Re SMB (pseudonym initials) - [2025] WADC 24

JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

LOCATION:   PERTH
CITATION:   RE SMB (pseudonym initials) [2025] WADC 24
CORAM:   CORMANN DCJ
HEARD:   11 FEBRUARY 2025
DELIVERED          :   17 APRIL 2025
FILE NO/S:   APP 4 of 2024
MATTER: IN THE MATTER of Part 7 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003
AND
IN THE MATTER of an Appeal by

BETWEEN: SMB (pseudonym initials)
Appellant

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :   CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION ASSESSOR OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram:   C F HOLYOAK-ROBERTS
File Number            :   CIC 3346/2023

Catchwords:

Criminal injuries compensation - Appeal of award - Application to amend original claims made - Application to adduce new evidence on appeal

Legislation:

Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA)

Result:

Leave to appeal out of time granted
Assessor's award affirmed
Additional award for future treatment expenses

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant	:	In person
Amicus Curiae	:	Mr C Economidis appeared on behalf of the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Justice

Solicitors:

Appellant	:	Not applicable
Amicus Curiae	:	State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

BAS v The Estate of NAS (dec) [2000] WASCA 270
M v J and J v J (Unreported, WASC, Library No 920598, 19 November 1992)
Martin v Martin [2015] WADC 138
Re CJR [2023] WADC 111
Re Richards [2022] WADC 100
Re Warrek [2019] WADC 50
S v Neumann (1995) 14 WAR 452
Underwood v Underwood [2018] WADC 13

CORMANN DCJ:

Introduction and background

By application lodged on 21 October 2023, the appellant claimed compensation for injury and loss suffered as consequence of offences committed against her at her home on 12 December 2022.
As regards the offences:
(a)a person was subsequently convicted of 'being armed or pretending to be armed in a way that may cause fear', and
(b)a second person was subsequently convicted of 'threaten to damage dwelling at night'.
In her application, the appellant described her consequent injuries as her being:
… fearful in her own house, [she] couldn't sleep, [she] didn't want to leave [her] house for months after the incident.
The appellant sought compensation alleged to arise from injuries which she described as future treatment expenses, namely counselling services and therapy estimated at $2,250.
By letter dated 24 November 2023, the chief assessor informed the appellant of her decision to award compensation in the amount of $7,500.
By email from the appellant to the Office of Criminal Injuries Compensation (CIC) on 18 December 2023, the appellant stated that she 'realised that $7,500 is far too low for what happened', and that she had 'somehow accidentally clicked that [she did not] want to claim for many things when in fact [she does] want to claim for them' including medical treatment expenses, travel expenses and loss of income.
The appellant then appealed the award to this court on the basis that she sought to amend her claim to include those additional components. She also applied for leave to adduce additional evidence as to her alleged injuries and future treatment needs.

Time for appealing

This appeal is brought under s 55(1) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA) (the Act).
Section 55(3) of the Act requires an appeal to be commenced within 21 days after the date of the decision. In this appeal, that period expired on 15 December 2023. The appeal notice was filed on 10 January 2024, being 26 days out of time.
Section 55(4) of the Act provides that 'if it is just to do so' the court may allow an appeal to be commenced after the 21 days. At the hearing, I reserved the question of leave to apply out of time as well as the substantive appeal.

Nature of the appeal

An appeal under s 55 of the Act is to be by way of a hearing de novo and the appellant need not demonstrate error on the part of the assessor.[1]
[1] Underwood v Underwood [2018] WADC 13 [19] (Underwood).
The court is to decide the claim afresh, without being fettered by the assessor's decision.[2]
[2] Section 56(1) of the Act.
Section 56(2)(a) of the Act provides that on appeal this court may exercise any power of an assessor under the Act, other than a power under s 19(1)(b), s 24(1) or s 25.
Section 56(2)(b) of the Act provides that this court may confirm, vary, or reverse the assessor's decision, either in whole or in part.

The evidence on appeal

Section 56(1) of the Act permits me to receive further evidence and information not before the assessor. The discretion to admit further evidence on an appeal ought to be exercised without undue restriction particularly given the beneficial purpose of the Act.[3]
[3] Re CJR [2023] WADC 111 [7].
The materials before the assessor were compromised of:
(a)the materials produced to this court by the assessor (Matter Book) pursuant to r 52 of the District Court Rules 2005 (WA); and
(b)documents produced by WA police (WAPOL) which included documents from two prosecution briefs, and CCTV footage from the night the offences were committed.
The appellant applied to rely on the following additional materials in the appeal:
(a)emails between the appellant and the CIC office after the assessor's decision was made (contained in the Matter Book);
(b)affidavit of the appellant filed 10 January 2024 setting out the basis for her request to amend her application;
(c)further affidavit of the appellant filed 8 November 2024 attaching, among other things, medical evidence and WAPOL communications;
(d)documents filed 30 January 2025 composed primarily of the appellant's mobile telephone call log screenshots from calls made on the night of the offences; and
(e)final affidavit of the appellant filed after the hearing, attaching an invoice for a psychological report obtained by the appellant.
I granted leave at the hearing for the appellant to adduce the additional evidence. I did so because I could not see any reason why it would be unjust to do so, and it seemed to me those materials bear relevance to the appeal and should form part of my assessment. I did so also bearing in mind that the discretion to admit the further evidence on appeal ought be exercised without undue restriction.

The assessor's decision

The assessor did not provide reasons at the time of making the decision. Reasons were requested pursuant to s 27(1) of the Act, and subsequently delivered on 16 July 2024. In the reasons, amongst other things, the assessor noted that:
(a)the appellant had not provided any documents in support of her application; that she had indicated she was 'too embarrassed' to seek treatment and she did not want any more people talking about the incident;[4]
(b)in answer to an enquiry from a CIC case manager for contact details of any person she may have sought treatment from, the appellant answered that she had not received any treatment 'due to discomfort' in speaking about the incident;[5] and
(c)in a statement given to WAPOL and obtained by the assessor, the appellant described the incident as having made her feel scared; that she was afraid for her safety and that she 'felt lucky to be okay' after observing CCTV footage of the incident.[6]
[4] [Redacted] [2024] WACIC 2 (Reasons) [6].
[5] Reasons [7].
[6] Reasons [17].
The assessor determined that, having regard to the evidence that was available, she was satisfied that the appellant had suffered mental and nervous shock, and that the appellant suffered psychological symptomology as a consequence of the offending 'for months after'.[7] The assessor otherwise determined that there was insufficient evidence to establish the claim for future counselling services and therapy, both as to whether the appellant required the treatment, and as to its cost and duration.[8]
[7] Reasons [19].
[8] Reasons [21].

The appellant's case on appeal

The grounds of appeal are that:
(a)the appellant, being self-represented, completed her application form incorrectly, and she now applies to amend her claims and provide more thorough information and evidence, and
(b)the amount awarded was inadequate in light of the trauma she alleges was suffered.

The issues in the appeal

Counsel for the amicus helpfully set out the issues for determination as follows:
(a)first, whether the appellant should be granted leave to appeal out of time;
(b)second, whether the appellant should be granted leave to adduce additional evidence;
(c)third, whether the application can (and should) be amended to seek compensation for additional alleged losses, and
(d)fourth, the appropriate amount, if any, to be awarded.

Issue one: should the appellant have leave to appeal out of time?

In papers filed in the appeal and in oral submissions, the appellant explained the delay was primarily due to her attempts to seek legal advice about the award and the steps available to her, which occasioned delay. Further, she alleges she suffers from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and this affected her ability to file the papers in time.[9]
[9] Appellant's submissions filed 30 January 2025 (AS), pages 2 - 3; ts 115, ts 147 - ts 148.
I consider it is just in the circumstances of the case to grant leave to the appellant pursuant to s 55(4) of the Act to appeal out of time. Those circumstances include that the delay is not lengthy and the appellant is self‑represented. I also note her attempts to obtain legal assistance after the award was made. While not made on oath, her claims appear to be corroborated by contemporaneous email exchanges between her and the CIC office in December 2023.[10] It appears that, before signing documentation to accept the award, the appellant attempted to obtain advice and to consider her position and next steps. I therefore make the grant to extend time in the circumstances described and in consideration of the principles which govern the exercise of the court's discretion set out in Underwood.[11]
[10] Matter Book (MB) 19 - MB 24.
[11] Underwood [25] - [28].

Issue two: should the appellant have leave to adduce additional evidence?

For the reasons already outlined in [18], at the hearing of the appeal, I granted leave to the appellant to adduce the additional evidence.

Issue three: can and should the application for loss and damage be amended?

Section 19(1)(a) of the Act provides that for the purpose of deciding a compensation application, an assessor may (amongst other things) amend the application. That power is available to this court on appeal.[12]
[12] Section 56(2)(a) of the Act.
At the hearing, the appellant contended that she made errors when submitting her online application form caused by her suffering from ADHD. She says her condition affects her ability to accurately carry out or complete tasks of that nature. Under questioning about her diagnosis, she indicated that she thought it had been first made in her early 20s and she was prescribed medication.[13] No independent medical evidence was produced about a diagnosis but the appellant did produce a letter from Ms Fiona Alexander, 'ADHD Coach and Consultant', stating that the appellant attended ADHD coaching sessions designed to 'address various aspects of understanding and managing' ADHD.[14]
[13] ts 115, ts 161 - ts 162.
[14] Affidavit filed 8 November 2024, pages 8 - 9.
In her appeal notice filed on 10 January 2024, the appellant alleges that she 'failed to inform' the assessor as to the stress and loss caused by the incident, and that the amount awarded is not commensurate with the injuries sustained. In written submissions filed on 30 January 2025, the appellant contends that the compensation award is insufficient in light of 'the severity of the respondents' actions', the exacerbation of trauma on her by reason of her ADHD and the barriers to her seeking treatment.[15]
[15] AS par 7.1.
In her affidavit filed on 10 January 2024, the appellant deposes that she incorrectly completed her CIC application and that she seeks additional compensation as follows:
Loss of rental income  $7,000
Medical treatment expenses                $15,000
Travel expenses  $12,000
Loss of employment income               $75,000
At the hearing on 11 February 2025, the appellant abandoned her claims for travel expenses, as well as her claim for loss of employment income.[16] She persisted with her claim for treatment expenses and for loss of rental income.
[16] ts 164 - ts 165.
The claim for loss of rental income arises because it is alleged that the appellant's housemates moved out after suggesting they did not feel safe there because of the offences. However, I do not consider that loss of rental income in that respect is loss 'suffered by the [appellant] as a direct consequence of the injury suffered'.[17] Therefore, such loss is not compensable under the Act. I do not allow the application to amend the claim to include loss of rental income.
[17] As required under the Act.
As regards the claim for treatment expenses, the appellant estimates these at $15,000. Such treatment expenses, if established, are compensable, and I therefore allow the application to amend. As to whether such expenses are established on the evidence, and an award made, is dealt with later in these reasons.

Issue four: Is it appropriate to award compensation and if so, what amount?

At the hearing, the appellant contended that the statements of material facts available in respect of the offences do not accurately explain the incident as experienced by her and that it was essentially 'dismissed' as a 'one-minute situation' where the offenders had just come to her home and knocked on the door 'with [a weapon]'.[18] The appellant's case on appeal was that the incident was more prolonged, traumatic and scary than what the documents reflected.[19]

Evidence and findings as to the incident on 12 December 2022

[18] ts 113.

[19] ts 115.

