDENT
Judgment delivered 31/05/93
The appellant, the liquidator of Allan Fitzgerald Pty. Ltd. (in liquidation), has appealed against the dismissal of an application which he made for declarations concerning the meaning and effect of sections 221P and 221YHJ of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 as amended (Commonwealth). The dispute between the parties concerns the claim of the respondent, the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, to payment in priority over other debts (except as provided by subsections 221P(3) and 221YHJ(5)) out of money obtained by the appellant, in his capacity as liquidator of the company, from the avoidance of preference payments pursuant to section 451 of the Companies (Queensland) Code. It was accepted that there is no presently material difference between sections 221P and 221YHJ of the Income Tax Assessment Act, and for convenience the appeal was argued by reference to the former section upon the common assumption that the outcome with respect to that provision would also determine the result of the dispute concerning section 221YHJ.
So far as presently material, section 221P provides: "221P(1) Where an employer makes a deduction for the purposes of this Division, or purporting to be for those purposes, from the salary or wages paid to an employee and refuses or fails to deal with the amount so deducted in the manner required by this Division, or to affix tax stamps of a face value equal to the amount of deduction as required by this Division, as the case may be, he shall be liable, and where his property has become vested in, or where the control of his property has passed to, a trustee, the…
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- Case
- [1993] QCA 195
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the Commissioner, as a creditor with an unsatisfied tax debt, had a statutory priority over funds that were recovered by the liquidator as voidable preferences. The court had to consider sections 221P and 221YHJ of the Income Tax Assessment Act, which provide for the Commissioner's priority in the distribution of a company's assets when it is in liquidation. Specifically, the court needed to ascertain whether these sections granted the Commissioner priority over funds that were previously subject to voidable preference payments.
In its decision, the court examined the statutory provisions and found that the Commissioner's priority under the relevant sections of the Income Tax Assessment Act applied to the distribution of the company's assets, including funds recovered as voidable preferences. The court held that the Commissioner, as a creditor with an unsatisfied tax debt, was entitled to be paid from the recovered funds before the respondent, who had received the voidable preference payments. The court's reasoning was based on the plain language of the statute, which indicated that the Commissioner's priority was not limited to initial distributions but extended to funds recovered as voidable preferences. Consequently, the Commissioner was granted priority over the respondent in the distribution of the recovered funds.
The final orders of the court reflected its determination that the Commissioner had priority over the recovered funds. The respondent was required to pay the Commissioner from the funds that were recovered as voidable preferences, to the extent necessary to satisfy the Commissioner's unsatisfied tax debt. This outcome ensured that the Commissioner's statutory priority was upheld, in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi