Re Skyring

[1989] HCATrans 153

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~ . ,,,~~

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Registry	No C7 of 1989
In the matter of -

An application for leave to

appeal pursuant to

section 34(2) of the

Judiciary Act 1903 by

ALAN GEORGE SKYRING

BRENNAN J

DAWSON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Skyring(8)

AT BRISBANE ON FRIDAY, 30 JUNE 1989, AT 12.02 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

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MR A.G. SKYRING:  Your Honour, this is a continuation of

matters which I have been pursuing before this Court :or

sone period of time, as you are no doubt well

aware~	I think on this instance we can keep it
fairly quick and lively.	That was my reference
which I had sent down earlier.	I was no quite

sure on procedure. There were four copies to be

handed up on the day so I will give you them

anyway.

The points are, I think, fairly well spelt

out - that is the legal points	are fairly well
spelt out in the actual appeal book.	So what I had
in mind, if I may,	Your Honour, was just to speak

very briefly to put those in their social context
because that is really what the whole action is

basically all about. Basically the process

that I am seeking to put in train, which is really

what this leave to appeal is about, is an

endeavour, albeit using a process which is perhaps

slightly unusual so far as the - - -

DAWSON J:  That is probably the point, is it not, Mr Skyring.

ls it not an inappropriate process to do what you want

to do, irrespective of the merits of that?

MR SKYRING:  Well, that is the point, Your Honour. Now,

I would submit that it is not. It is different.

I will certainly not deny that, but I believe - what

the whole process that I am seeking to have put in
train - you see, this is but the first step - would,

in fact, allow some very fundamental matters to be

addr sed in a way which has become very apparent

tom€ it does not seem to be possible in any other

forum where there is the strict control which the

courts have evolved over the centuries. So what I

am seeking to do is to basically make use of that

particular ability which you have perfected and - - -

DAWSON J:  But certiorari is a process whereby the record of

an inferior tribunal is removed into the Court and

it is corrected, but you cannot do that with Acts

of Parliament, can you?

MR SKYRING:  Yes, Your Honour. This is where I am saying,

the technique that I am seeking to use is in fact a
very old one and this point was actually raised in

some of the very early actions before the State

Supreme Court here, Your Honour, that in earlier

times - this is going back to the 1300s when
these writs were first evolved - that in fact they

could be used to bring all manner of official

documents before the courts. Now, that was in

the days when the King actually sat on the court and

matters requiring executive attention could in fact

be given there and then by the King in person, no

nonsense. Now, over the years there has been a

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separation of this executive function from the

judicial one and my sort of feeling of the

situation here - and this is an engineer's view

of the law, as opposed to a strict lawyer's view of

the law - is that now matters have to be of sufficient

moment to merit, in effect, what amounts to Crown

intervention, because that is really what is being

sought by the process and it is up to the judiciary

as independent arbiters to say "yes", or "no, this

is a matter of sufficient moment which ought to be

brought before the courts".

Now, the practice which you have mentioned has,

in fact, from my reading of the historical background,
basically evolved since about 1700 wherein the

application has been used in what I regard as a
restricted sense which is what you had outlined;

namely, where judgments are sufficiently bad on

their face they deserve to be set aside. It is a

form of appeal but when a decision has been taken,

ostensibly in good faith, but when one stands back

and looks at the whole picture in the direction that

such a decision would tend to take society in is

deemed to be bad, well okay, there has got to be a

~rocess somewhere whereby that can be stopped, and

1n essence

DAWSON J:  Is there any authority which says that this

procedure is available in the case of an Act of

Parliament?

MR SKYRING:  Yes, Your Honour, in the appendix to dismiss

judicial review,which was one of the documents that

I filed in some of the earlier proceedings in this

Court, and I have certainly argued before the

State Supreme Court, the point was actually made.

I do not, unfortunately, have the document with me

here now but, in fact, Acts of Parliament were

specifically one of the documents that could be

brought before the courts, yes, in bygone times,

but in that regard it is perhaps interesting to

mention that in 9 GEORGE IV, Chapter 83, which

basically set up the judicial system in this

country there was a provision in effect in that

for judicial review, before Acts of Parliament were

actually promulgated.	So the principle always has
been there.

Now, in recent time it seems to have dropped

into disuse. From other more recent reading that

I have done, whether in fact this is a fair

assessment of the facts or not, it would appear that
much of the blame, if I could use that term, could

be laid at the feet of Lord Mansfield who apparently

basically took the view of the courts in the 1770s

that, in fact, what Parliament said went and that is

it, the courts did not intervene.

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BRENNAN J:  Mr Skyring, we are not going to embark upon a

general disquisition of constitutional history.

MR SKYRING:	No, I was seeking to -
BRENNAN J:	We have a judgment here from Mr Justice McHugh

against which you are seeking leave to appeal.

MR SKYRING:  Yes, Your Honour, yes, that is basically the

point, right.

BRENNAN J:	Now, you must demonstrate some error apparent in this judgment which justifies the grant of leave
to appeal.  Now, do you wish to set about doing that?
MR SK YRING:	Yes, Your Honour.
BRENNAN J:	Very well, then do so.
MR SKYRING:	Right. In short, my reading of Justice McHugh's

judgment was that he felt he was being asked as a

single Judge, in effect, to give a ruling which

flew in the face of previous Full Court determinations

and that he was not prepared to do. Now, the basic

judgment on which he predicated his case was, in fact,

that given by Justice Deane in 1985 which really was

the first action in what has become a whole series,

wherein Justice Deane spelt out what he saw as the

situation in respect to the matters that I am seeking to

that question now, namely the validity of the two

provisions of the CURRENCY ACT and the Reserve Bank

vis-a-vis the CONSTITUTION. Now, I have, in fact

since - he stated what I believe to be the status

quo. In effect, that was then upheld on appeal

before the Full Court in July 1985, and which I

recollect both of Your Honours sat on.

Now, going on from that I then, in the following

year - at that appeal hearing I never specifically

addressed the particular points which Justice Deane

had cited in his judgment.	What I did was to broaden
the issue and to bring in the whole matter of

taxation because the issue that I am raising is

funding of the Crown's purposes generally and

associated with this the means whereby that should be

accomplished. Now, the following year I did in fact

specifically address the points which Justice Deane

had stated in his February 1985 judgment, pointing out

that there is a constitutional bar and how it, in

fact, works, that when I specifically addressed

those points Justice Deane when I confronted him

did not -	that there was no demur from him on the
argument which I, in fact, put.	The subsequent

effort then basically hinged on the use of certiorari

as the means of add res sing the whole issue, which is

the point which has just been taken up here now.

I subsequently then came back - now, on the basis of

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the judgments that have been given and, in effect,

upheld by the Full Court in July 1985, I then sought

to pay my income tax and I got into an awful lot of

strife, which situation has brought on this present

situation wherein I did, in fact, make a genuine

attempt to pay my tax -

BRENNAN J:  We are not concerned with your tax liabilities,

Mr Skyring.

MR SKYRING:  All right. Carrying on then, I got into a

conflict situation, not because of any action of
mine but because of conflicts in the statutes which

precluded my actually making a payment in a

strictly legal manner in terms of the statues which

are set down for making such payments within the

Supreme Court Rules. Now, that is not a matter

involving me.	That is a total system problem which
does need to be addressed.	I then sought - basically

in essence on advice from the bench here, given
in a very nice way - I then sought an application to

remove the matter again before the High Court, that

the whole issue could be addressed. On that occasion

again the Chief Justice, Justice Gaudron, and I have

forgotten the third Judge who heard the case, basically

concurred in essence that there was "insufficient
substance to the point to merit it being removed

before the Court".

Now, the whole argument there swung on what

was the interpretation to be put on ·~ubstanc~'.

Was it the soundness of argument or the sheer

social moment of the questions to be raised? My

belief, in view of what I have just outlined was,

in fac 4 the social moment of the matters to be raised.

Again, I was refused leave to bring the matter up on

that occasion so the system operated again on the

basis of the previous rulings that they were in fact

proper and correct which is, of course, the matter

that I have been disputing. This then was to thicken

the plot enormously in the intervening 12 months and

has brought others in on the act so that it now involves the banks. I have had a sequestration order	given against me because of a whole complicated
effort which has followed.

BRENNAN J:	Mr Skyring, we seem to be getting a long way away from the question of whether there is any error in
Justice McHugh's judgment.
MR SKYRING:	The error, I would suggest, Your Honour, is in

fact in the interpretation which he has put on the

Full Bench rulings. As I understand the situation, it is a single Judge,in effec 4 deferring to what he

rightly believes, and not unreasonably, was a

negative determination by the Full Bench of this

Court - although all of them have only been by a

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short Bench which is only four Judges, that was

just because of the circumstances - and he was not

prepared as a single Judge to.fly in the face of

that.

Now, my belief is that because of the subtlety

of the argument, in essense, the stance he took was

not unreasonable. I believe the matter has been

raised again - that the matter can be brought back

before the Full Court so that it may give its

determination of what it really meant and this is

the only way it can be done because there is a key

issue which is involved here which goes to the

heart of the way this nation operates. It touches

everybody. I think any reasonable assessment of

the situation at the moment would have to be that
there is something terribly, terribly wrong with

the way we conduct our financial affairs. Those

who have responsibility for them do not seem to be

able to provide the answer. It is a simple one as

I see it: basically, it has got to do with a

wrong form of accounting. Sort that ought and

everything will fall into place. But it is to get

the people who must make those decisions to be

brought to see that what they are doing is wrong

and with some simple adjustments the whole place

can be sorted out and that is, in essence, what the

whole action really, that is the bottom line, is all

about. To deny that, Your Honours, I believe is -

well, it would just be terribly wrong.

To bring the matter home in so far as it affects this Court, you will have notices that there is a

small matter of 40 pages have been left out of the

appeal record and in lieu of that was a letter from
the Registry seeking 14 bucks for a transcript.

Now, the key item here is individual liberties which

I level with Chapter 29 of the great Charter

which was set up as part of the law in this land

when the judicial system was first set up in 1828

and the final punch line which says and which I have

argued consistently since I brought this action

before the Court formally in 1983, but it was in my

original objection in 1980 when it started:

To no man shall we sell, defer or deny

right or justice.

Now, my submission is in this "sell" bit - and this

is the key thing that I have homed in on from day 1 -

ordinary meaning of words, dictionary definition:

sell - Make over or dispose of in exchange

for money.

money - Current -

coin, the first definition, and then there are others.

But it is the current coin bit which is the lead definition

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Now, my submission is that despite all the

talk that has been done, the simply fact on the

ground which my footnote to that letter added,

we do not have in physical form legal tender as

prescribed within the CURRENCY ACT which I can use

to effect that charge and therefore I get my
transcript so that I could include it in the record.

That is a simple effort. There is, of course, the

much bigger effort of the legality, in fact, of that

levelling of charge against me anyway in terms of

that statute provision. Now, okay, that is a

mere pittance, 14 bucks - tends to be regarded as

nothing, so to speak, but in fact that principle

though is looming large in a number of places around

this island. If I could just build up progressively,

in other cases, where that is the key issue.

On this appeal - - -

BRENNAN J: Well, it does not seem to me to have very much to

do with the points in Mr Justice McHugh's judgment.

MR SKYRING:  Well, if I could home in on the record. The key

point to which I took issue on is on page 50 of his

judgment which is on page 62 of the appeal record.
Having sort of outlined the case, what he said was:

In the circumstances, it is plain that the matters which are sought to be

litigated by the issue of process in this

case have been already litigated and

ruled on by the Full Court and by

Justice Deane in 1985. Mr Skyring sought

by implication by subsequent decisions of the Court, apparently in

to distinguish the judgment of the overruled

further applications brought by him.

However, I was not referred to any remarks

of this Court specifically reversing that

decision.

Now, that is the difficulty because it has all got to

do with how you interpret the judgments which have,

in fact, been given. Now, what I am saying is

that we have an absurd situation on the ground
which is what we - well, I and, indeed, my associate,

Mr Cusack - are seeking to address by formal processes of the law in the forum where we see the ultimate -

well, wisdom, if you like - have before you

when you are adjudicating on these matters the

collective record over centuries to be brought to

bear on cases such as this.

Now, on the matter of absurd situations because

that is really what we are dealing with here: the

absurdity of the situation as it seems to me is that

we have a whole - three major sectors of society:

the partisan/political, legal and financial communities

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who do not seem to be able to come to 3rips with the

fact, and it is a cold, hard fact on the ground - - -

BRENNAN J:	Mr Skyring, I have asked you.to confine yourself
to the points of error in Justice McHugh's judgment.
Now, either you will do so or you will cease your
argument.
MR SKYRING:	Okay. Well, my point is - you posed the question, points of error. It is a subtle point whether, in
fact, that is the issue; whether it is an error
because in one sense I can see that what Justice t~cHugh
has in fact said is not unreasonable - the lawyer's
term - but in another, it is quite unreasonable inasmuch as he is relying on a firm decision in 1985,which I would submit again to you, has in fact been overruled
by implication.  Now, while - it was easy to state the
negative case very clearly. It is not nearly so easy to be able to state the positive case which is the one that I am seeking to argue, in that sort of way.
That is why I have got on to these other matters,
because what we are dealing with is a matter of fact which it seems the legal fraternity collectively seems
unable to come to grips with.  So, if there is an
error, that is the error. It is not of Justice McHugh,
as such, it is the entire legal fraternity and
dependent on them  both the partisan/political
and the financial conununities. If there is an error,
that is the error. It is the perception of what the
situation is on the ground.

The legal view seems to be that what is on the

ground is proper and correct.	I would submit that
is not, in fact, so.	The error is in the

assessment of the situation.

BRENNAN J:  Mr Skyring, whatever might be the situation, as

you described it, "on the ground", the question is

whether or not you should be permitted to conunence

proceedings in this Court by the issue of the

process which was the subject of Justice Wilson's

order.

MR SKYRING: Well, I believe that should - I personally -

BRENNAN J: Yes. Well, whatever your personal belief is, of

course, that is a matter upon which - - -

MR SKYRING:  Yes, well, put the argument to be put, right.

BRENNAN J:  - - - you are entitled to respect. The question is,

however, whether the proceedings which you seek to

commence are appropriate to agitate any question

or decision by this Court.

MR SKYRING: Well, yes, Your Honour. If I may speak to that, I

believe they are and, furthenrore, such proceedings as

might be started in this Court would not be taken in

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isolation. Now, in this regard, might I draw attention

to the senate committee which has currently been set

up and is operating on the subject of the .cost of

justice?

BRENNAN J:  No, you may not, Mr Skyring, because it will have

nothing to do with this matter.

(Continued on page 10)

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MR SKYRING:	Okay.	In respect of the process to be issued,

the point is, what in fact I am seeking to have

done is a very simple matter - I can appreciate

your not wanting to launch the Court into a matter

that will go on for years and costs millions,

I take that point. I believe as a result of

the activities that have happened over a period

of years, the issues have now been brought down

to about half a dozen points which have been

summarized in the documentation and elaborated - if

you sort of work backwards through the documentation

as it has been filed - which require answers in

effect by the ministers of the Crown who are

ultimately responsible for the present law.

Okay, maybe they might have inherited it; they

have done what they can. But the fact of

the matter is they are, for the time being, the these matters. There is an awful conflict there

which I believe they ought to be called upon

to give account of why that conflict is allowed

to stand.

In order that the Court might know where

it is going, so to speak, our submissions have

outlined - mine, supplemented by Mr Cusack's -

what we see is the proper order of affairs,

having regard for some very fundamental statutes

which not only impinge on the liberties of the

citizen versus the State, but also of the

States versus the Federation. What we are talking
here is, basically, validity of statutes and it

is within the Court's powers to adjudicate on

such matters. There can be no doubt about that.

What we are saying is that there are conflicts in there vis-a-vis our own CONSTITUTION which I

believe have	come in there as a result of
treaty obligations.	How this RESERVE BANK ACT

is a case in point is one in particular; exactly

how that came about, I have since become aware

through extra reading on the history of the

Conn:nonwealth Bank and apparently it was made
as a decision by the - it was a ratification on
20 March 1947 of a proposal which had in fact

come from the IM:F.

If I may -two spots of advice I have picked

up over the years: <;ne from my dad, "Any law is

better than no law.'; and from the professor of

engineering, "Always make a decision. If you

have made a bad one, you can always go back and

change it. " My view of the 'Whole historical situation -

this is both legal, financial, chased back over

centuries, all is based on the documentation which

I have since filed in this Court - is that I believe

in 1947 the powers that be then made what they

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believe was a good decision, having regard to the

total world situation. In the 50 years since
what has evolved, I think, has become very clear

was that in fact they were conned and the place is in a hell of a mess because of that decision.

There is a very great need - - -

BRENNAN J: Now, Mr Skyring, - - -

MR SKYRING:	- - - to go back - - -
BRENNAN J:	- - - you are going on to the situation as

you see it on the ground again.

MR SKYRING:  Yes, but my point is - - - -

BRENNAN J:	Now, I think we have allowed you to speak tor . some considerable time now and thus far I think it is	.
right to say we have heard very little that
has anything to do with the application for

leave to appeal. Now, we do not wish to shut

you out from presenting your argument, but there

must be some limitation on it. Now, are you

able to present your argument in another five

minutes?