The appellant gave a contemporaneous, signed statement to WAPOL on 13 December 2022.[20] She stated that:
(a)She had been at her home on the evening of Sunday, 11 December 2022, with a friend who attended for dinner and drinks. In the earlier part of the night, there had been several unscheduled/uninvited attendances at the property, first to the front door and then to the side door, involving at least one of the subsequent offenders. On each occasion, the appellant says she asked them to leave and closed the door.
(b)Her friend ultimately left the property at 1.00 am, and the appellant thereafter locked the doors and went to bed. At approximately 2.00 am, the appellant heard a car outside and observed a vehicle across the street. She observed figures at the front door of her property; she called 000 and while calling, she could hear 'loud banging and bashing' outside. The noise was so loud the telephone operator kept asking the appellant to repeat the address, and the call somehow became disconnected.
(c)The appellant called her friend and, while on that call, the emergency operator telephoned back, which she answered. She spoke to the operator and informed her that it seemed they had left the property, and the operator told her to call back if they returned. She says that during the incident, she stayed in her bedroom as she was scared for her safety. She alleged the loud banging had carried on for approximately 10 minutes.
(d)WAPOL officers attended the property the following morning, and the appellant told them about the incident. She provided WAPOL with a copy of CCTV footage from the property.
[20] MB 41 - MB 48.
The statement of material facts in the case of the first offender records that:
At approximately 2.08am on Sunday the 11th of December 2022, the accused was on the front porch of [address] in company with another male who was in possession of a mattock.
…
The accused and the male have attempted to intimidate [appellant] and threatened to enter the address by punching the front door security screen.
The accused continued to act in a threatening manner by standing on the porch punching into his hand and yelling '[redacted]' at the front of the address. These actions have been captured on the occupant's CCTV … These actions caused the occupant fear and alarm that he would enter the address.
…
The second statement of material facts records that:
At about 2am on Monday the 12th of December 2022, the accused was at [address].
The accused was in company with a co-accused.
The accused had attended the address earlier in the night but had been told to leave the address by the victim.
The accused later returned and walked up to the front door of the house with a wooden Mattock over his right shoulder.
The accused used the mattock to knock on the front door. The accused stood on the porch whilst the co accused punched the front door and jumped around in an aggressive manner.
This caused the victim to fear for her safety and she hid in her bedroom.
…
In her original compensation application, the appellant stated that:[21]
I had 2 unknown men come to my house at 2am threatening me. They were armed and violent.
[21] MB 6.
In an email to the CIC office on 18 December 2023, the appellant stated, among other things that:[22]
I called 000 (twice) whilst the men were banging on the doors and windows threatening me for 20 mins, it was so loud that I had to scream my address 5 times over the phone. The [redacted] Police called me back but then refused to contact or dispatch any [redacted] Police officers as they were 'asleep' I begged them to please call them. They hung up on me and told me to 'calm down'. 2 days after the incident I received a phone call from a police officer asking if I was ok, I told them it was a bit late now to call as i could have been killed? The [redacted] Police also came over later that day 2 days after the incident. told me they were only just informed about what happened and didn't understand why they were not notified.
i cannot find any lawyer to actually help me, I have called EVERYWHERE this makes everything even more stressful
[22] MB 15 - MB 16.
Also adduced on appeal were the audio recordings of the two telephone calls between the appellant and emergency services between 2.00 am and 2.30 am. The audio was played during the appeal hearing. I understand the appellant's contention to be that the audio is relevant because she says it is demonstrative of the trauma suffered during the incident and supports the extent of injury alleged.
The first call lasted 1 minute and 33 seconds, during which the appellant contacted emergency services and reported people trying to 'break into [her] house and roll [her]'. The appellant did communicate a sense of urgency, at one point directing the operator to 'hurry up, quickly, come on'. She confirmed, in answer to questions, that the intruders were not inside; that all doors and windows were locked and that a male was present with her in the home inside. There was also a dog barking which could be heard continuously over the audio. The operator informed the appellant that they would 'be there as quick as they can'.
The second audio is for a further call from the appellant to emergency services, lasting 3 minutes and 47 seconds. According to the appellant's telephone log, this call was at 2.22 am. In this call the appellant states that she:
just tried to call before and the guy wouldn't send the police; I just had two guys with an axe try and bash through my doors; they've already been four times today; they've just gone to my friend's house as well; we need the police to come.
The operator asked whether the appellant 'had just spoken with [redacted] police', and the appellant answered in an agitated manner that 'yes and that [inaudible] keep asking all these stupid questions about how I know them; I don't know these people, they've just come and with an axe …'.

On answering questions from the operator about whether she knew the people who had attended, and why she thought they might be persistently attending, the appellant became more agitated, argumentative and angry. The conversation between the appellant and the operator deteriorated as the operator attempted to get further information from the appellant. It was clear, during that call, that the offenders had left the appellant's property. At one point, after angrily reciting the telephone number of her friend, the appellant stated in an aggressive tone: 'you do realise that we could, like, be actually getting stabbed and murdered right now'. During the call, both the operator and the appellant raised their voices at each other. One or the other then eventually disconnects the call.
Also available are screenshots of the appellant's mobile phone records.[23] In the period between 2.00 am and 2.30 am, the following call times appear:
Emergency number           2.08 am (outgoing)
[Friend of appellant]         2.11 am (outgoing)
Private number                 2.12 am (incoming)
Emergency number           2.22 am (outgoing)
[23] Appellant's affidavit filed 4 January 2025.
A preponderance of the available evidence suggests that the incoming call at 2.12 am was in fact from WAPOL, triggered by reason of the appellant's call to emergency services. The duration of that call was 4 minutes and 6 seconds. I say this because in the further call with emergency services at 2.22 am, the appellant indicates having spoken to police, but expresses dissatisfaction with their conduct and response. It is apparent that, in her mind, they kept 'asking stupid questions'. Being unhappy with the response of WAPOL seems to be a trigger for the appellant to again contact emergency services to request police attendance. Further, in her affidavit filed 10 January 2024, the appellant refers to being contacted by '[redacted] police', who she says refused to dispatch local police officers.
Based on all available evidence, I find that when home overnight, the appellant was the victim of offences committed, being those listed in [2] herein. While she recounts now, being substantially traumatised and that the incident was severe and prolonged, I do not consider the available objective evidence corroborates me making such a finding. The appellant was agitated and demanding during her communications with emergency services. She did not sound genuinely concerned for her safety, rather, she was unhappy with the response of WAPOL and emergency services, and her perceived refusal of them taking her reports seriously. It is not apparent that this was borne out of trauma or genuine fear that has been demonstrated as having any significant or long‑lasting impact in terms of her capabilities.
Notwithstanding, there is no question that the offences have had some impression on the appellant, and unsurprisingly, caused some psychological sequelae. While I do not accept the appellant's case as to the extent alleged, I nonetheless assess her claim on the basis of some recognised compensable injury. It has been established that at some point she held genuine fear for her safety and that the offences have caused her some psychological symptoms.