MR SKYRING: All I would say in summary, Your Honour, is

that you ask is there an error:  I am submitting

that the error is in respect of total system

operation, perception of same by the judiciary

which is at odds in so far as words describe

situations.	The error is in that perception,
vis-a-vis what is on the ground.	What the

whole process sought to be instituted is in fact

to call the relevant parties together, that this

can be pointed up, acknowledged and readjust

the whole nation, because that is really what
is involved here, on what seems to me in the
spirit of the law, in the broad sense of the law,

as evolved over centuries in a thoroughly constructive

way, which it is, to reset the national course.

There is a proper way to do this. I believe it	can only be done - well, it really needs to take
place concurrently in three fora: one is in the courts; secondly in the legislature - I believe
that is already underway with this cost of justice
senate inquiry; but also in society at large to
basically talk about this in the round. In society
at large the discussion is going on, as I understand
it, the effect of which is to point up, "Well, look,
there is something terribly wrong here", hlt they themselves do not seem to be able to come up with
the answer. The legislators to whom society at
large basically delegate-s authority in these matters,
because they seem to be blinded by their partisan
ideology cannot come up with the answer. The courts
then, who basically, as I see it, run the forum ·wherein the law meets the people in real life situations

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on the ground, have a role because the situation in

which I personally am cast is not one of my own

making.	I sought to discharge my obligations under
the law in the strict	sense, as I understood it,

and I was utterly frustrated. That is not my

problem. That is a system problem which

the system must respond to and that is the process

that I am seeking to put in train with the action

that I am seeking to launch.

Mr Cusack and I have jointly, because it

is a joint effort that has evolved over a period

of years - have put a proposition that - or certainly

for my part seems to me anyway, to answer or to

have right cardinal principles that have long been

upheld by the courts as the proper way to run

society.	What needs to be done is for that in
effect to be tested in court.	I take the stand

that Martin Luther did in that celebrated ..... in

1521:  I am prepared to admit I am wrong. But

will somebody please tell me where I am wrong?

At the moment everybody is ducking the issue and

that is that which is wrong, that the process ,;,.Till not

be allowed to proceed and that I say is the denial

of justice and that is what I am upset about.

"To no man shall we sell, defer or deny".

I have got the sequestration order seeking

to wrest my property from me. When I sought to

pay the bloody tax I was not prepared to use

what I saw as wrongful means and then I had

the rug pulled out from under me and the whole

place has gone terribly wrong.	And that is not
my problem.	I have tried to do it properly.

Now, if the courts do not intervene then they

will stand as frauds, deserving of the utmost

contempt and to be defamed utterly. I am not

mincing my words on that, Your Honour. If this

is not allowed, that is the course of action

which must be put in train. It is one I

hesitate to do but if it must be done it will

be done because that is where the error lies.

You have within your power to move on this case;

if you do not, then collectively I believe that

is a derogation of duty for which you deserve

to be removed from the Bench.

No doubt word would have got down south

that rather further down G•orge Street they do

tend to be a bit rough on judges up here these

days. You have ventured up here into this territory.

A key item comes up there on this matter of costs

which is central to that issue: whether in fact

that judge was properly removed from the Bench.

These are the sort of issues which are involved,

Your Honour, and they cannot be treated lightly.

The proper course for this which is one thing

Justice Connolly mentioned earlier on in one of

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the earlier actions, it was proper that the matter

be dealt with in the court and not on the street,

which is what I am trying to do and I am be-ing

frustrated at every turn to which I obJect

profusely and I believe rightly so too. I have tried

to do what I believe - the right thing. It is -

again, as an engineer - and this is Derhaps

partly my problem. As an engineer I have ventured

into the legal arena where there are clearly cultural

differences which show up. Now, engineers'

scientific-type thinking is basically oriented

towards society as opposed to the other older

professions. Perhaps this shows up no more clearly

than in the way in which one pays one's bills.

Lawyers, doctors, very simple - the uerson you

deal with, you send your bill to h:im but when a group

get together to build a road or a bridge, who do

they send their bill to? Now, this is community

things. So, our thinking is totally different and

the whole proposal which has evolved has derived

from that and not to allow the whole process to

follow its natural course is, I believe, an outright

denial of justice; not only to me as an individual

but to the other 15 or 16 million who are in the

same position as I am.

I believe it would be utterly wrong for this

action not to be allowed to get up, and on that

point, Your Honours, I will let my case rest.

BRENNAN J:  Thank you, Mr Skyring.

Having heard all that Mr Skyring wishes to say

with regard to the judgment of Mr Justice McHugh,

it appears to us that the judgment of Mr Justice McHugh

was correct and, accordingly, a grant of leave is

refused.

MR SKYRING:	Thank you, Your Honour.
AT 12.32 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE

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