The relevant law as to the appropriate award of compensation

Section 12 of the Act provides that a person who suffers 'injury as a consequence of the commission of a proved offence' may apply for compensation for the injury and any loss also suffered. Section 3 of the Act defines 'proved offence' to mean 'a crime, misdemeanour, or simple offence of which a person has been convicted'.
Section 12(3) of the Act provides that an assessor must not make a compensation award unless satisfied that the claimed injury and any claimed loss has occurred and did so 'as a consequence of' the commission of the proved offence.
Section 3 of the Act defines 'injury' to mean bodily harm, mental and nervous shock. The phrase 'mental or nervous shock' has been established to:
(a)comprehend any malfunction of the person which can be seen to be a consequence of the impact of events constituting the offence, or associated with the commission of the offence, as those events impact on the mind or nervous system;
(b)include distress, horror, disgust, and other similar adverse mental reactions, but to exclude mere fright, humiliation, or anguish; and
(c)ultimately, be more than a mere emotional reaction, and something of a more enduring character which may, in both the legal sense and in common parlance, be described as an injury.[24]
[24] S v Neumann (1995) 14 WAR 452, 461; M v J and J v J (Unreported, WASC, Library No 920598, 19 November 1992), 10 - 11 (Scott J); Martin v Martin [2015] WADC 138 [85].
The phrase, 'as a consequence of', requires a causal relationship or connection. Whether that causal relationship exists is a question of fact, to be resolved as a matter of commonsense. It is sufficient that, as a matter of ordinary commonsense and experience, the offence should be regarded as having materially contributed to the injury.[25]
[25] Re Richards [2022] WADC 100 [55].
Section 31(1) of the Act provides that the maximum award of compensation available is $75,000.
The court must apply the ordinary tortious principles for assessment of damages when assessing the amount of compensation under the Act, while operating in the jurisdictional limit and within the scope of the definitions of 'injury' and 'loss'.[26]
[26] Re Warrek [2019] WADC 50 [29] (Troy DCJ).
When assessing the amount of compensation, I must have regard only to any injury sustained by reason of the commission of the alleged offence. The amount awarded is only a reflection of the injury sustained and not a reflection of sympathy to the appellant or a representation of the alleged offender's culpability. Other extraneous matters such as the alleged experience of the appellant with WAPOL and/or with emergency services or concerns about their alleged conduct are also irrelevant to my assessment.

Analysis as to appropriate award of compensation

The appellant was a victim of proven offences. She claims that she sustained psychological injury as a consequence of the offences. She has been granted compensation for psychological symptoms in the amount of $7,500 by the CIC assessor.
In her appeal, the appellant says she was reviewed by a clinical psychologist, MPT, in August 2024. MPT appears to have produced a draft report, but the report is neither signed nor dated, and it does not appear on letterhead. According to an email on 16 September 2024 from MPT to the appellant, he forwarded her the report as a draft and requested that she confirm there are no major errors of fact, subsequent to which he will finalise the report.[27]
[27] Appellant's affidavit filed 8 November 2024, Attachment A.
In it, MPT recounts his qualifications, the documents reviewed and the history obtained by the appellant as to the incident. He ultimately opines that the appellant had genuine fear for her life. He considered she meets the relevant diagnostic criteria for post‑traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 80% causally related to the incident.
The appellant also produced a copy of an invoice for 'MPT Psychological Consultancy' dated 31 August 2024, in the amount of $1,276.[28] As submitted on behalf of the amicus, the appellant may have been entitled to claim for expenses incurred in obtaining the report. However, despite expressly requesting the invoice from MPT, nothing was ever paid by the appellant for it. From the communication exchanges produced, this does not appear to have been through her own fault or decision not to pay. The exchanges reflect attempts to have minor factual matters amended and a final report signed/issued for submission. She asked MPT for some assistance with ensuring, in essence, the admissibility of his report before it was finalised and before she paid the invoice. MPT appropriately recommended she obtain some legal advice, and stated, while giving her a recommendation for a lawyer: 'Please get advice as I would not like you to pay money for a useless report'. The appellant subsequently continued to chase MPT to get the report finalised, however, says that in the end 'she just gave up'.[29]
[28] Appellant's affidavit filed 12 February 2025, Attachment A.
[29] ts 151 - ts 152; Appellant's affidavit filed 12 February 2025, Attachment B.
Without evidence from MPT, it is difficult to be clear as to what happened from his perspective in terms of finalising the report. The appellant produced no communication to suggest he requested, or demanded payment prior to issuing the final report, and according to the appellant, despite her attempts, she simply could not get hold of him again and did not hear from him.
Notwithstanding that the report is not signed or dated, I am prepared to give some weight to it in light of the emails between MPT and the appellant. I do so also noting that in this appeal, pursuant to s 18(2) of the Act, the court is not bound by rules or practice as to evidence, and may inform itself in any manner it thinks fit.
In that respect, the following is relevant insofar as the court's receipt of that report is concerned:
(a)on its face, the report appears in all respects complete - it sets out underlying facts on which the opinion is based, answers a series of questions, and expresses an opinion;
(b)the emails between the appellant and MPT also suggest that the report was, in all respects, complete and his enquiry of her before finalising it was simply to confirm that there were no major errors of fact; and
(c)in an email reply to MPT, the appellant clarified small matters of fact (her parents' birth places and her own employment details) and otherwise confirmed at the hearing that they were the only matters which required amendment. Such matters, in my assessment, are not material to the opinion ultimately expressed.
However, while I am prepared to ascribe some weight to MPT's report, it is of course not without its limitations. It is not signed and it was not ultimately 'complete'. To place significant weight on such material, notwithstanding s 18 of the Act, would be an error. This is also because, regardless of its completion or otherwise, it contains a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder made by a clinical psychologist. In that regard, I have given consideration to the findings in BAS v The Estate of NAS (dec)[30] also involving a claim for criminal injuries compensation and the use of an opinion expressed by a psychologist rather than a psychiatrist. In BAS, the Court of Appeal concluded that the report of the psychologist in that case opining as to the claimant's PTSD and clinical depression was 'important evidence probative of the appellant's case and it therefore demanded adjudication of her application'.[31]
[30] BAS v The Estate of NAS (dec) [2000] WASCA 270 (BAS).
[31] BAS [42].
In the present case, I consider there are some critical distinctions as to the probative value of MPT's report compared to that in BAS. That includes that the MPT report was still in draft and ultimately was not signed. In addition, the report and opinion of the psychologist in BAS were noted to have been based not just on information and history given by the appellant, but on the results of clinical testing that he had conducted. Such testing was not a feature in MPT's report. I therefore place less weight on such report.
Finally, I note it is the appellant's evidence that she suffers from ADHD, pre‑dating the offences, and that she thinks she was diagnosed when she was around 24 years old.[32] Such diagnosis is relevant in the context of assessing compensation for a psychological injury, given it would impact on the appellant quite apart from any psychological symptomology caused as a consequence of the offences. In assessing an amount for loss, applying the usual principles, her pre‑existing condition is a causative factor of her psychological symptomology.
[32] ts 155 - ts 156. This is consistent with the information given to MPT, as it is included in his report as part of the history given.
Overall, by reference to the available evidence:
(a)I am satisfied, like the assessor before me, that the appellant has suffered some psychological symptoms as a consequence of the offences; and
(b)I am also satisfied that, based on the MPT report, there is a proper basis for me to award expenses for future medical treatment.
I therefore allow an amount for future expenses, being to cover the therapeutic services set out in MPT's report. Specifically, MPT opines that the appellant would 'do well' with specific PTSD therapy to help alleviate her chronic symptoms of feeling unsafe. He recommends 10 sessions with a suitably qualified private psychologist, with an understanding of ADHD and trauma, and estimates 10 sessions at a total of $2,500.
The payment of this award will be subject to the regime in s 48 of the Act.
I otherwise affirm the assessor's award of $7,500. I do not consider a proper basis has been established for that award to be varied.

Conclusion

For the reasons herein, the assessor's award is confirmed, and an additional award of $2,500 for future treatment is made, to be dealt with pursuant to s 48 of the Act. A total amount of compensation of $10,000 is allowed in this appeal.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.
SI
Associate
17 APRIL 2025